Shabbat 150a (קנ.) — the Talmud in English

Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: This verse speaks of Babylonia. And this is what it is saying:

“This nation, which said:

measure

money and gold dinars

and bring.

This teaches that “measure-and-bring” is an acronym for “measure and bring.”

Some say: “Measure-and-bring”—that it said to everyone:

“measure-and-bring” means

bring very, very much, without measure.

After Nebuchadnezzar had been removed from his kingship and had dwelled for seven years among beasts and animals, eating grass like them, he returned to his kingship. And he said

“And abundant greatness

You have added to me.”

That is, extraordinary greatness was added to me, greater than I had during my first reign.

Rav Yehuda said that Rav Yirmeya bar Abba said: This teaches that Nebuchadnezzar rode

Nebuchadnezzar

upon a male lion, and he tied a large serpent

large

to its head

to the lion’s head, to serve it as a bridle. And this was the greatness that was added to him.

To fulfill that which is stated: “And I have given the beasts of the field to serve him.”

Mishna:

A person may not hire laborers on Shabbat.

And he may not hire them for the needs of the following day either. This is because it is written: “From pursuing your affairs and speaking words.” One’s affairs on Shabbat should not be like his weekday affairs.

It is forbidden for us on Shabbat to speak, advise, or make arrangements concerning any matter that is forbidden on Shabbat, even if we intend that it be done after Shabbat [Rambam, Commentary on the Mishna].

And

so

a person may not say to his fellow

on Shabbat,

to hire laborers for him.

The Gemara will explain why this is necessary.

One may not wait until nightfall at the Shabbat boundary in order to hire laborers for him or to bring produce.

That is, it is forbidden for a person on Shabbat to bring himself close to the end of the permitted Shabbat boundary, in order to be there at nightfall at the conclusion of Shabbat, and to approach as much as possible the place of the laborers or the orchard located outside the boundary, so that immediately at the conclusion of Shabbat he will be able to leave the boundary, walk to that place, and hire laborers or bring produce. Since bringing the produce or hiring the laborers is forbidden on Shabbat, it is also forbidden to wait until nightfall for their sake.

But he may wait until nightfall [

walking on Shabbat to the end of the boundary]

he may

in order to be near an orchard located outside the boundary, so that he can leave for there immediately at the conclusion of Shabbat

to guard

its produce. For if the produce were within the boundary, guarding it would be permitted on Shabbat. Therefore, it is also permitted to wait until nightfall for this purpose.

And once he has left at the conclusion of Shabbat for the orchard in order to guard its produce, he may also

bring produce in his hand.

It is not considered that he waited until nightfall for the purpose of bringing the produce, for his primary intention was not this, but rather guarding it.

Abba Shaul stated a general principle: For anything that I am entitled [

permitted]

to say

on Shabbat to a gentile or to my fellow, that he should do it for me after Shabbat, I am also

entitled

to walk for its sake on Shabbat to the end of the boundary

and wait until nightfall for it,

in order to go to him immediately at the conclusion of Shabbat.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: And likewise, a person may not say to his fellow to hire laborers for him.

And we raise a difficulty concerning this: Since we learned, “A person may not hire laborers,” it is obvious that he may not even say this to his fellow.

For what difference is there whether he does it himself or whether his fellow does it?

Since his fellow is also forbidden to do so, when he sends him he violates the prohibition of “You shall not place a stumbling block before the blind.”

Rav Pappa said:

The Mishna came to teach us that it is forbidden to say even to a

gentile associate

that he should hire laborers for him.

Rav Ashi raised an objection to this:

That too is obvious, for

speech to a gentile

is forbidden as a

rabbinic prohibition.

And Rabbi had already stated this without qualification earlier in the Mishna: “If a gentile comes to extinguish [a fire], one may not say to him: Extinguish it.” For this too is forbidden because of “From pursuing your affairs and speaking words.”

Rather,

Rav Ashi said: Even if you say

that the Mishna is speaking

of an Israelite fellow, this

is the precise inference

it comes to teach us: A person may not say to his fellow, “Hire laborers for me.” But a person may say to his fellow: “Will you perhaps be able to stay with me in the evening?”

perhaps

“Will you perhaps be able to stay with me in the evening?”

And although both of them know that he intends to hire him for work after the conclusion of Shabbat, it is permitted, since he does not explicitly state that this is the purpose for which he is inviting him.

And whose opinion is the Mishna following? It is that of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korha

is.

As it was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korha

says: A person may say to his fellow: “Will you perhaps be able to stay with me in the evening?”

Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korha.

And Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: What is the reason of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korha?—

Because

it is written: “From pursuing your affairs and speaking words.”

This implies that specifically

speech

of a weekday

is forbidden

on Shabbat. But

thought is permitted.

And since he does not explicitly say with his mouth that he seeks to hire him, it is permitted.

Rav Aḥa bar Rav Huna raised an objection to Rava:

But

did Rabbi Yoḥanan say

that specifically

weekday speech

on Shabbat

is forbidden,

but

thought is permitted?

For according to this,

apparently

Rabbi Yoḥanan held that

thought is not equivalent to speech.

But this cannot be said, for in general Rabbi Yoḥanan holds that thought is equivalent to speech.

For

Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Everywhere it is permitted to think

about words of Torah,

except in a bathhouse and a lavatory.

For they are repulsive places. And since he says that even thought is forbidden, apparently thought is equivalent to speech.

And we answer: Actually, thought is not equivalent to speech.

But there it is different,

with regard to words of Torah, which are forbidden in a lavatory because

we require: “And your camp shall be holy.”

The verse states that the place where you camp must be holy, because Israel is constantly thinking about words of Torah.

And

in a lavatory there

is no holiness. And the verse did not specifically write “speech” there. Therefore, we derive that thought is also forbidden. But concerning weekday speech on Shabbat, it is written: “And speaking words.” Therefore, specifically speech is forbidden.

holiness. The verse there does not specifically mention “speech.” Therefore, we also learn that thought is forbidden. But concerning weekday speech on Shabbat, the verse says “speaking words.” Therefore, specifically speech is forbidden.

And we ask again:

Here,

with regard to words of Torah,

it is also written

at the end of that verse,

“Nor shall there be seen among you the nakedness of anything.”

Thus, even with regard to this prohibition, the word “thing” is written, implying speech. And if even thought is forbidden, it must necessarily be that thought is equivalent to speech. If so, let us say the same with regard to Shabbat.

And we answer: Actually, the prohibition against words of Torah in a lavatory does not depend upon speech. And

that “

thing”

is needed for the teaching of Rav Yehuda.

For Rav Yehuda said: An unclothed gentile—

it is forbidden to recite the Shema opposite him.

And we raise a difficulty concerning this:

Why specifically an unclothed gentile,

when

even an Israelite

who is unclothed

also

is forbidden to recite opposite him, because this is considered facing nakedness?

And we answer:

He stated the less obvious case. It is not necessary to say that an unclothed Israelite,

as it is obvious

that it is forbidden

to recite opposite him.

But with regard to a gentile,

I might have said that it is permitted to recite opposite him

since it is written concerning him: “Their flesh is the flesh of donkeys.”

And therefore

I might say

that it

is entirely acceptable

and is not considered nakedness.

It comes to teach us

that even an unclothed gentile is considered nakedness, and it is forbidden to recite opposite him.

We raise a difficulty:

But say this as well:

Since their flesh is like the flesh of donkeys, it is not called “nakedness.”

And we answer: This cannot be said, for

the verse says

concerning Noah,

“And they did not see their father’s nakedness.”

Apparently, even among the descendants of Noah it is called “nakedness.”

And this prohibition against saying a sacred matter opposite nakedness is derived from “Nor shall there be seen among you the nakedness of anything.”

This prohibition applies only to speech, because the word “thing” is written concerning it. But thought is permitted, because thought is not equivalent to speech.

But in a lavatory and a bathhouse, where words of Torah are forbidden because of “And your camp shall be holy,” they are forbidden even in thought, since the verse does not specifically mention “speech” there.

And we ask:

But is

weekday speech on Shabbat

forbidden?

For Rav Ḥisda and Rav Hamnuna both said: It is permitted to calculate accounts involving a mitzva on Shabbat.

And

so

Rabbi Elazar said: One may pledge charity to the poor on Shabbat.

And

so

Rabbi Yaakov bar Idi said that Rabbi Yohanan said: One may attend to matters involving danger to the public [

we attend to matters involving danger to the public],

and matters concerning the public [

such as governmental affairs]

on Shabbat.

And

so

Rav Shmuel bar Naḥmani said that Rabbi Yonatan said: One may go to theaters, circuses, and basilicas [

types of palaces] and gather there in the assembly hall,

in order to attend to the affairs of the public on Shabbat.

And

so

the tanna of the school of Menashe taught: One may arrange matches for children

in order

to betroth

them,

on Shabbat. And

one may likewise negotiate with teachers

concerning the child,

in order

to teach him Scripture and to teach him a trade.

All these involve secular speech. Nevertheless, it is permitted to speak about them on Shabbat. And if we interpret the verse, “from pursuing your affairs and speaking words,” as prohibiting secular speech, then it would be prohibited by Torah law . And if so, even speech concerning a mitzva should be prohibited [Tosafot].

And we answer: All these cases are different, because they concern the needs of a mitzva. Only secular speech concerning optional matters is prohibited. For

the verse says: “from pursuing your affairs and speaking words.”

And we interpret it:

your affairs are prohibited,

but

matters concerning Heaven are permitted.

Even teaching a child a trade is considered a matter concerning Heaven, because it is a mitzva to teach him a trade. For anyone who does not teach him a trade teaches him to steal.

Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: Accounts of “melekh,”

that is, accounts that he has no need for whatsoever and that do not concern him [for example, calculating how much he would need to spend to build a house when he is not currently engaged in building his house. And “melekh” is an acronym for “what is it to you,” meaning that you have no need for these accounts],

and

accounts

of no consequence,

which he once needed but which now have no practical significance for him [for example, “I spent such and such an amount on the construction of this building”]—

it is permitted to calculate them on Shabbat.

It was taught likewise in a beraita: Past accounts. And

accounts likewise

that he will have in the future

for himself,

it is prohibited to calculate

them on Shabbat.