Sanhedrin 52b (נב:) — the Talmud in English

Rabbi Elazar said:

What is a Torah scholar compared to in the eyes of an ignoramus—

how does the Torah scholar appear to the ignoramus?

At first,

the Torah scholar appears in his eyes

like a golden jug.

And if the Torah scholar

spoke with him,

conversed with him, immediately he

appears

in his eyes

like a silver jug.

And if the Torah scholar further

derived benefit from him—

from the ignoramus—he immediately

appears

in the eyes of the ignoramus

like an earthenware jug.

And an earthenware jug,

once it is broken, can no longer be repaired.

Accordingly, after they began speaking with Korah and then also benefited from his feast, they appeared to Korah like an earthenware jug, and it was easy in his eyes to enlist them in his dispute with Moses.

In the Mishna, Rabbi Elazar bar Tzadok’s testimony was cited concerning a court that judged a kohen’s daughter to be burned and surrounded her with bundles of branches and burned her; the Sages said to him: The court of that time was not learned.

And the Gemara cites a similar incident.

Imarta bat Tali [

the name of a woman]

was a kohen’s daughter who had committed adultery.

They brought her before the court, and

Rav Hama bar Tuvya surrounded her with bundles of branches and burned her.

He surrounded her

with bundles of branches and burned her.

Rav Yosef said:

Rav Hama

erred in two matters:

He erred with regard to Rav Mattana,

for Rav Mattana explained the mitzva of burning mentioned in the Mishna as referring to a wick of lead inserted into the condemned person’s mouth, rather than to burning the condemned person’s body.

And

also,

he erred in

the matter of the Mishna.

As it was taught:

It is stated [Deuteronomy 17:9]:

“And you shall come to the priests, the Levites, and to the judge who will be in those days.”

From the fact that it says “you shall come to the priests and to the judge,” the Sages derived:

When there is a kohen

with the priests standing in their service in the Temple,

there is judgment—the Great Sanhedrin may judge capital cases. But

when there is no kohein, there is no judgment.

when there is no kohen, there is no judgment.

Yet Rav Hama judged capital cases at a time when there was no kohen in the Temple, and he erred concerning a law explicitly stated in the beraita. We learned in the Mishna:

We learned in the Mishna:

Rabbi Elazar bar Rabbi Tzadok said: It happened that a kohen’s daughter committed adultery and

they surrounded her with bundles of branches and burned her. They said to him: This was because the court of that time was not learned.

Rav Yosef said: It was a court of Sadducees,

the Sadducees interpreted the verses according to their plain meaning and did not accept the Sages’ interpretations. Since it is stated, “She shall be burned by fire,” they reasoned on their own that they were required to burn her with bundles of branches.

The Gemara raises an objection: It appears from the Mishna that

this is what he said to them—

Rabbi Elazar bar Tzadok, who testified concerning a court that burned a kohen’s daughter with bundles of branches—

and this is what they replied to him:

that the court had not judged according to halakha, since they were Sadducees.

But wasn’t it taught—

we learned in a beraita:

Rabbi Elazar bar Rabbi Tzadok said: I remember when I was a child, riding on my father’s shoulders, and they brought a kohen’s daughter who had committed adultery

before the court,

and they surrounded her with bundles of branches and burned her.

The Sages said to him,

“According to your statement,

you were a minor”

when you witnessed it,

and testimony cannot be brought from a minor.

It follows that the Sages did not accept his testimony because he had been a minor, and not because the court of that time had been Sadducees.

The Gemara answers:

There were two incidents.

Once he testified about an incident that he had seen in his childhood, and concerning this they replied: Testimony cannot be brought from a minor. And once he testified about an incident that he had seen as an adult, and they replied to him that that court had been a court of Sadducees.

The Gemara analyzes:

Which

incident did

Rabbi Tzadok say to them

the Sages

first?

If you say

that

the first incident [

the first incident brought in our Mishna]

is what he told them first,

there is a difficulty, since concerning that incident, which he

told them

he had seen

when he was an adult,

they rejected him

and paid no attention

to it,

saying that they had been a court of Sadducees. If so, how is it possible that concerning the second incident, which he

told them

he had seen

when he was a minor,

they did not reject him by saying that they had been a court of Sadducees, but

paid attention to it, accepting his statement, merely saying to him: Testimony cannot be brought from a minor?

accepted his words—and merely told him that testimony cannot be brought from a minor?

Rather,

it is necessarily the case that

this—

the incident cited in the Tosefta—

is what he told them first, and

concerning it

they said to him,

the Sages:

You were a minor,

and testimony cannot be brought from a minor.

Rabbi Elazar then returned

and told them

the Sages that he had seen another similar incident

when he was

an

adult, and

concerning it

they said to him, the Sages, that that court had acted in this manner

because

the court of that time was not learned.

Mishna:

The mitzva concerning those executed by decapitation

is as follows.

They would sever

his head with a sword, as the government does

to one who has been sentenced to death.

Rabbi Yehuda says: It is a disgrace for him,

if they cut off his head and it falls, this is a disgrace to the dead, and it is stated in the Torah: “And you shall love your fellow as yourself.”

Rather,

this is how the mitzva concerning those executed by decapitation is performed:

They place his head

of the person sentenced to burning

on the anvil—

a thick piece of wood fixed in the ground, like that used by smiths—

, and he cuts

the head

with a kopitz,

a sword larger than a regular sword; because of its weight, the head is severed with a single blow.

The Sages said to him,

the Sages said to Rabbi Yehuda,

There is no more disgraceful death than this.

On the contrary, in order to prevent greater disgrace, his head should be severed with a sword.

Gemara:

It was taught: Rabbi Yehuda said to the Sages: I, too, know that it is a disgraceful death

to kill him on the anvil.

But what can I do, since the Torah says [

Leviticus 18]

“You shall not follow their statutes.”

If so, it is forbidden to kill a person with a sword, so that the mitzva should not be performed through a transgression.

And the Rabbis

held that there is no concern of “You shall not follow their statutes” when executing with a sword.

Since

we find

that it is written

that execution is performed with a

“sword” in the Torah,

as it is stated concerning the death of the inhabitants of an apostate city [Deuteronomy 13:16]: “You shall surely strike the inhabitants of that city with the sword,” it follows that according to the Torah the mitzva is to execute with a sword.

If so,

we are not deriving it from them;

execution with a sword is not considered an act subject to the prohibition against the practices of the nations, since we do not execute in this manner because it is their practice, but because this is the mitzva of the Torah.

The Gemara cites a proof for this principle: Any act that has a basis in the Torah may be performed even if the nations practice it as well:

For if you do not say so—

as the Rabbis maintain, but instead hold that it is forbidden to perform an act that is a practice of the nations even when it has a basis in the Torah—

then there is a difficulty: How are we to explain

that which was taught

in a beraita:

They burn items in honor of kings

who have died—their beds and their personal belongings, as an expression of mourning—

and

they do not

fear

any

of the practices of the Amorites,

even though it is the practice of the Amorites to burn items in honor of their kings.

And seemingly this is difficult:

How may we burn them, when it is written, “You shall not follow their statutes,”

and since the nations customarily burn items in honor of their kings, it should be forbidden to burn items in honor of kings because of the practices of the nations?!

Rather,

it is necessarily the case that burning items in honor of kings is permitted

since

we find

that burning

items in honor of kings is mentioned

in the Torah, as it is written [

Jeremiah 34:5], God said to Zedekiah: “You shall die in peace,

and with the burnings

of your fathers, the earlier kings who were before you, so shall they burn for you,” indicating that there was already an ancient practice of burning the belongings of kings.

And since this is so, it is permitted to burn items in honor of kings even when the Amorites practice this, because

we are not deriving it from them.

And

since we find that it is permitted to follow the practice of the nations in a matter that has a basis in the Torah,

here too

it is permitted to sever the head of the condemned person with a sword, and this does not constitute a violation of the practices of the nations, because

since “sword” is written in the Torah, we are not deriving it from them.

The Gemara analyzes:

But we learned in another chapter: These are those executed by decapitation: A murderer and the inhabitants of an apostate city.

Granted,

the inhabitants of an

apostate city

are executed by severing their heads with a sword, because

it is written concerning them [

Deuteronomy 13:17]: “You shall surely strike the inhabitants of that city

with the sword,”

and since the Torah states that they are to be killed with a sword, there is no concern of “You shall not follow their statutes.”

But as for a murderer, from where do we derive it

that his execution is with a sword?

As it was taught:

With regard to a master who kills his Canaanite slave, it is stated [Exodus 21:20]:

“He shall surely be avenged.”

And the meaning of

this vengeance, I do not know what it is—

how the master is to be punished.

But

when it says [

Leviticus 26:25]

“And I will bring upon you a sword avenging the vengeance of the covenant,” it must say—

from here it may be derived that just as this vengeance is carried out with a sword, so too

this vengeance

for a master who kills his slave is carried out by

a sword.

The Gemara raises a difficulty: Granted, the execution by sword can be derived from the phrases “with the sword” and “he shall surely be avenged.” But from where do we know that the manner of execution is by cutting off his head with a sword?

Perhaps he is pierced through

—they thrust the sword into his abdomen, and he dies as a result?

The Gemara answers:

“With the sword” is written.

The word “with” is derived from the expression “double-edged,” meaning a sword with two sides, so that each side is called an edge. The wording of the verse indicates that he is not killed by thrusting the tip of the sword into his abdomen, since the tip of a sword is not called an edge; rather, he is killed by cutting his body with one of the two edges of the sword.

The Gemara raises another difficulty: From where do we know that his neck is cut?

Perhaps he is made into a gistera —

his body is cut into two lengthwise?

Rav Naḥman said that Rabba bar Avuha said:

It is impossible to say that this is the manner of his execution, as

the verse states: “And you shall love your fellow as yourself,”

and included in loving one’s fellow is that if it has been decreed that he must die,

one should choose for him a fine death,

so that he will not be excessively disgraced in his death. But if his entire body were cut lengthwise, that would be a great degradation for the deceased.

The Gemara returns and raises an objection to what was stated above: that the source for executing a murderer by the sword is the verse concerning one who kills his slave, “he shall surely be avenged,” and the meaning of vengeance is execution by the sword, as it is stated: “a sword that takes vengeance”:

We have found

a master

who kills a slave,

who is liable to execution by the sword for killing him; but if he killed

a free person,

from where do we derive

that his execution is also by the sword?

The Gemara is astonished by the question:

And

is it

not a kal va-chomer?

If we find that one who kills a slave is liable to execution by the sword, all the more so one who kills a free person is executed by the sword.

Could one possibly say that if

he kills a slave,

the master’s execution will be

by the sword,

but if a person kills his fellow, who is

a free person,

he will be punished only

by strangulation?

The Gemara explains the question:

Indeed, if one kills a free person, logically his execution should be by the sword, by a kal va-chomer from one who kills a slave. However,

this works well according to the one who says

that execution by

strangulation

is considered an execution of

a lenient

nature; accordingly, it is not reasonable that one who kills a free person should be punished by a death less severe than one who killed a slave.

But according to the one who says that strangulation is more severe, what can be said?

From where do we know that one who kills a free person is judged by the sword? Perhaps his law is more severe than that of one who kills a slave, and he should be punished by strangulation, which is more severe than execution by the sword?

The Gemara answers: According to the one who says that strangulation is more severe, the source that a murderer who kills a free person is judged by the sword and not by strangulation

is derived from that which was taught

in a beraita: We find in Deuteronomy 21:9 that after fulfilling the mitzva of the heifer whose neck is broken, the elders prayed and said:

“And You shall eradicate the innocent blood from your midst,”

meaning: Corresponding to the breaking of the heifer’s neck, eradicate the innocent blood that was spilled.

From here the Sages derived that

all who shed blood are juxtaposed to the heifer whose neck is broken: Just as there

in the case of the heifer whose neck is broken, its execution is

by the sword, and

the place of the cutting

is the neck,

so too here,

in the case of anyone who sheds blood, his execution is

by the sword and at the neck.

The Gemara raises an objection:

If

the law of a murderer is juxtaposed to the breaking of the heifer’s neck, then it should be appropriate to juxtapose it to the heifer’s neck-breaking in other respects as well:

Just as there,

the heifer’s neck is broken

with a cleaver,

a knife larger and heavier than a sword,

and

the place of the breaking of the neck

is opposite the nape—

behind its head and not at the neck—

, so too here,

those liable to execution should be executed

with a cleaver and opposite the nape?

The Gemara answers:

Rav Naḥman said that Rabba bar Avuha said: The verse states

(Leviticus 19:18),

“And you shall love your fellow as yourself; choose for him a fine death.”

Mishna:

The mitzva of those executed by strangulation:

How is it carried out?

They would immerse him—

the condemned man—

in

the midst of

manure up to his knees.

And they place a cloth

made of a coarse fabric

inside

another cloth

that is

made of a

soft weave.

And they wrap it

around his neck; one pulls toward himself and the other pulls toward himself, until his soul departs.

Gemara:

It is stated (Leviticus 20:10): “And a man who commits adultery with a married woman, who commits adultery with his fellow’s wife—the adulterer and the adulteress shall surely be put to death.”

The Sages taught: “A man”—excluding a minor,

for if the adulterer is a minor, he is not liable to execution.

“Who commits adultery with a married woman”—excluding the wife of a minor,

because the wife of a minor is not called a married woman, since a minor’s betrothal is not a valid betrothal. "

“Who commits adultery with

his fellow’s wife”—excluding the wife of others”—

a gentile, because a gentile has no valid betrothal.

“Shall surely be put to death

the adulterer and the adulteress,”

by strangulation.

The Gemara analyzes this:

You say

that their execution is

by strangulation;

from where do you know this?

Or perhaps it is only one of all the forms of execution stated in the Torah?!

The Gemara answers:

You must say: Wherever it is stated

in the Torah using the expression

“death” without specification,

where it is not specified which form of execution is intended, the person liable for that transgression is judged by strangulation.

Because

you are not permitted to interpret it stringently, but only leniently!

Since we do not know which form of execution the Torah intended for him, we must be lenient with him and punish him by the least severe form of execution.

These are the words of Rabbi Yoshiyya.

Rabbi Yonatan says:

Indeed, his execution is by strangulation, but

not

for the reason given by Rabbi Yoshiyya, who explains that it is

because it is—

[strangulation]—a

lenient

form of execution, and that he must therefore be punished by the least severe form of execution. For according to Rabbi Yonatan, execution by the sword is less severe than strangulation.

Rather,

the reason that his execution is by strangulation is that

every

expression of

“death” stated without specification in the Torah refers only to strangulation.

The Gemara cites the words of Rabbi as an explanation of Rabbi Yonatan’s statement:

Rabbi says:

We find that

there is stated

in the Torah the law of

death at the hands of Heaven

(Genesis 38:10): “And He put him to death as well.”

And there is stated death at the hands of man—

“Shall surely be put to death.”

And from

the fact

that in both cases the expression “death” is stated without explaining which form of execution is intended, the Sages juxtaposed them: Just as

the death stated at the hands of Heaven

is

a death that leaves no mark,

with no sign or wound on the deceased,

so too the death stated at the hands of man

must be

a death that leaves no mark,

and inevitably his execution is by strangulation, the only form of execution that leaves no mark on the one executed.

The Gemara raises an objection:

Perhaps

every place where “death” is stated without specification refers to death by

burning,

which leaves no external mark on the deceased, since he is put to death by means of a burning wick thrown into his intestines?

The Gemara answers: Indeed, execution by burning also leaves no mark. Nevertheless, it is impossible to say that when the Torah says, “shall surely be put to death,” it means to render the adulteress liable to burning, because

from

the fact

that the Merciful One said

regarding the law of

a priest’s daughter

who committed adultery, that her execution is

by burning, it follows

that

indeed,

a daughter of Israel who committed adultery

is not subject to burning;

she is not judged by burning.

Therefore, her execution must be by strangulation, which is a death that leaves no mark.

And this is Rabbi Yonatan’s source for his assertion that wherever the Torah mentions death without specification, it refers to execution by strangulation.