Shekalim 21a (כא.) — the Talmud in English

Rabbi Hiyya

bar Abba said: Is that not appropriate fine ]

for him to raise such an objection?!

For it is a powerful objection.

Rabbi Yaakov bar Aḥa came and said in the name of Rabbi Abbahu in the name of Rabbi Yohanan:

In fact,

by Torah law it is to be brought from the communal funds,

as Rabbi Shimon expounded in a beraita from the verse: “an eternal statute”—it shall be from the resources of the world, i.e., the community.

And

once they saw [that they had seen] during the Second Temple period that there had been more than three hundred High Priests, each of whom did not complete his year, and they delayed appointing another in his place, and they realized

that it was becoming burdensome

that the

chamber

was being strained by this expense every year over an extended period.

I would say [they should enact and state]:

Let it be collected from the heirs,

and they will transfer it to the community.

And

once they saw that

they were

negligent regarding it,

the heirs, and did not bring it, they returned and

enacted that it should be brought from the collection of the Chamber,

as required by Torah law.

It emerges that by Torah law it is brought from the communal funds, and this does not contradict what we learned in the Mishna, that it is brought from the communal funds by virtue of a condition of the court. For this condition was necessary because they had previously enacted that it should be brought from the heirs.

We learned in the Mishna: And the minḥat ḥavitin was offered in its entirety when the High Priest died and they did not appoint another in his place. Since, according to Rabbi Shimon, it came from the communal funds, or according to Rabbi Yehuda, from the heirs, the law of “half of it,” stated in the Torah, does not apply to it; rather, a full tenth of an ephah was offered [in the morning, or also in the evening, as will be explained below].

Rabbi Yose said: Rabbi Yohanan raised the following question

concerning this law:

Does it come

as a full measure in the morning and a full measure between the evenings,

two tenths of an ephah each day?

Or

perhaps it comes only

as a full measure in the morning,

and no more. Since the law of half does not apply to it, they were commanded only to offer a tenth of an ephah each day.

And

the offering of the minḥat ḥavitin

between the evenings is abolished. [

The version of the Gra ]

Rabbi Yohanan reconsidered

and reflected,

and it was obvious to him [and the doubt was resolved] that he offers

a full measure in the morning and a full measure between the evenings.

And

still

this requires him to resolve [he was uncertain about this]: What is the law concerning the oil?

For before the High Priest died, he would place

three log

of oil into the mixture of the meal-offering each day: a log and a half for the half-tenth of an ephah in the morning, and a log and a half between the evenings.

But now, once he has died, and this meal-offering is brought in his place, with a full tenth of an ephah in the morning and a tenth of an ephah between the evenings—

what

is the measure of its oil?

Shall we say that the quantity of oil was likewise doubled, and he brings

three log in the morning and three log between the evenings?

Or

perhaps

a log and a half in the morning and a log and a half between the evenings?

Rabbi Ḥizkiya said: This too requires him to resolve [this too is subject to doubt],

concerning the measure of the frankincense that he brings with it.

Since for the minḥat ḥavitin he would place a handful of frankincense. Before he died, he would place half a handful of frankincense in the morning and half a handful between the evenings. Now that he has died and the measure of the fine flour has been doubled, the following doubt arises:

Does he bring

a handful

of frankincense

in the morning and a handful between the evenings?

Or half a handful in the morning and half a handful between the evenings.

Rabbi Yose said,

to resolve the question concerning the measure of the frankincense:

Is it conceivable

that when they

derived the

fundamental law of

a handful

of frankincense for the minḥat ḥavitin, did they

not derive it from the shewbread

?

For with regard to the minḥat ḥavitin, a handful is not mentioned at all; necessarily, they derived it from the shewbread, by means of a gezera shava, since “an eternal statute” is stated with regard to both.

And since they derived it from the shewbread, you can say:

Just as there,

with regard to the shewbread, they bring

two handfuls

of frankincense, one handful for each of the two rows of loaves,

so too here,

with regard to the minḥat ḥavitin, they bring

two handfuls

of frankincense, one handful for each burning.

Rabbi Ḥizkiya said,

to resolve the first question, whether the quantity of oil was doubled:

Is it conceivable

that when they

derived the

measure of oil for the minḥat ḥavitin—that it should be

three log—did they

not derive it from

the sacrifice of the

daily offering,

as we learned in the Sifra [Torat Kohanim]:

Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka, says: It is written concerning the minḥat ḥavitin: “a meal-offering always.” This comes to teach that it is like the meal-offering of the daily offering.

Just as with the daily offerings, the measure of oil for their meal-offerings is

three log, so too

the measure of its oil for the minḥat ḥavitin is three log.

And if so, you can say: Just as there, with regard to the daily offering, they bring

three log

in the morning with the morning daily offering, and three log in the evening with the daily offering between the evenings,

so too here,

with regard to the minḥat ḥavitin, they bring

three log

in the morning and three log in the evening.

We learned in the Mishna: One of the seven matters enacted by the court is: “And concerning the red heifer,

that they should not

be liable for misuse of sacred property with regard to its ashes.”

Rabbi Shimon bar Naḥman said in the name of Rabbi Yonatan: By

Torah

law it

should have been

that

those who benefit from the ashes of the red heifer

would be liable for misuse of sacred property,

and would bring a me'ila offering.

But they [the court of the Sages]

decreed

and enacted

that they should not be liable for misuse of sacred property with regard to it.

That is, those who benefit from it should not be considered liable for misuse of sacred property and should not bring a me'ila offering.

And we challenge this: Is it only by virtue of a condition of the court that there is no liability for misuse of sacred property with regard to the ashes of the red heifer?

But it was taught

in a beraita: Regarding what is written concerning the red heifer,

“It is a sin-offering,”

the verse comes

to teach

that only “it”—the heifer itself—is called a sin-offering,

and there is liability for misuse of sacred property with regard to it.

And exclusively

with regard to it there is liability for misuse of sacred property, but there is no liability for misuse of sacred property with regard to its ashes.

We see, then, that by Torah law there is no liability for misuse of sacred property with regard to its ashes, and this is not due to a condition of the court.

Rabbi Abbahu said:

Indeed, as a matter of fundamental law, by Torah law there is no liability for misuse of sacred property with regard to its ashes.

Rather, the Sages saw

at first [initially] that

they

were shaking it about [treating it contemptuously, an expression of shaking]

and applying it

for medicinal purposes

on top of their wounds.

Therefore

they decreed that there should be liability for misuse of sacred property with regard to it,

by rabbinic law.

And

once

the people saw that there was liability for misuse of sacred property even with regard to the ashes of the red heifer, they became apprehensive and did not wish to come and receive the sprinkling for one who had become impure through contact with the dead, fearing that they would be liable for misuse of sacred property with regard to the heifer.

And when the Sages saw

that they had been deterred

and the people had refrained from sprinkling upon the impure person, they returned and

decreed [enacted]

that there should be no liability for misuse of sacred property with regard to it.

Thus the law returned to its original state according to Torah law: there is no liability for misuse of sacred property with regard to the ashes of the red heifer.

It emerges that it is indeed correct that by Torah law we derive that there is no liability for misuse of sacred property with regard to the ashes of the red heifer; nevertheless, they needed the enactment of the court so that they would not be considered liable for misuse of sacred property.

We learned in the Mishna: A condition of the court applies

to the bird-offerings

that are disqualified: other bird-offerings are to be brought in their place from the communal funds.

There,

at the beginning of our chapter,

we learned:

Money found in the Temple between the box into which money is placed to bring bird-offerings and the box into which money is placed to bring fledglings of burnt-offerings as voluntary offerings—if it was found at a distance from both boxes,

half for

this and

half

for that, as it is an evenly balanced doubt—

they shall bring

from it

fledglings of burnt-offerings, and the reason is explained there. [The version of the Gra.]

And we challenge this: Is there not reason for concern that this money came from the box for obligatory bird-offerings, into which a woman who had given birth had placed her money so that a bird-offering could be brought with it for her obligation? If they bring fledglings of burnt-offerings with it, it emerges that she has not brought her obligatory offering.

And if so,

this woman—

with what will she achieve atonement?

Rabbi Yitzḥak said: It is a condition of the court

that

the one who supplies the bird-offerings

to the Temple treasury

supplies the disqualified and the lost offerings.

That is, the person from whom the Temple treasury purchases the birds for the obligatory bird-offerings assumes responsibility for providing bird-offerings in place of those found to be disqualified, and also in place of those that were lost. This woman will achieve atonement through the bird-offering that he supplies in place of the money found between the boxes.

We have completed you, chapter “Money That Was Found.”

Halakha A - Mishna:

The spittle of a zav and of a menstruating woman is a primary source of ritual impurity, and renders a person and vessels impure by Torah law. And the Sages decreed concerning any spittle that is found that it renders things impure, because of the uncertainty that perhaps it is the spittle of a zav or of a menstruating woman.

The Mishna explains the law of spittle found in Jerusalem:

All spittle found in Jerusalem is pure,

because in Jerusalem they did not decree impurity upon it; and by strict law it should not be rendered impure, as we follow the majority, and the majority of spittle is that of pure people.

Except for

spittle found in

the upper market

of Jerusalem, which renders things impure, for the reason the Gemara explains,

the statement of Rabbi Meir.

Rabbi Yosei says:

Spittle that is found

during all the other days of the year

(not during the pilgrimage festival), if it is found

in the middle

of the roads, it is

impure.

For during the rest of the year impure people are common, and since they are the majority, they walk in the middle of the road, while the pure, who are the minority, walk along the sides of the roads so that they will not become impure through them. Therefore, with regard to spittle found in the middle of the road, we presume that it came from the impure.

And spittle

that

is found

on the sides is pure,

as presumably it came from the pure.

And

the spittle found

during the pilgrimage festival,

when the majority of Israel is pure and the impure, who are the minority, withdraw and walk along the sides of the roads, the law is that spittle

that

is found

in the middle

of the road is

pure,

as presumably it came from the pure,

while that on the sides is impure,

as we presume that it came from the impure,

because

the

minority always withdraws to the sides.

The Mishna explains the law of ordinary vessels that are found:

All vessels found in Jerusalem,

if they are found on

the path

of

descent to the ritual bath,

they are

impure,

for there were two paths leading to the ritual bath: on one they descended to it, and on the other they ascended from it.

And a vessel found on the path of descent is certainly impure, since presumably it was brought there in order to immerse it, and it fell before they immersed it.

And

if they are found on

the path of ascent

from the ritual bath, they have the presumptive status of

pure,

as it is reasonable that they had already been immersed and were now being brought up from the ritual bath after becoming pure.

Because

its descent

to the ritual bath is not like

its ascent,

as on their descent they are impure, while on their ascent they are pure, since they have already been immersed. This is

the statement of Rabbi Meir.

Rabbi Yosei says: All of them are pure,

as they did not decree that vessels found in Jerusalem should be rendered impure because of uncertainty.

Except for the basket

in which they gathered the bones of the dead when they transferred him from a temporary grave to his ancestral grave,

and

except for

the rake,

with which they raked together the bones of the dead when they were scattered,

and

except for

the maritza

[the Gemara explains what it is],

which are designated for graves,

for since they are designated for graves, they have the presumptive status of impurity.

This law stated by Rabbi Yosei—that vessels found in Jerusalem are pure—was said only with regard to non-sacred property; but with regard to consecrated property they were stringent, as follows:

A

slaughtering

knife

found in Jerusalem

on the fourteenth

of Nisan has the presumptive status of purity, and

he slaughters with it immediately,

as we say that even if it had been impure, its owners certainly immersed it yesterday, so that it would become pure after sunset and be fit for slaughtering today, on the eve of Passover.

For a vessel that became impure and was immersed may not be used for consecrated property as long as it is a tevul yom, one who immersed that day. Only after sunset—that is, after the emergence of the stars—does it become completely pure.

If the knife was found

on the thirteenth

of Nisan, we are concerned that perhaps it is impure, and since there is sufficient time to immerse it before sunset [so that it will become pure after sunset], we are concerned that perhaps its owners have not yet immersed it.

Therefore he

immerses it and immerses it,

and slaughters the Paschal offering with it on the fourteenth, as sunset has already occurred.

If he found

a cleaver,

which is a large knife made for breaking bones, since it is not intended for slaughtering consecrated offerings, and likewise it is not used for breaking the bones of the Paschal offering, as it is stated: “You shall not break any bone of it,” we do not presume that its owners immersed it. Therefore, both

in this

case and

in that,

that is, whether it was found on the thirteenth or whether it was found on the fourteenth, he

immerses it

and only then is it pure.

In the Babylonian Gemara, tractate Pesaḥim [70a], they raised the following difficulty: The cleaver is suitable for cutting the bones of the festival offering brought together with the Paschal offering on the fourteenth of Nisan [but it is not suitable for the Paschal offering, since it is forbidden to break a bone in it]. If so, one could likewise say that it was immersed on the thirteenth so that it would be fit for this purpose. Why, then, if he found it on the fourteenth, does he immerse it?

And the Gemara establishes that the Mishna is referring to a case in which the nasi was dying on the thirteenth of Nisan. If he were to die, the entire public would become impure, since it is a mitzva for all Israel to attend to him, and they would offer the Paschal offering in impurity and would not need to purify the vessels.

Therefore, with regard to a knife intended for slaughtering the Paschal offering, a person immerses it, lest the nasi not die and they require a pure knife. Consequently, a knife found on the fourteenth may be used immediately, as it has the presumptive status that its owners immersed it the previous day in order to slaughter the Paschal offering with it on the fourteenth.

But with regard to a cleaver, there are two uncertainties as to whether they will need it.

A. Perhaps the nasi will die and they will perform the Paschal service in impurity, in which case they do not offer the festival offering in impurity and will not need the cleaver.

B. Even if the nasi does not die, perhaps they will not register many people for the Paschal offering, and there will be sufficient meat in the Paschal offering for the entire group. In that case, the law is that they do not bring a festival offering with it.

Since there are two uncertainties, a person does not immerse the cleaver, lest he nevertheless need it. Therefore, it has the presumptive status of impurity, and the one who finds it must immerse it.

If

the fourteenth falls on Shabbat,

and he finds a cleaver on that day, he

slaughters

with it

immediately,

and need not immerse it. Although he does not need the cleaver today to break the bones of the festival offering, since a festival offering is not brought on Shabbat, nevertheless he will need it tomorrow, on the fifteenth of Nisan, for the festival offering that he will offer then. And since vessels may not be immersed on Shabbat, its owners certainly immersed it on the thirteenth, and it is already pure.