Sanhedrin 80b — the Talmud in English

Rather, according to the one who says:

“This one and that one cause it, and it is permitted,”

what is there to say?

And why should the offspring created from its father, who is permitted for benefit, and its mother, who is forbidden for benefit, be forbidden?

Rather, Ravina said:

This is how you should revise the beraita:

If, before its verdict was completed, she became pregnant and gave birth,

then

her offspring is permitted,

as explained above.

But if, before its verdict was completed, she became pregnant, and once its verdict was completed she gave birth,

then

her offspring is forbidden,

and because

the fetus is the thigh of its mother,

and when the judgment was completed concerning its mother, it too became forbidden together with her.

We learned in the Mishna:

All those liable for death

who became mixed with one another are judged with the lenient one; those liable for stoning [who became mixed] with those liable for burning [are judged by stoning]. Rabbi Shimon says: They are judged by stoning:

The Gemara asks: Is

infer

from our Mishna that

one who was forewarned concerning a severe matter is considered forewarned concerning a lenient matter,

that is: one whom they forewarned that he would incur a severe death, that forewarning is effective even when we come to obligate him with a lenient death, because a lenient death is included within a severe one—

For if not, how would we obligate him with the lenient death concerning which they did not forewarn him, and he would be entirely exempt?

Rabbi Yirmeya said:

Do not infer this law from our Mishna, for

with what are we dealing here? For example, where they forewarned him without specification,

and they did not specify the death—and do not say: This is not a forewarning, because they did not mention the name of the death, for:

And this is the tannaitic authority,

our Mishna follows the view of the first tanna in the following beraita,

as it was taught:

And the rest of those liable for death in the Torah—

apart from one who curses the Name—

are put to death only by a congregation

of the Sanhedrin,

and witnesses, and a forewarning, and until they inform him that he is liable for death by the court,

but it is not necessary to specify by which death.

Rabbi Judah says: Until they inform him by which death he is being killed.

And the Gemara explains the reason for their dispute:

The first tanna derives it from the gatherer of wood,

for it is certain that they did not forewarn him concerning which death he would be killed, since they did not know by which death he would be killed until the Holy One, blessed be He, specified it to them after the act, as brought above on page 78b.

And Rabbi Judah says:

Since forewarning is learned from the verse’s statement, “The dead man shall be put to death,” and from it we derive: “That he render himself liable to death,” it follows that he must render himself liable to that death; and necessarily,

the gatherer of wood was a temporary ruling

to kill him, even though they had not forewarned him concerning a specific death.

We learned in the Mishna:

Those liable for stoning

who became mixed

with those liable for burning,

Rabbi Shimon says: They are judged by stoning, because burning is more severe; and the Sages say: They are judged by burning, because stoning is more severe:

Rav Yehezkel was teaching the Mishna to Rami, his son

when Rav Yehezkel learned this Mishna with Rami his son, he would teach it to him as follows:

Those liable for burning [mixed] with those liable for stoning

[which implies: the majority of them were liable for stoning],

Rabbi Shimon says: They shall be judged by stoning, because burning is more severe.

Rav Judah said

Rav Yehezkel’s son to his father:

Father, do not teach it to him this way

[do not teach it to him with this wording], for in this manner

why specifically because burning is more severe,

how did Rabbi Shimon state the reason as being that you cannot draw them toward the more severe death, burning, when

you can derive it from the fact that the majority of them are liable for stoning,

that is: Even if burning were not more severe but equal to stoning, they would be judged by stoning, since the majority of them are stoned.

Rav Yehezkel said to his son Rav Judah:

Rather, how should I teach it to him

[and how indeed should I teach it to him]!?

Perhaps you will say: I should teach it to him this way:

Those liable for stoning [mixed] with those liable for burning, Rabbi Shimon says: They shall be judged by stoning,

for although the majority are liable for burning, nevertheless it is impossible to obligate them with burning, since

burning is more severe—

If so, say the latter clause

[behold, even in this manner there is a difficulty concerning the latter clause, just as your question concerning the first clause, according to the way I was teaching it], for we learned in the latter clause:

And the Sages say: They shall be judged—

those liable for stoning who became mixed with those liable for burning—

by burning, because stoning is more severe, and

behold,

you can derive it

for even if stoning were equal to burning, they would be burned,

since the majority of them are liable for burning!?

And we answer: The latter clause is not difficult, for when the Sages said, “because stoning is more severe,” they did not come by this to provide a reason to obligate them with burning; they are liable for burning in any event, since the majority of them are liable for burning. And when the Sages said, “because stoning is more severe,”

there the Sages said it to Rabbi Shimon

[that is: They came to dispute Rabbi Shimon]:

According to you, who say: Burning is more severe,

and therefore you do not obligate them with burning like the majority of those liable among them,

not

that is not the case; rather,

stoning is more severe.

When Shmuel heard the style of Rav Judah’s words to his father,

Shmuel said to Rav Judah:

Sharp one

[sharp in Talmud]!