Sanhedrin 52b — the Talmud in English

Rabbi Elazar said ![](pamud.bmp "

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What is a Torah scholar compared to in the eyes of an ignoramus -

how does the Torah scholar appear to the eyes of an ignoramus?

At first he is compared

the Torah scholar in his eyes

to a golden jug.

And if the Torah scholar

spoke with him

conversed with him, immediately

he is compared

in his eyes

to a silver jug.

And if the Torah scholar added and

derived benefit from him -

from the ignoramus, immediately he

is compared

in the eyes of the ignoramus

to an earthenware jug.

And an earthenware jug,

once it is broken, it no longer has any remedy.

And therefore, after they began speaking with Korah, and also derived benefit from his meal, they appeared in the eyes of Korah as an earthenware jug, and it was easy in his eyes to join them to his dispute with Moses.

In the Mishna, the testimony of Rabbi Elazar bar Tzadok was brought concerning a court that judged the daughter of a koen to burning, surrounded her with bundles of branches, and burned her, and the Sages said to him: The court of that time was not learned.

And the Gemara brings a similar incident.

Imarta daughter of Tali

[a woman’s name]

was the daughter of a koen who committed adultery.

They brought her to the court, and

he surrounded

surrounded her

Rav Hama bar Toviyya with bundles of branches, and burned her.

Rav Yosef said:

Rav Hama

made two errors:

He erred concerning Rav Mattena,

for Rav Mattena interpreted the mitzva of burning mentioned in the Mishna as being with a wick of lead cast into his mouth, and they do not burn the body of the condemned.

And

also

he erred in

the matter of the Mishna.

For it was taught

it was stated [Deuteronomy 17:9]:

“And you shall come to the kohanim, the Levites, and to the judge who will be in those days.”

From what is stated, “You shall come to the kohanim and to the judge,” the Sages expounded -

when there is a koen

when the kohanim are standing at their service in the Temple

there is judgment,

the Great Court judges capital cases. But

when there is no koen, there is no judgment.

But Rav Hama judged capital cases when there was no koen in the Temple, and he erred in the law explicitly stated in the beraita. We learned in the Mishna:

We learned in the Mishna:

Rabbi Elazar son of Rabbi Tzadok said: It happened with the daughter of a koen who committed adultery and

they surrounded her with bundles of branches and burned her. They said to him: Because the court of that time was not learned.

Rav Yosef said: It was a court of Sadducees,

the Sadducees expounded the verses according to their plain meaning and did not accept the Sages’ expositions. Since it is stated, “She shall be burned with fire,” they reasoned on their own that they had to burn her with bundles of branches.

And the Gemara raises a difficulty: It is implied in the Mishna that

this is what he said to them

Rabbi Elazar bar Tzadok, who testified concerning a court that burned the daughter of a koen with bundles of branches,

and this is what they replied to him

that that court did not judge according to the halakha, since they were Sadducees.

And it was taught,

we learned in a beraita,

Rabbi Elazar son of Rabbi Tzadok said: I remember when I was a child, carried on my father’s shoulders, and they brought a daughter of a koen who had committed adultery

to the court

and they surrounded her with bundles of branches and burned her.

They said to him

the Sages: According to your words,

you were a minor

at the time you saw it,

and testimony is not brought from a minor.

And it is implied that the Sages did not accept his testimony because he was a minor, and not because the court of that time was Sadducees.

And the Gemara resolves:

There were two incidents.

Once he testified about an incident that he saw in his childhood, and concerning this they replied, “Testimony is not brought from a minor.” And once he testified about an incident that he saw in his adulthood, and they replied to him that that court was a court of Sadducees.

And the Gemara analyzes:

Which one,

which incident

did Rabbi Tzadok say to them

the Sages

first?

If you say,

if it is said

the first one

[the first incident brought in our Mishna]

he said to them first.

The difficulty is that concerning the same incident about which he

said to them

that he saw it

when he was an adult,

they rejected him

and did not pay attention

to it,

and said to him that they were a court of Sadducees. If so, how is it possible that concerning the second incident, about which he

said to them

that he saw it

when he was a minor,

they did not reject him by saying that they were a court of Sadducees,

and paid attention to it,

accepting his words, but merely said to him, “Testimony is not brought from a minor”?

Rather

necessarily,

this [-

the incident brought in the Tosefta]

he said to them first, and

concerning this

they said to him

the Sages

you were a minor,

and testimony is not brought from a minor.

And Rabbi Elazar returned

and said to them

the Sages that he saw another incident similar to this

when he

was

an adult, and

concerning this

they said to him

the Sages that that court acted in this manner,

because the court of that time was not learned.

Mishna:

The mitzva of those executed by decapitation,

how is it?

They would sever

his head with a sword, as the monarchy does

for one who was liable for execution.

Rabbi Yehuda says: It is a disgrace for him,

if they cut off his head and it falls, there is disgrace in this for the dead, and it is stated in the Torah, “And you shall love your fellow as yourself.”

Rather,

this is the mitzva of those executed by decapitation:

They place his head

of the one condemned to burning

upon the anvil -

a thick piece of wood fixed in the ground, like one used by smiths,

and he cuts

the head

with a cleaver

a sword larger than a regular sword, and because of its heaviness the head is cut off in one stroke.

They said to him

the Sages to Rabbi Yehuda,

There is no execution more disgraceful than this.

On the contrary, so that it should not come to greater disgrace, his head should be severed with a sword.

Gemara:

It was taught: Rabbi Yehuda said to the Sages, I too know that it is a disgraceful execution

to kill him upon the anvil.

But what can I do, for the Torah said

[Leviticus 18]

“You shall not walk in their statutes.”

And if so, it is forbidden to kill a person with a sword, so that the mitzva should not come through a transgression.

And the Rabbis

held that there is no concern of “You shall not walk in their statutes” in killing by means of a sword.

Since

we find

that it is written

killing by means of a

“sword” in the Torah,

as it is stated concerning the condemned city [Deuteronomy 13:16]: “Strike, strike the inhabitants of that city according to the sword,” it follows that this is the mitzva from the Torah: to kill with a sword.

If so,

we do not derive it from them,

the killing with a sword is not considered an act that involves the practices of the nations, since we do not kill in this manner because this is their practice, but because this is the mitzva of the Torah.

And the Gemara brings proof for the matter: Every act that has a root in the Torah is permitted to perform even if it is the way of the nations to do so:

For if you do not say so -

as the Rabbis hold, but it is forbidden to do something that is the practice of the nations despite its having a root in the Torah.

If so, it is difficult: How shall we explain

that which was taught

in a beraita:

They burn for kings

who have died their beds and their utensils, on account of mourning,

and they do not

fear

any

of

the ways of the Amorites,

despite the fact that it is the way of the Amorites to burn for their kings.

And apparently it is difficult:

How do we burn, when it is written, “You shall not walk in their statutes,”

and since the nations are accustomed to burn for their kings, it should be forbidden to burn for kings on account of the practices of the nations?!

Rather,

necessarily, it is permitted to burn for kings

since

we find

that burning

for kings

is written in the Torah, as it is written

[Jeremiah 34:5], that God said to Zedekiah: “You shall die in peace

and in the burnings of your fathers,

the earlier kings who were before you, so shall they burn for you,” and it is implied that there was already an ancient practice to burn the belongings of kings.

And since this is so, it is permitted to burn for kings even when the Amorites practice this, because

we do not derive it from them.

And

since we find permission to follow the practice of the nations in a matter that has a root in the Torah,

here too

it is permitted to sever the head of the condemned with a sword, and this does not involve the practices of the nations, because

since “sword” is written in the Torah, we do not derive it from them.

And the Gemara analyzes:

But what of what we learned in the other chapter: These are those executed by decapitation: the murderer and the inhabitants of the condemned city.

Granted,

the inhabitants of

the condemned city

are executed by severing their heads with a sword, because

it is written concerning them

[Deuteronomy 13:17], “Strike, strike the inhabitants of that city

according to the sword,”

and since it is stated in the Torah that their execution is by the sword, there is no concern of “You shall not walk in their statutes.”

But the murderer—from where do we know it,

where is it stated in the Torah that his execution is by a sword?

For it was taught:

It is stated concerning a master who kills his Canaanite slave [Exodus 21:20]

“He shall surely be avenged,”

and the meaning of

“this avenging I do not know what it is” -

how the master is to be punished.

But

when it says

[Leviticus 26:25]

“And I shall bring upon you a sword avenging the vengeance of the covenant,” it follows -

from here it is to be learned: Just as this vengeance is with a sword, so too

this avenging

of the master who kills his slave, his execution is by

a sword.

And the Gemara raises a difficulty: Granted, the killing by a sword can be learned from what is stated, “according to the sword,” and “he shall surely be avenged”; but from where do we know that the form of his killing is by cutting off his head with a sword?

And perhaps he pierces him with repeated thrusts

they thrust the sword into his stomach, and through this he dies?

The Gemara answers:

“According to the sword” is written,

the word “according to” is derived from the expression “double-edged,” that is, a sword that has two sides, so that each side is called an “edge.” The wording of the verse implies that his killing is not by thrusting the tip of the sword into his stomach, since the tip of the sword is not called an “edge,” but they kill him by cutting his body with one of the two sides of the sword.

And the Gemara again raises a difficulty: From where do we know that they cut his neck?

And perhaps they make him a gistera -

they cut his body in two along its length?

Rav Naḥman said in the name of Rabbah bar Avuha:

It is impossible to say that this is the manner of his execution, for

the verse says, “And you shall love your fellow as yourself,”

and included in love of one's fellow is that if it has been decreed upon him to die,

one should choose for him a fine death

so that he not be excessively disgraced in his death. But if they were to cut his body along its entire length, that would be a great disgrace for the dead.

The Gemara returns and raises a difficulty concerning what was said above: that the source for executing a murderer with a sword is what is stated concerning one who kills his slave, “He shall surely be avenged,” and the meaning of vengeance is a sword, as it is stated, “a sword that takes vengeance”:

We have found

a master

who kills a slave

who is liable to death by the sword for killing him, but if he killed

a free man,

from where do we have it

that his death too is by the sword?

The Gemara is astonished at the question:

And

if

is it not a kal va-chomer?

Behold, if we find that one who kills a slave is liable to death by the sword, all the more so one who kills a free man—his death is by the sword.

And is it possible to say that if

he killed a slave,

the master's death would be

by the sword,

but if a man killed his fellow, who is

a free man,

he would be punished only

by strangulation?

And the Gemara explains the question:

Indeed, if he killed a free man, logically his death is by the sword, by a kal va-chomer from one who kills a slave. But

this works well according to the one who says

that the death of

strangulation

is judged as a

light

death; if so, it is not logical that one who kills a free man should be punished with a lighter death than one who killed a slave.

But according to the one who says that strangulation is severe, what is there to say?

From where is it known that one who kills a free man is judged by the sword? Perhaps his law is more severe than that of one who kills a slave, and he must be punished with the death of strangulation, which is more severe than the sword?

And the Gemara answers: According to the one who says that strangulation is severe, the source that a murderer of a free man is judged by the sword and not by strangulation

is derived from that which is taught

in a beraita: We find [Deuteronomy 21:9] that after fulfilling the mitzva of the heifer whose neck is broken, the elders prayed and said

“And you shall remove the innocent blood from your midst,”

that is, corresponding to the breaking of the heifer's neck, you shall remove the innocent blood that was spilled.

From here the Sages derived that

all shedders of blood were likened to the heifer whose neck is broken: just as there

in the heifer whose neck is broken, its death is

by the sword, and

the place of the cutting is

from the neck,

so here too

every shedder of blood—his death is

by the sword and from the neck.

And the Gemara raises a difficulty:

If—

if the law of the murderer was likened to the breaking of the heifer's neck, then it should be likened to the breaking of the heifer's neck in other matters as well—

just as there

they break the heifer's neck

with a cleaver,

a knife larger and heavier than a sword,

and

the place of the breaking of the neck is

opposite the nape—

behind its head and not from the neck—

so here too

those liable to the death penalty, their death should be

with a cleaver and opposite the nape?

And the Gemara answers:

Rav Naḥman said in the name of Rabbah bar Avuha: The verse says [Leviticus 19:18]

(Leviticus 19:18),

“And you shall love your fellow as yourself; one should choose for him a fine death.”

Mishna:

The mitzva of those executed by strangulation

How is it done?

They would sink him—

the one being judged—

into

the midst of

dung up to his knees.

And he places a cloth

made of

coarse fabric into

another cloth,

the

made of

soft weaving.

And they wind it

around his neck; this one pulls toward himself and that one pulls toward himself, until his soul departs.

Gemara:

It is stated [Leviticus 20:10]: “And a man who commits adultery with a married woman, who commits adultery with the wife of his fellow, the adulterer and the adulteress shall surely be put to death.”

The Sages taught: “A man”—to exclude a minor,

for if the adulterer is a minor, he is not liable to death.

“Who commits adultery with a married woman”—to exclude the wife of a minor,

because the wife of a minor is not called a married woman, since the betrothal is not a betrothal. “

Who commits adultery with

the wife of his fellow”—to exclude the wife of others—

a gentile, because a gentile has no betrothal.

“Shall surely be put to death

the adulterer and the adulteress,”

by strangulation.

And the Gemara discusses:

You say

that their death is

by strangulation;

from where do you know this?

Or is it only one of all the deaths stated in the Torah?!

And the Gemara answers:

You say: Everywhere that it is stated

the expression

“death” in the Torah without specification,

where it was not specified which death is intended, the one liable for that transgression is judged by strangulation.

Because

you are not permitted to draw it toward stringency, but rather toward leniency!

And since we do not know which death the Torah intended that we should execute him with, we must be lenient with him and punish him with the lightest death.

The words of Rabbi Yashiah.

Rabbi Yonatan says:

Indeed, his death is by strangulation, but

not

as Rabbi Yashiah explains his reason,

because it is [—

strangulation] a

light

death, and he must be punished with the lightest death. For according to Rabbi Yonatan, death by the sword is lighter than strangulation.

Rather,

the reason that his death is by strangulation is because

every

expression of

“death” stated in the Torah without specification is only strangulation.

And the Gemara brings the words of Rabbi as an explanation of the words of Rabbi Yonatan:

Rabbi says:

We find that

there is stated

in the Torah the law of

death at the hands of Heaven [Genesis 38:10]: “And He put him to death also.”

(Genesis 38:10): “And He put him to death as well.”

And there is stated death at the hands of man—

“shall surely be put to death.”

And

from

what is stated in both cases, the expression “death” without it being explained which death, the Sages likened one to the other:

just as the death stated at the hands of Heaven

is

a death that leaves no mark,

there is no sign or wound upon the dead,

so too the death stated at the hands of man

must be

a death that leaves no mark,

and necessarily his death is by strangulation, which is the only death that leaves no mark upon the one executed.

And the Gemara raises a difficulty:

And let us say

that everywhere that “death” is stated without specification, the reference is to the death of

burning,

which leaves no external mark upon the dead, for they execute him by means of a burning wick thrown into his intestines?

And the Gemara answers: Indeed, burning too leaves no mark, but nevertheless it is impossible to say that when the Torah says “shall surely be put to death,” it obligates the adulteress to be burned, since

from

the fact

that the Merciful One said

concerning the law of a

daughter of a koen

who committed adultery, that her death is

by burning, it follows

that

behold—

a daughter of Israel who committed adultery

is not subject to burning;

she is not judged by burning.

If so, necessarily the adulteress's death is by strangulation, which is a death without a mark.

And this is Rabbi Yonatan's source that everywhere “death” is mentioned in the Torah without specification, the reference is to death by strangulation.