Shabbat 107a (קז.) — the Talmud in English

Gemara:

Rabbi Abba said that Rav Hiyya bar Ashi said that

Rav: A bird entered beneath his wings

having become trapped in his garment;

he sits and guards it until dark

and he need not release it, since he is merely guarding it.

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak raised an objection:

We learned in the Mishna:

“If the first person sat at the entrance and filled it, and a second person came and sat beside him, even if the first person stood up and left, the first is liable and the second is exempt.”

And we infer:

Is it not the case that

“exempt” means

exempt but prohibited?

This demonstrates that it is prohibited even initially, although he is merely guarding it?

And we answer:

No!

Rather,

he is exempt and it is permitted.

This too is logically evident

that it is permitted even initially,

as it teaches in the latter clause

of the Mishna:

“To what is this comparable? To one who locks his house to guard it, and it turns out that a deer is being guarded inside it.”

By inference: He is exempt and it is permitted!

For everyone does this.

Conclude from this!

Some say: Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: We too have learned this

that it is permitted even initially when a bird enters beneath his wings. For we learned:

“Even if the first person stood up and left, the first is liable and the second is exempt.”

What, is it not the case that he is exempt and it is permitted?

And we reject this:

No!

Rather,

he is exempt but it is prohibited.

And we raise an objection to the rejection:

But since it teaches in the latter clause: “To what is this comparable? To one who locks his house to guard it, and it turns out that a deer is being guarded inside it.” By inference, is he not exempt and is it not permitted?

Conclude from this

that he is exempt and it is permitted!

Shmuel said: In all cases of exemption on Shabbat

wherever the tractate of Shabbat says “exempt,” this means

exempt

but prohibited, except

for

these three cases, in which he is exempt and it is permitted.

The first is this:

the case in the Mishna where the first person sat at the entrance and filled it, and a second person came and sat beside him, and the first person stood up and left: the second person is exempt and it is permitted.

And from where do we know that he is exempt and it is permitted?

As it teaches in the latter clause: “To what is this comparable? To one who locks his house to guard it, and it turns out that a deer is being guarded inside it.”

And the other

case is that which we learned:

One who drains an abscess

opens a wound containing pus:

if

his intention

is to make an opening in it

—that is, he intends to improve it so that it will remain open—

he is liable

because of building an opening or because of repairing; what difference is there between repairing a vessel and repairing a wound? And

if

his intention is only

to remove

the

pus

and ease his pain, and he does not care if it closes again immediately,

he is exempt,

as this is a labor not needed for its own purpose, since he does not need the opening; and it is even permitted initially, because the Sages did not issue a decree in a situation of pain.

And from where do we know that he is exempt and it is permitted?

As we learned

below, at the beginning of the chapter All the Utensils: “A person may take” ...

a hand needle

a small needle with which garments are sewn

to remove with it a thorn

that has become embedded in his flesh, for although the needle is a utensil whose primary use is for a prohibited labor, it is permitted to move it “for his bodily need.”

Yet when he removes the thorn with it, he makes an opening in the wound; nevertheless, since he does not intend to make an opening and this is a situation of pain, they permitted it even initially, and the same applies to draining an abscess.

And the other

case is that which we learned:

One who traps a snake on Shabbat, if he is occupied with it so that it will not bite him

that is, this is why he traps it,

he is exempt,

as this is a labor not needed for its own purpose, since he has no need for the snake. And

if

he traps the snake in order to use it

for medicinal purposes, he is liable

because of trapping.

And from where do we know that he is exempt and it is permitted

when he is occupied with it so that it will not bite him? [In a place where there is no danger, but only concern about bodily injury.]

As we learned: One places a bowl

of earthenware

over the lamp

on Shabbat

so that the fire will not catch

the

beam

of the ceiling, provided that the lamp is not extinguished as a result.

And over the excrement of a small child

so that the child will not become soiled by it [and the novel point in both of these cases is that it is permitted to move an object for the sake of something that may not be moved on Shabbat].

And over a scorpion, so that it will not sting.

Thus, although the scorpion is trapped by placing the bowl over it, nevertheless, since this is a labor not needed for its own purpose, it is permitted even initially in order to prevent injury.

We have completed the chapter “One Who Weaves.”

Mishna:

The eight creeping things mentioned in the Torah

in the passage concerning the impurity of creeping things in Parashat Shemini —

one who traps them, or one who wounds them

on Shabbat,

is liable,

because only these creeping things have skin. Therefore, one is liable for trapping them, since they are customarily trapped for their skins, and thus “their kind is hunted.” But the other creeping things are not needed, and therefore one is not liable for trapping them.

Similarly, with regard to wounding, one is liable when he wounds them until the blood is gathered beneath the skin, even though it has not yet emerged. Since they have skin, the blood will ultimately emerge; it is only the skin that presently prevents it from emerging. Removing the blood is equivalent to removing the soul from that place, because “the blood is the soul.” This is a derivative of slaughtering.

[Another explanation: Through the wound, the skin is colored by the blood gathered within it, and one is liable on account of dyeing].

But with regard to the other creeping things and crawling creatures —

one who wounds them is exempt

until the blood emerges. But if the blood merely gathers, he is exempt, because the blood will ultimately return and be absorbed. For if it were destined to emerge, it would emerge immediately, since they do not have skin to prevent the blood from emerging. [According to the second explanation, he is exempt because they have no skin that can be colored

One who traps them for a purpose—

].

One who traps them for a purpose — is liable; if he traps them without a purpose —

is exempt!

Since they have no skin, they are not customarily trapped, and thus “their kind is not hunted,” and their trapping is considered a labor not needed for its own purpose.

An animal or bird that is in his possession

of a person,

one who traps it is exempt,

for it is already trapped and standing.

But one who wounds it is liable,

since it has skin.

Gemara:

From the fact that it teaches

eight creeping things

“one who wounds them is liable,” it follows that

these eight creeping things

have skin.

And we raise a difficulty:

Who is the tanna

who holds this way?

Shmuel said: It is Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri!

As we learned

in tractate Chullin:

Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri says: The eight creeping things have skins,

with a practical consequence with regard to impurity: Their skin does not have the status of the flesh of the creeping thing, which conveys impurity in the measure of a lentil; rather, it is pure.

But the Sages disagree with him there concerning four of the eight creeping things: the anaka, the ko’aḥ, the lizard, and the ḥomet. They hold that their skins have the status of their flesh and convey impurity. Thus, according to them, these four do not have skin.

Rabba bar bar Ḥana said in the name of Rav: You may even say

that the Mishna is

the opinion of the Sages.

For

the Sages disagreed with Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri only with regard to impurity, as it is written: “These are impure for you

among every creeping thing,” and we expound from the letter heh in “the impure”

to include that their skins

convey impurity

like their flesh [the inclusion applies only with regard to the four creeping things; see Rashi].

[and this inclusion was stated only with regard to the four creeping creatures; see Rashi].

But with regard to Shabbat, even the Sages agree

that the skin of all eight creeping things is considered skin with regard to wounding or dyeing.

And we challenge this:

But

if

with regard to Shabbat they did not disagree

with Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri, then according to the Sages the skin of the four creeping things is not considered skin?

But it was taught in a beraita: One who traps one of the eight creeping things mentioned in the Torah,

or

one who wounds them, is liable; this is the statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri.