Shabbat 138a (קלח.) — the Talmud in English

Rather, Abaye said: It is rabbinic,

and suspending the strainer does not involve the prohibition of a rabbinic labor restriction due to making a temporary tent; rather, it is prohibited rabbinically because of “weekday activity”

—so that one should not perform it in the manner in which he performs it on a weekday,

when he suspends a strainer in order to strain a large quantity on a regular basis.

Abaye was collecting

[he was gathering]

and

enumerating

the stringencies of the beraita

[the groups of laws in the beraitot], according to the order of their liability, exemption, and permission,

and he taught

as follows:

a.

The gud

is a sewn leather skin with straps by which it is suspended from pegs. Passersby place wine in it and stretch and suspend it on pegs so that the wind passes beneath the wine and cools it, and it is a temporary tent

See Note 15, where we cited the words of the Rashba. And the mishmaret

that we learned in our Mishna

The Rashba raised a difficulty against Rashi, who explains that the prohibition of the mishmaret is due to ordinary weekday activity and not to the prohibition of making a tent: Abaye includes the mishmaret together with the things prohibited because of a tent. The Rashba wrote, in defense of Rashi, that not all the things listed by Abaye are prohibited for the same reason; rather, all these things are implements that the Sages decreed may not be spread out. According to Rashi, even the kisei glin was not prohibited because of a tent. A canopy

which is like a tent spread above the bed and along its four sides and which people customarily lower after using the bed; therefore, it is a temporary tent.

And the kisei glin

[a chair from a place called Glin, which comes apart, with its parts assembled when one wishes to use it], and assembling it raises the concern that one might fasten the parts tightly and thereby incur liability for a sin-offering because of striking the final blow with a hammer This is how Rashi explained it. Tosafot [s.v. “kisei glin”] question Rashi’s explanation: Surely the entire sugya deals with the prohibition of making a tent. [See Note 13.] Tosafot disagree with Rashi and say that the kisei glin resembles a bed made of poles over which leather is spread. We find in the Gemara, Beitza 33a, that Rav Yehuda prohibits setting up such a bed when one places the poles and spreads the leather over them, because of the prohibition against making a tent. The Matzpeh Eitan wrote that Rashi follows his position in tractate Beitza, that the halakha does not follow Rav Yehuda, since Rav Yehuda rules in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda that an unintentional act is prohibited. Since the halakha follows Rabbi Shimon, who permits an unintentional act, there is no prohibition against setting up the bed, because one does not intend to make a tent. Therefore, Rashi explained that it is prohibited because one might fasten the parts. [See there Tosafot, s.v. “from below.”] Tosafot further wrote [s.v. “kisei taraskal”] in the name of Rabbeinu Tam that the bed and anything similar to it are prohibited only when they have complete partitions reaching the ground; but if they stand only on legs, they are not prohibited. Tosafot wrote in chapter Kira [above, 36b, s.v. “And Beit Hillel”] in the name of Rabbeinu Yitzhak that something that does not so closely resemble a tent is prohibited to make on Shabbat only when one makes the partitions; but if the partitions were already there, there is no prohibition. Otherwise, it would always be prohibited to return a pot onto a stove because of the prohibition against making a tent. The Rashba raised a difficulty against Tosafot’s method from the law of the gud, which is a tent without partitions and is prohibited. The Gra [Orah Hayyim, section 502, subsection 1] strengthens Tosafot’s method: If making a roof without partitions were prohibited, it would not help that one changes the procedure and places the roof before the partitions. See Biur Halakha 315:3, s.v. “our beds.” The Rosh [chapter 4 of Beitza, section 11] wrote that when one intends to make a tent for shade, it is prohibited even without partitions. [See Magen Avraham, section 315, subsection 7, and Mishna Berura there, subsection 20.]

All these

may not be done, but if one did so—

he is exempt, but it is prohibited.

b.

Permanent tents—

may not be made, but if one made one—

he is liable to bring a sin-offering

Rabbeinu Maimonides wrote: “One who makes a permanent tent has performed a derivative of building and is liable” [Laws of Shabbat 10:13]. The Penei Yehoshua [Sukka 16a, Tosafot s.v. “they spread”] wrote that the fundamental distinction between building and a tent is that building is permanent and endures for many days, whereas a permanent tent is relatively temporary compared with a building. Nevertheless, one is liable for a tent as a derivative of building, because this is the normal manner of making a tent. The Biur Halakha [315:1, s.v. “and there is no partition”] explains the distinction as follows: A building is made of stones and other materials ordinarily used for building, whereas a tent is made of soft materials unsuitable for building. Therefore, it is prohibited to erect a partition of stones even in a temporary manner. Although there is no prohibition of making a tent in such a case, since the Sages did not prohibit making a temporary partition, there is nevertheless a prohibition because of building, as temporary building is prohibited by rabbinic decree. With regard to building, there is no difference between a partition and a roof. It was not explained in the Gemara and the early authorities what length of time one must intend to leave the tent standing for it to be considered a permanent tent. The Pri Megadim [Orah Hayyim 626, subsection 8, Eshel Avraham] is uncertain whether placing s’khakh on a sukka on Shabbat or a Festival is prohibited by Torah law, or whether it is prohibited only by rabbinic decree, like a temporary tent. In that case, it would be permitted to tell a gentile to do it, because it is needed for a mitzva. According to the Bikkurei Yaakov [there, subsection 11], a sukka is certainly a temporary tent, and placing s’khakh on it entails no prohibition by Torah law. See Note 28, where opinions are cited that the distinction between permanent and temporary depends on the length of time.

c.

But a bed

that folds, with all its parts connected, and when one wishes to lie on it, one need only arrange the legs on which the bed stands.

And a kisei taraskal

which is a folding chair.

And an asla

which is like a folding chair, with an opening, and is used as a toilet.

All these

may be spread out initially

We learned in the Mishna:

And one may not place [wine] into a suspended [mishmaret] on Shabbat.

They raised a dilemma before them:

If one transgressed and

filtered

what is his status?

Rav Kahana said: If he filtered—

he is liable to bring a sin-offering.

Rav Sheshet raised an objection to this: Is there any such thing

[Have we ever found such a matter,] that they disagree so radically,

with the Sages requiring a sin-offering, while Rabbi Eliezer permits it initially

The Rashba raised the following difficulty: In chapter Eilu Kesharim, the Sages and Rabbi Yehuda disagree concerning the making of a loop knot. According to the Sages, it is permitted initially, whereas according to Rabbi Yehuda it is prohibited by Torah law. The Rashba answered that what is astonishing is not that the majority permit and the individual requires a sin-offering, but that the majority require a sin-offering and the individual permits it. It appears from the Rashba that there is no difficulty in principle with two opinions being far apart, but when the majority prohibit something by Torah law, the individual should at least prohibit it by rabbinic decree, since the fact that most of the Sages prohibit it demonstrates that the matter closely resembles a Torah prohibition.

Rav Yosef raised an objection to this: Why not?

After all,

we find, concerning a woman who goes out into the public domain on Shabbat with a

golden city

[the image of a city made of gold],

that Rabbi Meir requires a sin-offering, while

if

Rabbi Eliezer permits it initially.

And we explain:

What is this case?

As it was taught in a beraita: A woman may not go out with a golden city,

because it is heavy and is worn only to display wealth , and it is not an ornament but a burden,

but if she went out—

she is liable to bring a sin-offering, the words of Rabbi Meir.

And the Sages say: She may not go out

even though it is an ornament, because there is concern that she might remove it in order to display it and carry it four cubits,

but if she went out—

she is exempt.

Rabbi Eliezer says: A woman may go out with a golden city initially,

because only a distinguished woman ordinarily goes out with a golden city, and a distinguished woman does not remove the ornament in order to display it.

Abaye said to him: Do you maintain that Rabbi Eliezer is taking a position against Rabbi Meir,

to disagree with him,

who says: She is liable to bring a sin-offering?

Rabbi Eliezer

is taking a position against the Sages, who say: She is exempt, but it is prohibited. And he said to them: It is permitted initially

Tosafot [s.v. “Do you maintain”] say that Abaye’s words are not understandable. In the margin of Tosafot it is explained that it is unclear what is resolved by saying that Rabbi Eliezer’s statement was directed against the Sages. Ultimately, we have found that Rabbi Eliezer permits something that Rabbi Meir prohibits by Torah law. Although it is possible that Rabbi Eliezer did not know Rabbi Meir’s view and therefore did not go so far as to prohibit it by rabbinic decree, the wording of the Gemara does not indicate that this was Abaye’s intent. See Sefat Emet, who explains Tosafot’s question differently.

Although we have not found another case in which there is such an extreme disagreement among the tannaim, Rav Kahana’s statement that, according to the Sages, one who filters is liable to bring a sin-offering is not rejected

The Rashba wrote that the Gemara’s conclusion is indeed that it is possible for the Sages to require a sin-offering for something that Rabbi Eliezer permits initially, and Abaye’s statement was merely rejected. They raised a dilemma before them: If one places wine sediment into a mishmaret on Shabbat so that the wine will be strained—

because of which prohibition do we formally admonish him

Tosafot Tosafot wrote in chapter Kelal Gadol [73b, s.v. “because of which”] that the Gemara here seemingly indicates that one must admonish a person for a derivative labor by invoking its primary labor. Accordingly, if one tells him that filtering is a labor, this is not a valid admonition, until one tells him that filtering is a derivative of selecting according to Rabba, or a derivative of sifting according to Rabbi Zeira. Tosafot reject this: It may not be necessary to admonish someone regarding a derivative by invoking its primary labor. Rather, if one admonishes him for a derivative by invoking a primary labor, but it is not a derivative of that primary labor, the admonition is invalid, because the person being admonished thinks that the one admonishing him is mocking him. Therefore, Rabba and Rabbi Zeira disagreed in a case where he was admonished regarding filtering by invoking the primary labor: when is this considered a valid admonition? But if one simply admonishes him, “Do not filter,” he is liable. The view of Tosafot Rid is like the first approach of Tosafot: One must mention the name of the primary labor in the admonition. The reason is that for every prohibition in the Torah one must admonish a person regarding the specific prohibition that he is violating: for forbidden fat, regarding forbidden fat, and for blood, regarding blood. So too here, one should admonish him regarding the prohibition of the labor of Shabbat. However, since there is a division of labors with regard to Shabbat, and one who performs two labors unwittingly is liable to bring two sin-offerings, each primary labor is itself a separate prohibition; therefore, one must admonish him regarding that specific prohibition. Regarding the law of admonition for all areas of the Torah, the Minḥat Ḥinukh [mitzva 32, subsection 2] wrote that Rashi and Maimonides disagree. According to Rashi in tractate Shevuot, one must admonish him regarding that specific prohibition, whereas from Maimonides it appears that one need not admonish him regarding the specific prohibition, but regarding the punishment incurred for this transgression.

Rabba said:

Certainly, the labor of filtering is a derivative of the labor of sifting , but one is liable for it also

because of selecting

This is how Rashi explains it. In the novellae attributed to the Ran , he raised a difficulty against him: What compelled him to explain this way, namely, that Rabba concedes to Rabbi Zeira that filtering involves sifting? Sefat Emet says that Rashi apparently considered Rabbi Zeira’s reasoning—that filtering resembles sifting because the food is below and the refuse above—to be an irrefutable argument. However, Tosafot in chapter Kelal Gadol [73b, s.v. “because of which”] hold that Rabba maintains that an admonition regarding sifting is not a valid admonition. The Biur Halakha [section 319, subsection 9, s.v. “mishmaret”] explains Tosafot’s view: Rabba holds that the one who sifts performs an action on both the refuse and the food together, shaking the sieve and thereby separating the food and refuse. This is unlike filtering, where no action is performed on the sediment during the separation; rather, it remains in place and the wine drains from it. Therefore, filtering more closely resembles selecting, in which one removes the food while the refuse remains in place. See there what he wrote concerning Maimonides’ view. See also the novellae attributed to the Ran, where he cites the Ra’ah.

Rabbi Zeira said:

One must admonish him only

because of sifting.

Rabba said: My view is more plausible

that filtering resembles selecting, since

what is the usual manner of one who selects—

he takes the food and leaves the refuse

so too here—

in the process of filtering, he

takes the food and leaves the refuse.

Rabbi Zeira said: My view is more plausible

that filtering more closely resembles sifting, because

what is the usual manner of sifting—

the refuse is above and the food below,

whereas one who selects takes the kernels and leaves the clods below

The Gemara says in chapter Kelal Gadol [73b–74a] that winnowing, selecting, and sifting are essentially one labor—the separation of food from refuse—but they differ in the form of the labor. Since all three were performed in the construction of the Tabernacle, all three are considered primary labors. Rashi in the Mishna there explains: winnowing is done with a shovel in the wind, selecting is done by hand, and sifting is done with a sieve. It follows from Rashi that what distinguishes the labors is the manner of performance—by hand or with an implement, and which implement. However, on 75b, s.v. “he is a weaver,” Rashi explains that the difference between them is that although winnowing and selecting are both labors of separating refuse from kernels, one who winnows separates coarse material, whereas one who selects removes clods, and one who sifts separates flour. Thus, it appears that the difference between the labors depends on the type of material being selected and not on the form of selection. The Ran indicates that the reason winnowing and sifting are also considered primary labors in addition to selecting is that they differ in two respects: both in the manner of the labor, by hand or with an implement, and in the type of material being selected. It is possible that this is also Rashi’s view: whenever there is no difference both in the manner of performance and in the type of material being selected, the labor is considered selecting. Rabbeinu Hananel [74a] explains that winnowing is performed with the aid of wind, selecting is performed by hand, and sifting is performed with an implement. It follows that the difference between the labors depends only on the manner of performance and not on the type of material being selected. The Aglei Tal [The Labor of Winnowing, section 3, subsection 1] noted that the statements of Rabba and Rabbi Zeira present a difficulty for Rabbeinu Hananel: If the distinction between selecting and sifting depends only on the manner of the action—that one is done by hand and the other with an implement—then filtering is certainly a derivative of sifting. See there for his answer. See also Shevitat HaShabbat, General Principles of Winnowing, Selecting, and Sifting, subsection 7. Rami bar Yehezkel taught: A doubled cloak—

may not be made

by placing it over four poles, so that it forms a roof above and walls on the sides to provide protection from the sun.

But if one made it—

he is exempt, but it is prohibited.