Sanhedrin 60a (ס.) — the Talmud in English

As it is written:

“You shall not allow a sorceress to live,” and it is written

in the following verse:

“Whoever lies with an animal shall surely be put to death.”

And this is how they derive the matter from the juxtaposition of the verses:

Anyone included in the general category of “whoever lies with an animal”—

is included in the general category of “you shall not allow a sorceress to live.”

And since a descendant of Noah is included in the prohibition against lying with an animal, he is likewise included in the prohibition against sorcery.

We learned further in that same beraita:

Rabbi Elazar says: They were also commanded concerning diverse kinds

.

From where are these matters derived?

Shmuel said: When

the Torah warned, “You shall not mate your animal with a different species, etc.,” it began and

the verse said: “You shall observe My statutes,”

an expression that it did not use elsewhere. This indicates that the following warnings are—

statutes that I had already instituted for you

in the past, for I had warned the descendants of Noah concerning them.

And these are they:

“You shall not mate your animal with a different species; you shall not sow your field with a different species.”

What

is the prohibition of diverse kinds concerning

“your animal,”

concerning which I warned the descendants of Noah?

It is mating

—it is prohibited to mate one species with another. But plowing with an ox and a donkey together was not prohibited to them.

Also,

the prohibition of diverse kinds

concerning “your field,”

concerning which I warned the descendants of Noah, means

grafting

[which resembles mating], as they were prohibited from grafting one species onto another. But diverse kinds in a vineyard were not prohibited to them.

And they derive further:

What

is the prohibition of mating concerning

“your animal”

that applies

both in Eretz Yisrael and outside Eretz Yisrael,

since this is not a prohibition dependent on the Land, but rather on the animal itself,

also

the prohibition of diverse kinds stated concerning

“your field”

applies

both in Eretz Yisrael

and

outside Eretz Yisrael.

We raised a difficulty concerning this:

But if that is so,

having said that the expression “You shall observe My statutes” indicates statutes that I had already instituted for you, shall we say the same with regard to what is stated concerning all the mitzvot of the Torah:

“You shall observe My statutes and My ordinances”

—that is,

statutes that I had already instituted for you,

meaning that the descendants of Noah were commanded concerning all the mitzvot of the Torah!?

And we explain:

There,

where it is written

“You shall observe My statutes,”

the expression indicates statutes

of the present,

which were newly given at that time.

But

here,

where it is written

“You shall observe My statutes,”

as the statutes are mentioned before the command to observe them, the verse indicates that this is what it says:

statutes from the outset,

concerning which the descendants of Noah had already been commanded—

you shall observe .

We learned in our Mishna:

Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korha says, etc.

[On every day they questioned the witnesses using the euphemism, “May Yosei strike Yosei.”]

Rav Aḥa bar Ya'akov said:

The blasphemer

is not liable—

until he blasphemes the four-letter Name.

This serves to exclude

one who blesses

a two-letter Name—

who is not

[liable on account of blasphemy].

And we raise an objection:

It is obvious

that this is so, for

we learned: “May Yosei strike Yosei,”

and the reason Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korha mentioned the name Yosei is that it consists of four letters, like the Name for whose blasphemy one is liable!

And we explain:

Lest you say

that when the tanna mentioned “Yosei,”

he merely mentioned an incidental matter

and did not intend it precisely,

it teaches us

that one is liable specifically for blaspheming a four-letter Name.

Some say

that

Rav Aḥa bar Ya'akov said as follows: Infer from

the statement of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korha that

the four-letter Name—

is also a Name,

and one is liable for blaspheming it; it is not necessary that it be specifically the Explicit Name consisting of forty-two letters.

And we wonder:

It is obvious,

for

we learned: “May Yosei strike Yosei,”

which means four letters! And we explain:

Lest you say

that in fact one is not liable

until there is the Great Name

[until there is the great Name consisting of forty-two letters], and the reason the Mishna mentioned the name Yosei is

that he merely mentioned an incidental matter; it teaches us

that one is liable even for a four-letter Name.

We learned in our Mishna:

Once the judgment has been completed, etc.,

the judges stand on their feet and tear their garments, and they do not mend the tear.

That the judges must be

standing—

from where do we derive this?

Rabbi Yitzḥak bar Ami said: As the verse says: “And Ehud came to him

[to Eglon, king of Moab],

and he was sitting in the cool upper chamber that he had for himself alone. And Ehud said: I have a message from God to you. And he arose from his seat.”

Thus, Eglon arose from his seat when he heard that Ehud was about to say a message from God to him.

And are these not matters subject to a kal va-chomer: If Eglon, king of Moab, who was a gentile and knew only an appellation

of the Name,

stood

before it,

a Jew

who hears

and

also hears

the Explicit Name

[the distinctive Name, and not an appellation]—

all the more so

must he stand!

And that the judges must be

tearing their garments—

from where do we derive this?

As it is written

concerning the time when the king of Assyria sent Rabshakeh with a large army against Jerusalem:

“And Eliakim the son of Hilkiah, etc., and Shebna the scribe, and Joah the son of Asaph the recorder, came to Hezekiah with torn garments, and they told him the words of Rabshakeh.”

That is, they tore their garments over the blasphemies they heard from Rabshakeh, as it is stated there: “Which his master, the king of Assyria, has sent to blaspheme the living God.”

Thus, when one hears blasphemy, he must tear his garment! And that they

do not mend

the tear—

from where do we derive this?

Rabbi Abbahu said: It is derived

[this matter is derived] by means of a

verbal analogy, “tearing, tearing.” It is written here,

in the account of Rabshakeh:

“With torn garments.” And it is written there,

when Elijah parted from Elisha and ascended to Heaven:

“And Elisha saw it, and he cried, ‘My father, my father, the chariot of Israel and its horsemen!’ And he saw him no more; and he took hold of his garments and tore them into two tears.”

And it is difficult:

From the implication of that which is stated, “and he tore them into two,” do I not know that they were tears?

And what does the verse mean by stating “tears”?

It teaches that they remain

torn

forever,

and are not mended.

The Sages taught: Both one who hears

the blasphemy directly from the blasphemer himself,

and one

who

hears

the matter

from

one who

heard

it from the blasphemer—

must tear his garment.

But the witnesses

who came to testify concerning the matter before the court

are not obligated to tear their garments

at the time they testify, when they hear it from their own mouths, since

they already tore their garments when they heard

it from the blasphemer.

We raise a difficulty:

And if they tore their garments when they heard it—

what of it? They are hearing it now

[after all, they are hearing it again now]!

And we say:

It does not enter your mind

that they should have to tear their garments again.

As it is written

at the continuation of the account of Rabshakeh, after Eliakim, Shebna, and Joah came and reported his words to the king:

“And it came to pass, when King Hezekiah heard it, that he tore his garments.”

Thus, although they too heard the words of blasphemy again [from their own mouths], nevertheless only

King Hezekiah tore his garments, but they did not tear theirs,

since they had already torn them when they first heard the words from Rabshakeh.

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel: One who hears a mention of the Name

[a blessing of the Name]

from a gentile—

is not obligated to tear his garment.

And if you say,

did they not tear their garments when they heard it from

Rabshakeh

?

Rabshakeh was not a gentile; rather,

he was an apostate Jew.

And Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel: One tears—

only over the distinctive Name. This serves to exclude

[to exclude]

an appellation—

not,

for one does not tear over blasphemy of an appellation.

And Rabbi Ḥiyya disagrees with both of them

[both statements of Rav Yehuda in the name of Shmuel disagree with the statement of Rabbi Ḥiyya].

As Rabbi Ḥiyya said: One who hears a mention of the Name in the present era,

when we are in exile and the fear of the court does not lie upon the people, since those liable for capital punishment are not judged—

is not obligated to tear his garment.

This is

because if you do not say so,

but maintain that he is obligated to tear his garment, the matter would occur frequently, since there is no fear of the court, and

the entire garment would become filled with tears.

And now,

from whom

[from whom did the listener hear the mention of the Name?

If we say from a Jew, are Jews so utterly lawless

[are Jews so wanton] that they blaspheme the Name constantly?!

Rather, it is obvious—

that he heard

from a gentile.

And if

he is obligated to tear only upon hearing

the distinctive Name—

do they know it

[do gentiles know the distinctive Name so well] that they blaspheme with it constantly?

Rather, is it not

a case where he heard it from a gentile, and

with an appellation. And infer from this: It is only in the present era that they do not

tear their garments, because there is no fear of the court and his garment would become filled with tears.

But at the outset,

when there was a court, he was

obligated,

even if he heard it from a gentile and heard only an appellation.

Infer from this

that Rabbi Ḥiyya disagreed with Shmuel on both points: that one is obligated even when hearing it from a gentile, and even when he hears an appellation.

We learned in our Mishna:

The second says: I too am like him.

Reish Lakish said: Infer from this

that according to the basic law, if witnesses came to testify and one of them stated the substance of the testimony, and afterward the second said

“I too am like him,”

he is valid in monetary cases and in capital cases,

as it is as though the second witness had also stated the substance of the testimony.

And it is an added stringency that the Sages instituted

[it is an added stringency that the Sages instituted] with regard to testimony, requiring all the witnesses to articulate their testimony.

But here,

with regard to testimony concerning blasphemy of the Name,

since it is impossible

for all the witnesses to articulate their testimony, out of respect for the Name,

the Sages restored the law to its Torah basis

[they established the law as it is by Torah law], so that even when one says, “I too am like him,” it is considered testimony.

For if it enters your mind

that in all testimony, one who says, “I too am like him,”

is invalid,

can it be said that

here,

in the matter of blasphemy of the Name,

because it is impossible—

we execute the man

[kill the man] without valid testimony?

Rather, it necessarily follows that by Torah law such testimony is valid.

We learned in our Mishna:

And the third says: I too am like him.

The anonymous Mishna

[our Mishna states anonymously]

follows

the method of

Rabbi Akiva, who compares three

witnesses

to two.

Just as with two witnesses, if one of them is found to be a relative or disqualified, their testimony is void, so too with three or more: if one of them is found to be a relative or disqualified, their testimony is void, even though two valid witnesses remain. Therefore, we need to hear the testimony of the third witness as well, so that if he is proven to be a conspiring witness or his testimony is contradicted, the entire testimony will be void. And this is what we learned in our Mishna: “And the third says: I too am like him.”