Sanhedrin 8a — the Talmud in English

I am disqualified for you as a judge,

since you mentioned the favor you did me.

Rav said to Rav Kahana

his student:

Go out and judge him,

go out and judge him.

He saw him,

Rav Kahana saw that man,

who was behaving arrogantly toward him,

for he was acting haughtily toward him and speaking “loftily” [insolently].

Rav Kahana said to him: If you obey,

if you accept the judgment,

obey,

then it is well,

but if not,

if you do not accept the judgment because of your great arrogance,

I shall remove from you the “authority of Rav”

from your support!

I shall take away from you the “power” of Rav, on whom you rely because you did him a favor, from “your power.”

That is, I shall inform you [the Ran explains Rashi: I shall do something] that even Rav, who recognizes the favor you did him, will not be able to assist you. That is, I shall place you under a ban.

The Gemara continues to expound the verses concerning the command of Moses our teacher to the judges.

“You shall hear the small as the great”—

Reish Lakish said: It should be as dear to you,

to the judge,

the judgment of a peruta as

the judgment of

a hundred maneh.

And the Gemara discusses:

For what halakhic matter!?

For which law did Reish Lakish say that the judgment of a peruta is like the judgment of a hundred maneh?

If you say,

if it is said

to examine it and decide it,

that the judges are commanded to examine and decide truthfully and justly the judgment of a peruta as the judgment of a hundred maneh, then

it is obvious,

it is a simple matter, and it is not possible that Scripture came to teach us this.

And the Gemara answers:

Rather,

the intention of Reish Lakish is

to give it precedence,

to give precedence to the judgment: if a judgment concerning a peruta came before the court first, and afterward a judgment concerning a hundred maneh, the judge should not give precedence to judging the case of a hundred maneh; rather, whoever comes first before the court is first in judgment.

“You shall not be afraid before any man”—

Rabbi Hanan said: Do not hold back your words because of any man,

that is, a student who sits before his teacher should not refrain from expressing his opinion if he sees that his teacher is mistaken in the judgment [as explained above, 6b].

“For the judgment is God’s”—

Rabbi Hama bar Hanina said: The Holy One, blessed be He, said: Is it not enough for the wicked,

is it not sufficient

for the wicked

who distort the judgment by

taking money from this one and giving it to that one unlawfully,

and causing robbery,

but they also trouble Me to return money to its owners.

Therefore Moses said to the judges, “For the judgment is God’s!” When you act unjustly in judgment, it is as though you are judging the judgment of the Holy One, blessed be He, and as though you are taking money from the possession of the Holy One, blessed be He, because you trouble Him, so that He must return the money to its owners.

“And the matter that is too difficult for you, you shall bring

to me, and I shall hear it”—

Rabbi Hanina said, and some say

that it was said by

Rabbi Yoshia: For this matter,

that Moses said, “The difficult matter you shall bring to me,” as though he had taken authority for himself,

Moses was punished.

For he should have said, “You shall bring it before the Divine Presence.” And what was his punishment? He did not merit that the section of inheritances should be spoken to him from the mouth of the Divine Presence until the daughters of Zelophehad came before him, and he did not know what to answer them.

And as

it is stated: “And Moses brought their case before the Lord.”

But Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak disagrees with this statement and raises an objection:

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak challenged it:

Did Moses our teacher take authority for himself!? But

is it written, “and I shall make it known to you,”

as though he were certain that he knew the solution to every difficult matter!? Surely

“and I shall hear it” is written!

The meaning is: I shall hear it, and then

if I have learned it,

if the Holy One, blessed be He, has already taught me this law,

I have learned it,

I have already learned it, and I can make it known to you,

but if not,

if it is a new law that the Holy One, blessed be He, has not yet taught me, then

I shall go and learn it,

I shall turn to the Holy One, blessed be He, so that He will teach it to me.

If so, this is not language of authority.

Rather,

why in fact was the section of inheritances said only after the appeal of the daughters of Zelophehad?

As it was taught,

as we learned in a beraita:

It was fitting

that the section of inheritances should be written by Moses our teacher,

like all the sections of the Torah.

Rather, the daughters of Zelophehad merited it,

because of their great love for the Land of Israel,

and it was written through them.

And likewise

it was fitting that the section of the wood gatherer

which teaches that one who desecrates Shabbat is stoned,

should be written by Moses our teacher. Rather, the wood gatherer became liable,

and desecrated Shabbat,

and it was written through him.

And this matter came

to teach you that they cause

from Heaven

liability,

an evil matter, such as the punishment of stoning, which is a severe death,

through

a man who is

liable,

like the wood gatherer.

And

they cause

merit,

such as the laws of inheritances, which are a merit, that the sons and heirs inherit their relatives,

through one who is meritorious,

like the daughters of Zelophehad.

It is written

at the beginning of the Book of Deuteronomy, where Moses our teacher says to the Israelites,

“And I commanded your judges,”

to guide the public in the laws of the statutes against the will of the public.

And

further

it is written

there,

“And I commanded you at that time.”

If he warned the people to obey the voice of the judges, why was it necessary to warn the judges to lead them against their will?—

Rabbi Elazar said, Rabbi Simlai said:

There are two warnings here:

A warning to the public, that the fear of the judge should be upon them.

And a warning to the judge, that he should bear

the toil and burden

of the public,

to be deliberate in judgment.

And

to what extent

must the judge bear the toil of the public?

Rabbi Hanan said, and some say,

that it was said by

Rabbi Shabtai:

As Moses our teacher said, that he carries the people

“as a nurse carries the suckling.”

The Gemara now brings another exposition concerning the conduct of the public:

It is written

in the Book of Deuteronomy [at the beginning of chapter 31, verse 7]: “And Moses called Joshua, and said to him before the eyes of all Israel: Be strong and courageous

! For you shall come with this people

[you shall come with this people] to the land that the Lord swore to their fathers to give them.”

And

further

it is written

there afterward [verse 23]: “And He commanded Joshua son of Nun, and said: Be strong and courageous

! For you shall bring the Children of Israel

to the land that I swore to them, and I shall be with you.”

These two verses apparently contradict one another, for the first verse implies that Joshua would enter with them as one of them, while the second verse implies that Moses commanded Joshua to conduct himself toward them with authority when they entered the land.

Rabbi Yohanan said:

At first

Moses said to Joshua

on his own initiative [for he says, “that the Lord swore”],

“You and the elders of the generation, with them.”

[And some versions read:

“with you”].

That is, together; and according to their opinion and counsel you shall bring the people, and you shall not rule over the elders.

The Holy One, blessed be He, said to him

to Moses, that he should say to Joshua in another manner [for afterward it says there, “that I swore, and I shall be with you”]:

And so you shall say to Joshua:

“Take a staff and strike upon their heads!”

That is, only Joshua alone should lead them, because there is

one leader for a generation,

there is one leader for every generation,

and there are not two leaders for a generation.

The Gemara concludes with another law concerning the laws of the court.

A tanna taught,

we learned in a beraita:

Summoning—

with three!

And the Gemara discusses:

What is “summoning”?

What is the meaning of the summoning mentioned here?

If you say,

if it is said,

the blessing of

the

summoning,

that is, adding the blessing of the summoning before Grace after Meals, when three ate, and the tanna taught here the law that “three who ate together are obligated to summon.”

This is not possible.

For,

and it was taught,

we learned in another beraita:

Summoning, and the blessing of summoning, with three.

It is thus proven that “summoning” and “the blessing of summoning” are two different matters.

And if you would say,

if you wish to say in explanation of that beraita, and to explain that indeed they are one matter, but the tanna first said “summoning,”

and he is explaining,

afterward, his words, and said

what is

“summoning”

that is mentioned?—

The blessing of summoning,

which is with three.

According to this, the beraita that says “summoning—with three” also intended the blessing of summoning.

This too is not possible.

For

it was taught,

we learned in another beraita:

Summoning with three; the blessing of summoning with three.

Since the tanna said “summoning with three” and repeated and said “the blessing of summoning with three,” they are certainly two different matters.

If so, it is impossible to say that the intention of the beraita that says “summoning, and the blessing of summoning, with three” is to explain that summoning is the blessing of summoning. Necessarily, the beraita that says “summoning with three” is also not speaking of the blessing of summoning, but of “summoning”!

Rather,

necessarily,

what is “summoning”?

To what matter did the beraita refer when it said “summoning with three”?

Summoning for judgment!

The summoning by the court of the litigant to come and be judged before them, for the court messenger must summon him in the name of the three judges.

As in what Rava said: These three judges who sit,

three judges sitting in judgment and summoning a man to come before them,

and the court messenger goes,

the court messenger went,

and said in the name of one,

the messenger summoned him to come to judgment in the name of one judge, for example, saying to him: “The judge So-and-so summons you to judgment!”—

he has said nothing!

And if the person summoned does not appear before the court, they do not place him under a ban, as is the law concerning one who refuses to come before the court,

until he says it in the name of all of them,

until he summons him in the name of all three judges.

And concerning this law they said, “Summoning with three.”

But

this applies,

this law applies only on an ordinary day,

when it is not a court day,

which is not a day on which the court sits, for then the summoned person can claim that he did not believe the messenger.

But on a court day,

on the days fixed for the court’s sitting—for example, on Monday and Thursday, in the time of the Sages—

it makes no difference,

this law does not apply. On days when the court sits, even if they summon him merely in the name of the court, he cannot claim that he did not believe the messenger, and if he does not appear, they place him under a ban.

We learned in the Mishna:

Double payment and payments of four and five, with three.

Double payment and four and five, and similar cases, are called laws of fines, because anyone who pays more than what he damaged pays by way of a fine.

Rav Naḥman bar Rav Ḥisda sent

a messenger

to Rav Naḥman bar Yaakov,

to ask him:

“Let our master teach us! The laws of fines, with how many

judges are they judged?”

And the Gemara discusses:

What is he asking!?

What is the question that they asked?

Did we not learn: With three.

Did we not explicitly learn in our Mishna that they are judged with three?

And the Gemara explains:

Rather, he was asking about an expert individual.

Whether an expert individual

judges the laws of fines, or not.

He said to him,

Rav Naḥman bar Yaakov answered him:

You can learn it,

we learned this law in our Mishna—

For we learned:

Double payment and payments of four and five—

with three.

And we must infer:

What is “three”?

What type of three did the Mishna require for the laws of fines?

If you say three ordinary men,

this is not possible!

For

your father’s father said,

your grandfather,

in the name of Rav,

that

even ten, and they are ordinary men,—

are disqualified for the laws of fines.

Rather,

certainly, judges

who are experts are required.

And he said

the tanna of the Mishna,

“with three,”

specifically with three experts are the laws of fines judged, and not by one expert.

And thereby the question was resolved.

Introduction to the discussion of the one who brings an evil report

A. It is stated in the Torah [Deuteronomy 22]: One who married a woman,

and after the marriage came to court and brought an evil report against her, falsely claiming that his wife had committed adultery while she was betrothed, in her father’s house. And it was clarified that he was not speaking truthfully, he is liable for three punishments: lashes, payment of one hundred silver pieces, which he pays to the father of the young woman, and he remains under the prohibition against divorcing her all his days.

B. Bringing an evil report does not consist merely of speech, but only when the husband brought before the court two false witnesses who testified that she had committed adultery, and the witnesses were discredited by two other witnesses who came to contradict the husband’s witnesses.

C. But if the matter was true, that she had committed adultery, and the husband’s witnesses were not discredited, the woman is liable to stoning.

D. A husband who claims after the marriage that he married his wife presuming her to be a virgin and found her to have had intercourse, and claims that she committed adultery with him while she was betrothed in her father’s house, and the husband wishes to exempt himself from payment of the marriage settlement, is believed even if he brings no witnesses to support his words. For there is a presumption that a man does not trouble himself to prepare a wedding feast and then cause himself a loss by claiming that she committed adultery with him. Since he married her, he is certainly not suspected of spending money on the marriage so that immediately after the marriage, on the very next day, he would hate her and falsely accuse her of things that are untrue; therefore he is believed that he is speaking words of truth.

We learned in our Mishna:

The one who rapes, the one who seduces, and the one who brings an evil report—

with three, the words of Rabbi Meir. And the Sages say: The one who brings an evil report, with twenty-three, because it contains cases of capital law.

The Gemara assumes [according to Rashi’s method] that this is speaking of a case in which the claim of the husband, the one who brings an evil report, is that he married her presuming her to be a virgin and found her to have had intercourse, and he wishes to exempt himself from payment of the marriage settlement.

Therefore, Rabbi Meir holds that since this is a monetary claim, it is judged by only three judges.

The Sages also agree that monetary cases are judged by three judges. However, regarding a monetary claim in a case where the husband gives his wife a bad name, they hold as follows: since when the husband brings witnesses that she committed adultery, the case becomes a capital case, twenty-three judges are required in every such case—even when there are no witnesses to the adultery and he is not bringing a claim that she should be stoned.

In light of this premise, the Gemara—the Talmudic discussion of the Mishna—asks:

Does it contain

in the case of a husband who gives his wife a bad name,

a capital case

What difference does that make!?

What difference does it make that there are capital cases in other circumstances? In this claim, in which the husband is now suing in order to be exempt from paying her marriage settlement, there is no capital case here. Nor could the matter ever become a capital case, since the husband is not bringing witnesses that she committed adultery.

The Gemara now presents the words of several amoraim—sages of the era of the Gemara—to explain the words of the Mishna.

A. The first explanation is that of Ulla. Even if the husband does not bring witnesses before the court, the Sages are concerned about damaging publicity: perhaps, as a result of his coming to court, a rumor will spread that the husband claims she committed adultery, and people will hear this and bring witnesses to testify that she committed adultery. At present, however, the husband does not know that there are witnesses to this. Therefore, the Sages require a court of twenty-three judges from the very beginning of this proceeding.

Ulla said: They disagree about whether we are concerned about damaging publicity.

Rabbi Meir and the Sages disagree as to whether we are concerned that witnesses will come and testify that she committed adultery.

Rabbi Meir holds that we are not concerned,

and it is possible to judge the husband’s claim before three judges, as with other monetary cases.

But the Sages hold that we are concerned about damaging publicity,

lest news of the adultery spread and witnesses come to have her sentenced to death. Therefore, twenty-three judges are required from the very beginning of the proceeding.

B. The second explanation:

Rabba

according to the version of the Maharshal

said: Everyone

according to all opinions

does not suspect damaging publicity;

we do not need to be concerned that witnesses might come as long as they have not come. This is a monetary case, and it is judged by three judges—

Rather, the Sages and Rabbi Meir disagree about a different matter: a case in which the husband thought that he had witnesses and wanted to have her judged by stoning, so he brought his case before a court of twenty-three judges. The judges had already assembled, but in the end the witnesses did not come, and the judges dispersed. Now the husband wants three of those judges who remained to judge at least his claim that he should be exempt from paying her marriage settlement. Therefore, the Sages hold that there is concern for the honor of the original judges: people might say that they were not fit to judge, or that they had been unable to arrive at the truth. Rabbi Meir is not concerned about this.

And here,

in our Mishna,

they disagree about whether we are concerned for the honor of the original judges,

Rabbi Meir and the Sages.

And here, what are we dealing with?

The Mishna is not discussing an ordinary claim, in which case everyone agrees that it is judged by three judges. Rather, it is discussing this case:

for example, they assembled

they gathered

twenty-three,

a court of twenty-three judges, with the purpose

of judging a capital case,

of judging the woman by stoning, because the husband thought that witnesses would come. But they did not come,

and they dispersed,

the judges dispersed, leaving only three judges.

And he said to them,

the husband said to them:

“Judge my monetary case, at least!”

At least, you three who remain should judge my claim that I be exempt from paying the marriage settlement. Rabbi Meir holds that they may judge him, while the Sages hold that he must gather the judges again in order to judge the monetary case, out of concern for the honor of the original judges.

In summary:

A. If the husband brought witnesses from the outset, everyone agrees that twenty-three judges are required.

B. If he does not bring witnesses and claims that he should be exempt from paying the marriage settlement, then according to Rabba, everyone agrees that

three judges are sufficient. According to Ulla, the Sages require twenty-three judges, while three judges are sufficient according to Rabbi Meir.

C. If the judges assembled to judge a capital case and then dispersed, according to Rabba, the Sages require the case to be judged again only before twenty-three judges, while according to Rabbi Meir it may be judged before three judges.