Sanhedrin 8b — the Talmud in English

And now the Gemara brings a baraita from which it is implied in accordance with the words of Rabba, and it is a difficulty against the words of Ulla.

It was objected:

from that which we learned in a baraita:

“And the Sages say: If he brought a monetary claim—

[it is judged] by three; if he brought a capital claim—

[it is judged] by twenty-three.”

Granted, according to Rabba,

the baraita can be compatible with his words, since if

he brought the monetary claim first,

for the husband did not bring witnesses, and from the outset his claim was only to be exempted from her ketuba, he is judged

by three,

and in accordance with Rabba’s view. Whereas if

he brought the capital claim first,

thinking to bring witnesses that she had committed adultery, but they did not come, and the court dispersed, then

even

the

monetary

claim, the Sages hold that they judge her specifically

by twenty-three.

But

however

according to

the words of

Ulla it is difficult:

the baraita. For according to Ulla, in every case the Sages require twenty-three, even when he does not bring witnesses, lest they hear and witnesses come; and if so, how did the baraita say that he is judged by three!?

And the Gemara brings the answer of Rava and Rav Hiyya, that indeed there is a case in which even according to Ulla the Sages will hold that the monetary law of one who gives his wife a bad name is [conducted] by three: when it is clear that the husband will not bring additional witnesses. Then, if the judgment is reversed and the father sues the husband for one hundred silver pieces for giving his daughter a bad name, the husband’s case—the one who gave the bad name—will be judged by three.

Rava said: I and the lion of the group expounded,

we explained the baraita according to Ulla.

And who is he?

Who is the “lion of the group”?

Rabbi Hiyya bar Abin.

And this is how we answered:

In what case are we dealing here

[the baraita is not discussing an ordinary case of the husband’s claim, in which case the Sages would hold that twenty-three are required, but rather this case],

where the husband brought witnesses

against his wife

that she had committed adultery,

and twenty-three judges gathered for this purpose,

and the father brought witnesses and refuted the husband’s witnesses as conspiring witnesses.

And now the judgment was reversed: the husband, who had been the claimant, became the defendant for giving a bad name, whose Torah law is that he must pay the girl’s father one hundred silver pieces.

And

the father came

to

collect money from the husband;

in such a case, it is sufficient to judge him

by three

judges בלבד, even according to the Sages. For now there is no concern for disrepute, lest the husband’s witnesses come concerning her adultery, since it has become clear to us that everything was false: the husband relied on false witnesses, who were refuted as conspiring witnesses, and now he can no longer claim to be exempted from the payment of her ketuba, since his claims are false.

And there is also no concern for the honor of the earlier judges, since the judgment was reversed. The father’s claim is a new claim and a new judgment, and it is possible to begin the new proceeding with three.

This is the explanation, thus far, of what the baraita said: If he brought a monetary claim, [it is judged] by three.

And this is the explanation of the continuation of the baraita:

And in a place

where there is concern that he will come to the laws of

capital cases,

such as when the husband did not bring witnesses, and it is still possible that witnesses will hear and come, in accordance with Ulla’s view according to the Sages, then they initially require

twenty-three.

C. And now the Gemara brings a third explanation, that of Abaye, in the dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Sages in the Mishna: by how many is one who gives his wife a bad name judged?

According to Abaye’s view, the case is one in which the husband’s witnesses testified that she had committed adultery and warned her, but did not inform her at the time of the warning that her death would be by stoning. Therefore, Rabbi Meir holds that they neither stone her nor execute her, but the husband is exempt from paying her ketuba. And for adjudicating this claim of the husband, three are sufficient. Whereas the Sages hold that in this manner they do stone her, and therefore a court of twenty-three is required.

Abaye said: Everyone,

both Rabbi Meir and the Sages, hold

that we are concerned for disrepute.

If the husband did not bring witnesses and came to be judged concerning exemption from payment of her ketuba, we are concerned lest they hear and witnesses come, and it will be necessary to add judges, and they will bring disrepute upon the first three for not having judged.

And

they likewise hold that we are concerned

because of the honor of the earlier judges.

Since twenty-three gathered, they must complete even the monetary laws with them, because of the honor of the earlier judges.

And in what case are we dealing here? For example,

where the husband brought witnesses before three, and when the court examined the witnesses, it became clear to them that indeed they had warned her not to commit adultery [as is the law concerning witnesses who must warn], but they had not warned her that her punishment would be stoning. Therefore Rabbi Meir holds that this warning is not sufficient to make her liable for death, and only the husband’s monetary claim remains, and therefore he holds that this is judged by three. And the Sages hold that this warning is sufficient to judge her for death, and therefore twenty-three are required.

And this dispute as to whether an ordinary warning is a warning that creates liability for death, or is not a warning, depends upon the dispute between the Sages and Rabbi Judah.

And this is that tanna,

as we learned in a baraita [there it is stated that the “inciter,” who incites his fellow to worship idolatry, does not require a warning. And although they did not warn him, he is executed, and later in the baraita it is stated]:

And all the other people liable for executions stated in the Torah—

they are not executed,

the perpetrators of the transgression,

except by an assembly,

of twenty-three,

and witnesses and a warning.

And it is not sufficient that they tell him that the matter is forbidden to do; rather,

until they inform him that he is liable for death by the court.

For otherwise, he is not deterred from committing the transgression. But they do not need to specify to him which death from among the four court-imposed deaths he will receive. These are the words of the Sages.

And

whereas

Rabbi Judah says: Until they inform him by which death he will be executed.

And in our Mishna, Rabbi Meir holds in accordance with Rabbi Judah, while the Sages hold in accordance with the Sages who dispute with Rabbi Judah.

D. And now the Gemara brings the explanation of Rav Pappa, who likewise holds like Abaye, that everyone holds that we are concerned for disrepute and for the honor of the earlier judges. Rather, he establishes the Mishna as referring to a case in which the husband’s witnesses came to testify concerning the woman, and they say that they did not warn her at all, but the woman is a havera, one who knows the law, and knows that an betrothed maiden who committed adultery is liable for stoning.

Therefore, Rabbi Meir holds that they will not execute her, since they did not warn her, even though she was a havera, but will judge her only in monetary law, concerning the husband’s claim to be exempted from payment of her ketuba. Whereas the Sages say that they will execute her, and therefore twenty-three are required.

Rav Pappa said: Here we are dealing with a learned woman.

The dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Sages concerns a learned woman,

and they disagree

Rabbi Meir and the Sages in our Mishna

in the dispute,

in that which

Rabbi Yosei ben Yehuda and the Sages disputed.

As it was taught:

we learned in a baraita:

“Rabbi Yosei ben Yehuda says: A learned person

a Torah scholar,

does not require a warning,

and if he committed a transgression for which there is court-imposed death, he is executed even though they did not warn him.

For the law of

warning

was given only

in order

to distinguish between inadvertent and intentional,

so that the one warned would not be able to claim that he did not know that this matter was forbidden to do. But a learned person knows and knows.

And the Sages disagree with him and hold that a learned person also requires a warning, for it is possible that although he knows the laws of prohibition and permission, and is intentional, nevertheless here he is inadvertent concerning some detail of the details of the prohibition.

And the Sages hold like Rabbi Yosei ben Yehuda, and therefore they will execute the woman, and twenty-three are required.

And Rabbi Meir holds like the Sages who dispute with Rabbi Yosei ben Yehuda, and they will not execute her.

And now the husband comes to claim the payment of her ketuba, and therefore it is [judged] by three.

E. And now the Gemara brings the explanation of Rav Ashi, who likewise holds that everyone is concerned for disrepute and for the honor of the earlier judges. And according to his establishment, the Mishna is dealing with a case in which the witnesses did not warn her that if she committed adultery the court would execute her, but rather they told her that the court would make her liable for lashes. And in such a case, it is clear that the court will not execute her, but will only administer lashes to her.

And Rabbi Meir and the Sages disagree concerning the dispute that we learned in our Mishna: according to Rabbi Meir, a court of three is sufficient to administer lashes to her, while the Sages hold that the law of lashes is [adjudicated] by twenty-three.

Rav Ashi said:

In the Mishna, the case is

for example: