Sanhedrin 80b (פ:) — the Talmud in English

Rather, according to the one who says:

“This and that cause it, and it is permitted,”

what can be said?

And why should the offspring produced by a father from whom deriving benefit is permitted and a mother from whom deriving benefit is forbidden be forbidden?

Rather, Ravina said:

This is how you should teach the beraita:

If she became pregnant and gave birth before her sentence was finalized,

then

her offspring is permitted,

as explained above.

But if she became pregnant before her sentence was finalized, and gave birth after her sentence was finalized,

then

her offspring is forbidden, because

“

the fetus is its mother’s thigh”; and when the sentence was finalized concerning its mother, it too became forbidden along with her.

and when the judgment was completed concerning its mother, it too became forbidden together with her.

We learned in the Mishna:

All those liable for capital punishment

who became intermingled with one another are judged with the lesser punishment; those liable to stoning who became intermingled with those liable to burning are judged by stoning. Rabbi Shimon says: They are judged by stoning:

The Gemara asks: Does

one learn from this

our Mishna that

one who was forewarned concerning a more severe matter is considered forewarned concerning a less severe matter—that is, if someone was forewarned that he would incur the more severe death penalty, that forewarning is effective even if we are coming to impose the less severe death penalty upon him, because the less severe death penalty is included within the more severe one—

For otherwise, how could we impose upon him the less severe death penalty, concerning which he had not been forewarned, and thereby exempt him altogether?

Rabbi Yirmeya said:

Do not infer this law from our Mishna, because

with what are we dealing here? With a case where he was forewarned without specification,

and they did not specify the death penalty—and do not say: This is not a valid forewarning, because they did not mention the name of the death penalty; rather:

And this is the tanna—

our Mishna follows the view of the first tanna in the following beraita,

as it was taught:

And the rest of those liable for capital punishment stated in the Torah—

apart from one who curses God—

are executed only in the presence of an assembly

[of the Sanhedrin],

and witnesses, and forewarning, and only after they inform him that he is liable for a death penalty imposed by the court,

and it is not necessary to specify which death penalty.

Rabbi Yehuda says: Only after they inform him by which death penalty he will be executed.

And the Gemara explains the basis of their dispute:

The first tanna derives his view from the gatherer of sticks,

since he necessarily was not forewarned by which death penalty he would be executed, for they did not know by which death penalty he would be executed until the Holy One, blessed be He, explained it to them after the event, as cited above, on page 78b.

And Rabbi Yehuda says:

Since forewarning is derived from the verse, “The dead man shall be put to death,” and from it we derive: “That he should accept death upon himself,” it follows that he must accept that particular death penalty. Therefore, necessarily,

the case of the gatherer of sticks was a temporary ruling

to execute him, even though he had not been forewarned concerning a specific death penalty.

We learned in the Mishna:

Those liable to stoning

who became intermingled

with those liable to burning,

Rabbi Shimon says: They are judged by stoning, because burning is more severe, while the Sages say: They are judged by burning, because stoning is more severe.

Rav Yehezkel taught this to Rami, his son

[when Rav Yehezkel studied this Mishna with Rami his son, this is how he would recite it]:

Those liable to burning who became intermingled with those liable to stoning

[which implies that the majority were liable to stoning],

Rabbi Shimon says: They are judged by stoning, because burning is more severe.

Rav Yehuda said

to his father, Rav Yehezkel:

Father, do not teach it to him this way

[do not recite it to him in this wording], for in this formulation

why specifically because burning is more severe?

Why did Rabbi Shimon state as his reason that you cannot draw them toward the more severe death penalty of burning, when

you can derive it from the fact that the majority are liable to stoning—that is, even if burning were not more severe but equal to stoning, they would be judged by stoning, since the majority are liable to stoning?

Rav Yehezkel said to his son Rav Yehuda:

But how should I teach it

[how indeed should I recite it to him]!?

Perhaps you will say that I should teach it to him as follows:

Those liable to stoning who became intermingled with those liable to burning, Rabbi Shimon says: They are judged by stoning,

for although the majority are liable to burning, nevertheless it is impossible to impose burning upon them, since

burning is more severe—

If so, say the latter clause

[even in this formulation, the latter clause should present the same difficulty that you raised concerning the first clause, according to the way I was going to recite it], for we learned in the latter clause:

And the Sages say: They are judged—

those liable to stoning who became intermingled with those liable to burning—

by burning, because stoning is more severe, and

then

you can derive it

that even if stoning were equal to burning, they would be judged by burning,

since the majority are liable to burning!?

And we answer: The latter clause is not difficult, because when the Sages said, “because stoning is more severe,” they did not intend this as the reason for imposing burning upon them; they would in any event be liable for burning, since the majority are liable for burning. And when the Sages said, “because stoning is more severe,”

there the Sages were saying it to Rabbi Shimon

[that is, they came to disagree with Rabbi Shimon]:

According to you, who say: Burning is more severe,

and therefore you do not impose burning upon them, as would be appropriate for the majority among them who are liable for it,

no,

that is not the case; rather,

stoning is more severe.

When Shmuel heard the manner in which Rav Yehuda had spoken to his father,

Shmuel said to Rav Yehuda:

Sharp-minded one

[sharp in Talmud]!