Shabbat 135b — the Talmud in English

He said to him: The Torah was given, ![](pamud.bmp "

exact page location")

and

then

this halakha was renewed: anyone whose mother has the impurity of childbirth is circumcised on the eighth day; and anyone whose mother does not have the impurity of childbirth is not circumcised on the eighth day.

.this: Any child whose mother has the impurity associated with childbirth is circumcised on the eighth day, and any child whose mother does not have the impurity associated with childbirth is not circumcised on the eighth day.

And we challenge this:

Is it not so?

Is this indeed so?

But it was stated: one born by cesarean section, and one who has two foreskins [that he has two skins, or two organs, Rashi]—they disagree about it

who has two layers of skin or two organs, Rashi] - there is a dispute about it between

Rav Huna and Rav Hiyya bar Rav.

One said: We desecrate the Shabbat for him.

And one said: We do not desecrate

the Shabbat for him.

Their disagreement extends only to desecrating the Shabbat for him. But as for [circumcising him] on the eighth—

certainly we circumcise him,

even though in the case of one born by cesarean section his mother does not have the impurity of childbirth.

And we resolve:

This depends on that:

everyone who is circumcised on the eighth, his circumcision overrides the Shabbat; and everyone who is not circumcised on the eighth, his circumcision does not override the Shabbat, since the permission for circumcision on the Shabbat was stated with regard to circumcision on the eighth day.

And we say: This disagreement is

like the disagreement of the tannaim.

In the section “Lech Lecha,” two verses were stated concerning the circumcision of slaves.

a. “And a son eight days old shall be circumcised for you, every male throughout your generations, one born in the house, and one bought with money, from every son of a foreigner who is not of your offspring.”

b. “He shall surely be circumcised, one born in your house and one bought with your money.”

In the first verse it is stated, “A son eight days old shall be circumcised for you.” Whereas in the second verse circumcision on the eighth is not stated. And from this they learned that circumcision that is analogous to “for you” is on the eighth; and circumcision that is not analogous to “for you” is performed immediately.

And now we bring the disagreement of the tannaim in a beraita:

There is “one born in the house”—

who is circumcised on the first [day].

And there is “one born in the house”—

who is circumcised on the eighth.

There is “one bought with money”—

who is circumcised on the first [day].

And there is “one bought with money”—

who is circumcised on the eighth.

And we explain:

How so?

He purchased a pregnant maidservant, and afterward she gave birth

while in his possession.

This is “one bought with money” who is circumcised on the eighth.

For he acquired him in his mother’s womb, and he was born in the possession of an Israelite, and this is analogous to “for you.”

He purchased a maidservant, and her child was with her,

and eight days had not yet passed from the time of his birth;

this is “one bought with money”

who is circumcised on the

day

one

of his birth, for since he is not analogous to “for you,” therefore he is circumcised immediately.

And there is “one born in the house” who is circumcised on the eighth.

How so?

He purchased a maidservant, and she became pregnant in his possession and gave birth

in his house;

this is “one born in the house” who is circumcised on the eighth.

And below we challenge: how can one find, according to the first Tanna, “one born in the house” who is circumcised on the first [day]?

Rav Hama says:

if the maidservant

gave birth, and afterward immersed,

when she had not yet become obligated in mitzvot and she did not have the impurity of childbirth,

this is “one born in the house” who is circumcised on the first [day].

For anyone whose mother does not have the impurity of childbirth is circumcised immediately.

She immersed

for the sake of servitude, and became obligated in the mitzvot in which a woman is obligated,

and afterward gave birth,

and she has the impurity of childbirth,

this is “one born in the house”

who is circumcised on the eighth.

And the first Tanna does not distinguish between

if

she immersed and afterward gave birth,

and

between [if] she gave birth and afterward immersed. For even though his mother does not have the impurity of childbirth, he is circumcised on the eighth.

It follows that they disagree in the disagreement above: whether circumcision on the eighth depends on the impurity of childbirth. And we consider the matter:

Granted, according to Rav Hama, one can find “one born in the house”

who is

circumcised on the

day

one.

And one can find

“one born in the house”

who is

circumcised on the eighth.

And we explain it:

She gave birth and afterward immersed—this is “one born in the house” who is circumcised on the first [day].

She immersed and afterward gave birth—this is “one born in the house” who is circumcised on the eighth.

“One bought with money” is circumcised on the eighth, for example, when he purchased a pregnant maidservant and she immersed, and afterward gave birth.

“One bought with money”

who is

circumcised on the first [day],

for example, when two people purchased her while she was pregnant,

this one purchased the maidservant, and this one

purchased

her fetus.

For since the owner of the fetus has no share in the mother, this is not analogous to “for you,” and therefore he is circumcised on the first [day].

But according to the first Tanna, granted that all the others can be found, as we explained above.

But “one born in the house,”

who is

circumcised on the first [day]—

how can one find it?

For it is analogous to “for you,” whereas according to the first Tanna circumcision on the eighth does not depend on the impurity of childbirth.

Rav Yirmeya said: [It is] when he purchases

from another Israelite

a maidservant

who had already immersed,

for her fetus,

so that only the fetus would belong to him; since he has no share in the mother, this is not analogous to “for you.”

In several places in the Shas, Rabbi Yohanan and Resh Lakish disagree whether “acquisition of produce” is like “acquisition of the substance,” or not.

“Acquisition of the substance” is ownership of the substance of the thing.

“Acquisition of produce” is the right to eat, or to use, the produce or the uses of the object.

And the disagreement of Rabbi Yohanan and Resh Lakish is: who is defined as the principal owner of the object? Is it the one to whom the substance of the thing belongs, or is the one who has the right to use or eat the produce defined as the owner of the thing?

And in the manner in which Rav Yirmeya established it, he purchased a maidservant so that he would have the right to receive her fetus. He has no ownership of the substance of the mother; but the produce that comes from her belongs to him, so he has “acquisition of produce” in the maidservant.

And we challenge this:

This works well according to the one who says, “acquisition of produce” is not like acquisition of the substance.

And the owners of the fetus are not defined as owners with respect to the maidservant. Since he has the fetus but does not have the mother, this is not analogous to “for you.”

But according to the one who says, “acquisition of produce” is like acquisition of the substance, what is there to say?

Why is this not analogous to “for you”? For his ownership of the fetus automatically causes him to be considered her owner [since he has “acquisition of produce” in her], and he has both the mother and her fetus?

Rav Mesharshya said: [It is] when he purchases a maidservant on condition that he will not immerse her,

and she is a gentile who is not subject to mitzvot, and the one born from her is not analogous to “for you”; and this is “one born in the house” who is circumcised on the first [day]. [But we are not concerned with the impurity of childbirth according to the first Tanna].

It was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Shimon ben Gamliel says: Any

fetus

that remains [alive] for thirty days, in the case of a person, is not a nonviable birth. As it is stated: “And its redemption from one month old you shall redeem.”

And since its redemption is made dependent on [being] one month old, conclude from it that only now has it become clear to us that it is viable, but until now it had not.

Any [animal] that remains [alive] for eight days, in the case of an animal, is not a nonviable birth, as it is stated: “And from the eighth day onward it will be acceptable as an offering made by fire to the Lord.”

And we infer:

If it did not remain

thirty days in the case of a person, and eight in the case of an animal,

it is a doubt.