Sanhedrin 66a (סו.) — the Talmud in English

Or he says to the tax collector who has come to collect a tax from him for the king, or the city taxes:

“Do not begin with me”

collecting, because that is a sign of loss for me.

Or, if a person was demanding that he repay a debt to him, he would say to him:

“It is morning now,”

and I will not begin my day with something that is a loss for me; or he would say:

“It is the New Moon; it is the conclusion of Shabbat.”

It is a bad sign for me to begin with an expenditure rather than with an income.

The Sages taught:

[Leviticus 19]

“You shall not act as a soothsayer, and you shall not practice divination”—

such as those who practice divination

when they set out on a journey

, by means of a weasel, birds, or fish,

to determine whether they have a favorable sign to set out on a journey or to begin some undertaking.

Mishna:

Above, on 53a, the Mishna listed all those liable for execution by stoning, one of whom is one who desecrates Shabbat.

Now the Mishna explains:

“One who desecrates Shabbat”

is not liable for stoning unless he transgressed

with regard to

a labor prohibited on Shabbat [such as performing a labor that is a skillful labor, and something involving an action], and if one performed that same act intentionally without warning—

“for whose intentional transgression one is liable for karet,”

And

if he performed the act inadvertently, he brings

for his inadvertence

a

sin-offering.

Only for such labors, for whose intentional transgression one is liable for karet and for whose inadvertent transgression one brings a sin-offering, is one who performs them intentionally after receiving a warning liable for stoning.

However, labors for which there is no liability for karet or a sin-offering do not entail stoning [the Gemara will explain below which labors are meant].

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna that liability for stoning applies only to something for whose intentional transgression one is liable for karet and for whose inadvertent transgression one brings a sin-offering.

By inference,

from the fact that the Mishna must explain that one is liable for execution by stoning only for a labor for whose intentional transgression one is liable for karet and for whose inadvertent transgression one brings a sin-offering, we learn

that there is something

that consists of labors

that are desecration of Shabbat

and are prohibited on Shabbat,

and

nevertheless—

one is liable neither for a sin-offering for their inadvertent transgression nor for karet for their intentional transgression.

What is it?

What are these labors?

1.

The Shabbat limit!

Going beyond the two-thousand-cubit Shabbat limit,

and one who transgresses this intentionally and without warning is not liable for karet. One who transgresses it inadvertently does not bring a sin-offering.

Consequently, one who transgresses it intentionally after receiving a warning is not liable for stoning.

And

this law

is according to Rabbi Akiva

only. This is because Rabbi Akiva expounded [Sota 27b] that this labor of going beyond the Shabbat limit is not included among the thirty-nine labors of Shabbat. Therefore, it does not entail stoning.

2.

Kindling!

The labor of kindling a fire on Shabbat is distinct from the other labors. One who transgresses it intentionally and without warning is not liable for karet. Likewise, one who transgresses it inadvertently does not bring a sin-offering.

Consequently, one who transgresses it intentionally after receiving a warning is not liable for stoning.

And

this law

is according to Rabbi Yosei

only. [As will be explained below:]

The Gemara in tractate Shabbat [70a] discusses why the labor of kindling was stated separately rather than included with the other labors. As it is written [Exodus 35:2–3]: “

Six days labor shall be performed, and on the seventh day it shall be holy for you, a Shabbat of complete rest for the Lord; whoever performs labor on it shall be put to death. You shall not kindle a fire in any of your settlements on the day of Shabbat.”

Rabbi Yosei holds that the labor of kindling was singled out from the other labors and stated separately because “it was singled out for a prohibition.” That is, one is not liable for karet and stoning for it as for the other labors; rather, it is merely a negative commandment!

Rabbi Yosei does not dispute Rabbi Akiva’s statement, and he too holds that one who leaves the Shabbat limit is not liable for karet. Rather, Rabbi Yosei adds the labor of kindling as well, for which there is no liability for karet and consequently no liability for stoning.

Mishna:

We learned above [53a]: “And one who curses his father and mother” is also included among those liable for stoning.

One who curses his father and mother is not liable

for stoning unless

he curses them with the Name

of God!

However, if

he curses them by an appellation,

meaning that he did not curse them with the explicit Name but with one of its appellations, such as “Shaddai” or “Hosts,” “Gracious” or “Merciful”—

Rabbi Meir holds him liable

even if he curses by an appellation, for stoning,

but the Sages exempt him

from stoning.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: “If he curses them by an appellation, Rabbi Meir holds him liable, and the Sages exempt him.”

The Gemara asks:

Who are the Sages?

According to whose opinion was this law stated? —

It is Rabbi Menaḥem, son of Rabbi Yosei!

As it was taught: Rabbi Menaḥem, son of Rabbi Yosei, says:

It is stated [Leviticus 24:16]: “And one who blasphemes the Name of the Lord shall surely be put to death; the entire assembly shall stone him, stranger and citizen alike,

when he blasphemes the Name he shall be put to death!”

And the beraita explains:

Why must the verse state “the Name”

at the end of the verse? It has already stated at the beginning of the verse, “And one who blasphemes the Name of the Lord shall surely be put to death.” It should have stated only, “When he blasphemes, he shall be put to death.” Why, then, is “the Name” written again?

The answer is: Since the Name mentioned at the end of the verse has no relevance to one who blasphemes the Name, then

it teaches that this

“Name”

refers to one who curses his father and mother, who is not liable until he curses them with the Name.

It is thus explained that the Sages in our Mishna follow the opinion of Rabbi Menaḥem, son of Rabbi Yosei.

The Sages taught:

The Sages explain the laws governing one who curses:

1.

It is stated in the Torah [Leviticus 20:9]: “For

any man

who curses his father or his mother shall surely be put to death; he has cursed his father or his mother; his blood is upon him.”

We learn from this that a man who curses his father or mother shall be put to death.

But

why does the verse state “any man, any man”

with the word repeated?

The answer is:

To include a daughter,

for if she curses, her law is the same, and

the tumtum and

the

androgynos.

Although they are not included in the category of “man,” the Torah includes them, teaching that their law is the same as that of a man.

2.

The aforementioned verse states:

“Who curses his father or his mother.” I have derived only

from this

that

when he curses

his father and his mother

together, his law is execution. This is because the meaning of the verse, “his father and his mother,” implies both of them together.

However, one who curses

his father but not

with

his mother,

and likewise one who curses

his mother but not

with

his father,

but curses them separately—

from where

do we know that he is liable for execution for this curse?

The verse states:

The end of the aforementioned verse states:

“He has cursed his father and his mother; his blood is upon him.”

The derivation is as follows: From the beginning of the verse, which states, “Who curses his father or his mother,” we derive the punishment of one who

curses his father,

whereas from the end of the verse, “He has cursed his father and his mother; his blood is upon him,” we derive the punishment of one who

curses his mother—

the statement of Rabbi Yoshiyya.

Rabbi Yonatan says:

There is no necessity to infer from the beginning of the verse that it refers to one who curses his mother and father together. Although it says “his father and his mother,” with the conjunction “and” between them, nevertheless, this wording has two possible meanings:

It implies

that the verse speaks of one who curses

both of them together, and

it also

implies

that the verse speaks of one who curses

each one separately.

In Teshuvah Me'ahavah part I, siman 27, it was explained that although in every place it seems that the letter vav serves as a connection between two matters, and therefore here too it would seem to mean that he curses both father and mother together, yet this meaning alone is not acceptable; for if the vav were not written, and it were written 'mekallel aviv imo' we would say that this punishment of the curse applies when the father curses the mother, and thus there would be a need for the vav to inform us that the prohibition is upon the son not to curse his father and his mother.

And if so, we cannot say that the verse is speaking of one who curses both of them together; rather,

until the verse specifies for you, “together.”

And similarly, the verse specifies with regard to the prohibition of diverse kinds (Deuteronomy 22), “You shall not plow with an ox and a donkey together,” so that you should not say that it is prohibited to plow with an ox alone and with a donkey alone;

but since it is written “together,” we understand that only when they are together is plowing with them prohibited.

c.

It is stated in the aforementioned verse:

“He shall surely be put to death.”

And it is necessary to determine whether

by stoning, you say

that the curser is to be put to death,

or perhaps

he is judged

only by one of all the forms of execution stated in the Torah,

and not specifically by stoning.

The Gemara derives:

It is stated here

with regard to the curser, “His blood is upon him,”

and it is stated elsewhere

(Leviticus 20:27), “And a man or a woman in whom there is a ghost or a familiar spirit shall surely be put to death; they shall stone them with stones;

their blood is upon them.”

Just as there, the punishment is by stoning,

as it is stated, “They shall stone them with stones,”

so too here,

with regard to the curser,

the punishment is by stoning!

Now, after we have learned the punishment of one who curses, it must be asked:

We have heard the punishment. But the warning,

that is, the teaching establishing the prohibition whose violation entails this punishment and warning him against it,

from where is it derived?

The verse states:

(Exodus 22:27),

“You shall not curse judges,” and so on.

The Gemara analyzes this:

If his father was a judge, he is included in “You shall not curse judges.”

[The meaning of “judges” in this context also includes a judge, and it is prohibited to curse him.] If so, this is the warning for the punishment of one who curses his father, provided that his father was a judge.

And if his father was a leader, he is included in

(Exodus 22:27),

“You shall not curse a leader among your people.”

But if his father

was neither a judge nor a leader, from where

do we learn that it is prohibited for a son to curse his father, and that he is liable to death for cursing him?

The Gemara explains the derivation of the warning concerning a son who curses his father:

You can say that you derive

this warning through a

binyan av

from both of them,

from the leader and the judge:

It is impossible to derive the warning concerning one who curses his father from either one of them alone; it can be derived only from both of them.

It cannot be derived from the judge alone, because a judge is more severe than any other person, as it is stated concerning him, “You shall be careful to do according to everything that they instruct you,” and, “the man who acts presumptuously, refusing to listen …” It is evident that a judge is more severe than other people, and this warning was stated only with regard to him. Therefore, we could not derive from it the warning concerning one who curses his father.

And it cannot be derived from the leader alone, since people are obligated to heed his commands and not defy him when he commands them to do something, as it is stated with regard to Joshua: “Any man who defies your command …”

And since the warning concerning one who curses his father cannot be derived from either one of them alone, the Gemara explains how this prohibition is derived through a binyan av from both of them together.

The aspect of a leader is not like the aspect of a judge, and the aspect of a judge is not like the aspect of a

leader.

That is, the stringent aspect that prohibits cursing a leader is neither identical nor apparent in the stringent aspect that prohibits cursing a judge.

And in what way do they differ?

The aspect of a judge is not like the aspect of a leader, for you are commanded to follow his instruction,

with regard to the laws and halakhot that he instructs you, whereas this is not like the aspect of a leader, whose instruction you are not commanded to follow.

And the aspect of a leader is not like the aspect of a judge, for with regard to the leader

you are commanded not to defy him,

as it is prohibited to defy the leader’s word in anything he commands,

whereas this is not like the aspect of a judge,

for you are not commanded not to defy him.

And for this reason the prohibition cannot be derived from either one of them separately.

Rather, only through

the common aspect between them: They are among your people

that is, they perform the conduct of your people and behave as all Israel does,

and you are warned against cursing them; so too I,

the one deriving the law,

will include

your

father, who is among your people;

he too is included among your people and in this respect resembles the judge and the leader.

And

for this reason, you

are warned against cursing him.

Thus, through this binyan av from the judge and the leader, we learn that it is prohibited for a son to curse his father.

However, the Gemara challenges and refutes this derivation:

What is distinctive about the common aspect between them,

from which you derive the law,

is that their greatness caused them

to be distinguished in this respect, so that it is prohibited to curse them.

But one who does not possess this aspect of greatness is not subject to this prohibition! If so, with regard to a father who does not possess such greatness, from where is the warning against cursing him derived?

The Gemara answers:

The verse states

(Leviticus 19):

“You shall not curse the deaf,”

which indicates that

the wretched,

the lowly and unfortunate,

among your people are spoken of by the verse,

and even they may not be cursed.

It follows that the prohibition against cursing is not limited to the great among the people; it applies even to the lowly. If so, from this we can learn that one may not curse his father either!

But the Gemara also refutes this binyan av:

What is distinctive about the deaf, that his deafness caused him

to be forbidden to curse him? Since he is lowly in this respect, the Torah warned against degrading and causing him pain.

But with regard to an ordinary person who is neither wretched nor lowly, this cannot teach the prohibition against cursing him!

The Gemara answers:

The leader and the judge prove

that they are neither wretched nor lowly, and nevertheless it is prohibited to curse them. From this we learn that even one who is not lowly may not be cursed. A father is included in this as well, and from here we derive the warning concerning one who curses his father.

The Gemara refutes this:

What is distinctive about the leader and the judge, that their greatness caused them

to be prohibited to curse? If so, this proves that only the great may not be cursed.

The Gemara answers:

The deaf proves

that although he is not great, it is nevertheless prohibited to curse him!

And

if so,

the judgment returns,

that is, the ruling and the reason for singling out the prohibition against cursing one of the parties return and shift from one side to the other. If there is a refutation against one side, that refutation is itself refuted by the other side.

The result is:

The aspect of this one,

the stringent aspect that constitutes the reason for singling out one of them, such as the leader and the judge,

is not like the aspect of this one,

the deaf person, who does not possess the reason applicable to the leader and the judge;

and the aspect of this one

the stringent aspect of one of them, such as the deaf person,

is not like the aspect of this one,

the judge and the leader. -

The common aspect between them,

the leader, the judge, and the deaf person,

is that they are among your people, and you are warned against cursing them.

And since this is the common aspect between them,

I too will include

your

father, who is among your people,

and he too resembles them;

and

therefore,

you are warned against cursing him!

For the present, then, the source of the prohibition and warning concerning one who curses his father is derived from the common aspect of the leader, the judge, and the deaf person, whom it is prohibited to curse.

However, the Gemara also refutes this.

What is distinctive about the common aspect between them—

that they are different,

that the leader, the judge, and the deaf person are different and are not like the rest of the people?

A leader and a judge are different in that they have been elevated to greatness, whereas a deaf person is different in that he is wretched. This difference itself is what they have in common.

If so, their common aspect does not resemble a father, since he is not different from the rest of the people; and once again, we have no basis from which to derive the prohibition and warning concerning one who curses his father.

At this stage, the Gemara retracts the derivation of the warning concerning one who curses his father through a binyan av, and derives it by means of the principle “if it is not needed for its own matter,” as will be explained below.

Rather, if

the three laws stated in the Torah—A. the prohibition against cursing a judge; B. the prohibition against cursing a leader; and C. the prohibition against cursing a deaf person—were stated only with regard to themselves, and the prohibition against cursing one’s father is not derived from them,

if so,

let the verse write either, “You shall not curse a judge and a deaf person,”

“you shall not curse,”

or, “You shall not curse a leader and a deaf person,”

“you shall not curse.”

“You shall not curse a judge”

—

why do I need it?

After all, the prohibition against cursing a judge can be derived through the common aspect of the deaf person and the leader: the aspect of this one is not like the aspect of that one, and the aspect of that one is not like the aspect of this one; their common aspect is that they are among your people. From this we derive the prohibition against cursing a judge, who is also among your people. Why, then, was it written?

The Gemara proves from this:

If

the word “judge”

is not needed for its own matter,

to derive from it the prohibition against cursing a judge, since that prohibition can be derived from the leader, as stated,

assign it to the matter of his father,

and from it we derive the prohibition and warning concerning one who curses his father and mother.

The Gemara raises a difficulty:

This works well

for this derivation

according to the one who says that “judge,”

as written in this passage,

is mundane,

and does not refer to the Name of Heaven; rather, its meaning is the prohibition against cursing a judge.

But according to the one who says

that “judge,” mentioned in this verse,

is sacred,

and refers to one who “blesses” [as a euphemism] the Name, and not to the prohibition against cursing a judge,

what can be said?

From where will we derive the warning concerning one who curses his father? Even if we derive the prohibition against cursing a judge from the common aspect of the leader and the deaf person, the word “judge” is not superfluous, since it is needed to derive the prohibition against “blessing” the Name. Thus, there is again no basis from which to derive the warning concerning one who curses his father?

The Gemara cites the source of the discussion concerning the meaning of the word “judge”:

As it was taught in a baraita: “Judge,”

as written in our passage,

is mundane;

these are the words of Rabbi Yishmael. Rabbi Akiva says: “Judge” is sacred!

And it was taught in a baraita: Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov says: From where is the warning concerning one who “blesses” the Name derived?

The verse states: “You shall not curse judges”!

This establishes that the meaning of the verse is sacred, and not the mundane meaning teaching that it is prohibited to curse a judge.

If so, the verse is not superfluous, and we have no source from which to derive the warning concerning one who curses his father.

The Gemara answers:

According to the one who says that “judge” is mundane, he derives

the warning concerning one who “blesses” the Name,

which is sacred, from

the warning against cursing the judge,

which is mundane.

That is, the judge.

Certainly, if the Torah warned against cursing the judge, it also warned here against “blessing” the Name of Heaven, since there is no other source for the warning concerning one who “blesses” the Name.

And likewise,

according to the one who says that “judge”

mentioned in the passage means

“sacred,”

also

we derive

from it the warning against cursing the

mundane,

that is, the judge,

from

the warning against cursing the

sacred.

And since the word “judge” as stated in the passage has a dual meaning—both a warning concerning one who “blesses” the Name and a warning against cursing the judge—the warning against cursing the judge is superfluous, since the prohibition against cursing a judge can be derived from the common aspect of the leader and the deaf person.

And from this superfluous meaning, the warning against cursing the judge, we can derive the warning against cursing one’s father.

The Gemara refutes this:

It works well according to the one who says that “judge” is mundane,

and it is a warning against cursing a judge;

he derives

from it

the sacred,

that is, the warning concerning one who “blesses” the Name,

from the mundane.

For if the Torah warned against cursing the judge, it certainly warned likewise against “blessing” the Name.

But according to the one who says that “judge” is sacred, does he derive the mundane from the sacred?

Perhaps

it is possible that

the sacred alone was warned against:

the Torah warned against cursing the sacred Name, whereas

the mundane was not warned against,

and it did not warn against cursing the judge.

From where, then, do we compel the conclusion that the word “judge” also contains a warning against cursing a judge?

[Once again, then, the warning concerning a judge is not superfluous, and we have no source from which to derive the warning concerning one who curses his father?!]

The Gemara answers:

If so,

if the word “judge” served only as a warning concerning one who “blesses” the Name,

let the verse write, “You shall not be light,”

that is, you shall not be light regarding the honor of the sacred, and you shall not curse or degrade it.