Shabbat 50a — the Talmud in English

He removes the covering, and they fall.

And it is explicitly proven that even if he insulated with them, there is no permission to move them except by shaking the covering.

And we answer:

Rather, if it was stated, this is how it was stated:

Rava said: They taught

that wool fleece may not be moved,

except

when

he did not designate them for insulation

permanently. And although he has now insulated with them, they still remain designated for their work.

But

if

he designated them for insulation

permanently—

they may be moved,

because they no longer remain designated for their work.

It was also stated: When Ravin came, he said in the name of Rav Yaakov, who said that Rav Asi ben Shaul said in the name of Rabbi: They taught

in the Mishna, “they may not be moved,”

except

when

he did not designate them for insulation. But if he designated them for insulation, they may be moved.

Ravina said:

in fact, as we said initially: if he insulated with them, it is permitted to move them. And even if he had never designated them for insulation, they are no longer considered set aside for their work.

And that which we learned here, that even when he insulated with them it is forbidden to move them—

with

wool fleece

belonging to the stockpile,

a large arrangement of merchandise,

they taught

so. For in such a case he does not remove them from their work by insulating with them.

It was also taught so: Wool fleece belonging to the stockpile—

may not be moved. But if the householder prepared them for use—

they may be moved.

Rabba bar bar Ḥana taught before Rav: Palm branches,

the central stems

of

tree branches

of a palm tree, which he cut,

he cut them so that they would serve him

as wood [for example, for fuel or for making utensils].

for example, for fuel or for making utensils].

And

afterward

he reconsidered concerning them

to use them

for

using them for

sitting

upon them—

he must bind

them together on the eve of Shabbat, while it is still day, into a thick bundle fit for sitting, in order to permit moving them on Shabbat. For an act is required that demonstrates that they are designated for sitting and not for work. And otherwise it is forbidden to move them on Shabbat, because they are still set aside for work. And designation through thought alone is not sufficient.

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: It is not necessary to bind them,

rather, through designation by thought alone they become designated for sitting and not for the work of wood.

He,

Rabba bar bar Ḥana,

taught it

this beraita,

and he

also

said concerning it: The halakha is according to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel,

and it is not necessary to bind them.

It was stated: Rav said:

palm branches which he cut for wood, if he wishes to permit moving them on Shabbat, he

binds

them while it is still day. For he holds like the Sages, that only through an act do they become designated for sitting.

And Shmuel said:

it is not necessary to bind them; rather, it is sufficient that he

thinks

about them while it is still day for sitting. For he holds like Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, that thought is sufficient.

And Rav Asi said: He sits

upon them while it is still day. And through this they become permitted to move on Shabbat,

even though he did not bind

them,

and even though he did not think

about them for sitting.

And we raise an inquiry concerning it:

Granted, Rav—

he is the one who said like the first tanna,

that designation through thought is ineffective

but an act of binding is required.

And

granted

Shmuel too—

he is the one who said like Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel,

that thought is sufficient.

But Rav Asi, who said

that we do not require even thought, but sitting upon them alone is sufficient without designating them for sitting—

like whom did he say this?

And we answer:

He,

Rav Asi,

who said,

holds

like this tanna, as it was taught: One goes out on Shabbat

to the public domain

with pikkurin [combed flax placed on a wound]

combed flax placed on a wound]

and with tzifa [fluffed wool placed on a wound],

fluffed wool placed on a wound],

when he has stained them with oil and wrapped them

he has tied them

with a cord.

For through this he reveals his דעת that they are made so that his garments should not scratch his wound, and they are considered an ordinary garment. And anything that he takes out by way of wearing does not involve taking out from one domain to another.

But if

he did not stain

the pikkurin and the tzifa

with oil, and did not wrap them with a cord—

one may not go out with them

to the public domain.

For since he has not revealed his דעת that they are made for the wound, they are not a garment, but merely a burden, which is forbidden to take out from one domain to another. [ [ולאו דוקא בהוצאה אסורים, אלא אף בטלטול בעלמא אסורים משום מוקצה. לפי שאינם מוכנים לכך מבעוד יום. תוספות] ]And they are forbidden not only to take out, but even to move alone, because of muktze. For they were not prepared for this while it was still day. Tosafot.

And if he went out with them,

with the pikkurin and the tzifa when they were placed on his wound,

for one hour

on the eve of Shabbat

while it was still day,

then

even though he did not stain

them

and did not wrap them with a cord, it is permitted

to go out with them on Shabbat [and not specifically if he went out with them; rather, even if he sat with them in his house while it was still day. There].

And this is like Rav Asi: even without an act and even without designation through thought, they become designated for this purpose through his using them for it.

Rav Ashi said: We too have learned

support for Rav Asi.

For it was taught:

Straw,

ordinarily stands for bricks or for fuel, and for this reason it is muktze. And when

it

is

on top of the bed

and he did not designate it for lying upon it, if he wishes on Shabbat to lie upon it—

he may not move it with his hand

in order to spread it out, for it is forbidden to move.

But he moves it

here and there

with his body,

when he lies upon it, for movement “from the side,” indirectly, is permitted .

But if it was

the straw designated

for animal food,

it is not muktze, and it is permitted to move.

Or if there was upon it,

upon the straw,

a pillow or a sheet while it was still day,

that is, he had already lain upon it while it was still day—

he moves it with his hand,

because there is no muktze prohibition applying to it.

Evidently, lying itself designates it for this, even without an act and without thought. And this is like Rav Asi.

And we conclude:

Conclude from it!

And we raise an inquiry concerning it:

And who

is

the tanna

first

who disagrees with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel,

and holds that designation through thought is ineffective; rather, one must bind the palm branches in order to designate them for sitting?

And we answer:

Rabbi Ḥanina ben Akiva

is.

For when Rav Dimi came, he said

in the name

of Ze'ira, who said that Rabbi Ḥanina said: Once Rabbi Ḥanina ben Akiva went to a certain place and found palm branches that they had cut for wood.

And it was the eve of Shabbat.

And he said to his students: Go and think

about them for sitting, to permit them from the prohibition of muktze,

so that we may sit upon them tomorrow [on Shabbat]!

on Shabbat]!

And Ze'ira said:

And I do not know whether

the place to which Rabbi Ḥanina went

was a house of a feast,

and for this reason he permitted thought alone,

or whether it was a house of mourning,

and for this reason he permitted it! And we prove:

From the fact that

Ze'ira said, “I do not know

whether it was a house of a feast or whether it was a house of mourning,”

conclude from it,

that specifically

because they went

to a house of mourning or to a house of a feast

it was sufficient for them to designate through thought, because

they were occupied,

and they could not bind the palm branches while it was still day.

But here,

where there is time to bind them, if

he bound them, yes,

it is permitted. But if

he did not bind them, no,

they may not be moved on Shabbat through designation by thought alone.

Rav Yehuda said: A person may bring in,

on the eve of Shabbat while it is still day,

the full measure of his basket of earth,

and pour the earth onto the floor of his house,

and he may do with it,

with the earth, on Shabbat,

whatever he needs.

Mar Zutra expounded in the name of Mar Zutra the Great: And this

is specifically when

he designated for it

the earth

a corner!

For in this way the earth is considered prepared and designated for all his needs. But if he placed it in the middle of his house, so that it would serve as a place for the feet to tread, it is subordinate to the floor of the house, and it is forbidden because of muktze.

The Rabbis said before Rav Pappa: Like whom

does Rav Yehuda hold, in permitting the earth that he brought in while it was still day?—

Like Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel,

for designation through thought alone is sufficient for him.

For if it is like the Sages, they say

that

an act is required

that demonstrates that the earth is designated for doing his needs with it.

Rav Pappa said to them: Even if you say that it is like the Sages,

the statement of Rav Yehuda is also well explained. For

the Sages said that an act is required only

with

an object that

is

capable of having an act performed with it,

such as palm branches, with which an act of binding can be performed.

But with an object that is not capable of having an act performed with it,

such as earth,

we do not

require an act; rather, designation through thought is sufficient.

Let us say

that this statement of Rav Yehuda

was

a dispute

of tannaim

that was taught.

For it was taught:

With all abrasive substances [one rubs in order to polish]

on Shabbat

one may polish utensils.

Except for silver utensils,

which it is forbidden to rub

with gertakon [a type of earth formed in wine barrels],

because silver is soft. And rubbing with gertakon smooths, flattens, and softens it. And smoothing [flattening and softening] is a primary category of labor.

And we infer:

But with natron and sand—

it is permitted

to rub silver utensils, because they do not smooth the silver.

But it was taught:

even with

natron and sand it is forbidden

to rub the utensils!

Is it not that they disagree in this

these beraitot:

that one,

the tanna of the latter beraita,

holds that an act is required

that demonstrates that the sand is designated for his purpose. And even with an object that is not capable of an act, designation through thought is not sufficient to permit it from the prohibition of muktze. And it is because of muktze that he prohibits rubbing with it.

And the other,

the tanna in the first beraita,

holds that we do not require an act,

and he is like Rav Yehuda.

And we reject this:

No,

this is not so.

Rather,

everyone

holds like Rav Yehuda, that

we do not require an act

that demonstrates it in the case of an object that is not capable of an act; rather, thought is sufficient.

And it is not difficult.

This,

the beraita that prohibited rubbing with natron and sand,

is according to Rabbi Yehuda,

it comes,

who says: An act not intended is forbidden.

And this,

the beraita that permits doing so,

is according to Rabbi Shimon,

it comes,

who says: An unintended act is permitted.

For Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon disagree whether it is permitted for a person to perform an action through which a prohibited act is also performed, when he does not intend to perform the prohibition. For example, dragging a bed, chair, or bench, through which a furrow is made in the ground. The making of the furrow itself is forbidden because of the labor of plowing. And for this reason Rabbi Yehuda prohibits it.

And Rabbi Shimon permits it, since he does not intend to make the furrow, but merely to drag.

Here too, natron and sand sometimes smooth the silver. However, the person does not intend to smooth it, but to polish the silver.

According to Rabbi Yehuda, it is forbidden even though he does not intend the prohibited labor. And Rabbi Shimon permits it.

However, with gertakon it is forbidden even according to Rabbi Shimon, for gertakon certainly smooths the silver. And Rabbi Shimon agrees that where the prohibition will certainly be performed, it is forbidden even when he does not intend the prohibition. And as we hold, Rabbi Shimon agrees in a case of “cut off its head and it will not die.” That is, it is forbidden to cut off the head of a bird because of taking a life, even when he does not intend to kill it. Since the bird will necessarily die through this act, it is considered as though he intends the substance of the prohibition [or the name of the labor applies to his act. See the note, in the explanation of the matter of an unintended act].

And we ask:

In what have you established this

beraita

that permits it—as Rabbi Shimon?

Come and hear the final clause

of the beraita:

But he may not rub with them [with natron and sand]

the

hair

on Shabbat, because they remove the hair, and it is forbidden because of shearing.

And if

according to

Rabbi Shimon

it comes, who permits an unintended act, then Rabbi Shimon

permits it

even to rub the hair with them, since he does not intend this. And he does not consider it a case of “cut off its head and it will not die,” for it is not certain that the hair will be removed.