Sanhedrin 57a — the Talmud in English

a.

Idolatry and forbidden sexual relations, ![](pamud.bmp "

exact page location")

as it is written [

Genesis 6:11]:

“And the earth became corrupt before God,” and the school of Rabbi Ishmael taught: Everywhere that the expression

“corruption”

is stated, it refers only to a matter of sexual transgression and idolatry.

A matter of sexual transgression, as it is stated [

there]:

“For all flesh had corrupted its way.”

Idolatry, as it is written [

Deuteronomy 4:16]:

“Lest you corrupt yourselves and make for yourselves

an idol

,” and so on.

But surely the generation of the Flood was punished for these transgressions, and it is proven that they had been warned concerning them, for otherwise they would not have been punished, since “the verse does not punish unless it has first warned.”

And the other one,

that is, the one who derives [the warning] from “And He commanded,” why did he not derive it from this verse?

He holds that the principal warning was stated in “And He commanded,” whereas concerning the generation of the Flood

it was their customary conduct that He revealed.

That is, the verse revealed for what they were punished.

b.

Bloodshed, as it is written [

Genesis 9:6]:

“Whoever sheds the blood of man

by man shall his blood be shed

,” and so on.

And the other one,

that is, the one who derives [the warning] from “And He commanded,” why did he not derive it from this verse? He holds that the principal warning is from “And He commanded,” and here only

their killing is what He reveals.

That is, it came only to state by which death he is to be killed.

c.

Robbery, as it is written [

Genesis 9:3]:

“Like the green herb I have given you all,” and Rav Levi said: “Like the green herb,”

that is, only something that grows by itself was permitted to them to eat,

but not like a garden vegetable,

which is planted by another.

And the other one,

that is, the one who derives [the warning] from “And He commanded,” why did he not derive it from this verse?

He holds:

That verse came to permit flesh.

From this verse we learn the permission for the descendants of Noah to eat flesh.

d.

A limb from a living creature, as it is written [

there, verse 4]:

“But flesh with its soul, its blood, you shall not eat.”

And the other one,

that is, the one who derives [the warning] from “And He commanded,” why did he not derive it from this verse?

He holds:

That

verse

came to permit creeping creatures.

That is, since they were warned concerning a limb from a living creature from “You shall surely eat,” the verse came to permit a limb from a living creature among creeping creatures, since only a limb of those whose blood is called “soul” was prohibited. Creeping creatures are excluded, for their blood is not called “soul,” and it is therefore like flesh.

e.

Castration, as it is written [

there, verse 7]:

“Swarm upon the earth and multiply upon it.”

Whereas castration nullifies procreation.

And the other one,

that is, the one who derives [the warning] from “And He commanded,” why did he not derive it from this verse?

He holds: That verse is

merely for a blessing.

That is, He did not command them concerning procreation, but blessed them that they should be fruitful and multiply.

f.

Mixed species, as it is written [

there, Genesis 6:20]:

“Of the bird according to its kind,”

implying that the bird is permitted to mate only with one of its kind.

And the other one,

that is, the one who derives [the warning] from “And He commanded,” why did he not derive it from this verse?

He holds:

That verse is merely for companionship.

That is, there is no prohibition in the matter; rather, it is preferable that each species mate with its own kind.

Rav Yosef said: The scholars of the academy said [

they said in the academy]:

Although a descendant of Noah is warned concerning seven mitzvot, nevertheless

for three mitzvot

alone

a descendant of Noah is executed— [

g

r—

g

uiluy

; s

hedlikhuta; b

r

akha—

a mnemonic

for the three transgressions for which a descendant of Noah is executed]:

for forbidden sexual relations, for bloodshed, and for blasphemy.

Rav Sheshet raised an objection to this:

Granted, bloodshed

—a descendant of Noah is executed for it—because

it is written

in the statement of the Holy One, blessed be He, to Noah [Genesis 9:6]: “Whoever sheds the blood of man,”

whoever sheds the blood of man,

by man [through a person] shall his blood be shed—

But these

—the two additional mitzvot, namely forbidden sexual relations and blasphemy—

from where do they have it [

from where is it derived to obligate them for death]!? For:

If he derives [

if these mitzvot are learned through “what do we find”

from bloodshed,

just as he is executed for this, so he is executed for those—this cannot be said, for:

If so,

even all of them [

even all the other mitzvot of the descendants of Noah]

also

would be executed for them through “what do we find” from bloodshed!?

And

if because they were included

—the descendant of Noah was included as liable for death for these two mitzvot—

from

what the verse repeated in commanding these mitzvot to Israel—“Every man,”

“Every man,”

and it implies including the gentiles like Israel; this also cannot be said, for:

If so,

idolatry too was included from

“Every man,”

and why is a descendant of Noah not executed even for idolatry!?

Rather, Rav Sheshet said: Indeed, idolatry must be added, since it too was included through “Every man”:

And thus

said

the scholars of the academy:

For four mitzvot a descendant of Noah is executed,

namely: forbidden sexual relations, bloodshed, blasphemy, and idolatry.

And we raise an objection to this:

And

even

for idolatry a descendant of Noah is executed!?

But it was taught:

With regard to idolatry,

this is the law:

Those

matters [

acts that the worshipper performs for the sake of idolatry]

for which the court of Israel executes,

such as all the forms of worship that are customary for it,

a descendant

of Noah is warned concerning them—

It therefore follows:

there is a warning, [

indeed the descendants of Noah were warned against worshipping idolatry], but

death—

no,

but only for Israel!?

He said,

he answered,

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak:

Their warning [

that of the descendants of Noah]

is their death.

That is, every “warning” that the tanna taught concerning descendants of Noah is their death; the tanna was not precise to teach the expression “death” concerning those mitzvot for which the gentile is liable to death, and to teach the expression “warning” concerning those mitzvot for which the gentile is not liable to death.

But

Rav Huna and Rav Yehuda, and all the students of Rav,

disagreed with Rav Yosef and Rav Sheshet, who hold that a descendant of Noah is not executed for all seven of his mitzvot, and

they said:

For seven mitzvot a descendant of Noah is executed;

and the reason is:

The Torah revealed in one [

the Torah revealed that the gentile is liable to death for one of his mitzvot], namely bloodshed, as the Torah said: “Whoever sheds the blood of man, by man shall his blood be shed,”

and the same law applies to all of them,

his mitzvot, for which he is executed.

And we raise an objection to this:

And

even

for robbery—

which is one of his seven mitzvot—

a descendant of Noah is executed,

as these amoraim said!?

But it was taught

in the Tosefta of tractate Avoda Zara, chapter 9:

“The descendants of Noah were commanded concerning seven mitzvot: concerning laws, concerning idolatry, concerning forbidden sexual relations, concerning bloodshed, concerning robbery, and concerning a limb from a living creature.

Concerning laws, how? Concerning idolatry and blasphemy, how? Concerning forbidden sexual relations, how? And concerning bloodshed, how? ...

Concerning robbery,

how:

He stole,

the gentile,

and robbed [

or robbed]—

And likewise

if the gentile took a married woman,

a beautiful woman

in war, so that he is found to rob his fellow;

and likewise

if he did things that are

similar to them [

and below it explains them]—

This is the law:

a gentile with a gentile,

that is, a gentile who comes to do this to another gentile,

and

likewise

a gentile with an Israelite,

this is

forbidden

to him.

But

if

an Israelite

who comes to do this

to a gentile,

this is

permitted.”

that a gentile is executed for robbery, why did we learn: “A gentile with a gentile and a gentile with an Israelite is forbidden”?

And if it is so,

that the gentile is executed for robbery, why did we teach: “A gentile with a gentile and a gentile with an Israelite is forbidden”?

Let him teach

“A gentile with a gentile and a gentile with an Israelite is

liable

for death”! And we answer: In truth, even a gentile with a gentile and a gentile with an Israelite is liable for death; nevertheless, it teaches only the expression “forbidden,”

because he intended to teach in the latter clause [

because the tanna wished to teach in the latter clause]:

“An Israelite with a gentile is permitted,”

and to inform us that there is not even a prohibition in this; therefore

the tanna taught

also

the first clause—“A gentile with a gentile

is

forbidden.”

That is, had the tanna taught concerning a gentile with a gentile and a gentile with an Israelite “liable,” then correspondingly concerning an Israelite with a gentile he should have taught “exempt.” But this is not so, for then it would imply that the Israelite is merely exempt from death, but does transgress it by a negative commandment, whereas according to the truth, a gentile with an Israelite is permitted.

And we raise an objection:

But wherever there is liability, the tanna teaches it [

in that same beraita, concerning those transgressions for which the gentile is liable for death, the tanna does teach the expression “liable”]; and since concerning robbery the tanna changed his wording and taught the expression “forbidden,” it implies: in this case he is liable, and in that case he is forbidden but not liable!?

For

surely

he teaches in the first clause

of that same beraita:

Concerning bloodshed,

how:

a gentile with a gentile, and a gentile with an Israelite,

this is

liable

for death, whereas

an Israelite

who did so

to a gentile,

this is

exempt.

And we answer:

In truth, concerning robbery the tanna did not specifically use the expression “forbidden,” and he taught this only because concerning an Israelite we teach “permitted.” And as for your difficulty: in the first clause the tanna taught the expression “liable,” and since he did not teach the expression “forbidden” as concerning robbery, it implies that in this case he is liable and in that case he is forbidden; this is not difficult, for

there

concerning bloodshed the tanna was compelled to teach “liable,” for

how could he teach [

how could he have taught otherwise]!?

If

he had taught

concerning a gentile:

“forbidden,”

and

concerning an Israelite:

“permitted,”

but it was taught:

A gentile, and

likewise an Israelite, who are

small-animal shepherds,

who are presumed to be robbers, because they graze the animals in the fields of others—

we do not raise

them from a pit if they fell into it, in order to save them,

but

nevertheless

we do not lower

them into a pit to kill them by hand—

It follows that an Israelite is forbidden to lower the gentile and kill him; so the tanna was compelled to teach concerning a gentile with a gentile the expression “liable,” and correspondingly concerning an Israelite with a gentile the expression “exempt,” which implies, however, that it is forbidden.

We learned in the beraita: “Concerning robbery, how: he stole and robbed, and likewise a beautiful woman and likewise similar things”:

The Gemara asks:

“Similar to it”

in robbery—what is it?

He said,

Rabbi Aḥa bar Yaakov

explained:

It was necessary only for a laborer,

a gentile who ate grapes

in a vineyard

where he was working.

And we raise an objection to this:

A laborer in a vineyard—when [

when was he eating] that he is considered “similar to it” of robbery, but not actual robbery!? For:

If

the laborer ate the grapes

at the time of the completion of the work,

for example, he was hired to harvest the grapes and ate some of them at that time, this cannot be said, for:

Surely

it is permitted

even for an Israelite with an Israelite, as will be explained; whereas in the beraita we learned: “An Israelite with a gentile is permitted,” implying: an Israelite with an Israelite is forbidden.

And from where do we know that an Israelite with an Israelite eats at the time of the completion of the work?

For it is stated: “When you enter your fellow’s vineyard, you may eat grapes according to your desire, to your satisfaction, but you may not put any into your vessel.” And the Sages expounded: At the time when you put [grapes] into the vessel of the owner of the house—that is, at the time of the completion of the work—you may eat.

No,

lest you say: “The analogous case with regard to theft” is: a worker who ate

not at the time of completion of the work,

when he does not at that time place [the produce] into the owner's vessels, and in this manner, [when] a gentile [steals] from a gentile and [when] a gentile [steals] from an Israelite it is forbidden, while [when] an Israelite [steals] from a gentile it is permitted; but [when] an Israelite [steals] from an Israelite it is truly forbidden, for the Torah permitted [the worker to eat] only at the time of completion of the work. So too it is impossible to say [this], for:

if so

it is an actual theft [it is a complete theft], and it is already included in what we learned: “concerning theft.”

Rather, Rav Pappa said:

It was necessary [to mention] “the analogous case with regard to theft”

only for

a

gentile who stole or robbed

less than the value of a peruta.

And we raise an objection against this:

If so—that the beraita is dealing with theft of less than the value of a peruta—

how did we learn in the beraita: “

A gentile [stealing] from an Israelite is forbidden”?

But

an Israelite

is one who can forgo it

and he forgoes such a small amount of theft, so there is no theft here at all!?

And we answer:

Granted that afterward he forgoes it [although the Israelite forgoes it after the fact],

nevertheless

does he not have pain at the time [and is it not the case that at the time of the theft the Israelite experiences pain from the gentile's theft, even though it is less than the value of a peruta]!? And if so, it is included within theft, and it is properly taught: “A gentile [stealing] from an Israelite is forbidden.”

[разве в момент грабежа еврей не страдает из-за того, что нееврей его ограбил, даже если сумма меньше одной пруты]?! Поэтому это действительно входит в понятие грабежа, и правильно сказано в барайте: «Нееврею у еврея — запрещено».

We still raise an objection: This is satisfactory with regard to a gentile [stealing] from an Israelite: it is satisfactory that theft of less than the value of a peruta is called “the analogous case with regard to theft” and is not actual theft, since it is not complete theft, to extract it from him through judges, because he forgoes it. But concerning

a gentile [stealing] from a gentile

for less than the value of a peruta, is it indeed

“the analogous case”

of theft, and not actual theft!?

But

since

gentiles

are not ones who can forgo

that is, presumably he does not forgo it, for he is excessively particular about his money, and it turns out that he must also return it to him, if so,

it is an actual theft

and it is not called “the analogous case” of theft!?

Rather, he said:

Rav

Aḥa son of Rav Ika

explained what we learned in the beraita, “the analogous case” of theft:

The beraita was necessary

only

for one who withholds the wages of a hired laborer,

because since he did not snatch it from his hand, this is not called “theft ” but “the analogous case” of theft; and concerning this it properly taught in the beraita:

A gentile [stealing] from a gentile, and a gentile [stealing] from an Israelite, are forbidden; an Israelite [stealing] from a gentile is permitted.

The Gemara further explains the beraita that we learned: “And likewise a yefat to'ar, and likewise their analogous cases,” and asks: “

What is

the analogous case of a yefat to'ar?”

When Rav Dimi arrived [when Rav Dimi came from the Land of Israel],

he said:

Rabbi Elazar said that Rabbi Ḥanina said:

A Noahide who designated a maidservant for his slave, and

afterward

the master came

upon

her

without the slave's knowledge, he is

put to death on her account

because of the slave's theft; and this theft is “a gentile [stealing] from a gentile—the analogous case of a yefat to'ar.” The Gemara adds: “

The analogous case

with regard to bloodshed he did not teach”

the tanna in the beraita [the tanna did not mention “the analogous case” concerning bloodshed], because with regard to bloodshed you find only either a complete obligation or a complete permission.

Abaye said:

If you find that it is taught [if you find someone who teaches in a beraita: “the analogous case” with regard to bloodshed], then certainly

it is

Rabbi Yonatan ben Shaul, as it is taught:

Rabbi Yonatan ben Shaul says:

one who is

pursuing his fellow to kill him—

and the pursued person can

[that is, save himself]

save him [save himself]

through one of his limbs

of the pursuer, for example, he can cut off his leg,

but he did not save him

in this manner—instead, he killed him,

таким образом, а вместо этого убил его, —