Sanhedrin 57a (נז.) — the Talmud in English

1.

Idolatry and forbidden sexual relations,

as it is written

Genesis 6:11]:

“And the earth was corrupt before God,” and the school of Rabbi Ishmael taught: Everywhere that the expression

“corruption”

is stated, it refers only to forbidden sexual relations and idolatry .

Forbidden sexual relations, as it is stated [

there, verse 12]:

“For all flesh had corrupted its way upon the earth.”

Idolatry, as it is written [

Deuteronomy 4:16]:

“Lest you corrupt yourselves and make

for yourselves an image...

,” and so on.

But the people of the generation of the Flood were punished for these transgressions, and it is proven that they had been warned concerning them, for otherwise they would not have been punished, since “the verse does not punish unless it first warns.”

But the other one,

that is, the one who derives the warning from “And He commanded,” why did he not derive it from this verse?

He held that the essential warning was stated in “And He commanded,” whereas concerning the generation of the Flood

the verse merely revealed their conduct.

That is, Scripture revealed for what they were punished.

2.

Bloodshed, as it is written [

Genesis 9:6]:

“Whoever sheds the blood of man

by man shall his blood be shed

,” and so on.

But the other one,

that is, the one who derives the warning from “And He commanded,” why did he not derive it from this verse? He held that the essential warning is derived from “And He commanded,” whereas here only

their execution is revealed.

That is, the verse merely states by what form of death they will be killed.

3.

Robbery, as it is written [

Genesis 9:3]:

“Like the green herb I have given you all,” and Rabbi Levi said: “Like the green herb,”

meaning that only something that grows on its own was permitted for them to eat,

but not like garden vegetables,

which are planted by another.

But the other one,

that is, the one who derives the warning from “And He commanded,” why did he not derive it from this verse?

He held that

that verse came to permit the consumption of meat.

From this verse we learn that the descendants of Noah were permitted to eat meat .

4.

A limb from a living animal, as it is written [

there, verse 4]:

“But flesh with its soul, its blood, you shall not eat.”

But the other one,

that is, the one who derives the warning from “And He commanded,” why did he not derive it from this verse?

He held that

that

verse

came to permit creeping creatures.

That is, since they were warned against a limb from a living animal by the words “you shall surely eat,” this verse came to permit a limb from a living creature in the case of creeping creatures, since the prohibition applies only to a limb of creatures whose blood is called “soul.” Creeping creatures are excluded, since their blood is not called “soul,” and therefore it is like ordinary flesh.

5.

Castration, as it is written [

there, verse 7]:

“Swarm upon the earth and multiply upon it.”

Castration nullifies procreation.

But the other one,

that is, the one who derives the warning from “And He commanded,” why did he not derive it from this verse?

He held that

that verse was merely a blessing.

That is, He did not command them concerning procreation; rather, He blessed them that they should be fruitful and multiply.

6.

Crossbreeding, as it is written [

there, 6:20]:

“Of the birds according to its kind,”

which indicates that a bird may mate only with one of its own kind.

But the other one,

that is, the one who derives the warning from “And He commanded,” why did he not derive it from this verse?

He held that

that verse was merely for companionship.

That is, the matter is not prohibited; rather, it is preferable for each species to mate with its own kind.

Rabbi Yosef said: The scholars of the academy said [

they said in the academy]:

Although a descendant of Noah is warned concerning seven mitzvot, nevertheless

for three mitzvot

alone

a descendant of Noah is executed— [

G

R

I

dolatry

; B

loodshed;

B

lessing

—a mnemonic

for the three transgressions for which a descendant of Noah is executed]:

for forbidden sexual relations, for bloodshed, and for cursing God’s Name.

Rabbi Sheshet challenged this:

Granted, with regard to bloodshed,

a descendant of Noah is executed for it, because

it is written

in God’s statement to Noah [

“Whoever sheds the blood of man,

by man [through a person] shall his blood be shed”]—

But these others—

the two additional mitzvot, namely, forbidden sexual relations and cursing God’s Name—

from where do they derive it [

what is the basis for making them liable to execution]!? For:

If they derive [

if these mitzvot are learned by a mah matzinu—“what do we find”]

from bloodshed,

meaning, just as one is executed for this, so too one is executed for those, this cannot be said, since:

If so,

even all of them [

the other mitzvot of the descendants of Noah]

also

should entail execution for them by a mah matzinu from bloodshed!?

And

if it is because the descendant of Noah was included

among those liable to execution for these two mitzvot

by

the repetition in the verse of the commandment of these mitzvot to Israel—“

each person”—

which indicates that gentiles are included like Jews, this too cannot be said, since:

If so,

idolatry too was included by “

each person,”

why is a descendant of Noah not executed even for idolatry!?

Rather, Rabbi Sheshet said:

Indeed, idolatry must be added, since it too was included by “each person”:

And thus

the scholars of the academy said:

For four mitzvot a descendant of Noah is executed,

namely: forbidden sexual relations, bloodshed, cursing God’s Name, and idolatry.

And we raise an objection to this:

And

if so,

is a descendant of Noah executed for idolatry!?

But it was taught in a beraita:

With regard to idolatry,

this is the law:

Those

acts [

actions performed by one who worships idolatry]

for which a Jewish court executes,

such as all forms of worship that are customary for that idolatry,

a descendant

of Noah is warned concerning them—

This indicates that

there is a warning [

indeed the descendants of Noah were warned not to worship idolatry], but

execution—

no,

only Jews are liable to execution for it!?

He said—

he answered—

Rab Naḥman bar Yitzḥak:

Their warning [

that of the descendants of Noah]

is their execution.

That is, whenever the tanna uses the term “warning” concerning the descendants of Noah, this means execution for them. The tanna was not precise in using the term “execution” for mitzvot for which a gentile is liable to execution, and the term “warning” for mitzvot for which a gentile is not liable to execution.

But

Rab Huna and Rab Judah, and all the disciples of Rav,

disagreed with Rabbi Yosef and Rabbi Sheshet, who held that a descendant of Noah is not executed for all seven of his mitzvot, and

they said:

For all seven mitzvot a descendant of Noah is executed;

and the reason is:

The Torah revealed this concerning one [

the Torah revealed that a gentile is liable to execution for one of his mitzvot], namely, bloodshed, as the Torah states: “Whoever sheds the blood of man, by man shall his blood be shed,”

and the same law applies to all of them,

his mitzvot for which he is executed.

And we raise an objection to this:

And

if so,

for robbery—

which is one of his seven mitzvot—

is a descendant of Noah executed,

as these amoraim said!?

But it was taught

in the Tosefta of tractate Avoda Zara, chapter 9: “

The descendants of Noah were commanded concerning seven mitzvot: concerning civil law, idolatry, forbidden sexual relations, bloodshed, robbery, and a limb from a living animal.

Concerning civil law, how so? Concerning idolatry and cursing God’s Name, how so? Concerning forbidden sexual relations, how so? And concerning bloodshed, how so?...

Concerning robbery,

how so?

If a gentile steals

or

robs [

or commits robbery]—

And likewise

if the gentile takes a married woman, a

beautiful captive

in war, thereby robbing another man;

and likewise

if he performs acts that are

similar to these [

and below it explains what they are]—

This is the law: a gentile with a gentile,

that is, a gentile who does this to another gentile,

and

a

gentile with an Israelite,

it is

forbidden

to him.

But

if an

Israelite

does this

to a gentile,

it is

permitted.”

But if it is so,

that a gentile is executed for robbery, why did we learn: “A gentile with a gentile and a gentile with an Israelite is forbidden”?

Let it teach

instead: “A gentile with a gentile and a gentile with an Israelite is

liable

to execution”! We answer: In fact, a gentile with a gentile and a gentile with an Israelite is liable to execution; nevertheless, the tanna stated only the term “forbidden”

because he intended to teach the latter clause

[

because the tanna wished to state in the latter clause]: “

An Israelite with a gentile is permitted,”

to teach us that there is not even a prohibition in this, and therefore

the tanna

also stated in the

first clause—“A gentile with a gentile is

forbidden.”

That is, had the tanna stated concerning a gentile with a gentile and a gentile with an Israelite “liable,” then, corresponding to this, concerning an Israelite with a gentile he should have stated “exempt.” But this is not so, since that would imply that the Israelite is merely exempt from execution, but does transgress a negative commandment. In truth, however, a gentile with an Israelite is permitted.

And we raise an objection:

But wherever there is liability, the tanna teaches liability

[

in that very beraita, concerning those transgressions for which a gentile is liable to execution, the tanna indeed uses the language of liability]. Since, concerning robbery, the tanna changed his wording and used the term “forbidden,” this indicates that in one case he is liable and in the other he is forbidden but not liable!?

For

the opening clause of that same beraita

teaches:

Concerning bloodshed,

how so?

A gentile with a gentile and a gentile with an Israelite

is

liable

to execution, whereas

an Israelite

who does this

to a gentile

is

exempt.

And we answer:

In fact, concerning robbery the tanna did not specifically choose the term “forbidden”; he stated it only because concerning an Israelite we learned “permitted.” And as for your difficulty—that in the opening clause the tanna used the language of liability, which indicates that in one case he is liable and in the other he is forbidden—this is not difficult, because

there

concerning bloodshed the tanna was compelled to state “liable,” because

how else could he have taught it

[

how could he have formulated it differently]!?

If

he had taught

concerning a gentile:

“forbidden,”

and

concerning an Israelite:

“permitted,”

but it was taught in a beraita:

A gentile, and likewise an Israelite, who are

shepherds of small livestock,

who are presumed to be robbers, since they pasture the animals in other people’s fields—

we do not raise them

if they fell into a pit, in order to save them,

but

nevertheless

we do not lower them

into a pit in order to kill them with one’s hands—

This indicates that an Israelite is forbidden to lower a gentile into a pit and kill him. Therefore, the tanna was compelled to use the language of liability concerning a gentile with a gentile, and correspondingly the language of exemption concerning an Israelite with a gentile, which implies: but it is forbidden.

We learned in the beraita: “Concerning robbery, how so? He steals and robs, and likewise a beautiful captive, and likewise anything similar to them.”

The Gemara asks:

“

Anything similar to it

”

with regard to robbery—what is it?

Rabbi Aḥa bar Yaakov said—

he explained:

It was necessary only for a laborer,

a gentile who ate grapes

in a vineyard

where he was working.

And we raise an objection to this:

A laborer in a vineyard—when

[

when did he eat] that he is considered “anything similar to it” with regard to robbery, but not actual robbery!? For:

If

the laborer ate the grapes

at the time of completion of the work,

for example, he was hired to harvest the grapes and ate some of them at that time, this cannot be said, because:

It is

permitted

even for an Israelite with an Israelite, as will be explained; whereas in the beraita we learned: “An Israelite with a gentile is permitted,” which implies that an Israelite with an Israelite is forbidden.

And from where do we know that an Israelite may eat while the work is being completed?

For it is stated: “When you enter your fellow’s vineyard, you may eat grapes according to your desire until you are satisfied, but you shall not put any into your vessel.” And the Sages expounded: At the time that you place produce into the householder’s vessels—that is, at the time of completion of the work—you may eat.

No,

lest you say: “Its parallel with robbery” is referring to a laborer who ate

not at the time of the completion of the work,

when he is not giving food at that moment to the vessels of the homeowner, and in such a case, when a gentile acts against a gentile and when a gentile acts against a Jew, it is prohibited, while when a Jew acts against a gentile, it is permitted. But when a Jew acts against a Jew, it is indeed prohibited, for the Torah permitted this only at the time of the completion of the work. So too, it is impossible to say this, because:

If so,

it is outright robbery [it is complete robbery], and it is already included in what we learned: “concerning robbery.”

Rather, Rav Pappa said:

It is necessary to mention “its parallel with robbery”

only with regard to

a

gentile who robbed or stole

less than the value of a peruta.

And we raise an objection to this:

If so—that the beraita is dealing with robbery of less than the value of a peruta—

how do we understand what we learned in the beraita:

“When a gentile acts against a Jew, it is prohibited”?

But

a Jew

is one who is presumed to forgo

and does forgo such a small amount taken through robbery, so there is no robbery here at all!?

And we answer:

Granted, he forgoes it afterward [although the Jew forgoes it post facto],

nevertheless,

does he not experience distress at the time [and does the Jew not experience distress at the time of the robbery because of the gentile’s robbery, even though it is less than the value of a peruta]!? If so, it is included within robbery, and the beraita properly teaches: “When a gentile acts against a Jew, it is prohibited.”

We nevertheless raise another objection: The explanation is satisfactory concerning the case of a gentile acting against a Jew: robbery of less than the value of a peruta is called “its parallel with robbery,” and not actual robbery, since it is not complete robbery that can be extracted from him through the courts, because the Jew forgoes it. But concerning

a gentile acting against a gentile

in a case of less than the value of a peruta, is it really

“its parallel”

with robbery,

and not actual robbery!?

For since gentiles

are not ones who forgo—that is, presumably he does not forgo it, since he is excessively particular about his property, and it follows that he must also return it to him—

if so,

it is outright robbery

and it is not called “its parallel” with robbery!?

Rather, said

Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Ika,

it is necessary

for the beraita

only in the case of one who withholds a hired laborer’s wages,

for since he did not snatch anything from his possession, this is not called “robbery” but rather “its parallel” with robbery; and concerning this the beraita properly teaches:

When a gentile acts against a gentile, and when a gentile acts against a Jew, it is prohibited; when a Jew acts against a gentile, it is permitted.

The Gemara further explains the beraita that we learned: “And likewise a beautiful captive woman, and likewise their parallels,” and asks:

What

is the case of its parallel with a beautiful captive woman?

When Rav Dimi came [when Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael],

Rabbi Elazar said in the name of Rabbi Ḥanina:

A gentile who designated a maidservant for his slave, and

afterward

the master came

upon

her

without the slave’s knowledge,

he is

executed for it

on account of robbing the slave; and this robbery is “a gentile acting against a gentile—its parallel with a beautiful captive woman.” The Gemara adds:

“Its parallel”

with bloodshed was not taught

the tanna did not mention “its parallel” concerning bloodshed in the beraita, because in the case of bloodshed there is no situation other than either a complete obligation or a complete permission.

Abaye said:

If you find that it was taught [if you find one who teaches in a beraita: “its parallel” with bloodshed], then it is certainly

Rabbi Yonatan ben Shaul, as it was taught:

Rabbi Yonatan ben Shaul says:

A

pursuer pursuing another to kill him—

and the pursued person can

save him

[that is, save himself]

through one of the pursuer’s limbs,

for example, he can sever his leg,

but he did not save him

in this manner, but instead killed him,