Shabbat 50a (נ.) — the Talmud in English

He removes the covering, and they fall.

And it is explicitly demonstrated that even if he concealed something among them, it is not permitted to move them except by shaking off the covering.

And we answer:

Rather, if it was stated, it was stated as follows:

Rava said: They taught

that wool fleeces may not be moved

only

when

he did not designate them for insulation

on a permanent basis. And although he has now concealed something among them, they still remain designated for their original function.

But

if

he designated them for insulation

on a permanent basis,

they may be moved,

because they are no longer designated for their original function.

It was also stated: When Ravin came, he said in the name of Rav Yaakov, who said that Rav Asi ben Shaul said that Rabbi taught: They taught

in the Mishna, “They may not be moved,”

only

when

he did not designate them for insulation. But if he designated them for insulation, they may be moved.

Ravina said:

It should always be understood as we initially explained: If he concealed something among them, he is permitted to move them. And even if he had never designated them for insulation, they are no longer considered set aside for their original function.

And as for the fact that we learned here that even when he concealed something among them it is prohibited to move them—

with

wool fleeces

from a stockpile,

a large commercial collection,

they taught

this. For in such a case, concealing something among them does not remove them from their original function.

It was also taught in a beraita: Wool fleeces from a stockpile—

may not be moved. But if the owner prepared them for use—

they may be moved.

Rabba bar bar Ḥana taught before Rav: Palm branches,

the stalks

of

palm-tree branches,

which he cut,

cutting them so that they could serve him

as firewood

[for example, for fuel or for making utensils].

And

afterward

he reconsidered their use,

and decided to use them

for

using them for

sitting

on them—

he must tie

them together before Shabbat, while it is still day, into a thick bundle suitable for sitting, in order to permit moving them on Shabbat. An action demonstrating that they are designated for sitting and not for use as firewood is necessary. Otherwise, it is prohibited to move them on Shabbat, because they are still set aside for use as firewood. Mere designation in thought is insufficient.

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: It is not necessary to tie them,

but through designation in thought alone they are considered designated for sitting and not for use as firewood.

He,

Rabba bar bar Ḥana,

taught it

this beraita,

and he

also

said concerning it: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Shimon ben Gamliel,

and it is not necessary to tie them.

It was stated: Rav said:

Palm branches that one cut for firewood—if he wishes to permit moving them on Shabbat, he

ties

them before Shabbat, while it is still day. He follows the opinion of the Sages, who hold that they become designated for sitting only through an action.

And Shmuel said:

It is not necessary to tie them; it is sufficient that he

thinks

about them before Shabbat, while it is still day, for sitting. He follows the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Gamliel, who holds that designation in thought is sufficient.

And Rav Asi said: He sits

on them while it is still day. This permits moving them on Shabbat,

even though he did not tie

them,

and even though he did not think

of them as intended for sitting.

And we raise a difficulty:

Granted, Rav—

he is the one who said it in accordance with the first tanna,

who holds that designation in thought is ineffective

unless an action of tying is required.

And

granted,

Shmuel also—

he is the one who said it in accordance with Rabbi Shimon ben Gamliel,

who holds that designation in thought is sufficient.

But Rav Asi, who said

that even designation in thought is unnecessary, and that merely sitting on them is sufficient without designating them for sitting—

in accordance with whom did he say this?

And we answer:

He,

Rav Asi,

who said,

holds

in accordance with this tanna, as it was taught: One may go out on Shabbat

into the public domain

with pecurin

[combed flax placed on a wound]

and with tzifa

[fluffed wool placed on a wound],

when he has soaked them in oil and wrapped them

by tying them

with a cord.

For by doing so he demonstrates that they are made to prevent his clothes from scratching his wound, and they are therefore considered an ordinary garment. And anything one carries out by way of wearing is not considered carrying from one domain to another.

But if he

did not soak

the pecurin and the tzifa

in oil, and did not wrap them with a cord—

he may not go out with them

into the public domain. Since he has not demonstrated that they are made for the wound, they are not a garment; rather, they are merely a burden, and carrying a burden from one domain to another is prohibited.

And they are prohibited not only to carry out, but even merely to move, because they are set aside. For they were not prepared for this purpose while it was still day. Tosafot.

And if he went out with them,

with the pecurin and the tzifa when they were placed on his wound,

for one hour

before Shabbat,

while it was still day,

then

even though he did not soak

them

and did not wrap them with a cord, it is permitted

to go out with them on Shabbat [and it is not specifically necessary that he went out with them; even if he sat with them in his house while it was still day, this is sufficient. There].

And this accords with Rav Asi: even without an action and without designation in thought, they become designated for this purpose through his using them for it.

Rav Ashi said: We, too, have learned

in accordance with Rav Asi.

As it was taught:

Straw,

which ordinarily is designated for making bricks or for fuel and is therefore set aside. And when

it

is

upon the bed,

and one did not designate it for lying upon, but wishes to lie upon it on Shabbat—

he may not move it with his hand

in order to spread it out, since it is prohibited to move it.

But he may move it

from side to side

with his body,

when he lies upon it, since moving it indirectly, in an unusual manner, is permitted.

But if it was

straw designated

for animal feed,

it is not set aside, and it is permitted to move it.

Or if there was

on the straw

a pillow or sheet while it was still day,

meaning that he had already lain upon it while it was still day—

he may move it with his hand,

since there is no prohibition of a set-aside object in this case.

Thus, lying upon it itself designates it for this purpose, even without an action and without thought. This accords with Rav Asi.

And we conclude:

Learn from this!

And we raise a difficulty:

And who

is

the tanna

of the first opinion

who disagrees with Rabbi Shimon ben Gamliel,

and holds that designation in thought is ineffective, but one must tie the palm branches in order to designate them for sitting?

And we answer:

It is Rabbi Ḥanina ben Akiva.

who holds this view.

For when Rav Dimi came, he said

in the name

of Zeira, who said that Rav Ḥanina said: Once Rabbi Ḥanina ben Akiva went to a certain place and found palm branches that had been cut for use as firewood.

And it was the eve of Shabbat.

And he said to his students: Go and think

of them as designated for sitting, thereby removing their status as set-aside objects,

so that we may sit upon them tomorrow

[on Shabbat]!

And Zeira said:

And I do not know whether

the place to which Rabbi Ḥanina went

was a banquet hall,

and therefore he permitted designation in thought alone,

or whether it was a house of mourning,

and therefore he permitted it! And we infer:

From the fact that

Zeira said, “I do not know

whether it was a banquet hall or whether it was a house of mourning,”

learn from this

that specifically

because they had gone

to a house of mourning or to a banquet hall

designation in thought alone was sufficient for them, because

they were preoccupied,

and could not tie the palm branches while it was still day.

But here,

where there is time to tie them, if he

tied them, it is

permitted. But if he

did not tie them, it is not

permitted to move them on Shabbat through designation in thought alone.

Rav Yehuda said: A person may bring in

before Shabbat, while it is still day,

a full basket of earth,

and pour the earth onto the floor of his house,

and use it

the earth, on Shabbat,

for all his needs.

Mar Zutra expounded in the name of Mar Zutra the Great: And this is

specifically when he

designated it

the earth

for a corner!

For in this way the earth is considered prepared and designated for all his needs. But if he placed it in the middle of his house so that it would serve as flooring for his feet, it is subordinate to the floor of the house and is prohibited as a set-aside object.

The Sages said before Rav Pappa: In accordance with whom

does Rav Yehuda agree, when he permits earth brought in while it was still day?

In accordance with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel,

who holds that designation in thought alone is sufficient.

For if it is in accordance with the Sages, they say

that

we require an action

demonstrating that the earth is designated for his needs.

Rav Pappa said to them: You may even say that it is in accordance with the Sages, and Rav Yehuda’s ruling is still understandable. For

For

the Sages said that we require an action only

with

something that

is

capable of having an action performed with it,

such as palm branches, with which an action of tying can be performed.

But with something that is not capable of having an action performed with it,

such as earth,

we do not

require an action; designation in thought alone is sufficient.

Shall we say

that Rav Yehuda’s ruling

is

a dispute

of tannaim

?

As it was taught:

With all materials used for scrubbing

[one scrubs in order to polish]

the utensils on Shabbat.

Except for silver utensils,

which one may not scrub

with tartakon

[a type of earth formed in wine barrels], because silver is soft. Scrubbing with tartakon smooths, polishes, and softens it. Smoothing and softening is a primary labor.

And we analyze:

This implies that with natron and sand it is

permitted

to scrub silver utensils, because they do not smooth the silver.

But was it not taught

that even

with natron and sand it is prohibited

to scrub utensils?

Do the two beraitot not disagree on this point

—these beraitot:

One

the tanna of the latter beraita

holds that an action is required

demonstrating that the sand is designated for its use. Even with something incapable of an action, designation in thought alone is insufficient to remove its status as a set-aside object. It is because of the prohibition of set-aside objects that he prohibits scrubbing with it.

And the other

the tanna of the first beraita

holds that an action is not required,

in accordance with Rav Yehuda.

And we reject this:

No,

that is not the case.

Rather,

everyone

agrees with Rav Yehuda, that

an action is not required

demonstrating this in the case of something incapable of an action; designation in thought is sufficient.

And it is not difficult.

This

the beraita that prohibits scrubbing with natron and sand, is in accordance

with Rabbi Yehuda,

who holds,

“An unintentional act is prohibited.”

And this

the beraita that permits doing so, is in accordance

with Rabbi Shimon,

who holds,

“An unintentional act is permitted.”

Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon disagree as to whether a person may perform an action that also causes a prohibited act when he does not intend to perform the prohibited act—for example, dragging a bed, chair, or bench, which thereby makes a furrow in the ground. The making of the furrow itself is prohibited as the labor of plowing. Therefore Rabbi Yehuda prohibits it.

Rabbi Shimon permits it, since he does not intend to make the furrow, but merely to drag the object.

Here too, natron and sand sometimes smooth silver. However, the person does not intend to smooth it, but to polish the silver.

According to Rabbi Yehuda, it is prohibited even though he does not intend the prohibited labor. Rabbi Shimon permits it.

However, scrubbing with tartakon is prohibited even according to Rabbi Shimon, since tartakon certainly smooths the silver. Rabbi Shimon agrees that when the prohibited act will certainly occur, it is prohibited even when one does not intend the prohibition. As we hold, Rabbi Shimon agrees in a case of “cut off its head and will it not die.” That is, it is prohibited to cut off a bird’s head because of taking a life, even when one does not intend to kill it. Since the bird will inevitably die through this act, it is considered as though he intended the prohibited act itself [or the designation of the labor applies to his act. See the note for an explanation of the concept of an unintentional act].

And we raise an objection:

How did you establish this

beraita

that permits it—as being in accordance with Rabbi Shimon?

Come and hear the latter clause

of the beraita:

But he may not scrub with them

[with natron and sand]

his hair

because they remove the hair, which is prohibited as shearing.

And if

it is in accordance

with Rabbi Shimon,

who permits an unintentional act, then Rabbi Shimon

permits

even scrubbing one’s hair with them, since he does not intend this. And he does not consider it a case of “cut off its head and will it not die,” since it is not certain that the hair will be removed.