Shabbat 131a (קלא.) — the Talmud in English

And Rav

follows

his own reasoning, as he said:

the alleyway is not rendered permissible

by

constructing a

lehi and a korah until there are

houses and courtyards,

namely, two houses opening onto each of the two courtyards, and the courtyards must be

open into it,

the alleyway.

Rav's reasoning is that the reason they permitted rendering an alleyway fit with a lehi and a korah is that it contains a large number of residences, and people do not use it so privately; therefore, this small correction is sufficient.

This is not so with a courtyard, where there are not so many residences and where people use it privately. The Sages therefore required that it be rendered fit by means of two strips, one on each side of the entrance, or one strip four tefahim wide.

And an alleyway onto which no courtyards open, and in which there are not so many residences, and where people engage in private activities, must be rendered fit according to the law of a courtyard [Mishna Berura, section 366, subsection 102].

But here,

after the courtyards have joined an eruv with the houses, there are only

houses

in this alleyway, but

there are no courtyards,

as the courtyards have thereby been nullified with regard to the houses.

And we raise an objection: If this is Rav's reason

even when they have not joined an eruv

the courtyards with the houses,

let us regard these houses as though they were sealed.

For since they have not joined an eruv, one may not carry from the house to the courtyard, and it follows that the courtyards interpose between the houses and the alleyway.

And

if so, in this alleyway there are only

courtyards, and

there are

no houses,

so for what reason is it permitted to carry throughout it when they have not joined an eruv?

If one of the members of the courtyard forgot and did not join an eruv with the others, he renders it forbidden for all the members of the courtyard to carry from their houses into the courtyard. The solution is that the one who did not join the eruv should nullify his domain to them and say: “My domain is nullified to you,” or, “It is acquired by you.” This is effective even without an act of acquisition, because this is not a transfer of ownership but rather a withdrawal of one’s domain; for this reason, one may withdraw his domain even after nightfall [Shulhan Arukh, section 380, and Mishna Berura].

And this is difficult for us: Even when they have not joined an eruv, let us regard the houses as though they were sealed, and there are no houses.

And we answer: Even if they have not joined an eruv, there is a possibility of carrying from the houses into the courtyard. For

it is possible that

the members of the houses

will nullify the domain of all of them to one

of them. And since they will withdraw their domains in his favor, everything will be considered a single domain, and the entire courtyard will then be considered his. It will then be permitted to take objects from his house into the courtyard. Therefore, we do not say: “The houses are like sealed structures, and let us regard them as nonexistent.”

And we refute this: Even if they nullified their domains to one person, and he is permitted to take objects from his house into the courtyard,

ultimately,

there is only

one

house

present

from which it is possible to take objects into the courtyard. But there are not

two houses

from which it is possible to take objects into the courtyard;

there are none.

Yet Rav said that at least two houses opening onto two courtyards must be open into the alleyway?

And we answer: Since “withdrawal of one’s domain” can be performed even on Shabbat itself,

it is possible that from the morning

until

midday,

they will withdraw their domains

in favor of one

person.

And from midday until evening,

until the end of Shabbat, they will withdraw their domains

in favor of another

person. It follows that the domain of two people was available for carrying into their courtyards during the course of Shabbat; thus, there are two houses from which it is possible to carry.

And we question this:

Ultimately,

when

this one is present, that one is not present.

For there are never two courtyards simultaneously into which it is permitted to carry, but only one after the other?

Rather, Rav Ashi said:

The explanation for why there is a distinction between whether they joined an eruv or not is that

what caused the courtyards to prohibit carrying

from them into the alleyway

was the houses

that caused it.

Had the residents of the houses not made “courtyard eruvin,” it would have been permitted to carry in the alleyway, because Rav follows the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who holds that the roof of a courtyard, an enclosure, and an alleyway are all one domain, and it is permitted to carry from one to the other objects that had come to rest there, but not objects that had come to rest in a house. However, when the houses have joined an eruv with the courtyard and objects belonging to the houses are present in the courtyard, the Sages decreed that one may not take objects from the courtyard into the alleyway, lest one come to take out objects that had come to rest in the house.

But if the houses did not join an eruv with the courtyards, it is forbidden to take objects from the house into the courtyard.

And

if so, now

there are none

of the houses, and therefore there is no longer any reason to prohibit carrying from the courtyard into the alleyway. The alleyway is considered as though they had all joined together in a partnership, and it is obvious that it is permitted to carry within it.

Rabbi Hiyya bar Abba said that Rabbi Yohanan said: Rabbi Eliezer did not say that for every

matter

the preparations for a mitzva override Shabbat.

The proof is

that

the bringing of the offering of

the two loaves

on the festival of Shavuot

is an obligation of the day,

and they may be sacrificed only on that very day.

And Rabbi Eliezer did not derive

that their baking overrides Shabbat

by means of a gezera shava,

but if he held that all preparations for a mitzva whose mitzva is performed on Shabbat override Shabbat, why would he need a gezera shava?

As it was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Eliezer says: From where is it derived that the preparations for [

baking ]

the two loaves, which

they are,

override Shabbat?

The term “bringing” is stated with regard to

the offering of

the omer,

as it is written: [Leviticus 23:10] “And you shall bring the omer, the first of your harvest, to the priest. And you shall count for yourselves from the day after the rest day, from the day that you bring the omer of the waving.”

And the term “bringing” is stated with regard to

the offering of

the two loaves,

as it is written: [there, 17] “From your dwelling places you shall bring a loaf of bread of waving.”

And we derive by means of a gezera shava:

Just as with regard to the “bringing” stated concerning the omer, its preparations

for the mitzva—that is, reaping, grinding, and sifting—

override Shabbat,

as the Gemara in tractate Menahot derives from the verse: [Exodus 34:21] “Six days you shall work, and on the seventh day you shall rest; in plowing and in reaping you shall rest.” Just as plowing is optional, so too reaping is optional; the reaping of the omer is excluded, as it is a mitzva.

So too, with regard to the “bringing” stated concerning the two loaves, their preparations

that is, their baking—

override Shabbat.

And we explain: This gezera shava is

unoccupied.

The verse is superfluous, and it comes solely to teach us this.

For if it were not unoccupied,

and it were not superfluous but taught us an additional law,

it would be possible to refute

the gezera shava:

What is special about the omer is that

even

if one found reaping already done,

not having been performed for the sake of the mitzva of the omer, he

reaps,

because reaping itself is a mitzva, as it is written: “And you shall reap—and you shall bring.”

Would you say the same with regard to the two loaves,

for which “reaping” was not stated in the commands,

so that if one found reaping already done, he does not reap,

but brings grain from that which was already reaped?

We inquire about this:

Is it indeed unoccupied?

Which verse is actually superfluous?

And we explain:

Now,

it is

written

in the verse:

“And you shall bring the omer, the first of your harvest, to the priest.”

And if so, this other verse that is written: [Leviticus 23:15]

“From the day that you bring”—

why do I need it?

It is superfluous.

Rather,

learn from it

that the verse comes

to leave it unoccupied

and to derive a gezera shava.

And we refute this:

Nevertheless,

this gezera shava is

unoccupied

only

on one side.

For only on one side of the gezera shava—namely, with regard to the omer—is there a superfluous verse, whereas on the other side—with regard to the two loaves—it is not superfluous.

And we know that

Rabbi Eliezer

said: A gezera shava that is

unoccupied

only

on one side—

we derive

from it,

but

we

also

respond

to it, to refute it.

And we answer: The verse that states, “From your dwelling places

you shall bring,”

is superfluous, for before it is stated, “And you shall offer a new meal-offering to the Lord”—why do I need “you shall bring”? Rather,

it is an amplification.

And since it is superfluous, it is possible to derive a gezera shava.

We inquire about this: When Rabbi Yohanan said, “Rabbi Eliezer did not say that for every”—

what does this exclude?

Which preparations for a mitzva does Rabbi Eliezer hold do not override Shabbat?

If you say it comes to exclude the lulav,

so that cutting it from a tree would not override Shabbat—

But it was taught in a beraita: The lulav and all its preparations override Shabbat; this is the statement of Rabbi Eliezer.

Rather,

perhaps you will say that it comes

to exclude

the preparations of

a sukka,

so that they would not override Shabbat.

That is impossible, because

it was taught in a beraita: A sukka and all its preparations override Shabbat; this is the statement of Rabbi Eliezer.

Rather,

perhaps you will say that it comes

to exclude

the preparations of

matza.

That is impossible, because

it was taught in a beraita: Matza and all its preparations override Shabbat; this is the statement of Rabbi Eliezer.

Rather, to exclude the shofar,

so that its preparation would not override Shabbat.

That too is impossible, because

it was taught in a beraita: The shofar and all its preparations override Shabbat; this is the statement of Rabbi Eliezer.

Rav Adda bar Ahava said:

Rabbi Yohanan comes

to exclude

preparations for a mitzva such as placing

tzitzit on his garment, and

affixing

a mezuzah to his doorway.

With regard to these, Rabbi Eliezer agrees that they do not override Shabbat.

The Gemara brings proof:

A beraita was also taught accordingly,

that if he performed these preparations on Shabbat, he is liable to bring a hatat.

As it was taught:

And they agree,

the Sages and Rabbi Eliezer concur concerning this matter,

that if one attached tzitzit to his garment or made a mezuzah for his doorway, he is liable.

What is the reason

that Rabbi Eliezer agrees here?

Rav Yosef said: Because no fixed

time is established for the mitzvot of tzitzit and mezuzah

.