Shabbat 131a — the Talmud in English

And Rav

follows

his reasoning, for he said:

the mavוי is not permitted

by

making

a side-post and a crossbeam until there are ![](pamud.bmp "

exact column position")

houses and courtyards,

such that there are two houses open to each of the two courtyards, and those courtyards are

open into it,

to the mavוי.

And Rav’s reason is because what they permitted in a mavוי, to render it fit with a side-post and a crossbeam, is because there is in it a multitude of residents, and they do not use it so privately; therefore, this small correction suffices.

This is not so in a courtyard, in which there are not so many residents, and in which they use [the area] privately; the Sages therefore required it to be rendered fit by means of two strips on the two sides of the entrance, or one strip of four tefachim.

And a mavוי to which courtyards are not open, and in which there are not so many residents, and in which discreet uses are performed, must be rendered fit according to the law of a courtyard [Mishna Berura, section 366, subsection 102

]. And here,

after the courtyards joined in an eruv with the houses, there are only

houses

in this mavוי, but

there are no courtyards,

for the courtyards were nullified with regard to the houses.

And we challenge this: If Rav said this for that reason—

even when they did not join in an eruv

the courtyards with the houses,

let us regard these houses as though they were sealed.

For since they did not join in an eruv, they may not carry out from the house into the courtyard, and it follows that the courtyards interrupt between the houses and the mavוי.

And

if so, in this mavוי there are only

courtyards, and

there are

no houses,

so for what reason, when they did not join in an eruv, is it permitted to carry throughout all of it?

One of the members of the courtyard who forgot and did not join in an eruv with the others renders it forbidden for all the members of the courtyard to carry from their houses into the courtyard. The solution is that he should nullify his [the one who did not join in an eruv] domain for them, and say: “My domain is nullified or transferred to you.” This is effective even without an act of acquisition, because this is not “transfer of ownership” but rather “withdrawal of domain”; and for this reason it is possible to withdraw one’s domain even after nightfall [Shulchan Arukh, section 380, and Mishna Berura ].

And this is difficult for us: Even when they did not join in an eruv, let us regard the houses as though they were sealed, and there are no houses.

And we answer: Even if they did not join in an eruv, there is a possibility of carrying from the houses into the courtyard. For

it is possible that

the members of the houses

withdraw the domain of all of them in favor of one

of them. And since they will withdraw their domains to him, everything will be considered one domain, and the entire courtyard will then be considered his. It is then permitted to take out from his house into the courtyard. Therefore, we do not say, “The houses are like sealed [entities], and let us regard them as such.”

And we refute this: Even if they withdrew their domains to one person, and he is permitted to take out from his house into the courtyard,

in the end,

there is only

one

house

present

from which it is possible to take out into the courtyard. But there are

no two houses

from which it is possible to take out into the courtyard,

present.

Yet Rav said that there must be open to the mavוי at least two houses that are open to two courtyards?

And we answer: Since “withdrawal of the domain” can be performed even on Shabbat itself, if so,

it is possible that from the morning,

from the morning

until midday,

they will withdraw their domains

in favor of one.

And

from midday, and toward evening,

until the conclusion of Shabbat, they will withdraw their domains

in favor of another one.

It follows that there was a domain belonging to two people from which it was possible to take out into their courtyards during Shabbat, and thus we have two houses from which it was possible to take out.

And we raise an objection:

In the end,

this is the situation:

at the time when this one is present, that one is not present.

For there are not, simultaneously, two courtyards into which it is permitted to take out, but only one after the other?

Rather, Rav Ashi said:

The explanation for why there is a distinction between whether they joined in an eruv or not is that

who caused the courtyards to become forbidden

to take out from them into the mavוי?

The houses

are what caused it.

For had it not been for the “courtyard eruvs” made by the residents of the houses, it would have been permitted to carry in the mavוי, because Rav holds in accordance with the view of Rabbi Shimon, that the roof of a courtyard, an open area, and a mavוי are all one domain, and it is permitted to carry from one to the other vessels with which Shabbat began in those places, but not in the house. However, when the houses are joined with the courtyard and vessels belonging to the houses are found in the courtyard, the Sages decreed that they should not take out from the courtyard into the mavוי, lest they come to take out vessels with which Shabbat began in the house.

But if they did not join the houses with the courtyards, it is forbidden to take vessels from the house into the courtyard.

And

if so, now

there are no

houses; therefore there is no longer a reason for forbidding taking out from the courtyard into the mavוי. And the mavוי is considered as though all had joined in a partnership in it, and it is obvious that it is permitted to carry in it.

Rabbi Chiyya bar Abba said in the name of Rabbi Yochanan: Not for everything

did

Rabbi Eliezer say that the preparations for a mitzva override Shabbat.

And the proof is:

for

the bringing of

the two loaves

on the festival of Atzeret

is the obligation of the day,

and they are sacrificed only on that very day.

And Rabbi Eliezer did not derive

that their baking overrides Shabbat

except by means of a gzera shava,

whereas had he held that all preparations for a mitzva whose mitzva is on Shabbat override Shabbat, why do I need a gzera shava?

For it was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Eliezer says: From where [is it derived] that the preparations for

the baking of

the two loaves, that they

they are,

override Shabbat?

“Bringing” is stated with regard to

the offering of

the omer,

as it is written: [Leviticus 23:10] “And you shall bring the omer, the first of your harvest, to the priest. And you shall count for yourselves from the day after the Shabbat, from the day on which you bring the omer of the waving.”

And “bringing” is stated with regard to

the offering of

the two loaves,

as it is written: [there, 17] “From your dwelling places you shall bring bread for a waving.”

And we derive by a gzera shava:

Just as with regard to the “bringing” stated concerning the omer, the preparations

of the mitzva—that is, reaping, grinding, and sifting—

override Shabbat,

as we derive in Tractate Menachot from the verse that is written: [Exodus 34:21] “Six days you shall work, and on the seventh day you shall rest; in plowing and in reaping you shall rest.” Just as plowing is optional, so too reaping is optional; the reaping of the omer is excluded, for it is a mitzva.

So too, with regard to the “bringing” stated concerning the two loaves, the preparations

for them, namely their baking,

override Shabbat.

And we explain: This gzera shava is

available.

For the verse is superfluous, and it comes to teach us only this.

For if it were not available,

and it were not superfluous, but rather taught us an additional law,

it would be possible to refute

the gzera shava:

What is so about the omer, that

even

if he found [the grain] reaped,

meaning that it had not been reaped for the sake of the mitzva of the omer, he

reaps,

because reaping itself is a mitzva, as it is written: “And you shall reap—and you shall bring”;

will you say the same with regard to the two loaves,

for “reaping” was not stated among the commands,

that if he found [the grain] reaped, he does not reap,

but rather brings from what was reaped?

And we inquire about this:

Is it indeed available?

Which verse is truly superfluous?

And we explain:

Now,

for

it is written

in the verse:

“And you shall bring the omer, the first of your harvest, to the priest.”

And if so, this other verse that is written: [Leviticus 23:15]

“From the day on which you bring”—

why do I need it?

It is superfluous.

Rather,

infer from it

that the verse comes

to make it available

and to derive a gzera shava.

And we refute this:

But still,

this gzera shava is

available

only

on one side.

For only on one side of the gzera shava [namely, with regard to the omer] there is a superfluous verse, whereas on the other side [with regard to the two loaves] it is not superfluous.

And we have heard him

Rabbi Eliezer

say: A gzera shava that is

unoccupied

available

only

on one side—

we derive

from it,

and

also

respond

to it, to refute it.

And we answer: The verse that is written, “From your dwelling places

you shall bring,”

is superfluous, for before it is stated, “And you shall offer a new meal-offering to the Lord”—why do I need “you shall bring”? Rather,

it is an amplification.

And since it is superfluous, it is possible to derive a gzera shava.

And we inquire about this: This statement that Rabbi Yochanan said, “Not for everything did Rabbi Eliezer say”—

to exclude what?

Which preparations for a mitzva does Rabbi Eliezer hold do not override Shabbat?

If you say, to exclude the lulav,

whose cutting from that which is attached [to the ground] should not override Shabbat—

But it was taught in a beraita: The lulav and all its preparations override Shabbat; these are the words of Rabbi Eliezer.

Rather,

perhaps you will say that it comes

to exclude

the preparations of

a sukka,

that they should not override Shabbat.

This is not possible, for

it was taught in a beraita: A sukka and all its preparations override Shabbat; these are the words of Rabbi Eliezer.

Rather,

perhaps you will say that it comes

to exclude

the preparations of

matza.

This is not possible, for

it was taught in a beraita: Matza and all its preparations override Shabbat; these are the words of Rabbi Eliezer.

Rather, to exclude the shofar,

whose preparation should not override Shabbat.

This too is not possible, for

it was taught in a beraita: A shofar and all its preparations override Shabbat; these are the words of Rabbi Eliezer.

Rav Adda bar Ahava said:

Rabbi Yochanan comes

to exclude

preparations for a mitzva such as placing

tzitzit on his garment, and

fixing

a mezuzah on his doorway.

For with regard to these Rabbi Eliezer agrees that they do not override Shabbat.

And the Gemara brings proof:

It was also taught thus,

that if he performed these preparations on Shabbat, he is liable for a sin-offering.

For it was taught:

And they agree,

the Sages and Rabbi Eliezer agreed in their view concerning this,

that if he attached tzitzit to his garment and made a mezuzah for his doorway, he is liable.

What is the reason

that Rabbi Eliezer agrees here?

Rav Yosef said: Because no fixed

time is assigned to them, for the mitzvot of tzitzit and mezuzah,

[there is no fixed] time.