Shabbat 99b (צט:) — the Talmud in English

Unless they made for it

at some distance from the well

a partition ten handbreadths high

, with the one drawing the water standing on the near side of the partition, and bringing the water there.

And one may not drink from it on Shabbat.

That is, it is prohibited to stand at the edge of the well, which is a public domain, draw water from the well with a vessel, tilt his head toward the cavity of the well, and drink from the vessel. This is a decree that the Sages issued, lest he draw the vessel toward himself,

unless he inserted [

above the well]

his head and most of his body.

And the well and its surrounding embankment combine to make ten,

to render the well a private domain and prohibit all these actions.

Rav Mordekhai asked Rabba:

If there was

a pillar in the public domain, ten handbreadths high

handbreadths

and four

handbreadths wide by four handbreadths, making it a private domain,

and he threw

an object from the public domain

and it came to rest on top

of the pillar, and before it came to rest on top of the pillar, the object passed through the air opposite the public domain above ten handbreadths, which is a “place exempt,”

what

will he be liable for?

The sides of the doubt are:

Do we say: The initial uprooting was in a prohibited manner [

in the public domain], and

the placing was in a prohibited manner

in the private domain, and although the object passed through a “place exempt,” this does not negate the transfer from the public domain into the private domain, and he is liable?

Or perhaps, since it came from a place exempt [

since the object reached the private domain from a “place exempt,” having passed through the air above ten handbreadths],

he

will not be liable?

Rabba said

to Rav Mordekhai:

It is a Mishna

, it is stated in our Mishna, as will be explained!

Rav Mordekhai came

Rav Mordekhai

and asked

also

Rav Yosef,

and

he said

to him

he too:

It is a Mishna!

Rav Mordekhai came

Rav Mordekhai

and asked

also

Abaye,

and

he said to him

he too:

It is a Mishna!

He said to them

Rav Mordekhai:

All of you are spitting the same spit [

You are all spitting one spit]!

They said to

Rav Mordekhai:

And do you not reason [

Do you not hold] that the doubt can be resolved from our Mishna?!

And didn’t we learn

in our Mishna: “And the rock,

one who takes from them or places upon them is liable.”

He is liable, even though it is impossible to place something on top of a rock without its first passing through a place exempt.

He said to them

Rav Mordekhai: Our Mishna cannot resolve my doubt, because

perhaps the Mishna

is speaking

of

placing upon it a

needle

, since in order to place it on the pillar there is no need to raise it into the air above ten handbreadths, which is a place exempt.

And we challenge this:

Even a needle—surely it is impossible that it is not raised slightly

, for it is impossible to place it on a pillar ten handbreadths high without raising it somewhat into the air above the public domain before placing it on the rock?!

And we answer: The case is one in which

it has

the rock

a projection.

That is, our Mishna is dealing with a rock whose greater part is above ten handbreadths, but which has a projection resembling a horn that is lower than ten handbreadths, and he placed the needle in that location. This place too, despite being below ten handbreadths, is considered a private domain, under the law of the “recesses of a private domain,” since it is not itself a significant area.

Alternatively,

our Mishna may be explained as referring to a case

where it was placed in a groove [

he placed the needle in a groove in the rock] that is within ten [handbreadths]. In order to insert the needle into the groove at the edge of the rock, he need not raise it above ten handbreadths, and the needle did not come from a “place exempt.”

Rav Misha said: Rabbi Yoḥanan has a doubt [

he was uncertain]:

A wall in the public domain, ten

handbreadths

high and not four

[handbreadths]

wide,

and it surrounds a karmelit, and he made it a private domain

, that is, he enclosed the entire karmelit with this wall and made it a private domain,

and he threw

from the public domain

and it came to rest on top

of the wall, which itself does not have the measure of the width of a private domain,

what

will he be liable for?

Do we say that, since

the wall itself is

not four

handbreadths wide,

it is a “place exempt”

, like any area that has partitions but is not four by four handbreadths?

Or perhaps, since

this wall

made

the karmelit into a

private domain,

a private domain is

considered as though it is filled

[with objects] [

as though it were filled with objects], and this filling combines with the width of the wall to make the wall itself a private domain, so that it is considered as though it were four [handbreadths] wide?

Ulla said: It is a kal va-chomer

: If

for others,

for the karmelit that it enclosed,

the wall makes

the

partition

to make it a private domain,

all the more so for itself

that it should make a partition, so that the wall itself is included within the private domain.

It was also stated: Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Ashi said that Rav said, and likewise Rabbi Yitzḥak said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said:

A wall in the public domain, ten handbreadths high and less than four handbreadths wide

[the letter he],

and surrounded by a karmelit,

and he made it a private domain: one who throws an object and it comes to rest on top of it is liable.

For this is a kal va-chomer: if

it serves as a partition for others, is it not all the more so for itself?;

Rabbi Yoḥanan raised a dilemma: A pit

that was

nine

handbreadths deep בלבד, so that it was not a private domain,

and he removed a clod from it and thereby completed it

to

ten

handbreadths, and the pit became a private domain, and he removed it and carried it into the public domain. Thus, before the act of lifting, the place was still not a private domain; through the act of lifting, the place became a private domain.

What

is the halakha: is he liable for carrying from a private domain into the public domain?

The lifting of the object and the making of the partition

that is, making the pit a place surrounded by partitions and a private domain

come together

they occur simultaneously—

is he liable

or is he not liable?

And if you would say: Since there was not initially a partition ten handbreadths high

at the outset, before the lifting, but rather they came into being together,

he is not liable.

There is still room for doubt:

A pit

that was

ten

handbreadths

deep, and he placed a clod into it

that he had brought from the public domain

and reduced its depth

from ten handbreadths, so that before the placing the pit was a private domain, rendering him liable, but through the placing the domain was removed,

what is the halakha?

The placing of the object and the removal of the partition

that is, the removal of the partition that made it a private domain, and the removal of the domain

come together—

is he liable or is he not liable?

That is, even if you would say in the first case that we do not consider the new situation created through the lifting, but rather what existed before the lifting, [and therefore he is exempt], this does not necessarily establish that, if one placed an object in a private domain and through the placing the status of private domain was removed from the place, he is liable because there had been a private domain there before the placing, despite the fact that a new situation was created through the placing. Rather, there is still room for doubt:

perhaps, nevertheless, he is exempt, since through the placing the partition was removed.

And we raise an objection: What was Rabbi Yoḥanan uncertain about?

He could resolve it from his own statement

from his own words this uncertainty can be resolved!?

For

we learned:

One who throws an object four cubits

in the public domain, and it comes to rest

in

front

of a wall

that stands in the public domain: If it comes to rest at a height

above ten handbreadths

, which is the airspace of a “place of exemption,” it is

like one who throws into the air

and he is exempt. But if it comes to rest in front of the wall

below ten

handbreadths, which is the airspace of the public domain, it is

like one who throws onto the ground

and he is liable.

And one who throws onto the ground

four cubits

is

liable.

And we discussed it:

Why does he become liable when the object reaches the wall below ten handbreadths?

But it did not come to rest

there in front of the wall; why, then, does he become liable?!

And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: We learned this with regard to a moist fig

which adheres to the wall.

And

now the difficulty is:

Why

is he liable,

when the fig reduces

the

four cubits?

For once it adheres to the wall, the distance from the place of throwing is reduced, and it is no longer four cubits; the Mishna is speaking even of a case in which the distance from the place of throwing to the wall is exactly four cubits, and once it adheres there are no longer four cubits. Why, then, is he liable?! Rather, it must be that a reduction produced by the very act that creates liability is not considered as though it had already existed at the time of that act. With regard to the act that creates liability, we consider it as though the distance had not yet been reduced, and Rabbi Yoḥanan’s uncertainty concerning placing an object and removing a partition is resolved from his own words!?

And we answer: The proof is not comparable to the case under discussion, because

there,

in the case of the fig, he

does not nullify

it

he does not nullify the fig with regard to the wall; he intends to remove it from there, and this is not a reduction. Whereas

here,

in the case of the clod placed in the pit, he

nullifies

it

with regard to

the pit, and it is a reduction.

Rava raised a dilemma: If one threw

from the public domain a board four by four handbreadths,

and it came to rest

the board

on top of

stakes

that were thin, driven into the public domain, ten handbreadths high but less than four handbreadths wide, and through this throwing a private domain was created beneath the board, because “the edge of the roof descends and seals,”

what is the halakha

regarding liability for this throwing, because of carrying from the public domain into the private domain? And the Gemara asks:

What is Rava’s uncertainty

? If you say that he was uncertain about the law of

the placing of an object and the making of a partition coming together,

whether he is liable, and his uncertainty concerned the placing of the board, whether he is liable for it—

Thus

this is

his uncertainty,

that of Rabbi Yoḥanan; why, then, did Rava raise this uncertainty again?

so why should Rava raise this uncertainty again?

And we answer:

Rava’s uncertainty concerns a case in which he threw a board with an object on top of it: what is the halakha?

Is he liable for the object, because he carried it from the public domain into the private domain?

That is, if you would say that in the case of placing an object and making a partition simultaneously he is not liable, and therefore he is certainly not liable for the board, what is his status with regard to liability for the object? The sides of the uncertainty are:

Since

they come together

the placing of the object and the making of the partition beneath it occur simultaneously,

it is like placing an object and

afterward

making a partition,

for which he is not liable.

Or perhaps, since it is impossible that the object is not lifted slightly and then comes to rest

it is impossible that the object is not raised slightly when the board is placed, and then comes to rest on the board,

it is like making a partition and

afterward

placing an object

and he is liable? And we conclude:

teyku.

Rava said: Water

that is

on top of water,

even though it is not at rest there, having ceased its movement,

this is considered its coming to rest

for purposes of rendering one who lifts part of it from there liable. But

a nut on top of water,

which is not at rest there, having ceased its movement,