Shabbat 124b (קכד:) — the Talmud in English

Beit Shammai say

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one may not remove

on a Festival when it is not needed

a child, a lulav, or a Torah scroll into the public domain.

For the labor of carrying was not permitted on a Festival any more than on Shabbat, except for carrying that is necessary for food preparation.

And Beit Hillel permit

even carrying that is not necessary for food preparation, for they hold that a Festival cannot be compared to Shabbat.

And this Mishna of “There is no difference”—is according to Beit Shammai. Whereas that Mishna of “They may remove”—is according to Beit Hillel.

And we reject this:

You may say that you heard Beit Shammai

compare a Festival to Shabbat with regard to the labor of

carrying.

But with regard to

moving

muktzeh—

did you hear them

say that they compare a Festival to Shabbat? And from where is it known that the Sages prohibited moving objects on a Festival just as it is prohibited on Shabbat?

And we answer:

A

s

is moving itself not because of carrying?

For everything that they decreed concerning muktzeh was because of carrying, lest one come to carry on Shabbat. And if you permit moving objects on a Festival, people will also come to permit carrying. Therefore, there is no distinction between moving and carrying.

And Rav too agreed with this teaching of Rava

that an object whose designated use is prohibited may be moved for its own use or for its place.

For Rav said: Master,

a shovel, if he wishes to move it in order

that it not be stolen,

which is akin to moving it from sun to shade—

this is moving for no necessary purpose, and it is prohibited.

And we infer: The reason

that he moves it

so that it not be stolen

is why it is prohibited; but for its own use or for its place, even though it is an object whose designated use is prohibited,

it is permitted.

And this is in accordance with Rava, who says that an object whose designated use is prohibited may also be moved for its place.

And we challenge this:

No!

How can you say that Rav permitted an object whose designated use is prohibited to be moved for its place?

But Rav Kahana once came to Rav’s house, and Rav said:

Rav

Bring him a trap—

a trap—

for

Rav

Kahana, so that he may sit

so that he could sit

on it.

And from the fact that Rav had to explain that they should bring the trap so that he could sit on it, does it not mean

that he intended to say

that an object whose designated use is prohibited may indeed be moved for its own use,

but it is permitted only for this purpose. However,

for its place—

no!

And therefore Rav emphasized that the moving was for its own use.

And we answer:

No.

There is no proof from there. Rather,

this is what he said to them:

Rav said,

Take the trap,

take the trap from the place where it was standing

from before

Rav

Kahana,

so that Rav Kahana would have a place there to sit. Thus, the moving was for the sake of its place.

And if you wish, say instead:

The reason Rava had to say that they should move it so that Rav Kahana could sit on it is that

there it was from sun to shade,

for the trap was in a place where it could be damaged. It could therefore have been mistakenly understood that Rav permitted moving an object from sun to shade; consequently Rav explained his words: the permission to move it is for its own use, but from sun to shade it is indeed prohibited to move it.

Rav Mari bar Rahel had certain felt cushions

felt cushions

in the sun,

lying in the sun and liable to be damaged.

He came before Rava. He said to him

Rav Mari said to Rava:

What is the ruling concerning moving them

May one move them from sun to shade?

He said to him

Rava said to him:

It is permitted!

And Rava followed his own position, that an object whose designated use is permitted may be moved from sun to shade.

He said to him

Rav Mari

I have

I have cushions

other

and I have no need for them.

He said to him

Rava

They can be used

those cushions

for guests.

Rav Mari said to him:

I also have

cushions

for guests,

and I have no need for them.

He said to him

Rava

You have revealed your position

You have revealed your view

that you agree with Rabba,

that an object whose designated use is permitted may not be moved when it is not needed for its own use; therefore you told me that you have no need for the cushions.

And therefore:

According to everyone—

it is permitted

to move them, since an object whose designated use is permitted may be moved from sun to shade.

But

according to you,

since you hold like Rabba, that an object whose designated use is permitted may not be moved from sun to shade, for you it is

prohibited.

Rabbi Abba said that Rav Hiyya bar Ashi said that Rav said: Brooms made of cloth,

a broom made of cloth with which one cleans the table—

may be moved on Shabbat.

But

brooms

made of palm branches,

with which one sweeps the floor [and it is prohibited to sweep a house on Shabbat, because when one sweeps the house one fills its depressions with earth, which constitutes leveling depressions [which is a form of building on Shabbat]]—

no!

That is, it is prohibited to move them.

Rabbi Elazar says: Even those made of palm branches

are permitted to move.

And we explain:

What are we dealing with?

If you say

that he moves them

for their own use or for their place,

but

would Rav say in this case that those made of palm branches are not permitted?!

But Rav—

held like Rava,

that an object whose designated use is prohibited may be moved for its own use.

Rather,

we are dealing with one who moves them

from sun to shade.

And therefore the Rabbis prohibited it.

And we refute this: Would

Rabbi Elazar say in this case: even

brooms

made of palm branches

may be moved?! But regarding an object whose designated use is prohibited, no one holds that it may be moved from sun to shade.

And we answer:

Actually,

we are dealing with one who moves them

from sun to shade.

And

say

that this is how the text should read:

And Rabbi Elazar likewise said,

in accordance with the statement of the Sages, that brooms made of cloth may be moved, but brooms made of palm branches, whose designated use is prohibited, may not be moved.

Mishna:

All vessels that may be moved on Shabbat—

their fragments may be moved along with them,

for they are permitted to be moved whether they broke on Shabbat or before Shabbat,

provided that they are suitable for some sort of use,

that they be suitable for some task, even if it is not similar to their former use.

For example,

fragments of a kneading trough

in which dough is kneaded, if they are suitable

to cover the mouth of a barrel.

Likewise,

fragments of glass

if they are suitable

to cover the mouth of a jug.

Rabbi Yehuda says:

The fragments may be moved only

provided that they are suitable

for doing with them

something similar to their use

their original, former use.

For example:

fragments of a kneading trough,

if they are now suitable

for pouring thick soup into them,

thick soup.

And those of glass,

fragments of glass, if they are now suitable

for pouring oil into them.

When the fragments and the vessels serve as receptacles.

Gemara:

Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: The dispute

between the first tanna and Rabbi Yehuda is when

they broke

the vessels

on the eve of Shabbat.

For one

Rabbi Yehuda

holds

that only when the fragments serve

a use similar to their former use, yes

only then may they be moved. But when they are suitable only for

a different use—

no,

they may not be moved.

And the other,

the first tanna,

holds that even

when the fragments serve

a different use, they may be moved.

But if they broke on Shabbat—

everyone agrees that they are permitted,

even when they do not serve a use similar to their former use. For

since they were prepared

the fragments

along with their original vessels—

it is permitted

to move them, because when Shabbat began, while the vessels were whole, they were permitted to be moved.

This reasoning—that the state of the whole vessel on the eve of Shabbat facilitates leniency concerning moving its fragments on Shabbat—is a rationale based on the “name of the vessel” with regard to its preparedness.

The reason that a fragment of a vessel is muktzeh is that it was not “prepared” on the eve of Shabbat for use as a fragment of a vessel. But since it had the status of a vessel when Shabbat began and was “prepared” for use on Shabbat, that status and preparedness do not leave it during Shabbat even when it breaks [provided that it remains suitable for some use, for if it is not suitable for use, it is muktzeh because of its very nature].

Perhaps this is the explanation of Rashi’s words at the beginning of tractate Beitza and at the end of tractate Shabbat: He holds that fruit pits may be moved from the table, since the “name of the fruit” still applies to them even after the fruit has been eaten and only the pits remain.

Rav Zutrai raised an objection

from what we learned in a beraita:

One may burn

on a Festival

whole vessels,

for they are fit to be moved.

But one may not burn fragments of vessels,

for they are muktzeh.

And we explain:

That they broke—

when

when did they break?

If you say that they broke on the eve of the Festival—

why may one not burn them? They are

merely pieces of wood,

and they are not muktzeh, since from the eve of the Festival they were designated for burning.

Rather, is it not that they broke

on the Festival? And it teaches: One may burn whole vessels but may not burn fragments of vessels.

And it teaches: One may burn whole vessels but may not burn fragments of vessels.

We do not say that the fragments were prepared along with their original vessels when the Festival began; rather, we say that they are nolad, a newly created entity, and it is prohibited to move them.

Rather, if it was stated, it was stated as follows:

Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: The dispute

between the first tanna and Rabbi Yehuda is when

they broke on Shabbat.

For one,

the first tanna,

holds: It is prepared

along with its original vessel.

And the other,

Rav Yehuda,

holds: It is nolad

and it is prohibited to move them.

But if they broke

broke

before Shabbat—

everyone agrees that they are permitted

to be moved, since they were prepared for a use before the day began.

One beraita teaches:

a beraita:

One may burn whole vessels but may not burn fragments of vessels.

And another beraita teaches

in another beraita:

Just as one may burn whole vessels, so may one burn fragments of vessels.

And another beraita teaches,

a third beraita:

One may burn neither whole vessels nor fragments of vessels.

And we explain:

This

beraita that teaches that one may burn whole vessels but not fragments of vessels—

is Rabbi Yehuda,

who holds that there is muktzeh and nolad.

Therefore, one may burn whole vessels, since they are not muktzeh. But it is prohibited to burn fragments of vessels, because they are nolad.

This

beraita that teaches that one may burn both—

is Rabbi Shimon,

who holds neither of muktzeh nor of nolad. Therefore, one may burn even fragments of vessels.

This

beraita that teaches that one may not burn even whole vessels—

is Rabbi Nehemya,

who holds that a vessel may be moved only for its designated use, and ordinary vessels are not designated for burning.

Rav Naḥman said: These bricks

bricks

that remained from construction,

which remained after the building was completed and were no longer designated for further construction—

may be moved

to move them, since

they are suitable for sitting on.

They are fit to sit upon, and they have the status of a vessel.

But if he

arranged them,

he placed the stones one on top of another—

he certainly set them aside

for another building project, and it is prohibited to move them.

Rav Naḥman said that Shmuel said: A

piece of

small pottery—

may be moved in a courtyard,

because vessels are commonly found there, and the pottery is suitable for covering them; therefore, the pottery has the status of a vessel.

But in a karmelit [even in a place where moving is permitted, such as within four cubits],

since vessels are not commonly found there and the pottery has no use—

no.

Rather, it is prohibited to move it.

And Rav Naḥman himself said: Even in a karmelit

it is permitted to move the pottery. For there are people who sit there, and the pottery can be used to cover spittle; thus it has the status of a vessel.

But in the public domain—

no!

There the pottery has no use, and therefore it is prohibited to move it there even less than four cubits.

And Rava said: Even in the public domain

it is permitted to move it less than four cubits. Since in a courtyard it has the status of a vessel, even when it is in the public domain it does not lose that status.

And Rava proceeded

and continued

according to his own position.

For Rava was walking along a path

in the public domain

that was muddy.

His shoes became soiled with mud,

his shoes became dirty with mud.

His attendant came,

his attendant

took a piece of pottery

and took a piece of pottery

and cleaned it with it,

and wiped the mud with the pottery.

The Sages rebuked him,

they scolded the Sage’s attendant for moving the pottery in the public domain.

He said,

Rava said:

Is it not enough

not enough

that they have not learned

that they do not know what is permitted and what is prohibited,

but they also teach their error

to others?!

If it had been in a courtyard,

the pottery

would it not have been suitable

fit

to cover a vessel with it

a vessel, and it would have been permitted to move it?

Here too, it is suitable,

this piece of pottery

for me

to wipe with it. And although this use is not common, nevertheless, since this pottery has the status of a vessel in a courtyard, that is sufficient to permit moving it in the public domain in order to wipe with it.

Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: A lid of a

stopper

barrel that broke

the barrel

may be moved,

for the lid is suitable for covering a vessel.

A beraita also teaches so: A lid of a

barrel that broke,

it—

the lid

and its fragments,

the fragments of the barrel

may be moved on Shabbat,

for they are suitable for covering vessels.

But one may not detach a fragment from it,

and he may not repair it by removing the protrusions from the fragment in order

to cover a vessel with it, or to support

or to support with this smooth fragment

the legs of a bed.

For by removing the protrusions, he makes a vessel out of the piece of pottery, which constitutes striking the final blow.

And if he threw

this lid

into the refuse heap,

it loses its status as a vessel and

it is prohibited

to move it.

Rav Pappa raised an objection: If that is so,

that throwing away the lid is effective in removing its status as a vessel,

throw away his cloak

he threw the garment into the refuse heap on Shabbat; would

it likewise be prohibited

to move it? Certainly throwing a garment into a refuse heap does not remove the garment’s status as a vessel.