Shabbat 107b — the Talmud in English

And the Sages say: There is no “skin” except ![](pamud.bmp "

Exact page location")

for those

creeping creatures

that the Sages enumerated

with regard to impurity, whose skin is skin.

And we are astonished:

On the contrary, why did the Sages enumerate

that their skins become impure like their flesh, when

they do not have skin?!

And Abaye said: This is what it means: Skin is not distinct from flesh

with regard to Shabbat, and one is liable for trapping and wounding,

except with regard to those that the Sages did not enumerate,

namely, the four creeping creatures whose skins do not become impure, because they are considered skin and not flesh: the mole, the mouse, the tortoise, and the tinshamet. But with regard to those four that the Sages enumerated, whose skins are like their flesh with regard to impurity, the same applies with regard to Shabbat: one who traps them or wounds them is exempt.

This is difficult for Rav, who said that the Sages did not dispute with regard to Shabbat?

And we resolve it:

Rava said

to Abaye:

The tanna said “why did the Sages enumerate,”

and it is not reasonable that he confused “enumerated” with “did not enumerate”?

Rather, Rava said: This is what it means:

The Sages said to Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri: You say that with regard to Shabbat the eight creeping creatures have skin, while with regard to impurity they do not have skin, but their skins are like their flesh. This is not so; rather,

skin becomes impure like flesh only with regard to those that the Sages enumerated

alone, and not the skins of all eight creeping creatures. But with regard to Shabbat, they did not dispute.

We challenge this:

This implies that Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri

holds that even

those as well that the Sages did not enumerate become impure?!

But it was taught: Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri says: The eight creeping creatures have skins, and they do not become impure?

Rav Adda bar Mattana said: Correct it as follows: “And the Sages say”

to Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri: Indeed, with regard to Shabbat we agree with you that the eight creeping creatures have skin, but

with regard to impurity, there is no skin for those that the Sages enumerated.

For those four, their skins are like their flesh. And we should not read, “but there is no skin for those that the Sages enumerated.”

Thus Rav’s words are resolved, that the Sages did not dispute with regard to Shabbat.

We challenge this:

And still

it should be difficult: Did

the Sages not dispute with regard to Shabbat

?

But it was taught in a beraita: One who traps one of the eight creeping creatures stated in the Torah

or

one who wounds them, is liable.

With regard to which creeping creatures?

With regard to creeping creatures that have skins,

namely, those four that the Sages did not enumerate.

And what is a wound that does not return

for which one is liable on Shabbat?

When the blood is congealed

and gathered in one place,

even though it has not emerged,

it will no longer return and be absorbed.

Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri says: The eight creeping creatures have skins.

This shows that the Sages also dispute with regard to Shabbat?

And we resolve it:

Rav Ashi said: Who is the first tanna

of this beraita?

It is Rabbi Yehuda,

and

he follows the approach of touch.

He holds that one follows the quality of the skin: those creeping creatures whose skin is soft have skins that are like their flesh, while those whose skin is hard do not have skins that are like their flesh; and he does not derive from the verse concerning “the impure ones” as the Sages do.

For we learned: Rabbi Yehuda says: The lizard

has the same status

as the mole,

for its skin is not like its flesh. But according to the Sages, who derive from the verse, the lizard is one of the four creeping creatures whose skin is like their flesh; necessarily, Rabbi Yehuda’s reason is that the matter depends on the physical reality, and the lizard has thick skin. Therefore its status is like that of the mole.

And according to Rabbi Yehuda, impurity and Shabbat are the same.

But the Sages, who dispute Rabbi Yohanan

ben Nuri

with regard to impurity,

hold that specifically with regard to impurity do we expound a verse to distinguish between the creeping creatures, but

with regard to Shabbat they agree with him,

that all eight creeping creatures have skin.

We challenge this:

If so, this

that is taught in the earlier beraita: “One who traps one of the eight creeping creatures is liable,

these are the words of Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri.”

This

should have said, “These are the words of Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri and his dispute,”

for the Sages agree with him with regard to Shabbat?!

And we answer:

Teach

in the beraita:

“These are the words of Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri and his dispute.”

Levi asked Rabbi: From where is it established that a “wound”

for which one is liable on Shabbat must specifically be a wound

“that does not return,”

and if it returns it is not called a wound? For example, wounding those creeping creatures that do not have skin, or a small blow in which even the blood did not congeal?

Rabbi answered him:

For it is written: “Can a Cushite change his skin, or a leopard his spots?”

What is meant by “his spots”?

If you say that it refers

to an actual leopard, which has

patches upon patches,

different colors in its skin, and the verse wonders: Can a leopard change the color of its skin?

If so, this is difficult:

This “or a leopard his spots.”

But

it should have written “or a leopard his colors”

to write?

Rather,

it is necessarily the case that “leopard” is used in the sense of change.

And this is what it means: Can a Cushite change his skin and change the wound of his skin? And we learn that the wound is

like the Cushite —

just as the skin of the Cushite does not return, so a wound does not return.

For does the verse say that the wound will return to its original state, so that the skin will not become hardened at the place of the injury?

We learned in the Mishna:

“But with regard to the other reptiles and creeping creatures,”

one who wounds them is exempt.

And we infer: Specifically, one who wounds them is exempt.

But one who kills them is liable.

Who is the tanna

who holds that one is liable for killing small reptiles and creeping creatures?

Rabbi Yirmeya said: It is Rabbi Eliezer. For it was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Eliezer says: One who kills a louse on Shabbat —

is like one who kills a camel on Shabbat!

That is, like one who kills a large animal.

Rav Yosef objected to him:

The Mishna can even be understood according to the Sages. For

the Sages disputed Rabbi Eliezer only with regard to a louse,

whose killer is exempt because

it does not reproduce. But with regard to other reptiles and creeping creatures that reproduce —

they do not dispute.

And both derived it only from rams,

the red rams that were slaughtered for the work of the Tabernacle for the sake of their skins, and from there we learned the labor of “slaughtering” on Shabbat.

Rabbi Eliezer holds: Like rams —

just as rams involve taking a life, so too, anything that involves taking a life,

one is liable for it on Shabbat, even for lice.

And the Sages hold: Like rams —

just as rams reproduce, so too, anything that reproduces,

excluding lice, which do not reproduce.

Abaye said

to Rav Yosef:

And

do

lice not reproduce?

But the master said: The Holy One, blessed be He, sits and provides nourishment from the horns of wild oxen

which are large animals

to the eggs of lice.

And it entered our minds that this means small lice when they emerge from their eggs; thus lice indeed reproduce?

And we resolve it: The reference is not to the eggs of lice, but rather

it is a species,

a species of creeping creature

that is called lice eggs.

We challenge this:

But it was taught: “tefuyyei

[a species of creeping creature]

and lice eggs”

[Rashi says that he does not know where the beraita is found or concerning what it was stated], which shows that lice have eggs?

And we resolve it: Here too,

it is a species that is called lice eggs.

We challenge this:

But the flea reproduces, and it was taught: With regard to one who traps a flea on Shabbat, Rabbi Eliezer obligates, and Rabbi Yehoshua exempts.

This shows that the Sages [who are Rabbi Yehoshua] dispute even in the case of something that reproduces?

And we resolve it:

Rav Ashi said:

And is

trapping being compared to killing

?!

Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua disputed only

with regard to trapping a flea, since it is something that is not ordinarily trapped:

one master,

Rabbi Eliezer,

holds: One is liable for something that is not a species ordinarily trapped, and the other master,

Rabbi Yehoshua,

holds

that he is

exempt.

But with regard to killing —

even Rabbi Yehoshua agrees

that he is liable, since it reproduces.

We learned in the Mishna: “But with regard to the other reptiles and creeping creatures” ...

one who traps them for a purpose is liable;

if not for a purpose, he is exempt.

And we raise an objection concerning this:

Who is the tanna

who exempts when it is not for a purpose?

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav: It is Rabbi Shimon, who says: For a labor not needed for its own purpose, one is exempt.

And trapping when it is not for a purpose is a labor not needed for its own purpose.

There are those who teach this

with regard to this, as we learned:

One who opens an abscess on Shabbat: if he makes an opening for it, he is liable; if he does so to extract pus from it, he is exempt.

And concerning this we say:

Who is the tanna

who exempts when he does so to extract pus?

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav: It is Rabbi Shimon, who says: For a labor not needed for its own purpose, one is exempt.

For the principal labor is making the opening, but this person does not need the opening to remain at all, but only temporarily, in order to extract the pus.

And there are those who teach this with regard to this,

as we learned:

One who traps a snake on Shabbat: if he is occupied with it so that it will not bite him, he is exempt; if it is for healing, he is liable.

And concerning this we say:

Who is the tanna

who exempts when he does so so that it will not bite him?

Rav Yehuda said in the name of

Rav: It is Rabbi Shimon, who says: For a labor not needed for its own purpose, one is exempt.

For he does not need the trapping itself, since if he were certain that it would not bite him, he would not trap the snake; he does not need it in order to use it, but traps it so that it will not reach him and harm him.

Shmuel said: One who draws out

removes

a fish from the sea [in a manner in which there is no trapping, such as when it had already been trapped before nightfall within the sea]

[in a case where there is no issue of trapping, such as when it had already been trapped in the sea before Shabbat began]

once a coin-sized area on it has dried

when the fish has dried over a diameter of a sela on its body, even though it is still struggling, and he then returns it to the sea,

is liable

on account of taking a life, for it will no longer return to life.

Rabbi Yosei bar Avin said: And

specifically when it dries

between its fins.

Rav Ashi said: Do not say

that he is not liable until it

has actually dried, but even if it has become slimy,

so that the slime stretches with the finger touching the fish, he is likewise liable.

Mar bar Hamduri said in the name of Shmuel: If one put his hand into the womb of an animal and detached the fetus in its womb,

thereby uprooting the fetus and causing it to miscarry —

he is liable.

What is the reason?

Rava said: Bar Hamduri explained it to me:

And did

Rav Sheshet not say: One who plucks

hops

[a species of vegetation]

from thorn bushes

from atop various thorns, while the hops are not attached to the ground but grow upon the thorns and draw nourishment from the scent of the ground through the thorns —

is liable on account of uprooting a thing from its place of growth.

Here too, he is liable on account of uprooting a thing from its place of growth

[the early authorities explain that he did not specifically say “uprooting a thing from its place of growth” with regard to a fetus, but rather, the reason with regard to a fetus is taking a life; and the Gemara compares them, that just as with hops one is liable on account of uprooting it from its place of growth, even though the hops have no life of their own but only through the thorn bush, so too with a fetus, whose life exists only through its mother, one is liable for uprooting it from her on account of taking a life].