Shabbat 135b (קלה:) — the Talmud in English

He said to him: The Torah was given,

and

then

this halakha wasחדש [sic: source wording unclear]

was established: Anyone whose mother is impure with the impurity of childbirth is circumcised on the eighth day, and anyone whose mother is not impure with the impurity of childbirth is not circumcised on the eighth day.

And we challenge this:

Is that so?

Is this indeed the case?

But it was stated: A child delivered by caesarean section, and one who has two foreskins [i.e., he has two layers of skin or two shafts, Rashi]—concerning them

there is a dispute between

Rav Huna and Rav Hiyya bar Rav.

One says: The Shabbat may be desecrated on his behalf.

And one says: It may not be desecrated

on his behalf on Shabbat.

The dispute is only with regard to desecrating the Shabbat on his behalf. But as for the eighth day,

we certainly circumcise him,

even though, in the case of a child delivered by caesarean section, his mother is not impure with the impurity of childbirth.

And we answer:

The two matters are interdependent:

Anyone who is circumcised on the eighth day has his circumcision override the Shabbat. And anyone who is not circumcised on the eighth day does not have his circumcision override the Shabbat, since the permission for circumcision on Shabbat was stated with regard to a circumcision performed on the eighth day.

And we say: This dispute is

like the dispute between tanna’im.

In the passage of Lekh Lekha, two verses were stated concerning the circumcision of slaves.

a. “And every male among you who is eight days old shall be circumcised throughout your generations, one born in the house, and one purchased with money, from every foreigner who is not of your offspring.”

b. “He shall surely circumcise one born in your house and one purchased with your money.”

In the first verse it says: “One who is eight days old shall be circumcised among you.” But in the second verse, circumcision on the eighth day is not mentioned. From this they derived that circumcision that is analogous to “among you” is performed on the eighth day, whereas circumcision that is not analogous to “among you” is performed immediately.

And now we cite the dispute between tanna’im in a beraita:

There is “one born in the house”—

who is circumcised on the first day.

And there is “one born in the house”—

who is circumcised on the eighth day.

There is “one purchased with money”—

who is circumcised on the first day.

And there is “one purchased with money”—

who is circumcised on the eighth day.

And we explain:

How so?

If he purchased a pregnant maidservant, and afterward she gave birth

while in his possession,

this is one purchased with money who is circumcised on the eighth day.

For he acquired him while he was in his mother’s womb, and he was born in the possession of an Israelite; thus, he is analogous to “among you.”

If he purchased a maidservant, and her child was with her,

and eight days had not yet elapsed from the time of his birth,

this is “one purchased with money”

who is circumcised on

the

first

day after his birth, since he is not analogous to “among you”; therefore, he is circumcised immediately.

And there is “one born in the house” who is circumcised on the eighth day.

How so?

If he purchased a maidservant, and she conceived in his possession and gave birth

in his house,

this is “one born in the house” who is circumcised on the eighth day.

[And below we challenge this: How can the first tanna find a case of “one born in the house” who is circumcised on the first day?]

Rav Hama says:

If the maidservant

gave birth and afterward immersed,

before she had become obligated in mitzvot and while she was not impure with the impurity of childbirth,

this is “one born in the house” who is circumcised on the first day.

For anyone whose mother is not impure with the impurity of childbirth is circumcised immediately.

If she immersed

for the sake of becoming a maidservant, thereby becoming obligated in the mitzvot in which a woman is obligated,

and afterward gave birth,

and she is impure with the impurity of childbirth,

this is “one born in the house”

who is circumcised on the eighth day.

And the first tanna does not distinguish between

whether she

immersed and afterward gave birth,

or

between giving birth and afterward immersing. For even though his mother is not impure with the impurity of childbirth, he is circumcised on the eighth day.

Thus, they dispute the issue stated above: Is circumcision on the eighth day dependent on the impurity of childbirth? And we inquire:

Granted, according to Rav Hama, one can find a case of “one born in the house”

who is

circumcised on

the

first day.

And one can find a case of

“one born in the house”

who is

circumcised on the eighth day.

And we explain it:

If she gave birth and afterward immersed, this is “one born in the house” who is circumcised on the first day.

If she immersed and afterward gave birth, this is “one born in the house” who is circumcised on the eighth day.

“One purchased with money” who is circumcised on the eighth day is, for example, one who purchased a pregnant maidservant, had her immerse, and afterward she gave birth.

“One purchased with money”

who is

circumcised on the first day

is, for example, a case in which two men purchased her while she was pregnant:

one purchased the maidservant, and the other

purchased

her fetus.

Since the owner of the fetus has no share in the mother, he is not analogous to “among you”; therefore, he is circumcised on the first day.

But according to the first tanna, granted that all the other cases can be found, as we explained above.

But “one born in the house,”

who is

circumcised on the first day—

how can one find such a case?

For he is analogous to “among you,” whereas according to the first tanna circumcision on the eighth day is not dependent on the impurity of childbirth.

Rav Yirmeya said: It is a case in which one purchases

from another Israelite

a maidservant

who had already immersed,

for her fetus,

so that only the fetus would belong to him. Since he has no share in the mother, he is not analogous to “among you.”

In several places in the Shas, Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish dispute whether “acquisition of produce” is equivalent to “acquisition of the substance” or not.

“Acquisition of the substance” is ownership of the substance of the item.

“Acquisition of produce” is the right to eat or use the produce or the uses of the object.

The dispute between Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish is: Who is defined as the item’s primary owner? Is it the one who owns the substance of the item, or is the one who has the right to use it or eat its produce defined as the item’s owner?

In the case as Rav Yirmeya established it, he purchased a maidservant so that he would have the right to receive her fetus. He has no ownership of the mother’s substance, but the produce that comes from her belongs to him; thus, he has “acquisition of produce” in the maidservant.

And we challenge this:

That works according to the one who says: “Acquisition of produce” is not equivalent to acquisition of the substance.

Thus, the owner of the fetus is not defined as the owner with regard to the maidservant. Since he has the fetus but not the mother, he is not analogous to “among you.”

But according to the one who says: “Acquisition of produce” is equivalent to acquisition of the substance, what can be said?

Why is he not analogous to “among you”? For his ownership of the fetus automatically causes him to be considered the owner of the maidservant [since he has acquisition of produce in her], and he has both the mother and her fetus.

Rav Mesharsheya said: It is a case in which he purchases a maidservant on the condition that she not immerse,

and she is a gentile who is not subject to mitzvot, and one born to her is not analogous to “among you”; this is “one born in the house” who is circumcised on the first day. [But according to the first tanna, we are not concerned with the impurity of childbirth].

It was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Shimon ben Gamliel says: Any

fetus

that remains alive for thirty days, in the case of a human being, is not a stillbirth, as it is stated: “And its redemption, from one month old, you shall redeem.”

Since its redemption is made dependent on its being one month old, conclude from this that only now has it become clear to us that it is viable; until now, it had not.

Any animal that remains alive for eight days is not a stillbirth, as it is stated: “And from the eighth day onward it shall be acceptable as an offering made by fire to the Lord.”

And we infer:

If it did not remain alive

for thirty days in the case of a human being, or eight days in the case of an animal,

it is a matter of uncertainty.