Shabbat 52b (נב:) — the Talmud in English

Rav Yitzḥak Nappaḥa said:

The Mishna is speaking

of

bracelets that became impure while they were ornaments for a person, and afterward their owner reconsidered their use, and they were

no longer intended for a person’s ornament

and became

an ornament

for a

animal

while they were still impure. They now need to be immersed in order to remove their original impurity, so that they will not render pure items impure.

And Rav Yosef said:

Even all animal rings are capable of contracting impurity,

since a person pulls the animal with them;

they are therefore considered utensils made for human use, which are capable of contracting impurity imparted by utensils.

And we prove this: Is it not taught in a beraita:

A stick used for an animal,

with which one drives a camel or a female camel—if it is

of metal,

it

is capable of contracting impurity,

in accordance with the law of simple metal utensils?

But one made of wood is not capable of contracting impurity, even if it has the status of a utensil, because simple wooden utensils that do not have a receptacle do not contract impurity.

And

what is the reason

that an animal stick is considered a utensil serving a person?

Since a person drives with it

the animal.

Here too,

in the case of a bracelet, it serves a person and is considered a utensil,

since a person pulls with it

the animal.

We learned in the Mishna:

And he immerses them in their place.

And we raise a difficulty: How can immersion be effective for a bracelet while it is tied to the animal?

But there is an interposition

caused by the ring, which is tightly inserted into a hole in the bracelet, and the water does not enter the place of contact between the bracelet and the ring.

Rav Ami said:

The Mishna is speaking

of bracelets that had been welded

by striking them with a hammer until the hole in which the ring was inserted became enlarged. From that point onward, the water can enter there.

We inquire into this:

Shall we say that Rav Ami,

who established our Mishna as referring to bracelets that had been welded,

holds like Rav Yosef,

who establishes our Mishna as referring to bracelets that were originally made for an animal?

For if

he

holds like Rav Yitzḥak, who said

that our Mishna is speaking

of items changing from a person’s ornament to an animal’s ornament,

and they became impure while they were still a person’s ornament and were afterward designated for an animal, then it is impossible to establish the case as one of welded bracelets.

For

once they were welded,

an act was performed on them

to change them from a person’s ornament to an animal’s ornament, since through the welding they are no longer attractive as a person’s ornament.

And

through this,

their impurity departed from them,

since the welding causes them to lose the status of an ornament.

For

this is what

we learned: All utensils

whose production has not yet been completed entirely

“descend”

to the status of being fit to receive

their impurity through thought

alone. Although they still require improvement and ordinarily do not yet have the status of utensils, if one decides to leave them as they are, that constitutes the completion of their production, and they are capable of contracting impurity from that point onward.

But

they do not

lose

emerge from their impurity

once they have become impure through thought alone—that is, by now deciding to continue improving them—

but only through a change in physical form.

For example, if one decided to make a mat from leather, it becomes a utensil through thought and is capable of contracting impurity. From that point onward, even if he decides to make it into straps and sandals—and with regard to this, its production has still not been completed—the status of a utensil that it acquired through his initial thought is nevertheless not nullified.

It is purified only if he begins to perform an act on it that nullifies his initial thought. For example, if he places a knife into it, its status as a utensil is nullified and its impurity departs.

It follows that we have learned that through an act, an item’s status as a utensil is nullified. Accordingly, the Mishna cannot be explained in accordance with Rav Yitzḥak, as referring to a case in which the items were welded. If so, their impurity would have departed and they would not require immersion.

This proves that he holds like Rav Yosef. For although after the welding they are no longer suitable as an ornament for a person, they nevertheless retain the status of a utensil serving a person, since a person pulls the animal with them. Therefore, their impurity did not depart through the welding, and they require immersion and sprinkling.

And we reject this: It is possible that Rav Ami holds like Rav Yitzḥak.

As for why their impurity did not depart through the welding, the reason is that

he holds like Rabbi Yehuda, who said that

Rabbi Yehuda said:

An act

performed in order to

improve an item is not an act

that removes

its

status as a utensil and thereby removes it from impurity.

As it is taught in a beraita: Rabbi Yehuda says: It was not said

[that]

a change in physical form

nullifies the status of a utensil when it is performed in order

to improve it.

Rather,

only a change in physical form performed in order

to damage

the utensil nullifies its status as a utensil.

Here, the welding was performed in order to improve the bracelet for the animal’s use. For this reason, it does not remove it from the status of a person’s utensil that it previously possessed.

The Gemara returns to the earlier difficulty: How is immersion effective when the bracelet is attached to the animal? Would that not constitute an interposition?

And we answer:

It was taught in a baraita:

The case here is one of

bracelets

with

openings.

They were made from the outset with broad hollow spaces, with one ring placed loosely inside another ring. Therefore, the place of contact between the ring and the bracelet does not constitute an interposition.

A certain student from Upper Galilee asked Rabbi Elazar: I heard that they distinguish

as a matter of halakha between

one ring and another ring,

but I do not know what this distinction is.

He said to him,

Rabbi Elazar:

Perhaps you did not hear

of a distinction in this matter

except with regard to

carrying on

Shabbat,

but not with regard to impurity.

For we find a distinction between rings with regard to the liability for carrying on Shabbat. If one carries a ring bearing a signet, he is liable to bring a sin-offering, since it is not an ornament but a burden. But for carrying a ring without a signet, one is exempt by Torah law [below, 59b], and its prohibition is only rabbinic, as they decreed because he might remove it and show it to others. [At that point, it would no longer be worn in the manner of wearing but carried in the manner of a burden, and he would be liable by Torah law.]

For if it is with regard to impurity, this one and that one are the same.

Whether it is a ring bearing a signet or one without a signet, it is a utensil and is capable of contracting impurity.

And we raise a difficulty:

And

if

with regard to impurity this one and that one are the same,

and all rings have the same law, we nevertheless find a distinction between them.

For

we learned: A person’s ring

is impure. But an animal’s ring, a utensil’s ring, and all other rings

are pure,

because an ornament for an animal or a utensil is not considered an ornament.

And we answer:

When Rabbi Elazar said to him

that there is no distinction between rings with regard to impurity,

he too

was speaking about

a person’s ring.

With regard to that ring, we do not find a distinction concerning impurity.

And we raise the difficulty again:

And

with regard to a person’s rings,

are this one and that one the same?

But even among them we find a distinction.

And it is taught in a beraita: A ring that one prepared

in order

to gird with it

his

loins

[serving as a buckle for his belt],

and to tie with it between his shoulders

his sleeves,

is pure.

For it is like a ring of utensils, and it is not capable of contracting impurity.

And they did not say

that a ring is

impure, אלא

only a

finger ring.

Since it is an ornament, only it has the status of a vessel.

And it is thus proven that there is also a distinction with regard to a person’s rings.

And we answer:

When

Rabbi Elazar said to the student that there is no distinction between rings with regard to impurity,

he too

was referring to a

finger ring.

That is so. But with regard to Shabbat there is a distinction: If it has a signet, it is a burden, whereas if it does not have a signet, it is an ornament.

And we raise another objection:

And

with regard to a

finger ring, are this one and that one the same

—are they all equivalent with regard to impurity?

But didn’t we learn in the Mishna: A ring of metal, whose signet

—the signet of that ring, which is found at the top of the ring—

is of

wood or

coral

and is attractive—if the ring touches impurity, it is

impure.

Since the ring is the principal component, and since it is made of metal, its status is like that of simple metal vessels, which are susceptible to impurity.

But if

it is of coral, while its signet

is of

metal—

it is

pure.

Since its principal component is made of coral wood, its status is like that of simple wooden vessels, which are not susceptible to impurity.

It follows that even with regard to a finger ring we find a distinction concerning impurity. Why, then, did Rabbi Elazar say, “This one and that one are the same”?

And we answer:

When

Rabbi Elazar said,

he too

was referring to a ring that is

entirely

of

metal. He was saying to that student that there is no distinction with regard to impurity.

to that student, that there is no distinction in it with regard to impurity.

He further asked

that student Rabbi Elazar:

I heard that a distinction is made

as a matter of halakha

between one needle and another,

but I do not know what that distinction is.

Rabbi Elazar said to him:

Rabbi Elazar:

Perhaps you did not hear

of a distinction in this matter

except with regard to Shabbat

alone. A distinction is made between a needle with an eye and one without an eye: For carrying out a needle with an eye one is liable to bring a sin-offering [62a], but for a needle without an eye, which is merely an ornament, one is not liable for carrying it out [57a].

For if it is with regard to impurity—

this one and that one are the same,

as all needles are equivalent and are susceptible to impurity.

And we challenge this:

And

if

with regard to impurity this one and that one are the same—

yet even with regard to impurity we find a distinction among needles, as there are needles that do not become impure.

But didn’t we learn: A needle that

became impure, and afterward

its eye or its point was removed [its point],

it is

pure.

Since it has lost its status as a vessel, its impurity has departed from it.

And we answer:

When

he said that there is no distinction among needles, he was speaking

of a

needle that is

complete.

needle to which he was referring.

And we challenge this again:

And if

with regard to a

complete

needle,

are this one and that one the same?

And

yet even with regard to it we find a distinction.

But didn’t we learn: A needle that has become rusty—

if

this

impedes sewing,

it is

pure; but if not, it is impure.

And they say in the school of Rabbi Yannai: And

the measure of rust that impedes sewing

is when its mark

of rust

is discernible

on the garment that is sewn with this needle.

Thus, even with regard to a complete needle we find a distinction concerning impurity—between rust that impedes sewing and rust that does not impede sewing.

And we answer:

When

he said that there is no distinction among needles, he was speaking

of a sharpened needle [a polished needle that has no rust];

a polished needle without rust]

that is what he was referring to

here.

And we challenge this again:

And with regard to a sharpened needle, are this one and that one the same?

But it was taught in a beraita: A needle—

whether it has an eye or does not have an eye, it is permitted to move it on Shabbat

in a courtyard, and it is not subject to the prohibition of muktzeh, since it has the status of a vessel and it also has a permitted use, as it is fit for removing a thorn with it.

And they did not say

that there is a distinction between

one with an eye

and one without an eye

except with regard to impurity alone.

It is thus clear that specifically a needle with an eye is susceptible to impurity. But a needle without an eye does not become impure, because it is not considered an important vessel. If so, are all needles not equivalent with regard to the laws of impurity?

And we answer:

Abaye interpreted this beraita in accordance with Rava

as referring

to an unfinished needle.

That is, a needle at the beginning of its manufacture, which is intended to be pierced. As long as it has not been pierced, its manufacture is not yet complete, and therefore it is not susceptible to impurity. For with regard to impurity, the verse concerning purification from the impurity of a vessel uses the term “a vessel made for use,” meaning a vessel whose manufacture has been fully completed.

But a needle whose manufacture was completed with the intention that it not be pierced is susceptible to impurity. It is with regard to such a needle that Rabbi Eliezer said, “This one and that one are the same.”

Mishna:

A donkey may go out

into the public domain

with a saddlecloth,

because it is always placed upon it in order to warm it. As it is known: “A donkey—even during the season of Tammuz, it is cold for it.” Therefore, the saddlecloth is not a burden for it, but rather clothing.

When may it go out with it?

When it is tied to it.

This will be explained in the Gemara.

Rams,

the males, may go out bound [joined to one another by a tie].

This is not a burden, because this is their customary practice. Other interpretations of this are also stated in the Gemara.

Ewes,

the females, may go out with their tails raised [with their tails tied upward],

with their tails tied upward],

and bound [with their tails tied downward],

with their tails tied downward],

and covered [wrapped in cloth],

as this is their customary practice, and it is not considered a burden. The Gemara explains for what purpose this is done to them.

Goats may go out with their udders bound

[with a pouch tied over them]. Sometimes this is done in order to tighten their udders so that they will dry up and no longer produce milk, so that they will become pregnant again, or so that they will become fat for eating. Sometimes it is done to preserve the milk, so that it will not drip onto the ground.

Rabbi Yosei prohibits them all [all those that the first tanna permitted] from going out into the public domain, because it is a burden.

—all those that the first speaker permitted—to go out into the public domain, because they are burdens.

Except for covered ewes,

since the covering is for the sake of protecting their wool, it is considered an ornament.

Rabbi Yehuda says:

They may go out with all those mentioned above, in accordance with the first tanna. However,

“goats may go out with their udders bound”

means specifically when they were bound in order

to dry.

Since in that case the pouch is fastened tightly, there is no concern that it might fall.

But they may not

go out when their udders are bound

for

the purpose of preserving the

milk.

Since the pouch is not fastened tightly, we are concerned that it might fall, and the owner may then carry it in the public domain.