Sanhedrin 81a (פא.) — the Talmud in English

Do not say to your father in this manner

Do not tell your father in the wording you used], and thereby inform him that he is mistaken

:

For

it was taught in a baraita: If one’s father was transgressing words of Torah, he should not

embarrass him and

say to him: “

Father, you have transgressed words of Torah”;

rather, he should say to him

in the form of a question: “

Father,

is it possible that

this is what is written in the Torah?”

And you, too, should not have said to him explicitly, “Do not change this or that.”

And we raise an objection to this:

Ultimately—

since when he says to him in the form of a question, “Father, is this what is written in the Torah?”—

it is the same thing;

even in this wording he is embarrassing him, for he is saying to him, “Is what you are doing proper?”

Rather,

this is what

he should say to him: Father, a verse is written in the Torah stating this

and this, and the father himself will take to heart why his son is reminding him of this verse.

Mishna:

One who became liable to two court-imposed death penalties

is

judged by the more severe

of them.

If he committed a transgression for which he became liable

to

two death penalties,

such as his mother-in-law who was a married woman, he is

judged by the more severe

penalty among them, namely, burning, and not strangulation, as in the case of an ordinary married woman.

Rabbi Yosei says:

If he committed a transgression for which he became liable to two death penalties, he is

judged according to the first prohibition that came upon him;

he is judged according to the prohibition regarding which he was first required to be careful and from which he was required to separate himself, but not according to the prohibition that came upon him last, even though it is more severe [and this will be explained further in the Gemara]. This is because Rabbi Yosei maintains: “One prohibition does not take effect upon another prohibition,” even when the later prohibition is more severe than the earlier, and consequently he is not liable to two death penalties.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: One who became liable to two court-imposed death penalties is judged by the more severe:

And we raise an objection to this: Is it not

obvious

that he should be judged by the more severe penalty?

Rather, has he gained by gaining

[What, does he have reason to profit from becoming liable to an additional death penalty?] Certainly, since if he had transgressed only the more severe prohibition he would have been judged by it, he should not escape it because he became liable to an additional death penalty!?

Said

in explanation

Rava:

Here, with what are we dealing? With a case where he committed a lesser transgression, and his verdict was concluded for the lesser transgression, and

after his verdict to be put to death had been concluded,

he again committed a more severe transgression.

The Mishna teaches that he is held liable for the more severe transgression and is executed for it. This is novel, because:

It might enter your mind to say: Since his verdict for the lesser transgression was concluded, this man is already a dead man,

and he should not be held liable to be put to death—

it teaches us

that he is judged for the latter transgression and is executed for it.

He asked him

[his father]

[his brother]

of Rav Yosef bar Ḥama, from Rabba bar Natan:

From where is this matter that the Sages stated

[What is the source for what the Sages said]:

One who became liable to two court-imposed death penalties

and whose verdict was first concluded for the less severe death penalty, and afterward he committed the more severe transgression, is

judged by the more severe penalty?

Rabba bar Natan said to him:

For it is written

[Ezekiel 18]:

“Now if a man is righteous and does justice and righteousness, he has not eaten upon the mountains, nor lifted his eyes to the idols of the house of Israel; he has not defiled his fellow’s wife, nor approached a menstruating woman. He has wronged no one, restored his pledge for a debt, committed no robbery, given his bread to the hungry, and covered the naked with a garment. He has not lent at interest, nor taken increase; he has withdrawn his hand from injustice, carried out true justice between one man and another. He has walked in My statutes and observed My ordinances, acting faithfully—he is righteous; he shall surely live, says the Lord God—

and he begets

[the righteous man]

a violent son who sheds blood

and commits one of these [and the son commits against his brother one of the following transgressions]. And he [this son] does not do any of these [all the good deeds performed by his father and mentioned earlier in the passage], for he also

eats upon the mountains and defiles his fellow’s wife.

He oppresses the poor and needy, robs by robbery, does not restore a pledge,

lifts his eyes to the idols,

commits an abomination. He lends at interest and takes increase, and shall not live; he has done all these abominations; he shall surely be put to death; his blood shall be upon him.”

“And he begets a violent son who sheds blood”:

This is a murderer whose execution is

by decapitation.

“He defiles his fellow’s wife”:

This is a married woman,

and one who engages in intercourse with her is executed

by strangulation.

“And he lifts his eyes to the idols”:

This is idolatry,

which is punished

by stoning—

And it is written

at the end of the passage:

“He shall surely be put to death; his blood shall be upon him”—

that is,

by stoning,

for this wording is interpreted in this manner throughout the Torah.

It necessarily follows that his verdict had first been concluded for the least severe of the penalties, and nevertheless he is liable to stoning; for otherwise, what would Ezekiel have taught by stating that he is liable to stoning?

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak raised an objection against this:

Say that all of them are punishable by stoning

[Perhaps all the transgressions mentioned are punishable by stoning]!? How so:

“And he begets a violent son who sheds blood”:

This is a rebellious and wayward son

whose

liability is

by stoning.

“He defiles his fellow’s wife”:

This is a betrothed young woman, for

one who engages in intercourse with her is executed

by stoning,

and she is called “his fellow’s wife” because of what she will ultimately become.

“And he lifts his eyes to the idols”:

This is idolatry, which is punishable by stoning.

And we answer:

If so, what does Ezekiel teach us

when all of them are punishable by stoning? Since they are all punishable by stoning, it is certainly clear that he is liable to stoning.

And we continue to ask:

Perhaps Ezekiel was merely repeating the Torah!? Perhaps he intended only to repeat the Torah’s mitzvot, in order to warn Israel concerning them!?

And we answer:

If so, it would have been necessary for him

to Ezekiel

to repeat it in the manner in which Moses our teacher repeated it

[he should have repeated it in the wording with which Moses repeated the Torah]; that is, he should have explicitly said “a rebellious and wayward son” and explicitly said “a betrothed young woman,” rather than use wording that could lead to error.

Rav Aḥa bar Ḥanina expounded: What is the meaning of that which is written

in that passage in Ezekiel concerning the righteous man:

“He has not eaten upon the mountains”:

That is,

he did not eat for the sake of his ancestors;

he did not need the merit of his ancestors, since he himself was pious.

“Nor lifted his eyes to the idols of the house of Israel”:

He did not walk with an upright bearing.

“And he did not defile his fellow’s wife”:

He did not encroach upon his fellow’s trade.

“Nor approached a menstruating woman”:

He did not derive benefit from the charity fund,

for this is disgraceful for a respectable person.

And it is written

concerning one who refrains from all these:

“He is righteous; he shall surely live.”

When Rabban Gamliel reached this verse, he would weep and say: The one who does all of them is the one who lives; if he does one of them, he does not

[one who refrains from all of these lives], but one who refrains from only one of them does not live].

Rabbi Akiva said to him:

If that is so,

concerning that which is written at the end of the passage on forbidden sexual relations:

“Do not defile yourselves with all these”

for through all these the nations became defiled...,”

here too

you will

say: With all of them, but not with one of them—the verse warned only against becoming defiled by all the forbidden sexual relations together, and did not warn against becoming defiled by any one of them!?

Rather,

certainly,

“with one of all these,”

here

too,

“with one of all these.”

We learned in the Mishna:

If he committed a transgression

for which he became liable to two death penalties, he is judged by the more severe; Rabbi Yosei says: He is judged according to the first prohibition that came upon him:

It was taught in a baraita: How did Rabbi Yosei say: He is judged according to the first prohibition that came upon him:

If the woman with whom he engaged in intercourse was

his mother-in-law,

for example, he married the daughter of a widow, and her mother became forbidden to him as his mother-in-law [and she is punished by burning],

and she became a married woman,

having married a man [and she is punished by strangulation], and afterward he engaged in intercourse with her, he is

judged as one who violated the prohibition against his mother-in-law.

But if she was

a married woman

[who is punished by strangulation],

and

afterward

she became his mother-in-law,

when he married her daughter, and he engaged in intercourse with her afterward, he is

judged as one who violated the prohibition against a married woman,

even though this is a less severe death penalty than burning, because the prohibition of a mother-in-law does not take effect upon him, since she was already forbidden to him as a married woman.

Said

in objection

Rav Adda bar Ahava to Rava:

How can we have learned:

“His mother-in-law became a married woman; he is judged as one who violated the prohibition against his mother-in-law”!?

He should also be judged for violating the prohibition against a married woman, for Rabbi Abbahu said: Rabbi Yosei concedes with regard to a prohibition

that

adds

to the earlier prohibition; that is, if through the second prohibition the woman became forbidden even to someone to whom she had not been forbidden by virtue of the first prohibition—as in this case, when she married, she became forbidden to everyone to whom she had not previously been forbidden—the latter prohibition also takes effect upon her. If so, he should be liable for the prohibition against a married woman even according to Rabbi Yosei!?