Sanhedrin 8b (ח:) — the Talmud in English

The Gemara now cites a beraita that appears to support Rabba, and which raises a difficulty against Ulla’s position.

Meitivei,

from what we learned in a beraita:

“And the Sages say: If he brought a monetary claim

—the case is judged by three; if he brought a capital claim

—by twenty-three.”

Granted, according to Rabba,

the beraita can be reconciled with his position, because if

he brought a monetary claim first,

meaning that the husband does not bring witnesses, and from the outset his claim was only to be exempted from payment of her ketuba, he is judged

by three,

in accordance with Rabba’s view. But if

he brought a capital claim first,

meaning that he intended to bring witnesses that she had committed adultery, but they did not come, and the court dispersed, then

even

a claim of

money,

the Sages maintain that she is judged specifically

by twenty-three.

But

according

to

Ulla,

it is difficult

for the beraita. For according to Ulla, the Sages require twenty-three in every case, even when he does not bring witnesses, lest they hear of the matter and witnesses come. If so, how could the beraita say that he is judged by three?!

The Gemara now presents the resolution of Rava and Rav Ḥiyya: There is indeed a case in which even according to Ulla the Sages would maintain that the monetary case of a husband who brought a slanderous accusation against his wife is judged by three—when it is clear that the husband will bring no further witnesses. In that event, if the judgment is reversed and the father sues the husband for one hundred silver zuz for having brought a slanderous accusation, the husband’s case, as the one who brought the accusation, will be judged by three.

Rava said: I and the lion of the company expounded,

we explained the beraita in accordance with Ulla.

And who is he?

Who is the “lion of the company”?

Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Avin.

And this is how we resolved it:

What are we dealing with here?

The beraita is not discussing an ordinary case of the husband’s claim, in which case the Sages would maintain that twenty-three are required, but rather this case:

the husband brought witnesses

against his wife

that she had committed adultery,

and twenty-three judges assembled for this purpose,

and the father brought witnesses and refuted the husband’s witnesses as conspiring witnesses.

The judgment has now been reversed: The husband, who had been the claimant, has become the defendant, accused of having brought a slanderous accusation; by Torah law, he must pay the girl’s father one hundred silver zuz.

And

the father came

to

collect money from the husband.

In such a case, it is sufficient to judge him

by three

judges, even according to the Sages. There is no longer any concern about public disparagement, lest the husband’s witnesses regarding her adultery come, since it has become clear to us that everything was false: The husband relied on false witnesses, who were refuted as conspiring witnesses, and he can no longer claim to be exempted from payment of her ketuba, since his claims were false.

There is also no concern for the honor of the original judges, since the judgment has been reversed. The father’s claim is a new claim and involves a new judgment, and the new proceeding may be initiated with three judges.

This concludes the explanation of what the beraita said: “If he brought a monetary claim, by three.”

And this is the explanation of the continuation of the beraita:

And in a place

where there is concern that the case will come to involve

capital law,

for example, when the husband did not bring witnesses, and it is still possible that witnesses will hear of the matter and come, as Ulla explains according to the Sages, they must initially have

twenty-three.

3. The Gemara now presents a third explanation, that of Abaye, of the dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Sages in the Mishna concerning the number of judges required for a husband who brought a slanderous accusation against his wife.

According to Abaye, the case is one in which the husband’s witnesses testified that she had committed adultery and warned her, but did not inform her at the time of the warning that her execution would be by stoning. Therefore, Rabbi Meir maintains that she is neither stoned nor otherwise executed; rather, the husband is exempt from paying her ketuba. Three judges are sufficient for adjudicating this claim. The Sages, however, maintain that in such a case she is indeed stoned, and therefore a court of twenty-three is required.

Abaye said: Everyone,

both Rabbi Meir and the Sages, maintains

that we are concerned about public disparagement.

If the husband did not bring witnesses and came to court to establish his exemption from payment of her ketuba, we are concerned that witnesses may hear of the matter and come, requiring additional judges to be added, and that they will disparage the original three for not having adjudicated the case properly.

And

they also maintain that we are concerned

for the honor of the original judges.

Once twenty-three judges assembled, the case must be completed before them, even with regard to monetary law, for the honor of the original judges.

And what are we dealing with here? For example,

the husband brought witnesses before three judges, and when the court examined the witnesses, it became clear to them that they had indeed warned her not to commit adultery, as required of witnesses who must issue a warning, but had not warned her that her punishment would be stoning. Therefore, Rabbi Meir maintains that this warning is insufficient to make her liable for execution, and only the husband’s monetary claim remains, so he maintains that the case is judged by three. The Sages maintain that this warning is sufficient for judging her liable to execution, and therefore twenty-three are required.

This dispute as to whether an unspecified warning constitutes a warning that renders one liable to execution, or is not considered a warning at all, depends on the dispute between the Sages and Rabbi Yehuda.

And this tanna is

as we learned in a beraita [where it says that an inciter—one who incites another to worship idolatry—does not require a warning. And although he was not warned, he is executed; and the continuation of the beraita states]:

But with regard to all the other people liable for executions stated in the Torah,

they are not executed

the transgressors

except by an assembly,

of twenty-three,

and witnesses, and a warning.

It is not sufficient for the witnesses to tell him merely that the act is prohibited; rather,

until they inform him that he is liable to execution by the court.

For otherwise, he may not be deterred from committing the transgression. They need not, however, specify which of the four court-imposed executions he will receive. These are the words of the Sages.

But

Rabbi Yehuda says:

“Until they inform him by which form of execution he will be executed.”

In our Mishna, Rabbi Meir follows Rabbi Yehuda, while the Sages follow the Sages who dispute Rabbi Yehuda.

4. The Gemara now presents Rav Pappa’s explanation, which likewise follows Abaye in maintaining that everyone is concerned about public disparagement and the honor of the original judges. Rav Pappa, however, establishes the Mishna as referring to a case in which the husband’s witnesses came to testify against the woman and said that they had not warned her at all, but the woman was a ḥavera, a learned woman who knew the law and knew that an engaged girl who committed adultery is liable to stoning.

Therefore, Rabbi Meir maintains that she should not be executed, since she was not warned, even though she was a ḥavera; rather, she is judged only under monetary law, based on the husband’s claim to be exempted from payment of her ketuba. The Sages, however, say that she should be executed, and therefore twenty-three are required.

Rav Pappa said: Here we are dealing with a learned woman.

The dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Sages concerns a learned woman,

and they disagree

Rabbi Meir and the Sages in our Mishna

in a dispute

concerning the matter disputed by

Rabbi Yosei ben Yehuda and the Sages.

As it is taught:

We learned in a beraita:

“Rabbi Yosei ben Yehuda says: A ḥaver,

a Torah scholar,

does not require a warning,

and if he committed a transgression for which the court imposes execution, he is executed even though he was not warned.

Because the requirement of

the law of

warning was instituted only

in order

to distinguish between an unintentional transgressor and an intentional transgressor,

so that the person warned could not claim that he did not know that the act was prohibited. But a ḥaver knows—he knows.

The Sages disagree with him and maintain that even a ḥaver requires a warning, because although he may know the laws of what is prohibited and permitted and may be acting intentionally, it is nevertheless possible that in this particular case he is unintentional with regard to some detail of the prohibition.

The Sages in our Mishna follow Rabbi Yosei ben Yehuda; therefore, they would execute the woman, and twenty-three are required.

Rabbi Meir follows the Sages who dispute Rabbi Yosei ben Yehuda, and they would not execute her.

The husband has now come to claim payment of her ketuba, and therefore the case is judged by three.

5. The Gemara now presents Rav Ashi’s explanation. He too maintains that everyone is concerned about public disparagement and the honor of the original judges. According to his interpretation, the Mishna is referring to a case in which the witnesses did not warn her that if she committed adultery the court would execute her; rather, they told her that the court would impose lashes upon her. In such a case, it is clear that the court would not execute her, but would only administer lashes.

Rabbi Meir and the Sages disagree in the same dispute that we learned in our Mishna: Rabbi Meir maintains that a court of three is sufficient to administer lashes to her, while the Sages maintain that the law of lashes requires twenty-three.

Rav Ashi said:

The Mishna is referring to

a case such as: