Shabbat 148b (קמח:) — the Talmud in English

And if you say that they should make a change by

spreading a cloth

over the mouth of the pitcher, this too is forbidden. For we must be concerned lest

it lead to wringing

the cloth of the water.

And if you say,

“Cover the pitcher with a cover”

[a covering], and thereby let this constitute a change, we should not require this of them, because

sometimes the covering becomes detached

from the pitcher.

And

if we require her to cover it,

she may come to tie it

[to fasten it]. And a permanent knot is involved, which is forbidden by Torah law.

Therefore it is impossible

to make a change in drawing the water. For this reason, they perform it in the manner in which it is done on a weekday.

And Rava bar Rav Ḥanan said to Abaye: We learned: One may not clap

[strike one hand against the other] on a Festival, to display mourning.

And one may not slap

one’s hand against one’s heart on a Festival, as an expression of mourning.

And

likewise

one may not dance

for rejoicing

on a Festival.

The reason is explained in Beitza: It is a decree lest one repair a musical instrument.

And he raised an objection:

But we see that people perform

these actions on a Festival.

And

why

do we not say anything to them

to protest against them?

Abaye said to him: According to your reasoning,

one should likewise ask this concerning that

which Rava said:

A blind alley that opens onto the public domain, and they made a side-post for it so that carrying within it would be permitted,

a person may not

sit at the mouth of the side-post

[at the opening of the side-post bordering on the public domain]. For

perhaps an object will roll

[become rolled]

to him

in the public domain, within four cubits. And since the distinction between the alley and the public domain is not sufficiently noticeable, we are concerned lest

he come to bring

this object from the public domain and return it to the alley, thereby transgressing the prohibition against bringing an object into the alley.

And

there is a difficulty:

But we see women placing pitchers

[setting down their pitchers]

and sitting at the mouth of the alley.

And

why

do we not say anything to them,

telling them that this is forbidden, as Rava said?

Rather,

the reason that we do not protest against them is that, in any event, the protest will not be effective.

Leave Israel alone.

For

it is better that they be unwitting than that they be deliberate.

Rava bar Rav Ḥanan thought

that Abaye meant that when he said this,

this applies to

a rabbinic

prohibition. But with regard to

a

Torah prohibition,

we do protest against them. And

we do not

fear that they may not listen.

We conclude:

That is not so.

Rather,

it makes no difference whether it is a

rabbinic

prohibition or whether it is a

Torah

Torah prohibition;

whenever people have adopted such a practice, one should not protest against them, for it is better that they be unwitting than deliberate.

And we prove this:

For the additional time of Yom Kippur is a Torah obligation.

One must extend the sanctity of the day into the preceding weekday and begin the fast slightly before nightfall, as we derive from the verse: “And you shall afflict your souls on the ninth day, in the evening.”

And

even so,

we see them

people

eating and drinking

until it becomes dark, and they add nothing from the weekday to the sanctity of the day,

and we do not say anything to them.

This is because of the principle: “Leave Israel alone. It is better that they be unwitting than deliberate.” Evidently, even when they transgress Torah prohibitions, one should not protest against them.

We learned in the Mishna:

And similarly, a woman may ask her female companion for loaves.

We inquire concerning this: It is implied that specifically

on Shabbat is it forbidden

to say, “Lend me,” because he may come to write.

But on a weekday it is entirely permitted.

It is permitted to borrow a loaf, and we are not concerned here with interest, even though he uses the language of a loan.

Shall we say that the Mishna is not in accordance with Hillel,

who prohibited doing this even on a weekday?

For

that

we learned:

It is forbidden to borrow a se’a of wheat on condition that one repay a se’a of wheat in return. For if the wheat rises in price between the time of the loan and repayment, the borrower will be found to be repaying a greater monetary value than that of the loan.

And so Hillel would say: A woman may not lend a loaf to her female companion until they establish its monetary value.

That is, she must assess its value, determining how much it is worth at the time of the loan, and she must likewise undertake to repay that value. Otherwise, we are concerned

that the wheat may rise in price, and

if she repays according to the value of the loaf at the time of repayment,

they will come to constitute interest.

We reject this:

Even if you say

that the Mishna follows

Hillel,

there is still no difficulty from that source. For

that

which is implied by the Mishna—that on a weekday it is permitted to borrow one loaf for another—refers

to a place where the value of the loaf is fixed

and known to everyone. Therefore, it is permitted even to borrow without qualification. If the price rises, he gives their value according to what they were worth at the time of the loan.

And

that

which Hillel prohibited borrowing without qualification refers

to a place where the value of the loaf is not fixed,

where the market price has not yet been established and the value of the loaf is not known to everyone. In such a case, we must be concerned that the loaf may become more expensive. Since they did not know its value at the time of the loan, she will repay according to the price at the time of repayment and come to transgress the prohibition of interest.

We learned in the Mishna:

And if he does not trust him,

he places his cloak with him, and settles the account with him after Shabbat.

It was stated: A Festival loan —

Rav Yosef said: It may not be claimed

in court. If he brings his fellow to court to demand repayment of this loan, the court never attends to it and does not obligate him to repay it.

And Rabba

said: A Festival loan

may be claimed

in court.

And we explain:

Rav Yosef said, “It may not be claimed,”

because

if you say

that it

may be claimed, he may come

the lender

to write

the loan [and even though he took it using the language of a temporary loan, there is still reason for concern. Tosafot].

And Rabba said, “It may be claimed,”

because

if you say

that it

may not be claimed, a person will not give

his fellow anything on a Festival.

And he may come to refrain from the rejoicing of the Festival.

And we raise an objection:

We learned: If he does not trust him, he places his cloak with him,

and settles the account with him after Shabbat.

Granted, if you say that “a Festival loan

may not be claimed,”

for that reason

he

places his cloak with him

as a pledge

and settles the account with him after Shabbat.

For if he does not seize collateral from him, he will be unable to collect the repayment from him in court.

Rather, if you say

according to Rava, that

it can be claimed, why

must he

leave his garment with him?

Let him give him

the lender the loan,

and claim it from him

in court after Shabbat.

And we answer: Although he can claim it from him, he is unwilling to lend without collateral.

For he says: I do not want him to stand

and come with him

to court, and

not select for me

a judge,

and thereby force me to trouble myself.

Rav Idi bar Avin raised an objection

to Rav Yosef:

We learned in the Mishna: If one slaughters a cow and distributes it

on credit to the purchasers

on Rosh HaShana of the year following the Sabbatical year, if the month

of Elul

was made a leap month, the Sabbatical year releases

this debt. For it is established that the Sabbatical year releases debts at its conclusion. Since Elul was extended, the first day of Rosh HaShana was the thirtieth of Elul, and it was still the Sabbatical year.

And if

Elul

was not

made a leap month, that day was the first of Tishrei of the eighth year. Therefore,

it is not released.

And

this is difficult:

if

a loan made on a Festival

was not given to be claimed, what does “it releases” mean?

In any event, he cannot claim the debt from the purchasers in court, since he lent them the meat on Rosh HaShana, which is a Festival.

And we answer:

That case is different,

since, when Elul was extended,

it became apparent that

that day

was an ordinary weekday. Therefore, it was not a loan made on a Festival, and had it not been for the fact that the Sabbatical year releases it, it could have been claimed.

And we raise another objection:

Come and hear from the latter clause: If it was not [a leap month], it is not released.

And if Elul was not extended, that day was the Festival of Rosh HaShana.

Granted, if you say

that a loan made on a Festival

can be claimed, this is why it teaches: “It is not released.”

For we are dealing with the eighth year.

But if you say, “It cannot be claimed,” what does

“it is not released” mean?

In any event, it cannot be claimed.

And we answer: Although he cannot claim a loan made on a Festival in court, nevertheless,

if the borrower gives him

the repayment voluntarily,

he may take it

from him, the lender. This is what it means when it says: If Elul was not extended, if the borrower gives it to him willingly, he may take it from him.

And we raise another objection:

By inference,

the word “releases” taught in the

first clause

comes to teach that even

if the borrower gives it to him

voluntarily, the lender

may not take it

from him. But if the borrower gives it to him willingly, why should he not take it?

And we answer: Both the first clause and the latter clause are speaking of a case in which the borrower gives it to him voluntarily. However,

the first clause,

since the Sabbatical year releases it,

requires

the lender

to say to him

the borrower,

“I release it.”

But

the latter clause,

since the Sabbatical year does not release it,

the lender need not

say to him, “I release it.”

Rather, if he gives it to him, he may take it.

As we learned in the Mishna: If one repays a debt during the Sabbatical year, the lender must say to him

the borrower:

“I release it.”

And if he says to him,

the borrower,

“Nevertheless,

I do not wish it to be released,”

he may accept from him

the repayment.

As it is stated: “This is the matter of the release: You shall release.”

Even if in the end he accepts it from him, he must mention the Sabbatical release verbally.

Rav Avya,

when he lent money on a Festival,

would take collateral

as stated in the Mishna: “He leaves his garment with him, and they settle the account after the Festival.”

Rabba bar Ulla

would not take collateral. Rather, after the Festival he

would employ a ruse

with the borrower: He would ask him for some object and retain it against the debt.

We learned in the Mishna:

And likewise, on the eve of Pesach

in Jerusalem when it occurs on Shabbat, he leaves his garment with him, and they settle the account after the Festival.

Rabbi Yohanan said: A person may consecrate his Paschal offering on Shabbat

on which the eve of Pesach occurs.

And

likewise, he may consecrate

his Festival peace-offering on the Festival,

which is the day on which it is offered. Although it is established that one may not consecrate offerings on Shabbat or a Festival, on the day on which they are offered it is permitted to consecrate them. For just as their offering overrides Shabbat, so too their consecration overrides Shabbat.

And we say:

Let us say that our Mishna supports

Rabbi Yohanan.

For we learned:

And likewise, on the eve of Pesach in Jerusalem when it occurs on Shabbat,

if one comes to purchase a lamb for his Paschal offering,

he leaves his garment with him

[with the seller],

and settles with him

the account after the Festival.

Evidently, on Shabbat he may take his Paschal offering and consecrate it.

And we reject this: There is no proof from here, because it is not speaking of initially consecrating the lamb on Shabbat. Rather,

what are we dealing with here? With

a lamb that had already been consecrated as a Paschal offering, and

he designates

additional participants in the lamb

for his Paschal offering.

And they become obligated to him for the value of their share in the lamb. On account of this debt, the participant leaves his garment with the one who designated the participants. Thus there is no prohibition of consecrating on Shabbat,

for

indeed

the lamb was consecrated from the outset

and

was already standing

And we challenge this: How can you establish the Mishna as speaking of joining the group on Shabbat?

Did we not learn: One may not initially join an animal on a Festival?

And certainly not on Shabbat, because of the prohibition against buying and selling on Shabbat and Festivals.

And we answer:

This case is different,

as it is speaking of a person who regularly joins the owner of the lamb's group.

Since he regularly frequents him,

he is not considered to be joining for the first time on Shabbat. Rather,

it is as though he had joined it

with regard to this lamb

from the outset

[before Shabbat]

it is considered.

The owner initially consecrated the lamb with the intention that this person, too, would join it.

[And Tosafot did not have this question and answer at all, since there it is speaking of joining a group voluntarily, and it is not appropriate to raise a difficulty from there concerning joining for the sake of a mitzva. Furthermore, there it explains the matter in an entirely different way.]

And we again seek to prove:

And

there is still support for Rabbi Yohanan from

that

which

Rabbi Hoshaya taught: A person may go

on Shabbat that occurs on the eve of Pesach

to a shepherd who regularly deals with him, and

the latter

gives him a lamb for his Paschal offering, and

the purchaser

consecrates it and fulfills his obligation with it

as his Paschal offering. Evidently, he may consecrate the Paschal offering on Shabbat, which is the day on which it is offered.

And we reject this:

There too

there is no proof at all, because

since he regularly

purchases

from him

his Paschal offering,

the shepherd consecrates it

the shepherd

from the outset

on the eve of Shabbat, for this lamb to be the Paschal offering of this purchaser.

And we challenge this:

But “he

gives him a lamb for his Paschal offering

and consecrates it,”

it teaches.

This clearly indicates that the purchaser consecrates it on Shabbat.

And we answer: In fact, it had already been consecrated by the shepherd on the eve of Shabbat. However, the purchaser must consecrate it again as

“consecration of increased sanctity,”

which imposes one consecration upon another,

by rabbinic ordinance.

It is merely an enhancement that the owner himself should consecrate it.

And we ask:

Did Rabbi Yohanan really say this,

that a person may consecrate his Paschal offering on Shabbat?

But Rabbi Yohanan said: The halakha follows an unattributed Mishna.

And we find an unattributed Mishna that explicitly teaches that one may not consecrate offerings on Shabbat.

As we learned: One may not consecrate, assign valuations,

[by vowing, “My valuation is upon me”],

or dedicate to the Temple treasury

[dedications for the kohanim or dedications for the Most High],

or separate terumot and tithes on a Festival.

And

all of these

that

were stated with regard to a Festival,

that they may not be performed,

by a kal va-chomer

that

on Shabbat

they are prohibited. This is difficult for Rabbi Yohanan, who says, “A person may consecrate his Paschal offering on Shabbat.”

And we answer:

There is no difficulty. Here,

in Rabbi Yohanan's statement, it is speaking

of

the Paschal offering and the Festival peace-offering, which are

obligations whose time is fixed.

Their offering is required specifically on that day, and just as their offering overrides Shabbat, so too their consecration overrides Shabbat.

Here,

in the Mishna, it is speaking

of obligations whose time is not fixed,

such as vows and freewill offerings, whose offering does not override Shabbat. Therefore, they too may not be consecrated on Shabbat.

Mishna:

A person may count

on Shabbat

the

number of

his guests and his delicacies

[his varieties of delicacies], and recite them

from his mouth. But he may not

read them

from writing.

If he wrote the names of his guests or his delicacies on the eve of Shabbat, he may not read them on Shabbat from that writing. The reason is explained in the Gemara.

A person may cast lots

[assign lots]

with his children and members of his household at the table,

to determine by lot who will receive each portion.

Provided that

the portions are equal, and

he does not intend to make one portion larger

for one person

than a smaller portion

for another. The reason is explained in the Gemara.

Lots may be cast

[lots] among the kohanim

for

the meat of

consecrated offerings on a Festival. But

lots may not be cast

for the portions. The Gemara will explain this.

The Gemara will explain this.