Sanhedrin 65a (סה.) — the Talmud in English

Mishna:

The Torah states: [Leviticus 19:31] “Do not turn to the ovot or the yideonim.”

And if one transgressed intentionally, he is liable to karet, as it is stated: [Leviticus 20:6] “And the person who turns to the ovot and to the yideonim, I shall cut off that person from among his people.”

And since for intentional transgression he is liable to karet, for an unwitting transgression he is liable to a sin-offering.

And if one transgressed intentionally after receiving a warning, he is liable to death, as it is stated there: “And a man or a woman who has within them an ov or a yidoni shall surely be put to death.”

The master of an ov —

this is

a sorcerer called

a “pitom,” who speaks from his armpits.

This sorcerer raises the soul of the dead from the earth and seats it in his armpit, beneath his arms; he strikes his two arms together, and then the soul of the dead speaks.

And a yidoni —

this is one who speaks with his mouth.

He places in his mouth the bone of an animal called a “yadua,” and then the soul of the dead speaks from within the bone through the force of his sorcery, on its own, without his performing an action.

These,

the ov and the yidoni,

are executed by stoning,

as it is stated: [Leviticus 20] “They shall stone them with stones.”

And one who consults them —

is subject to a warning.

As it is stated: [Leviticus 19] “Do not turn to the ovot and the yideonim.”

The warning against consulting them is also included in the general prohibition against sorcery, as it is stated: [Deuteronomy 22] “There shall not be found among you … one who binds spells, or one who consults an ov or a yidoni.”

Gemara:

At the beginning of tractate Keritot, the Mishna enumerates the thirty-six cases of liability for karet in the Torah, for which one who transgresses unwittingly is liable to a sin-offering. There the Mishna lists only the master of an ov, and not the yidoni, even though one is liable to karet for both. Here, however, with regard to those liable to be stoned, the Mishna also lists the yidoni, together with the master of an ov.

Therefore the Gemara discusses:

What is different here,

why does our Mishna differ from the Mishna in tractate Keritot,

which teaches

in our Mishna also

the master of an ov and

also

the yidoni,

and what is different with regard to Keritot, where it teaches

only

the master of an ov, and omitted

and the tanna left out and did not list

the yidoni

among those liable to karet in the Torah!?

Rabbi Yohanan said: Since both of them,

the master of an ov and the yidoni,

were stated in a single prohibition.

Therefore, one who transgresses both while unaware of them as prohibitions does not bring separate sin-offerings, but is liable to only one sin-offering. The tanna in tractate Keritot, however, listed all those liable to karet that are subject to separate sin-offerings: if one performed all of them while unaware of them as prohibitions, he would be liable for thirty-six distinct sin-offerings. But for an ov and a yidoni he is liable for only one sin-offering, since they were stated in a single prohibition; and only distinct prohibitions divide transgressions into separate sin-offerings. Therefore the tanna in tractate Keritot did not say, “an ov and a yidoni.”

Reish Lakish said: A yidoni

is not subject to liability for a sin-offering

because it involves no action,

as the bone speaks on its own, and a sin-offering is brought only for an action; whereas the master of an ov performs an action by striking his arms together.

The Gemara asks:

And according to Rabbi Yohanan,

who holds that a yidoni is also liable to a sin-offering, except that there is no division into separate sin-offerings between the master of an ov and the yidoni, if so,

what is different about the master of an ov, whom

the tanna listed at the beginning of tractate Keritot, but did not list the yidoni!?

The Gemara explains:

Because the verse mentions it first,

as everywhere in the Torah the verse mentions the master of an ov before the yidoni.

The Gemara asks:

And Reish Lakish, why did he not say in accordance with Rabbi Yohanan? —

Rav Pappa said: They are distinct with regard to the death penalty.

With regard to liability for the death penalty, the verse says, “an ov or a yidoni,” and not, “an ov and a yidoni.” The verse thus distinguishes them with regard to the death penalty, so that one is liable to death for each one separately. From here Reish Lakish proves that a yidoni is not liable to bring an offering for an unwitting transgression. For if a yidoni were liable to bring an offering, there would be a division into separate sin-offerings between it and the master of an ov, since Reish Lakish holds that distinct death penalties for intentional transgressions divide them into separate sin-offerings for unwitting transgressions. It must therefore be that there is no liability for a sin-offering in the case of a yidoni, because it involves no action.

But

if

Rabbi Yohanan

holds that only

a distinction in the prohibition —

is considered a distinction

with regard to sin-offerings. But a distinction

in the death penalty

for an intentional transgression —

is not considered a distinction

with regard to sin-offerings. And since the master of an ov and the yidoni were stated in a single prohibition, they are not divided into separate sin-offerings when both are performed while unaware of them as prohibitions. Therefore the tanna did not list the yidoni together with the master of an ov at the beginning of tractate Keritot.

And Rabbi Yohanan —

why did he not say in accordance with Reish Lakish,

who says that since one is not liable for a sin-offering without an action, the tanna in Keritot did not list the yidoni, because it involves no action? After all, Rabbi Yohanan also holds that there is no liability for a sin-offering without an action!?

He could say to you,

Rabbi Yohanan:

The Mishna of Keritot

is in accordance with the view of

Rabbi Akiva, who said: We do not require

an action

for liability to bring a sin-offering, as the Mishna there lists one who blasphemes, which involves no action, and nevertheless he is liable to bring an offering for his unwitting transgression.

And Reish Lakish could say: Granted, Rabbi Akiva does not require a significant action,

a major one,

but he does require a minor action,

whereas a yidoni involves no action whatsoever.

The Gemara explains according to Reish Lakish, who holds that everyone agrees that an action is required:

One who blasphemes—what minor action

minor

is there? —

The movement of his lips

when he speaks

is considered an action.

But in the case of a yidoni there is not even movement of the lips, as the dead person speaks by itself from within the bone.

In the case of the master of an ov, what action is there? —

The Gemara explains:

Striking his arms together,

by which he raises the dead through sorcery by striking his arms together,

is considered an action.

The Gemara raises a difficulty:

And even according to the Sages?

Since the Sages disagree with Rabbi Akiva only with regard to one who blasphemes, but not with regard to the master of an ov, it would seem that the Sages agree that one is liable for a sin-offering for an unwitting transgression involving an ov.

And this presents a difficulty:

But it was taught in a beraita: He is not liable

for a sin-offering for an unwitting transgression involving idolatry

except for something involving an action, such as slaughtering, burning incense, pouring a libation, or bowing.

And seemingly there is a difficulty: Bowing does not involve an “action” that accomplishes anything; it is performed only with one’s body.

And

with regard to this

Reish Lakish

said to resolve it:

Who is the

who is the

tanna

who taught in the beraita that one is liable only for something involving an action, such as

“bowing” —

it is Rabbi Akiva, who said: We do not require a significant action,

but a minor action suffices to render him liable for a sin-offering. Bowing is considered a minor action. And what the tanna said in the beraita—that one is liable to a sin-offering only for an action—means that at least a minor action is required.

And Rabbi Yohanan said: You may even say

that the beraita that renders one liable for bowing applies even according to

the Sages,

because

the bending of his body is considered an action according to the Sages.

The Gemara infers from the fact that Reish Lakish disagrees with Rabbi Yohanan and establishes the beraita concerning bowing specifically in accordance with Rabbi Akiva that, according to Reish Lakish, the bending of one’s body is not considered an action, and therefore according to the Sages one is exempt for it.

And the Gemara raises a difficulty:

Now, according to Reish Lakish, if the bending of his body is not considered an action according to the Sages,

then how can it be that

the striking of the arms of the master of an ov —

is considered an action!?

The Gemara answers:

When Reish Lakish said as well

that striking his arms is considered an action, he said this only

according to Rabbi Akiva;

he said it

but according to the Sages —

he did not say it.

according to the Sages.

The Gemara asks:

If so,

if according to the Sages striking the arms in the case of the master of an ov is also not considered an action, then the Mishna in Keritot, which says that according to the Sages one who blasphemes is excluded, should not need to say merely “one who blasphemes is excluded”; rather, according to the Sages,

it should have said: “One who blasphemes and the master of an ov are excluded,”

to say!

Rather, Ulla said:

the Mishna in Keritot, which implies that according to the Sages one is liable to a sin-offering for an ov, is speaking

of one who burns incense for a demon,

who raises the dead in a manner in which he burns incense for the demon appointed over it; and burning incense is a full-fledged action.

Rava said to him: One who burns incense for a demon —

is an idolater!

Why, then, are an idolater and the master of an ov enumerated there as two separate liabilities!?

Rather, Rava said:

the Mishna in Keritot is dealing

with one who burns incense in order to bring together.

He does not accept the demon as a deity; rather, he burns incense that benefits the sorcery he performs in order to bring the demons to him, to this place.

Abaye said to him:

but

one who burns incense

in order

to bring together

the demons to him, the prohibition of

“one who binds spells” applies to him,

and it involves neither karet nor stoning, but only a prohibition.

He said to him:

Yes,

indeed, an ordinary “one who binds spells” is prohibited only by a negative commandment. However,

the Torah stated

here, with regard to

this spell-binder,

who burns incense for the minister appointed over the demons, that he

is subject to stoning

for an intentional transgression. Therefore, if he acted unwittingly, he is liable to a sin-offering, and this is the case discussed by the Mishna in Keritot.

The Sages taught: [Deuteronomy 18]

“One who brings creatures together”

“One who binds spells” —

whether one who binds large creatures,

who brings large animals together through sorcery,

or one who binds small creatures,

who brings small animals together through sorcery,

and even

one who brings together creeping creatures, such as

snakes and scorpions,

and even if he does this so that they will not cause harm, for example, he incites them against one another so that they will go to a desolate place and not cause harm here.

Abaye said: Therefore, one who binds a wasp and a scorpion,

who brings a snake and a scorpion together through his incantations,

even though he intends

to bring them together so

that they will not cause harm —

it is prohibited.

The Gemara raises a difficulty:

And according to Rabbi Yohanan, what is different about the bending of one’s body

for idolatry,

which is considered an action according to the Sages, whereas

if

the movement of the lips

in the case of one who blasphemes, the Sages said that it

is not considered an action?

The Gemara answers:

Rava said: The case of one who blasphemes is different, since it exists in the heart.

This is because the principal basis of liability for one who blasphemes is his intention in his heart to “curse” God; through his speech he merely gives voice to what is in his heart, and therefore the movement of his lips is not considered an action. This is not so with one who bows to idolatry: his liability is not for the intention of his heart, but for the act of bowing. Therefore the bending of his body is considered an action.