Shabbat 107b (קז:) — the Talmud in English

And the Sages say: There is “skin” only

for those

creeping things

that the Sages enumerated

with regard to impurity, for whose skin is considered skin.

And we are astonished:

On the contrary, why did the Sages enumerate

that their skins convey impurity like their flesh, if

they do not have skin?!

And Abaye said: This is what the tanna meant: Skin is not distinct from flesh

with regard to Shabbat, and one is liable for trapping and wounding,

except with regard to those that the Sages did not enumerate,

namely, the four creeping things whose skins do not convey impurity, because they are considered skin rather than flesh: the mole, the mouse, the tortoise, and the tinshamet. But those four that the Sages enumerated, whose skins have the status of their flesh with regard to impurity, have the same law with regard to Shabbat: one who traps or wounds them is exempt.

This presents a difficulty to Rav, who said that the Sages did not disagree with Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri with regard to Shabbat.

And we answer:

Rava said

to Abaye:

The tanna said, “why did the Sages enumerate,”

not “why did the Sages not enumerate,” and it is not reasonable that he confused “enumerated” with “did not enumerate.”

Rather, Rava said: This is what

the Sages said to Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri: You say that with regard to Shabbat the eight creeping things have skin, whereas with regard to impurity they do not have skin, but their skins have the status of their flesh. This is not so. Rather,

skin has the status of flesh only with regard to those that the Sages enumerated,

and not the skins of all eight creeping things. But with regard to Shabbat they did not disagree.

And we challenge this:

Does it follow that Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri

holds that even

those that the Sages did not enumerate also convey impurity?!

But it was taught: Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri says: The eight creeping things have skins, and they do not convey impurity?

Rav Adda bar Mattana said: Explain it this way: And the Sages say

to Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri: Indeed, with regard to Shabbat we agree with you that the eight creeping things have skin, but

with regard to impurity, there is no skin with regard to those that the Sages enumerated.

For those four have skins with the status of their flesh. And we should not read, “but there is no skin except with regard to those that the Sages enumerated.”

Thus Rav’s statement is resolved: The Sages did not disagree with regard to Shabbat.

And we challenge this:

Still,

it should be difficult: Did

the Sages not disagree with regard to Shabbat

with Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri?

But it was taught: One who traps one of the eight creeping things mentioned in the Torah

or

one who wounds them is liable.

With regard to which creeping things?

With regard to creeping things that have skins,

namely, the four that the Sages did not enumerate.

And what is a wound that does not heal

for which one is liable on Shabbat?

When the blood gathers

and collects in one place,

even though it has not emerged,

it will no longer return and be reabsorbed.

Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri says: The eight creeping things have skins.

Thus, the Sages did disagree also with regard to Shabbat?

And we answer:

Rav Ashi said: Who is the first tanna

of this beraita?

It is Rabbi Yehuda,

and

he follows the approach of the texture.

He holds that one follows the quality of the skin: Those creeping things whose skin is soft have skins with the status of their flesh, while those whose skin is hard do not have skins with the status of their flesh. And he does not derive this from the verse concerning “the impure,” as the Sages do.

As we learned: Rabbi Yehuda says: The lizard

has the same status

as the mole,

whose skin does not have the status of its flesh. But according to the Sages, who derive the matter from the verse, the lizard is one of the four creeping things whose skin has the status of its flesh. Therefore, Rabbi Yehuda’s reason must be that the matter depends on the physical reality: The lizard has thick skin, and therefore its status is like that of the mole.

According to Rabbi Yehuda, impurity and Shabbat have the same law.

But the Sages, who disagree with Rabbi Yoḥanan

ben Nuri

with regard to impurity,

hold that it is specifically with regard to impurity that we derive from the verse a distinction among the creeping things;

but with regard to Shabbat, they agree with him

that all eight creeping things have skin.

And we challenge this:

If so, this

statement taught in the beraita above, “one who traps one of the eight creeping things is liable,”

is the statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri.

This should have said,

“the statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri and his opponent,”

since the Sages agree with him with regard to Shabbat?!

And we answer:

Teach

in the beraita:

“The statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri and his opponent.”

Levi asked Rabbi: From where

do we know that a “wound” for which one is liable on Shabbat is specifically a wound

“that does not heal,”

and if it heals it is not called a wound? For example, a wound in those creeping things that have no skin, or a minor blow in which even the blood did not gather?

And Rabbi answered him:

As it is written: “Can a Cushite change his skin, or a leopard his spots?”

What is the meaning of “his spots”?

If you say that it refers

to an actual leopard, which has

patches upon patches,

different colors in its skin, and the verse wonders: Can a leopard change the color of its skin?

If so, this is difficult:

Why does it say, “or a leopard his spots”?

But

it should have said, “or a leopard his colors”

in writing?

Rather,

it is unavoidable that “leopard” here is used in the sense of alteration.

And this is what it means: Can a Cushite change his skin and alter the wound in his skin? We learn that a wound is

like the Cushite —

just as the Cushite’s skin does not heal, so a wound does not heal.

For does the verse mean to say that the wound will return to its original state, so that the skin will not become hardened at the place of the blow?

We learned in the Mishna:

“But with regard to the other creeping things and crawling creatures,”

one who wounds them is exempt.

And we infer: One is exempt specifically for wounding them.

But for killing them, he is liable.

Who is the tanna

who holds that one is liable for killing small creeping things and crawling creatures?

Rabbi Yirmeya said: It is Rabbi Eliezer. As it was taught: Rabbi Eliezer says: One who kills a louse on Shabbat —

is like one who kills a camel on Shabbat!

That is, like one who kills a large animal.

Rav Yosef raised an objection to this:

The Mishna can even be according to the Sages. For

the Sages disagreed with Rabbi Eliezer only with regard to a louse,

and one who kills it is exempt because

it does not reproduce. But with regard to the other creeping things and crawling creatures, which do reproduce —

they do not disagree.

And both of them derived it only from rams,

the rams that were slaughtered for the work of the Tabernacle for the sake of their skins, and from there we learn the labor of “slaughtering” on Shabbat.

Rabbi Eliezer holds: Like rams —

just as rams involve taking a life, so too, anything whose killing involves taking a life

is one for which one is liable on Shabbat, even killing lice.

And the Sages hold: Like rams —

just as rams reproduce, so too, anything that reproduces;

this excludes lice, which do not reproduce.

Abaye said

to Rav Yosef:

But

does

a louse not reproduce?

But the Master said: The Holy One, blessed be He, sits and provides sustenance from the horns of wild oxen

which are large animals

to the eggs of lice.

And it entered our minds that this means the small lice when they emerge from their eggs; thus, lice do in fact reproduce?

And we answer: It does not refer to the eggs of lice. Rather,

it is a species,

a species of creeping creatures

called “lice eggs.”

And we challenge this:

But it was taught: “tipuyei”

[a species of creeping creatures]

and lice eggs

[Rashi says that he does not know where this beraita is found or with regard to what it was stated] — thus, lice do have eggs?

And we answer: Here too,

it is a species called “lice eggs.”

And we challenge this:

But the flea reproduces, and it was taught: With regard to one who traps a flea on Shabbat, Rabbi Eliezer deems him liable, and Rabbi Yehoshua exempts him.

Thus, the Sages [that is, Rabbi Yehoshua] disagree even with regard to something that reproduces?

And we answer:

Rav Ashi said:

What, do you compare

trapping to killing

?!

Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua disagreed only

with regard to trapping a flea, since it is something that is not customarily trapped:

one master,

Rabbi Eliezer,

holds that one is liable for something whose kind is not hunted, while the other master,

Rabbi Yehoshua,

holds

that he is

exempt.

But with regard to killing —

even Rabbi Yehoshua agrees

that one is liable, since it reproduces.

We learned in the Mishna: “But with regard to the other creeping things and crawling creatures” ...

one who traps them for a purpose is liable;

if he traps them without a purpose, he is exempt.

And we raise a difficulty:

Who is the tanna

who exempts one who traps without a purpose?

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav: It is Rabbi Shimon, who said: One is exempt for a labor not needed for its own purpose.

Trapping without a purpose is a labor not needed for its own purpose.

Some teach this statement with regard to the following:

As we learned:

One who opens an abscess on Shabbat: If he makes an opening for it, he is liable; if he does so merely to remove pus from it, he is exempt.

And concerning this we say:

Who is the tanna

who exempts one who does so to remove pus?

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav: It is Rabbi Shimon, who said: One is exempt for a labor not needed for its own purpose.

The primary labor is the construction of the opening, whereas this person does not need the opening to remain at all; he needs it only temporarily, in order to remove the pus.

And some teach this statement with regard to the following:

As we learned:

One who traps a snake on Shabbat: If he is occupied with it so that it will not bite him, he is exempt; if he does so for medicinal purposes, he is liable.

And concerning this we say:

Who is the tanna

who exempts one who does so so that it will not bite him?

Rav Yehuda said in the name of

Rav: It is Rabbi Shimon, who said: One is exempt for a labor not needed for its own purpose.

He does not need the trapping itself, for if he were certain that the snake would not bite him, he would not trap it. He does not need it to use it; rather, he traps it so that it will not approach him and harm him.

Shmuel said: One who draws out

a fish from

the sea [in a manner that does not involve trapping, for example, it had already been trapped before nightfall inside the sea]

[in a case where there is no issue of trapping, such as when it had already been trapped in the sea before Shabbat began]

once a coin-sized area of its skin has dried

so that the fish’s body has dried over a diameter the size of a sela, even though it is still writhing, and he then returned it to the sea,

is liable

because of taking a life, since it will no longer return to life.

Rabbi Yosei bar Avin said: And

it must specifically have dried

between its fins.

Rav Ashi said: Do not say

that he is liable only once it

has actually dried; rather, even if it has produced slime,

so that the slime stretches with the finger touching the fish, he is also liable.

Mar bar Hamduri said in the name of Shmuel: If one inserted his hand into the intestines of an animal and dislodged the fetus in its womb,

thereby uprooting the fetus and causing it to miscarry —

he is liable.

What is the reason?

Rava said: Bar Hamduri explained it to me:

What,

did Rav Sheshet not say:

One who pulls out kashuta

[a species of plant]

from hazmei and higei

from atop species of thorn bushes—although the kashuta is not attached to the ground, but grows on the thorns and draws nourishment from the scent of the earth through them—

is liable on account of uprooting something from its place of growth.

Here too, he is liable on account of uprooting something from its place of growth

[The early authorities explain that the expression “uprooting something from its place of growth” was not stated literally with regard to a fetus], rather, the reason with regard to a fetus is taking a life. The Gemara compares the two cases: Just as in the case of kashuta one is liable for uprooting it from its place of growth, even though the kashuta does not live independently but only by means of the hazmei and higei, so too, with regard to a fetus, whose life is sustained only through its mother, one is liable for uprooting it from her on account of taking a life.