Shabbat 49b — the Talmud in English

Rabbi Ḥanina bar Ḥama said to them: This is what Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, said ![](pamud.bmp "

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My father,

Rabbi Yosei,

was a leatherworker

[a craftsman who processed hides]

.

And he said

to us [on a weekday; Rashi. And Rabbeinu Ḥananel explained that this took place on Shabbat]:

Bring hides and let us sit on them!

This shows that even a craftsman does not object to the hides being used, and that even for him they are designated for sitting. Therefore, they are not objects set aside and may be moved.

They raise an objection from a source: Boards belonging to a householder—

one may move them

on Shabbat, because they are suitable for use.

But boards

belonging to a craftsman—

one may not move them,

because they are set aside for his work.

And if he had decided

during twilight, at the onset of Shabbat,

to place

on the boards

bread for guests—

in either case,

whether they are boards belonging to a householder or belonging to a craftsman,

one may move

them.

Thus, ordinarily, boards belonging to a craftsman may not be moved, because they are set aside for his work. This is difficult for Rabbi Ḥanina bar Ḥama, who permits even hides belonging to a craftsman to be moved.

And we answer:

Boards are different, because

the craftsman

is careful with them,

lest they become damaged. Hides, however, are different, because the craftsman is not careful with them, since there is no concern that they will be damaged.

Come and hear a proof: Hides—

whether processed

[tanned]

or unprocessed, one may move them on Shabbat, because they are not objects set aside, as they are suitable for sitting.

They are not set aside, because they are fit for sitting.

And the Sages said

“hides

that are processed”

only

with regard to ritual impurity.

Only processed hides are susceptible to ritual impurity. Unprocessed hides are not susceptible to ritual impurity.

And we analyze this:

Is it not

that the statement in the source permits moving them on Shabbat

without distinction

between hides

belonging to a householder, and without distinction

between hides

belonging to a craftsman? If so, this supports Rabbi Ḥanina bar Ḥama.

And we reject this:

And we reject this:

No, do not say “without distinction.” Rather, it is specifically hides

do not say “there is no difference.” Rather, it is specifically hides

belonging to a householder that may be moved.

.

And we respond:

But hides

belonging to a craftsman—what is their status?

belonging to a craftsman—what is their status?

One may not move

them, contrary to Rabbi Ḥanina bar Ḥama.

It is not possible to say this.

For

if so,

the statement

taught

at the end of the

beraita, “And they said ‘processed hides’ only with regard to ritual impurity,” would be difficult.

For according to your words, even with regard to Shabbat, processed and unprocessed hides differ.

And if so,

let the source distinguish and teach it in that context itself,

with regard to Shabbat, and say as follows:

When is this statement applicable—

that both processed and unprocessed hides may be moved? It is specifically

when they belong to a householder. But when they belong to a craftsman,

only unprocessed hides may be moved, but processed hides

may not.

Since he is careful with them, they are no longer designated for sitting and may not be moved.

And we reject this again: In fact, hides belonging to a craftsman may not be moved. The reason the source does not distinguish in this manner is that

the entire

beraita

is discussing a householder. The tan­​​​​nay distinguishes between hides belonging to a householder, and in that context we find a distinction only with regard to ritual impurity.

And we conclude: This matter is

a dispute

a

dispute among

tannaim, the Sages of the Mishnaic period.

As it was taught in a

beraita:

Hides belonging to a householder may be moved. But hides belonging to a craftsman may not be moved.

Rabbi Yosei says: Both this one and that one,

whether they belong to a householder or to a craftsman,

may be moved.

The Sages returned and sat

those Sages mentioned above,

and they raised the following question:

Regarding the statement that we learned in the Mishna: “Thirty-nine categories of labor, lacking one” —

corresponding to what

were these particular labors established as the primary categories of labor prohibited on Shabbat?

Rabbi Ḥanina bar Ḥama said to them: They correspond to the labors performed for the Tabernacle,

because all thirty-nine of these labors were needed for the work of the Tabernacle.

For this reason, the passage concerning Shabbat was placed next to the passage concerning the work of the Tabernacle, so that the laws of Shabbat could be derived from the work of the Tabernacle.

Rabbi Yonatan ben Elazar said to them: This is what Rabbi Shimon, son of Rabbi Yosei ben Lakonia, said:

The number of the thirty-nine labors

corresponds to

the number of times that the word

“labor”

or

“his labor”

or

.

Together, they number

forty minus one.

This is what the verse means when it says, “You shall not perform any labor”: You shall not perform the number of labors corresponding to the number of appearances of the word “labor” in the Torah.

Rav Yosef raised a question:

Regarding the verse about Joseph,

“And he came

into the house to perform his labor,”

is this verse also

included in the count

of thirty-nine occurrences,

or not?

The Gemara will explain shortly what caused him to be uncertain.

Abaye said to him

to Rav Yosef: Why do you have any uncertainty about this?

Let us bring a Torah scroll and count

whether there are thirty-nine occurrences of “labor” in the Torah without this verse or not. For

did Rabba bar bar Ḥana say in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan

in another incident:

“They did not leave there until they brought a Torah scroll and counted them”?

Rav Yosef said to him

to Abaye:

My uncertainty

concerning whether this verse is included in the count is

because

the word “labor” appears in another verse concerning the work of the Tabernacle, in the verse

“And the labor was sufficient.”

If these two verses are both counted, there will be forty occurrences of “labor” in the Torah. Therefore, one of these two verses must not be included in the count.

I am uncertain which of them is included in the count. Do we say that the verse

“And the labor was sufficient” is included in the count,

because it speaks of actual labor? This is what the verse means: The labor that they were performing was sufficient, neither less nor more than necessary [for example, the flattening of sheets of gold to cover the boards, which they flattened in precisely the required quantity].

But

the verse concerning Joseph, “And he came into the house to perform his labor,” is not included in the count, because the verse is not speaking of actual labor. Rather, it should be understood

in accordance with the one who says that

Joseph

entered to attend to his needs

[that is, to have relations with Potiphar’s wife. But the image of his father’s likeness appeared to him, and his father said to him: “Your brothers are destined to be inscribed on the stones of the ephod. Do you wish your name to be erased from among them?”].

Or perhaps, “And he came into the house to perform his labor” is included in the count,

and Joseph entered to perform actual labor.

And this

verse,

“And the labor was sufficient,”

is not included in the count, because it does not speak of actual labor. Rather,

this is what it means: His work was completed!

For the verse is referring to the work of bringing the voluntary offerings: the bringing was completed, and there was no further need for offerings.

And we conclude:

The question remains without a resolution.

A

beraita was taught in accordance with the one who says that the thirty-nine labors

correspond to the number of

the number of

labors performed for the Tabernacle.

As it was taught in a

beraita: One is liable only for a labor whose counterpart was performed in the Tabernacle. They

[in the work of the Tabernacle]

sowed

plants used to produce the blue dye and the red-dyed ram skins,

and

so

you shall not sow

on Shabbat.

They reaped

plants used for dye,

and

so

you shall not reap.

They lifted the boards from the ground

of the Israelite camp, which was a public domain,

onto a wagon,

which was a private domain [because it was ten handbreadths high and four handbreadths by four handbreadths wide],

and

so

you shall not bring an object from a public domain into a private domain.

They lowered the boards from the wagon to the ground,

a public domain,

and

so

you shall not take an object out of a private domain into a public domain.

They carried

boards

from one wagon to another, and

so

you shall not carry an object from one private domain

to

another private domain

.

And the Gemara asks: One who carries an object from one private domain to another private domain,

what has he done?

There is no Torah prohibition in doing this.

And we answer:

Abaye and Rava both say, and some say Rav Adda bar Ahava:

This is what the verse means: Do not carry

from one private domain to another private domain through a public domain.

This is analogous to carrying from one wagon to another, which was done in the Tabernacle, since the airspace between the wagons was a public domain.

We learned in the Mishna: One may insulate food

with fleeces of wool, but one may not move

them.

Rava said: They taught

that it is prohibited to move them

only

when he

did not insulate anything in them.

They therefore remain set aside for their usual work.

But if he insulated something in them,

they are no longer designated for their usual work,

and one may move them.

One of the Sages who was his contemporary raised an objection from a source

[he was then on his first day in the house of study]

to Rava:

But we learned in the Mishna:

“One may insulate food with fleeces of wool, but one may not move them. What does he do?”