Shabbat 100a (ק.) — the Talmud in English

This is not its placing

for which he would be liable for removing it from there.

Rava raised a dilemma: If a nut

was placed

in a vessel, and the

vessel

was

was

floating on water,

which is not considered placed because it moves back and forth, and he removed the nut and took it out, is he liable?

The sides of the dilemma are:

Do we say: We follow the nut,

that is, should we consider the nut as it is in relation to the vessel,

and it is at rest,

and it is therefore considered placed in the vessel, in which case he is liable?

Or perhaps: We follow the vessel,

that is, we do not consider the nut independently, but rather the vessel and the nut together,

and it is not at rest;

the two of them together are not at rest, and therefore he is exempt. And we conclude:

The dilemma remains unresolved.

The Gemara further explains:

Oil

that was floating

on wine

or water, and one removed the oil from it and took it out—the law depends on the

dispute between Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri and the Rabbis.

As we learned

in tractate Tevul Yom:

Oil

of teruma

that was floating on wine

of teruma,

and one who immersed that day touched

who disqualifies teruma through his touch,

the oil,

this person

disqualified only

the

oil

alone. For he is considered to have touched only the oil, and the oil is not capable of rendering the wine impure, since it itself is disqualified, but is not impure in a manner that would enable it to render others impure.

Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri says: The two are joined to one another,

and both become disqualified together.

Similarly, in our case, according to the Rabbis he is not liable for removing the oil, because oil on wine is like a nut on water. But according to Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri, he is liable for it, as he would be for water on water.

Abaye said: If there is a pit in the public domain

that was

ten handbreadths deep

handbreadths

and eight handbreadths wide

—four by four handbreadths exactly—

and one threw

from the public domain

a mat into it,

this person

is liable,

for he transferred an object from the public domain into the private domain. But if he

divided it with a mat,

that is, he threw a mat into it vertically, and the mat divided the pit so that on neither side of the mat is there an area of four handbreadths, he is

exempt—

For there is no longer a private domain here, since it is not at least four by four handbreadths. Consequently, he is exempt even for throwing the mat itself, because when the placing and the removal of the partition occur simultaneously, he is exempt.

And the Gemara explains:

For Abaye, for whom it is obvious that a mat nullifies a partition

and it is no longer a private domain,

all the more so a clod of earth

[if he brought a ring from the public domain into a pit ten deep, thereby reducing it from a depth of ten handbreadths]

nullifies the partition

and the status of a private domain is nullified with regard to the pit, since he nullifies the clod there.

But

according to Rabbi Yohanan, who raises a dilemma

regarding a

clod of earth

that one nullifies with regard to the pit,

with regard to a mat it is obvious

to him

that it does not nullify the partition;

the pit therefore remains a private domain, because he does not nullify the mat with regard to the pit.

And Abaye said: If there is a pit in the public domain

that was

ten

handbreadths

deep and four

by four handbreadths: If the pit was

full of water, and one threw into it

any object from the public domain, this person

is liable,

and we do not say that since the pit is full, it is no longer a private domain, because the water nullifies the partitions.

But if it was

full of produce, and one threw

from the public domain

into it

any object, this person is

exempt.

And we explain:

What is the reason?

Because

water does not nullify the partition,

but

produce does nullify the partition.

It was also taught so:

that water does not nullify the partition.

As it was taught:

One who throws from the sea,

which is a karmelit, to the highway

[the sartya mentioned above, on page 6a. It is a road along which people travel from one city to another], which is the public domain,

or from

the

highway

into the sea,

this person is

exempt,

for he transferred an object not from the public domain into the private domain, but into a karmelit.

Rabbi Shimon says: If there is

in the sea

at the place where he threw

the object there a separate depression by itself that is

ten

handbreadths

deep

and four

by four handbreadths, this person is

liable.

For this depression is a private domain. We have therefore learned from Rabbi Shimon’s statement that water does not nullify the partitions of a place.

Mishna:

One who throws

an object

four cubits

in the public domain, and the object comes to rest

in

front of

a wall

that stands there:

If it struck the wall

above

a height of

ten handbreadths

from the ground of the public domain, which is a “place exempt,” because the public domain extends only up to ten handbreadths, this person is

like one who throws through the air

above ten handbreadths, for which he is exempt.

But if it struck the wall

below

a height of

ten handbreadths

from the ground of the public domain, this person is

like one who throws on the ground,

and he is liable.

One who throws on the ground

in the public domain

four cubits

is

liable.

Gemara:

And we challenge this: Why does he become liable when the object strikes the wall below ten handbreadths,

but it did not come to rest

when it struck the wall?

He said—

Rabbi Yohanan

explained: We learned this with regard to a juicy fig cake

that was thrown against the face of the wall and adhered to it;

we learned

that the object has come to rest.

Rabbi Meir and the Sages disagreed in Eruvin 11b regarding the law of a “dome” with respect to a mezuzah. This is an entrance constructed in a rounded, domed shape, whose open entrance does not have a height of ten handbreadths within a width of four handbreadths, which is the measure of an “entrance” that obligates one to affix a mezuzah. However, the structure surrounding the entrance contains enough material to be carved away and complete the entrance to the required measure. According to Rabbi Meir, “we carve in order to complete”: We regard the wall surrounding the entrance as though it had been carved away and the measure of an “entrance” had thereby been completed, and it is consequently obligated in mezuzah. According to the Sages, “we do not carve in order to complete,” and the entrance is not obligated in mezuzah.

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav, who said in the name of Rabbi Hiyya: If one threw

an object from the public domain toward the wall

above ten

handbreadths,

and

the object

came to rest

there

in any hole,

which is not four by four handbreadths, but the wall was thick enough for the hole to be enlarged and made four by four handbreadths, thereby creating a private domain there, like a pillar ten handbreadths high and four handbreadths wide standing in the public domain, which is a private domain:

We have arrived

at the dispute

between Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis,

who disagreed regarding an entrance constructed like a dome that does not have the measure of an entrance, but which contains enough material to be carved away and completed to the measure of an entrance, whether it is obligated in mezuzah:

According to Rabbi Meir, who says

there

“we carve in order to complete,”

this person is

liable

for transferring an object from the public domain into the private domain, because we regard the hole in the wall as though it had been carved out and enlarged to a width of four by four handbreadths, thereby creating a private domain there.

Whereas

according to the Rabbis, who say

there

that they do not hollow it out in order to complete it, he is not liable.

For the hole does not have the measure of a private domain, which is four by four handbreadths.

It was also taught so: If

he

threw it above ten

handbreadths

and it proceeded and came to rest in a hole of any size

in the wall, and there is sufficient material there to enlarge it and make it four by four handbreadths:

Rabbi Meir deems him liable, and the Sages exempt him.

This follows their method, as they disagreed in the case of a mezuzah as to whether “they hollow it out in order to complete it.”

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav:

A. A pillar in the public domain that is ten high in a straight vertical line and four by four handbreadths wide is a private domain.

B. If the partitions of the area did not rise in a straight vertical line, but rather there was

a mound

in the public domain

that rises gradually

to a height of

ten

handbreadths

within four

cubits—in other words, its slope was so steep that the mound had already risen to a height of ten handbreadths by the time it reached four cubits—

and he threw an object, and it came to rest on it,

that is

liable,

as though the mound were upright and rose in a straight vertical line. But if the mound does not rise to a height of ten handbreadths until it reaches more than four cubits, it is not a private domain; rather, it has the status of the rest of the public domain, because it is convenient for walking upon.

A mavוי enclosed on three sides by partitions, but open on its fourth side to the public domain—the Sages prohibited carrying within it four cubits until one places a side-post or crossbeam at its entrance, so that people would not come to confuse it with the public domain and permit carrying four cubits there.

It was also taught so: A mavוי that

had the elevation of the ground in the public domain adjacent to the entrance of the mavוי

level with its interior

of the mavוי, near its entrance,

and a slope was made toward the public domain.

That is, only near the entrance was the floor of the mavוי at the same elevation as the floor of the mavוי, whereas farther inside the floor of the mavוי was higher than the area adjacent to the public domain. Therefore, they had to slope the floor of the mavוי, making it into a slope that descended toward the public domain.

Or

the level of the floor of the mavוי, toward its entrance adjacent to the public domain, was

level

in elevation

with the public domain, and a slope was made toward its interior.

That is, the public domain was higher than the floor inside the mavוי, so that near the entrance to the mavוי its floor was level with the public domain, and only after one cubit or half a cubit inside the mavוי did its floor begin to slope, like a slope descending toward the interior of the mavוי—

that mavוי does not require either a side-post or a crossbeam,

because the elevation of the slope is considered a fourth partition.

Rabbi Ḥanina ben Gamliel says: A mound that rises gradually

in height according to the ratio of

ten

handbreadths in height

within four

cubits of length,

and he threw

an object from the public domain

and it came to rest upon it,

that is

liable,

since the height of the mound is considered a private domain.

Mishna:

If one threw

an object in the public domain

within four cubits

from the place where he is standing,

and it rolled beyond four cubits,

he is

exempt.

But if he threw

beyond four cubits, and it rolled,

even before it fell to the ground,

within four cubits,

he is

liable.

Gemara:

The Gemara raises a difficulty concerning what was stated in the latter clause, that one is liable for an object that was beyond four cubits and rolled back within them:

But it did not come to rest

beyond four cubits; why, then, is he liable!?

Rabbi Yoḥanan said

in reply:

And this is when it came to rest

the object beyond four cubits

upon something.

It was also taught so

in accordance with Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement, that if the object did not come to rest at all, he is not liable. For it was taught:

He threw

an object

beyond four cubits, and

the object did not cease moving at all, and

the wind pushed it and brought it inside, and even though it then carried it out again,

he is

exempt.

But if

the wind caught it briefly,

meaning that the object ceased moving briefly because of the wind beyond four cubits,

even though it then

the wind

brought it inside

within four cubits, he is

liable.

Rava said:

Rabbi Akiva and the Sages disagreed in the Mishna at the beginning of the chapter concerning one who throws from one private domain to another private domain through the public domain, whether he is liable. The Sages hold that he is not liable, because we do not say that “something caught in the air is considered as though it came to rest.” And do not say that the Sages disagreed with Rabbi Akiva only when the object was caught in the air more than three handbreadths above the ground of the public domain, but that within three handbreadths they did not disagree. Rather, even

within three

handbreadths of the ground of the public domain,

according to the Rabbis,

who hold that “something caught in the air is not considered as though it came to rest,”

it must come to rest upon something,

and he is not liable even if he threw from one private domain to another private domain through the public domain below three handbreadths—

The same practical difference applies to one who throws an object four cubits in the public domain, and after it passes four cubits it reaches within three handbreadths, and he remembers his inadvertent act before it comes to rest: He is exempt, since the beginning and the end of his act were not both inadvertent, and we do not say that before he remembered, it was already considered to have come to rest.

Marimar was sitting and reciting this teaching

in the name of Rava:

Ravina said to Marimar: