Sanhedrin 53b — the Talmud in English

And it is explained in the Mishna in Yevamot that

“the prohibition of a mitzva”

means those who are

secondaries

to the forbidden relations

by rabbinic words.

For example, his mother’s mother and his father’s mother. [Yevamot 21a]

The Gemara explains:

And why are they called

by the name

“the prohibition of a mitzva”?

Because

it is a mitzva to obey

the

words of the Sages.

And those who are said to be forbidden by

“the prohibition of sanctity”

are:

a widow to a High Priest, a divorced woman and a woman released through halitza to an ordinary priest,

[an ordinary priest].

And why are they called

by the name

“the prohibition of sanctity”?

Because

it is written [Deuteronomy 21:6]

“

They shall be holy to their God.”

And it was taught concerning this: Rabbi Yehuda exchanges [the terms]

and explains that “the prohibition of a mitzva” means a widow to a High Priest, a divorced woman and a woman released through halitza to an ordinary priest, while “the prohibition of sanctity” means secondaries to the forbidden relations.

And why were a widow to a High Priest and a divorced woman and a woman released through halitza to an ordinary priest called “the prohibition of a mitzva”? Because it is stated [Leviticus 21:14], “A widow, a divorced woman, a profaned woman, a prostitute—these he shall not take,” and at the conclusion of Leviticus it is stated: “These are the mitzvot”; therefore, all the laws mentioned previously were called mitzvot.

And why were secondaries to the forbidden relations called “the prohibition of sanctity”? Because anyone who fulfills the words of the Sages is called holy. Or because of “sanctify yourself through what is permitted to you.”

And it is implied from Rabbi Yehuda’s words that he does not dispute the substance of the law concerning those forbidden by the prohibition of a mitzva and sanctity; rather, he only

exchanges the terms

for them, and it is implied:

the halitza is required.

And if it should enter your mind

to say that

Rabbi Yehuda holds in accordance with Rabbi Akiva,

that betrothal does not take effect with those liable for a negative commandment,

then it is difficult:

now,

after all,

those liable for negative commandments according to Rabbi Akiva

their law

is considered like that of those liable for excision, and those liable for excision are not subject to halitza and levirate marriage;

it follows that those liable for negative commandments likewise do not enter into levirate marriage or halitza, whereas from Rabbi Yehuda’s own words it is implied that those forbidden by the prohibition of a mitzva and sanctity, who are liable for negative commandments, undergo halitza but do not enter into levirate marriage; thus, they are not judged like those liable for excision, and this is contrary to Rabbi Akiva.

And since we find that Rabbi Yehuda does not hold in accordance with Rabbi Akiva, the Gemara’s original question returns: what is the woman who is not fit for his father of whom Rabbi Yehuda speaks?

The Gemara answers: In fact, the woman who is not fit for his father is one who is forbidden to him by a negative prohibition, and Rabbi Yehuda holds in accordance with Rabbi Akiva.

And what we find—that Rabbi Yehuda holds that those forbidden by negative prohibitions undergo halitza—

he said this according to the words of the first Tanna, but he himself does not hold so,

for in his view they enter neither into levirate marriage nor into halitza, like those forbidden by a prohibition carrying excision, who do not fall to levirate marriage.

The Gemara returns to explain Rabbi Yehuda’s words as they were brought in our Mishna:

When Rabbi Yitzhak came, he taught as we learned—

he taught as it is stated in our Mishna.

One who has intercourse with his mother is liable on account of his mother and on account of his father’s wife,

Rabbi Yehuda says: He is liable only on account of his mother.

And what is the reason

why did Rabbi Yehuda hold that he does not transgress on account of his father’s wife?

Abaye said: For the verse says [Leviticus 18:7] “

The nakedness of your father and the nakedness of your mother you shall not uncover;

your mother she is; you shall not uncover her nakedness.” From the fact that the Torah repeated the words

“your mother she is,”

it is implied that one who has intercourse with his mother, even though she is both his mother and his father’s wife,

on account of his mother

alone

do you make him liable, and you do not make him liable on account of

his father’s wife.

The Gemara raises an objection to Abaye’s words:

But from now,

according to this method, the opposite may be expounded from the following verse.

For it is stated [there, verse 8]:

“The nakedness of your father’s wife you shall not uncover; it is the nakedness of your father.”

From the fact that Scripture repeated “it is the nakedness of your father,” it is implied that that father’s wife, even though she is also his mother, nevertheless

on account of his father’s wife you make him liable, and you do not make him liable on account of his mother.

But

it is necessarily impossible to expound a derivation of this kind, because according to this it follows that one who has intercourse with

his mother who is his father’s wife

is not liable at all, neither on account of his mother nor on account of his father’s wife, for in one verse

this one stands here and is excluded by it:

it is stated “your mother she is,” and it is excluded that he transgresses on account of his father’s wife; and in a second verse

this one stands here and is excluded by it:

it is stated “it is your father’s wife,” and it is excluded that he transgresses on account of his mother.

But this is entirely impossible, for

now

if he has intercourse with

his mother who is not his father’s wife,

for example, if she was divorced by him,

, he is liable

for having transgressed the prohibition of his mother; and likewise, if he has intercourse with

his father’s wife who is not his mother, he is liable

for having transgressed the prohibition of his father’s wife.

If so, is it possible that if he has intercourse with

his mother who is his father’s wife,

who has both designations,

he is not liable at all?

And the Gemara brings another difficulty against Rabbi Yehuda’s derivation according to Abaye:

And furthermore,

another difficulty:

according

to

the Rabbis as well,

who make one who has intercourse with his mother inadvertently liable for two—on account of his mother and on account of his father’s wife—

it is written, “your mother she is,”

and for what purpose was this superfluity written?

But

the Rabbis necessarily hold that

that

superfluity, “your mother she is,” as well as “it is your father’s wife,”

is needed for that which

was expounded by

Rav Shisha, son of Rav Idi.

Below [54a] it is stated: From where is it known that one who has intercourse with his mother who is not his father’s wife, for example, if she was divorced from his father, is liable to stoning? Rav Shisha, son of Rav Idi, said: The verse says, “your mother she is”; Scripture made his mother who is not his father’s wife like his mother who is his father’s wife.

If so,

according to Rabbi Yehuda as well,

it is impossible to derive from what is stated “your mother she is” that he is liable only on account of one designation, since

that is needed for that which Rav Shisha, son of Rav Idi, [expounded].

And since this is so, the Gemara’s question returns: From where did Rabbi Yehuda learn that one who has intercourse with his mother inadvertently is liable only on account of his mother and not on account of his father’s wife?

Rather, Rav Aha, son of Rav Ika, said: The verse says, “

The nakedness of your mother it is; you shall not uncover

her nakedness,”

the wording of Scripture implies:

on account of one nakedness you make him liable, and you do not make him liable on account of two nakednesses;

therefore Rabbi Yehuda held that if he had intercourse inadvertently with his mother, he is liable for only one prohibition.

And it is reasonable that the prohibition he transgresses is the nakedness of his mother and not the nakedness of his father’s wife, since first she is his mother and afterward his father’s wife.

And the Gemara raises an objection to Rav Aha, son of Rav Ika’s, derivation from our Mishna:

But from now,

if we derive everywhere that when “her nakedness” is stated, he is liable on account of only one forbidden relation, then also where it is stated—

“The nakedness of your daughter-in-law you shall not uncover; she is your son’s wife; you shall not uncover her nakedness,”

we should derive

likewise

that one who has intercourse with his daughter-in-law transgresses only one prohibition,

on account of one nakedness you make him liable, and you do not make him liable on account of two nakednesses.

But we learned

in our Mishna:

One who has intercourse with his daughter-in-law is liable on her account for his daughter-in-law and for a married woman, whether during the lifetime of his son or after the death of his son;

thus, he is liable under two designations.

And Rabbi Yehuda did not dispute this,

even though in the first clause, concerning one who has intercourse with his mother, Rabbi Yehuda disputed with the Rabbis and made him liable under one designation.

From here it follows that the source of Rabbi Yehuda is not what is stated “her nakedness,” for if so, he should also have disputed concerning the law of his daughter-in-law, where “her nakedness” is likewise stated, and made him liable under one designation.

Rather,

the reason that the expression “her nakedness” is stated concerning his daughter-in-law is necessarily not in order to make her liable on account of one forbidden relation, but

since it is one body, even though they are two prohibitions, “her nakedness” is written.

And

likewise here

concerning his mother, the expression “her nakedness” is stated not because she is judged as one designation, but

since it is one body, even though they are two prohibitions, “her nakedness” is written.

And consequently Rav Aha, son of Rav Ika’s words are rejected, and the Gemara’s question again returns: From where did Rabbi Yehuda learn that one who has intercourse with his mother is liable only on account of his mother and not on account of his father’s wife?

Rather, Rava said:

In fact, Rabbi Yehuda’s source is what is stated [Leviticus 18:7] “The nakedness of your mother you shall not uncover; she is your mother”—[unclear: the source text is corrupted here; the continuation contrasts the case where the mother is also the father’s wife with the case where she is not].

It implies both

that whether she is his father’s wife and his mother, or whether she is not his father’s wife, he always transgresses the prohibition of his father’s wife, even with regard to punishment.

And concerning what the Gemara asked from the following verse, in which it is stated [there, verse 8], “The nakedness of your father’s wife you shall not uncover; it is the nakedness of your father,” implying that he transgresses only on account of his father’s wife and not on account of the prohibition of his mother—and if so, the verses appear to contradict one another—Rava answers that the verse “it is your father’s wife” is needed for another derivation.

Rabbi Yehuda holds

that what is written in the preceding verse,

“The nakedness of your father you shall not uncover”—

“

the nakedness of your father”

is his father’s wife.

But what is stated afterward, “The nakedness of your father’s wife you shall not uncover; it is the nakedness of your father,” comes to teach that his father’s wife is forbidden after his death. Therefore, it is impossible to exclude from this verse that if his father’s wife is also his mother, he transgresses only on account of his father’s wife.

And

therefore

he brings it

Rabbi Yehuda learned from this superfluity

through a gzera shava—

and

this is the derivation:

Just as in the warning, when the prohibition of a father’s wife is stated, it implies that whether

his father’s wife who is his mother or his father’s wife who is not his mother,

he is liable to stoning for her, so too with regard to punishment there is no distinction between his father’s wife who is his mother and one who is not his mother: in both cases he is liable to stoning.

But

his mother who is not his father’s wife—from where

is it known that she is forbidden to him?

The verse says: “The nakedness of your mother you shall not uncover; she is your mother,”

implying that the Torah prohibited intercourse with his mother whether she is his father’s wife or whether she is not his father’s wife.

And from the words “she is your mother” it is implied that if his mother is also his father’s wife,

on account of his mother you make him liable, and you do not make him liable on account of his father’s wife.

And this is Rabbi Yehuda’s source, for he says: One who has intercourse with his mother who is his father’s wife transgresses only on account of his mother alone.