Sanhedrin 60a — the Talmud in English

as it is written: ![](pamud.bmp "

exact page location")

“A sorceress you shall not let live,” and it is written

in the verse following it:

“Whoever lies with an animal shall surely be put to death.”

And this is how they expound from the juxtaposition of the matters:

Everyone who is included in the general category of “whoever lies with an animal”—

is included in the general category of “a sorceress you shall not let live.”

And since a descendant of Noah is included in the prohibition against lying with an animal, he is likewise included in the prohibition against sorcery.

We learned further in that same beraita:

Rabbi Elazar says: They were also commanded concerning mixtures

.

From where are these words?

Shmuel said: For

when the Torah warned, “You shall not breed your animal with a mixture, etc.,” it opened and

the verse said: “You shall observe My statutes,”

a formulation that it did not use in other places. This indicates that these warnings below are

statutes that I had already enacted for you

in the past, for I had warned the descendants of Noah concerning them.

And these are they:

“You shall not breed your animal with a mixture”; “You shall not sow your field with a mixture.”

What

prohibition of mixtures of

your animal,

which I warned the descendants of Noah about—

breeding

it is: it is forbidden to breed one species with another species, but plowing with an ox and a donkey was not forbidden to them,

so too

the prohibition of mixtures

in your field,

which I warned the descendants of Noah about—that is,

grafting

[similar to breeding]. It was forbidden to them to graft one species onto another. But mixtures of a vineyard were not forbidden to them.

And they further expound:

What

prohibition of breeding of

your animal

is practiced

both in the Land and outside the Land,

for this is not a prohibition dependent upon the Land, but upon the body,

so too

the prohibition of mixtures stated concerning

your field

is practiced

both in the Land,

and

both outside the Land.

And we raised it against this:

But from now,

since we said that the expression “You shall observe My statutes” indicates statutes that I had already enacted for you, shall we also say this with regard to what is stated concerning all the mitzvot of the Torah:

“And you shall observe My statutes and My ordinances”—

that is,

statutes that I had already enacted for you,

so that the descendants of Noah were commanded concerning all the mitzvot of the Torah?!

And we explain:

There,

where it is written

“And you shall observe My statutes,”

it indicates statutes

of now,

which were newly given now.

But

here,

where it is written

“You shall observe My statutes,”

since it mentioned the statutes first and then the command of observing, the verse indicates that it said as follows:

statutes from the outset,

concerning which the descendants of Noah had already been commanded—

you shall observe .

We learned in our Mishna:

Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korha said, etc.

[Every day they examined the witnesses with the euphemism, “May Yose strike Yose.”]

Rav Aha bar Yaakov said:

The blasphemer

is not liable—

until he curses the Name of four letters.

To exclude

one who curses the Name

of two letters—

not

[he is not liable on account of blasphemy].

And we object:

Obviously

this is so, for

“May Yose strike Yose,” we learned,

and the reason Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korha mentioned the name “Yose” is that it consists of four letters, like the Name for cursing which one is liable.

And we explain:

Lest you say

that perhaps what the tanna stated, “Yose,”

was merely an incidental matter that he stated,

and not specifically,

it teaches us

that one is liable specifically for a Name of four letters.

There are those who say:

Thus

Rav Aha bar Yaakov said: Infer from this

from the words of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korha that

a Name of four letters—

is also a Name,

and one is liable for cursing it; and it is not necessary that it be specifically the Explicit Name, consisting of forty-two letters.

And we are astonished:

Obviously,

for

“May Yose strike Yose,” we learned,

and that means four letters! And we explain:

Lest you say

that in truth he is not liable

until there is the great Name

[until there is the great Name, of forty-two letters]. And the reason the Mishna mentioned the name Yose is that

it was merely an incidental matter that he stated; it teaches us

that one is liable even for a Name of four letters.

We learned in our Mishna:

When the verdict has been completed, etc.,

and the judges stand on their feet and tear, and do not mend.

That the judges must be

standing—

from where do we know it?

Rabbi Yitzhak bar Ami said: For the verse says: “And Ehud came to him

[to Eglon, king of Moab],

and he was sitting in the upper chamber that belonged to him alone. And Ehud said: I have a word of God to you. And he rose from upon the throne.”

Thus Eglon rose from upon the throne when he heard that Ehud was about to say a word of God to him.

And are these not matters that follow by kal va-chomer: Just as Eglon, king of Moab, who was a gentile and knew only by the euphemism

of the Name—

stood

before it,

an Israelite

who hears,

and

further, who hears

the Explicit Name

[the distinctive Name, and not a euphemism]—

all the more so

they must stand!

And that the judges must be

tearing—

from where do we know it?

As it is written

when the king of Assyria sent Rabshakeh with a heavy force against Jerusalem:

“And Eliakim son of Hilkiah, etc., and Shebna the scribe and Joah son of Asaph the recorder came to Hezekiah, with torn garments, and they told him the words of Rabshakeh.”

That is, they tore their garments over the blasphemies that they heard from Rabshakeh, as it is stated there: “which the king of Assyria, his master, sent to blaspheme the living God.”

Thus, when one hears blasphemy, he must tear! And that they

do not mend

the tear—

from where do we know it?

Rabbi Abbahu said: It is derived

[this matter is learned] by

“tearing, tearing.” It is written here,

in the incident of Rabshakeh:

“with torn garments.” And it is written there,

when Elijah parted from Elisha and ascended to heaven:

“And Elisha saw, and he cried out: My father, my father, the chariot of Israel and its horsemen! And he no longer saw him; and he grasped his garments and tore them into two tears.”

And there is reason to wonder:

From the implication of what is stated, “and he tore them into two,” do I not know that they are tears?

And what does “tears” come to teach?

It teaches that they remain

torn

forever,

and do not become mended.

The Sages taught: Both one who hears

the blasphemy from the blasphemer himself,

and one

who

hears

the matter

from

the

hearer

from the blasphemer—

is liable to tear.

But the witnesses

who came to testify concerning the matter before the court

are not liable to tear

at the time they testify, even though they hear from themselves, since

they already tore when they heard

from the blasphemer.

And we raised it against this:

And if they tore when they heard—

what is the consequence? They are hearing it now

[behold, they are hearing it again now]!

And we say:

It does not enter your mind

that they must tear again.

As it is written

following the incident of Rabshakeh, after Eliakim, Shebna, and Joah came and told the king his words:

“And it came to pass, when King Hezekiah heard, that he tore his garments.”

Thus, although they too heard the words of the blasphemy again [from themselves], nevertheless only

King Hezekiah tore, and they did not tear,

since they had already torn when they first heard from Rabshakeh’s mouth.

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel: One who hears an invocation of the Name

[a blessing of the Name]

from a gentile—

is not liable to tear.

And if you say,

behold, when they heard from

Rabshakeh

they tore their garments?

Rabshakeh was not a gentile; rather,

he was an apostate Israelite.

And Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel: One tears—

only over the distinctive Name. To exclude

[to exclude]

a euphemism—

not,

for one does not tear over its cursing.

And Rabbi Hiyya’s opinion disagrees with his on both matters

[and Rabbi Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel’s two statements disagree with Rabbi Hiyya’s statements].

For Rabbi Hiyya said: One who hears an invocation of the Name in the present time,

when we are in exile, and the fear of the court is not imposed upon people, since those liable for capital punishment are not judged—

is not liable to tear.

Because

if you do not say so,

but he should be liable to tear, the matter would occur constantly, since there is no fear of the court, and

the entire garment would become filled with tears.

And now,

from whom

[from whom] did the one who heard the invocation hear it?

If we say from an Israelite, are Israelites so entirely lawless

[are Israelites so entirely lawless] that they curse the Name constantly?!

Rather, obviously—

he heard

from a gentile.

And if

he is liable to tear only when hearing

the distinctive Name—

do they know it

[do gentiles know the distinctive Name so well] that they curse with it constantly?

Rather, is it not—

the case is that he heard from a gentile, and

with a euphemism. And infer from this: It is only in the present time that they do not

tear, because there is no fear of the court, and his garment would become filled with tears.

But at the outset,

when there was a court—

he was liable,

even though he heard from a gentile, and heard only a euphemism.

Infer from this

that Rabbi Hiyya disagreed with Shmuel’s words on two matters: that one is liable even for hearing from a gentile, and even when he heard a euphemism.

We learned in our Mishna:

The second says: “I too am like him.”

Reish Lakish said: Infer from this

that according to the fundamental law, if witnesses came to testify, and one of them stated the substance of the testimony, and afterward the second said:

“I too am like him,”—

it is valid in monetary cases and in capital cases,

and it is as though the second also stated the substance of the testimony.

And it is an elevation that the Sages enacted

[it is an elevation that the Sages made] concerning testimony, requiring all the witnesses to articulate their testimony.

But here,

in testimony concerning cursing the Name,

since it is not possible

for all the witnesses to articulate their testimony, because of the honor of the Name—

the Sages established it according to the Torah law

[the Sages established the law as it is according to Torah law], so that even when he says, “I too am like him,” this is considered testimony.

For if it enters your mind

that in all testimonies one who says, “I too am like him,”

is invalid,

could one say that

here,

in the matter of cursing the Name,

because it is not possible—

we kill the man

[they kill the man] without valid testimony of witnesses?

Rather, it necessarily follows that according to Torah law such testimony is valid.

We learned in our Mishna:

And the third says: “I too am like him.”

An anonymous

[our Mishna stated anonymously]

as

the method of

Rabbi Akiva, who compares three

witnesses

to two.

Just as with two witnesses, if one of them is found to be a relative or disqualified, their testimony is nullified, so too with three or more, if one is found to be a relative or disqualified, even though two valid witnesses remain, their testimony is nullified.

And therefore we need to hear the testimony of the third as well, so that if he is refuted as a conspiring witness or contradicted, all the testimony will be nullified. And this is what we learned in our Mishna: “And the third says: ‘I too am like him.’”