Shekalim 6b (ו:) — the Talmud in English

Halakha 4 — Mishna:

a.

One who gathered and collected coins and said, “These are for the contribution of the half-shekel,” and discovered that they exceeded the amount of a half-shekel—

the surplus of the shekels is non-sacred property.

Since he intended to consecrate only what was necessary for the contribution of the half-shekel [and the Mishna follows the opinion of Beit Hillel, above, Halakha 3].

b.

The surplus

of money from the funds he set aside to purchase

a tenth of an ephah

for a meal-offering—that is, money remaining in his possession after he purchased a meal-offering [and the Gemara will explain which meal-offering is meant].

And likewise,

the surplus

of money from the funds he set aside to purchase

the nests of zavim

or

the nests of zavot and women who have given birth.

For a poor zav, a zava, or a woman who has given birth is required to bring two turtledoves or two young doves, one as a sin-offering and one as a burnt-offering; these are called a nest. If one purchased a nest with the money and money remained from these funds,

and likewise, the surplus of the funds that a sinner set aside to purchase

sin-offerings and guilt-offerings.

The law of the surplus of all these is

their surplus—

that it goes to

freewill offerings.

That is, one purchases with it burnt-offerings, which are sacrificed when the altar is idle, with no other offerings being sacrificed.

This is the general principle: Everything

that

comes for a sin-offering or for a guilt-offering—

its surplus goes to freewill offerings.

This is derived from a verse below, at the end of Chapter 6, which teaches that the surplus of a sin-offering is converted to a freewill offering.

c.

The surplus

of money that one set aside to purchase

a burnt-offering

has the law that it goes

to a burnt-offering,

with which he himself brings another burnt-offering.

d.

The surplus

of money that one set aside to purchase a

meal-offering

has the law that it goes

to a meal-offering,

with which he brings another meal-offering.

e.

The surplus

of money that one set aside to purchase

peace-offerings

has the law that it goes

to peace-offerings,

with which he brings another animal as a peace-offering.

f.

The surplus

of money that one set aside to purchase the

Paschal offering

goes

to peace-offerings,

with which he brings a peace-offering.

g.

The surplus

of money that a person set aside for the offerings of poor

Nazirite

men, who do not have sufficient money to bring their own offering, and money remained from those funds in his possession—he gives the surplus

to

the offerings of other

Nazirites,

others.

h.

The surplus

of money that the

Nazirite

himself set aside for his offerings goes

to the

burnt-offering of

freewill offerings,

which is sacrificed when the altar is idle, with no other offerings being sacrificed.

Gemara:

Rabbi Yosei said: While I was there,

when I was there, in Babylonia, before I ascended to Eretz Yisrael,

I heard

the

voice [

sound ] of

Rabbi Yehuda,

when he

asked

this question before

Shmuel:

One who

set aside his shekel

for the contribution of the shekels to the Temple

and died—

what should be done with his shekel?

Shmuel said to him:

Shmuel:

It shall go to a freewill offering.

We see that Shmuel also held that the surplus of the shekels, since it is sacred for the most sacred offerings, should go to a freewill offering.

And

Rabbi Elazar

also held this view.

As it was stated:

A High Priest who set aside money with which to purchase flour for the daily meal-offering of the High Priest [which he brought in the morning and evening; it consisted of a tenth of an ephah of flour, divided in two, and he sacrificed half an ephah in the morning and half in the evening].

If he set aside money, and after purchasing the flour money remained in his possession, the amoraim disputed what should be done with

the surplus of his tenth of an ephah: Rabbi Yohanan said: He shall cast it into the Dead Sea,

and it is forbidden to benefit from it, but if one benefited from it, he does not bring a me'ila-offering.

Rabbi Elazar says: It shall go to a freewill offering.

Thus, he too holds that what remains from money set aside for the most sacred offerings goes to a freewill offering.

And we challenge this: Shall we say that

our Mishna—

our Mishna—

disagrees with Rabbi Yohanan?

For it is stated in the Mishna:

The surplus of the shekels—

non-sacred property.

The surplus of the tenth of an ephah,

and likewise

the surplus of the nests of zavim and zavot,

and likewise

the surplus of the nests of women who have given birth, and of sin-offerings and guilt-offerings—

their surplus goes to freewill offerings.

The Gemara understood that “the surplus of the tenth of an ephah” refers to the surplus of the meal-offering that the High Priest brings every day.

If so, the Mishna explicitly states that its law is that it goes to a freewill offering and not to the Dead Sea, contrary to what Rabbi Yohanan said?

What did Rabbi Yohanan do with it,

what could he answer to this challenge? [The Gra does not have these words].

And we answer:

He interpreted it [

he would answer and explain ], that the Mishna is referring to the law of

the surplus of the tenth of an ephah of the sin-offering meal-offering of an Israelite.

That is, one who sinned through a false oath, or entered the Temple while impure, and is required to bring a female sheep as a sin-offering. If he cannot afford it, he brings two turtledoves or two young doves. “

And if he cannot afford two turtledoves or two young doves, he shall bring his offering for the sin that he committed: a tenth of an ephah of fine flour as a sin-offering.”

And if money remained from the funds he set aside to purchase the tenth of an ephah, burnt-offerings for freewill offerings are brought from the surplus. But the surplus of the High Priest’s tenth of an ephah always goes to the Dead Sea, in accordance with Rabbi Yohanan.

One who consecrates a lamb as a Paschal offering when it is not the time of Passover, but during the rest of the year, sacrifices it as a peace-offering. This is derived from a verse.

And the Gemara explains the source for this:

Rabbi Yosei said: Concerning this,

concerning this matter,

Abba bar Ba

disputed

them,

for he was Shmuel’s father,

that they

the Babylonians

say [

they said ] :

From where is it derived that the Paschal offering,

which is sacrificed when not in its proper time,

is converted to the designation of a peace-offering?

The verse states: “And if his offering is from the flock—

for a peace-offering

to the Lord.”

And we interpret it:

Every

thing

that

comes

from the flock,

such as the Paschal offering, is

brought

and sacrificed as

a peace-offering.

Yet if one sacrifices a Paschal offering [which comes from the flock] on the eve of Passover as a peace-offering, it is disqualified.

It follows that the verse comes to teach us that a Paschal offering brought to be sacrificed during the rest of the year must be sacrificed as a peace-offering, for this is what makes it fit to be sacrificed when not in its proper time.

Concerning this,

they challenged [

he challenged them ] Rabbi Yosei: From where do you know that the verse is speaking of a lamb set aside as a Paschal offering? Perhaps the verse is speaking of the “surplus of a burnt-offering.”

For

indeed

also

a burnt-offering

comes

from the flock.

Perhaps the verse teaches us that if one set aside a lamb for his burnt-offering, it was lost, and he set aside another lamb in its place, and the first lamb was then found, one of them is sacrificed as a burnt-offering, while the other becomes “the surplus of a burnt-offering” and is sacrificed as a peace-offering?

And we answer: The verse says, “And if his offering is from the flock.” This indicates that it is speaking of

something that comes only from the flock,

namely, the Paschal offering, which comes only from sheep and goats.

A burnt-offering is excluded, since it can also come from cattle.

They challenged

[

indeed

also

a guilt-offering

does not come from cattle, but only from the flock.

Rabbi Bun bar Kahana said:

The verse says

“from the flock,”

and this indicates

something that comes from the entire flock,

such as the Paschal offering, which comes both from sheep and from goats.

A guilt-offering is excluded, since it comes only from sheep

[the Gra’s version ]

alone,

and does not come from goats.

And we challenge this: How can you derive from the word “from” that the verse is referring to the entire flock? This is the opposite of the manner in which this word is ordinarily interpreted.

For

everywhere you say

[

“from”

means that the verse intends

to exclude [for example, “from cattle,” and not all cattle—to exclude an animal that has mated unnaturally or been the object of such mating]. Yet here

[for example, “from cattle,” meaning not all cattle—to exclude an animal that has engaged in bestiality or an animal that has been the object of bestiality]. But here

you

say

that

the verse’s intention in stating

“from

the flock” is

to include

something that comes from the entire flock, and not from only part of the flock!?

Rabbi Mana said: Here too,

we derive from the verse

“from

the flock”

an exclusion.

And the

exclusion

is

that

the Paschal offering

does not come

from a lamb two years old.

And there is another

exclusion, that

the Paschal offering

does not come from a female.

And this is how we interpret this verse: “From” is an exclusion, indicating that one may not bring a female or an animal two years old. And “flock” refers to something encompassing the entire flock, both sheep and goats. Thus, the verse teaches us that it is not speaking of a guilt-offering.

They challenged

[

The verse states: “And if his offering is from the flock, from the sheep or from the goats, for a burnt-offering.”

Say

from now on: The surplus of the Paschal offering is brought

and sacrificed as an offering

a burnt-offering.

And let us interpret it as follows: Everything that comes from sheep or goats is converted and brought as a burnt-offering!

Rabbi Avun said:

Since one verse teaches that the Paschal offering is converted to a peace-offering, while another verse teaches that it is converted to a burnt-offering, it is logical that we derive that it is converted to a peace-offering, since

we convert something that

is intended

for eating,

namely, the Paschal offering,

into something that

is intended

for eating,

namely, a peace-offering.

But we do not convert something that

is intended

for eating into something that is not

intended

for eating,

but only for burning, namely, a burnt-offering.

And further,

Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Bun said:

The Paschal offering and peace-offerings are offerings of lesser sanctity, whereas a burnt-offering is an offering of the most sacred sanctity.

And it is logical that

we convert offerings of lesser sanctity to the designation of offerings of lesser sanctity, but we do not convert offerings of lesser sanctity to the designation of offerings of the most sacred sanctity.

Rabbi Yohanan said: Concerning this

[concerning this matter] that the Babylonians said,

Rabbi Hanina

disputed them.

For

they say

[

there is no

lamb consecrated as a

Paschal offering

when not in its proper time that

is converted

and sacrificed

as a peace-offering unless it was slaughtered as a peace-offering.

But if it was slaughtered as a burnt-offering, it is disqualified.

But

I

say: Even if it was slaughtered

it

as a burnt-offering, it is sacrificed as a peace-offering.

it is nevertheless sacrificed as a peace-offering.

Rabbi Ila said:

This is

the reason of Rabbi Yohanan: Even if one slaughtered the Paschal offering as a burnt-offering, it is sacrificed as a peace-offering, because he interprets the verse as follows:

view that even if one slaughtered the Paschal offering with the designation of a burnt-offering, it is sacrificed as a peace-offering, because he expounds the verse as follows:

It is written:

“If his offering is from the flock—

for a peace-offering.”

From here we derive that something that comes from the flock, namely, the Paschal offering, is converted so that it is sacrificed as a peace-offering.

The verse could have stated only “for peace-offerings.” Since it states “for a sacrifice of peace-offerings,” we derive:

Every

Paschal offering

that

is sacrificed when not in its proper time with any designation of

sacrifice

whatsoever is nevertheless sacrificed and

brought as a peace-offering.

The following discussion is explained according to the interpretation of the Kehillot Yaakov on tractate Zevahim, siman 24.

a.

We learned in tractate Zevahim, chapter 1, Mishna 1: All offerings that were slaughtered not for their sake, meaning that they were slaughtered with the designation of another offering, are fit. Except for the Paschal offering and the sin-offering, which, if slaughtered not for their sake, are disqualified.

b.

The Paschal offering, which we said is disqualified if it is slaughtered not for its sake, refers specifically to one slaughtered at its proper time, on the eve of Passover. But if it is slaughtered when not in its proper time with the designation of another offering, it is fit and is sacrificed as a peace-offering, as we derived above from the verse.

c.

One who slaughters an offering with the intention of eating from its flesh after the time appropriate for eating it, or with the intention of sprinkling its blood on the altar after its time, renders it pigul, and the offering is disqualified; one who eats from its flesh is liable to karet.

d.

When does this apply? When the offering was sacrificed in accordance with its mitzva and had no other disqualification. But if it had another disqualification—for example, if one slaughtered a Paschal offering or sin-offering not for its sake—the offering is not rendered pigul by the pigul intention he had to eat it beyond its prescribed time. Rather, it is merely a disqualified offering; the designation of pigul does not apply to it, and one who eats it is not liable to karet.

The Gemara raises a doubt: One who sacrifices the Paschal offering when not in its proper time with the designation of a burnt-offering, and entertained a pigul intention—for example, he intended to sprinkle its blood tomorrow—does the offering

change

to

a disqualifying intention, or not?

For a Paschal offering sacrificed when not in its proper time is not disqualified by an intention that it be sacrificed not for its sake, and its law is not like that of a Paschal offering sacrificed at its proper time, which is disqualified by an intention that it be sacrificed not for its sake.

The reason is that, when one intends to sacrifice the Paschal offering not for its sake when it is not in its proper time, he thereby removes its status as a Paschal offering, and consequently its law is like that of any offering, which is not disqualified by an intention that it be sacrificed not for its sake.

The Gemara now raises the question: If one slaughtered the Paschal offering when not in its proper time with the designation of a burnt-offering, and also entertained a pigul intention—to sprinkle its blood tomorrow—

does this too constitute a removal of its status, so that its law is like that of any other offering, which is not disqualified by an intention that it be sacrificed not for its sake?

Or, if at the time of slaughter he entertained a disqualifying pigul intention, does this not constitute a removal of its status, and is its law like that of a Paschal offering sacrificed not for its sake, which is disqualified?

And we challenge this:

What is the case

in which he entertained a disqualifying intention?

If he

slaughtered it

not for the sake of a Paschal offering, but

as a burnt-offering,

with a pigul intention

to sprinkle its blood tomorrow,

then what difference does it make whether this intention constitutes a removal of its status as a Paschal offering or not?

In any event, it is disqualified,

since he entertained a pigul intention!

And we answer: Indeed, whether the “disqualifying intention” constitutes a removal of its status or does not constitute such a removal, the offering is disqualified.

Nevertheless, there is a practical difference:

Whether the offering becomes pigul, so that one is liable to karet for eating it, or whether it is merely disqualified and does not become pigul, so that one is not liable to karet for eating it.

For

if you say

that the designation of the offering

changes

through the intention he had to sacrifice it as a burnt-offering, despite also entertaining

a disqualifying intention,

a pigul intention, then this constitutes a removal of its status, and its law is not that of a Paschal offering; the intention he had to sacrifice it not for its sake did not disqualify it.

If so, its law is that of a fit offering concerning which one intended to sprinkle its blood beyond its proper time, and it becomes

pigul,

and one who eats from its flesh is liable to karet.

But

if you say

that

the

designation of the offering does not

change

through the intention he had to sacrifice it not for its sake, since he also entertained

a disqualifying intention

to sprinkle its blood beyond its proper time, then its law remains that of a Paschal offering, for which an intention that it be sacrificed not for its sake is disqualifying. Once again, its law is that of an offering sacrificed not in accordance with its mitzva, which cannot be rendered pigul by a pigul intention; it is merely a

disqualified

offering, but it does not become pigul, and one who eats from its flesh is not liable to karet.

If one consecrated a Paschal offering before its proper time and slaughtered it before its proper time, if he slaughtered it as a Paschal offering, it is disqualified, since a Paschal offering sacrificed when not in its proper time is disqualified.

But if he slaughtered it as a peace-offering, that is, not for its sake, it is fit, since its status as a Paschal offering was removed and the designation of a peace-offering took effect upon it, as we said above.

And we raise a doubt: One who slaughters the Paschal offering [when not in its proper time]

for its sake

[which is a disqualifying intention ]

and not for its sake

[which is a valid intention ]

during the rest of the year,

that is, when not in its proper time—what is the law?

Does the intention “not for its sake,” which renders it fit, come and override the disqualifying intention “for its sake,” thereby rendering the offering fit, or not?

Rabbi Bun bar Hiyya said in the name of Shmuel bar Abba:

Just as one who slaughters the Paschal offering in silence, and afterward, during the continuation of the slaughter, says that he is slaughtering it not for its sake, renders it fit,

although, when one slaughters the Paschal offering in silence, we say that its unspecified designation is for its sake, as though he explicitly slaughtered it as a Paschal offering, nevertheless, if he subsequently intended that it be slaughtered not for its sake, it is fit. Apparently, the intention that it be sacrificed not for its sake comes and overrides the unspecified intention, which is considered as though it were for its sake.

If so, here too,

since he said

at first that he was slaughtering it for its sake,

and

then

said

that he was slaughtering it

not for its sake—

he is considered like one who slaughtered in silence, and

afterward explicitly stated that it was

not for its sake.

And it is fit,

because the intention that it be sacrificed not for its sake removes the effect of the initial intention that it be sacrificed for its sake.

He said to him: If that is so,

that there is no distinction between one who slaughters in silence—for we say that his unspecified intention is for the sake of the Paschal offering—and one who slaughters while explicitly saying that it is for the sake of the Paschal offering, and even in the latter case we say that the intention he had at the end of the slaughter that it be sacrificed not for its sake overrides the initial intention that it be sacrificed for its sake and renders it fit—

then

even

in a case where he

slaughtered it

as a Paschal offering, and throughout the slaughter intended that he was slaughtering it

for its sake in order to sprinkle its blood not for its sake, we should likewise say that the intention that it be sacrificed not for its sake, which he entertains later at the time of the sprinkling, comes and renders it fit. And

we should likewise say that the intention “not with its designation,” formed later at the time of sprinkling, makes it valid. And it

it should be

as though

from the outset, when he slaughtered it, he had done so for its sake and not for its sake, and it is fit.

Rabbi Abba Mari said:

There is no proof that one who slaughters it for its sake and sprinkles its blood not for its sake renders it fit, from the case of one who slaughters in silence and sprinkles its blood not for its sake [the Gra’s version].

For

from where do you know

that one who slaughters

silently

from beginning to end is

fit?

Perhaps

since he slaughtered the entire slaughtering

silently,

we say that he slaughtered it implicitly for its designated purpose, and this is

invalid.

This is not analogous to one who slaughtered silently and afterward said that he had not done so for its designated purpose, since there he intended, during that same service, that it was not for its designated purpose.

But here, during the slaughtering itself, he did not intend that it was not for its designated purpose; rather, he slaughtered silently, and the offering had already become invalid. Therefore, what he intended during the service of the sprinkling—that it was not for its designated purpose—cannot render it fit.

The law of a nazir: after the days of his naziriteship have been completed, he brings three offerings: a sin offering, a burnt offering, and a peace offering.

If he has already offered the burnt offering and the peace offering, but has not yet designated an animal for his sin offering, the money remaining is found to be designated for the sin offering. And if he brought a sin-offering animal with part of the money, the remainder is considered the surplus of a sin offering.

However, if he offered the sin offering first and still remains obligated to bring the other offerings, the money remaining at the end is not the surplus of a sin offering, but the surplus of a burnt offering or of a peace offering.

We learned in the Mishna:

The surplus

from the money that

the nazir

set aside for his offerings shall be used to bring from it an offering,

a freewill offering: