Sanhedrin 48a (מח.) — the Talmud in English

We derive it from “objects used in service” [of the dead and of idolatry].

It is preferable to derive the law of a dead person from the law of idolatry, since both involve “objects used in service”: with regard to a dead person, the discussion concerns objects used in service of the dead, and the verse “that the nations served there” likewise speaks of objects used in service of idolatry.

To exclude the beheaded heifer, which itself is sacred.

For the beheaded heifer is itself sacred, and is not an “object used in service.”

The Gemara discusses this:

And according to Abaye, what is the reason that he does not derive it from idolatry?

The Gemara answers:

He could say to you:

Abaye:

We derive one matter whose ordinary use is such from another matter whose ordinary use is such.

A dead person and a beheaded heifer both involve objects that are ordinarily used in that manner,

to exclude idolatry, whose use is not ordinary.

It is not the ordinary way to serve idolatry, since even a gentile is prohibited from serving idolatry. Therefore, one cannot derive from there that designation does not render an object prohibited, because perhaps the reason there is specifically that although one designated the object for use in idolatry, he might ultimately regret this and not use it for idolatry.

Mnemonic: Kaf-Hei, Nafshi, DeHatziva, Nekheisa, Da, UMinah.

These are the identifying signs of the Mishnayot and beraitot from which the Gemara will seek to prove the dispute between Abaye and Rava as to whether designation is significant or not.

Meytivi

from that which we learned in tractate Kelim:

A kerchief

a cloth that a woman wears on her head,

which is susceptible to midras impurity

Although the kerchief is not primarily intended for sitting, it nevertheless contracts midras impurity, because sometimes a woman folds it and sits on it, or rests her head upon it,

and she designates it for a scroll,

she set the kerchief aside to wrap a Torah scroll in it,

is pure from midras impurity.

Its midras impurity is removed without any immersion, since it is now no longer fit for sitting, as it is prohibited to sit on a kerchief of a Torah scroll, and the status of “midras” has been removed from it, since one says to the person using it, “Stand up, and let us perform our work.”

But it is impure

with contact impurity of midras.

The kerchief still retains a lesser degree of impurity through contact with a midras [and its status descends from that of a primary source of impurity, which renders a person and vessels impure, to that of a first-degree source of impurity, which renders only food impure].

This is because even when it serves as a kerchief for scrolls, it still retains the status of a vessel and can contract impurity through contact. In addition, when it itself had been impure with midras impurity, the kerchief had at that same time itself come into contact with the midras and contracted contact impurity of midras; this impurity remains upon it even after its midras impurity has been removed.

It follows that merely designating the kerchief for a Torah scroll removed its midras impurity, because designation is significant. This is difficult for Rava, who says that designation is not significant?

The Gemara answers:

Say

that the Mishna means that she did not merely give the kerchief over and designate it for a Torah scroll, but rather:

she gave it over and wrapped it,

she also wrapped it around the Torah scroll, so that there was an act and not merely designation.

The Gemara asks:

Why do I need “she gave it over and wrapped it”?

Why are both required—that she designate the kerchief for a Torah scroll as well? Is it not enough that she merely wrap it, which is an act?

The Gemara answers:

It is in accordance with the statement of Rav Hisda, for Rav Hisda said: With regard to this cloth that one designated for placing tefillin in it

a cloth that he designated for putting tefillin into,

and he placed tefillin in it,

and he put the tefillin into it,

it is prohibited to place coins in it.

It is prohibited to put money in it, because the cloth became an accessory of a mitzva.

This is specifically because he both designated the cloth and placed the tefillin in it. But if he merely

designated it

for tefillin

and did not place them in it,

he is not prohibited from placing money in it, because designation is not significant.

And likewise, if he merely

placed tefillin in it but did not designate it

for this purpose initially,

he may place coins in it,

because putting the tefillin there was merely incidental. Therefore, the Mishna says “and she gave it over”: the woman must also designate the kerchief for the Torah scroll; merely wrapping it is not sufficient.

And according to Abaye, who says that designation is significant,

he disagrees with Rav Hisda, and says:

If he designated it, even though he did not place tefillin in it,

that alone is sufficient to prohibit placing money in it, because designation is significant.

But if he

placed tefillin in it

alone, he concedes to Rav Hisda that only if

he designated it

for this purpose initially

does

it become prohibited; but

if he did not designate it, it does not.

It does not become prohibited, because this was merely incidental.

And according to Abaye, the Mishna in Kelim is to be understood literally: It is sufficient for the woman to give the kerchief over for a Torah scroll for its midras impurity to be removed, since designation is significant; it is not necessary for her also to wrap it around the Torah scroll.

Ta shema:

It was taught in a beraita:

A structure over a grave,

a structure built over the grave,

that he built for the sake of

a

living

person, in order to bury him in it when he dies,

is permitted in benefit,

because it does not yet have the status of a grave.

And if he added one tier of stones to it [

one course of stones]

for the sake of a dead person,

for someone who had already died,

it is prohibited in benefit.

It follows that merely building the grave and designating it for the dead is sufficient to render it prohibited in benefit, which is difficult for Rava, who says that designation is not significant?

The Gemara answers:

Here, with what are we dealing? With a case where he placed a dead person in it.

He did not merely designate the grave for a dead person; he also buried the dead person in it, and therefore it became prohibited in benefit.

The Gemara objects:

If so, why specifically

why is it specifically when he

added

a tier of stones? After all,

even if he did not add one, it should also

become prohibited, since he actually buried the dead person there? The Gemara answers:

It is necessary

for the beraita to teach only that

even though he removed it,

even if he later removed the dead person from there, the grave nevertheless remains prohibited in benefit because he added a tier of stones there and designated it for the dead. Without the designation, the grave would not have remained prohibited after the removal, because we would have said that the burial was merely incidental, as in the case of placing tefillin in a cloth without designating it, where it is not prohibited to place money in it because the tefillin had been placed there only incidentally.

Rafram bar Pappa said in the name of Rav Hisda: If he recognized it,

the particular tier of stones that he added for the sake of the dead person,

he removes it

from the structure

and it is permitted

in benefit, since by doing so he nullified the act of designation.

Ta shema:

It was taught in a beraita:

One who hewed a grave for his father and then went and buried him in another grave, may not be buried in it

the son

ever.

It follows that merely hewing the grave renders it prohibited in benefit, because designation is significant, which is difficult for Rava?

The Gemara answers:

There

the reason is not a prohibition against benefit, but rather

because of the honor of his father.

That is why the son may not be buried in it. Indeed, if he hewed the grave for the sake of another dead person who was not his father, it would be permitted for him to be buried in it.

This too is evidently so,

that the entire reason is only the honor of his father.

For it teaches in the latter clause

of that same beraita:

Rabban Shimon

ben Gamliel says: Even one who hewed stones

from the mountain in order to build a grave for his father,

and then went and buried him

ultimately

in another place,

and did not build his father’s grave from them,

may not be buried in them

the son

ever.

Granted, if you say

that the reason is

because of the honor of his father, it works:

therefore, the son may never be buried in them, because that would not be honoring the father.

But if you say

that the reason is

because of designation,

this is difficult: Is

flax spun for weaving—

one who spun flax in order to weave from it a garment for a dead person—

subject to anyone who would say

that it becomes prohibited? Surely even Abaye says that designation is significant only when he wove the garment and completed it so that it was fit for the dead person; but spinning alone is certainly not considered even designation?

Here too, the hewing of stones alone does not even have the status of designation. Why, then, should it be prohibited for the son to be buried in those stones? Rather, clearly the reason is only the honor of his father.

Ta shema

from that which was taught in a beraita:

A new grave,

in which no one has yet been buried,

is permitted in benefit.

And if he

placed a stillborn infant in it,

into the grave,

it is prohibited in benefit.

The Gemara infers:

“He placed [it],” yes.

Only if he actually buried the dead person in it does it become prohibited. But

“he did not place [it],” no.

It does not become prohibited, even if he designated the grave for a dead person.

This is difficult for Abaye, who maintains that designation is significant?

The Gemara answers: In fact,

the same law applies: Even though he did not place

the stillborn infant in it, it becomes prohibited immediately through designation, because designation is significant.

The beraita therefore stated the case in which he placed a stillborn infant in it in order to teach that a stillborn infant has the legal status of a dead person, rendering its grave prohibited even after the infant has been removed from it.

And to exclude the view of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, who said: Stillborn infants do not acquire their graves,

for if one buried a stillborn infant and removed it from there, the grave does not become prohibited in benefit, because a stillborn infant does not have the legal status of a dead person.

It teaches us

that a stillborn infant does indeed render its grave prohibited.

A new grave that is permitted in benefit means one that he hewed for a living person in order to bury him when he dies, or one that he hewed without a specific designation in order to use it when needed. It does not have the status of designation.

Ta shema

from that which we learned in tractate Shekalim:

The surplus of funds collected for the dead

money left over from a charity collection conducted for the needs of a mitzva dead person or for deceased poor people, may be used

for

the needs of

other dead people.

The surplus of funds collected for a dead person

if the money was collected for the needs of a particular dead person, the surplus belongs

to his heirs.

The heirs may benefit from the money that remains. It follows that although the money was designated for the needs of a particular dead person, it does not become prohibited in benefit. This is difficult for Abaye, who says that designation is significant? The Gemara answers:

Here, with what are we dealing? With a case where they collected

the money

while he was alive,

when the particular person was still living; therefore, it does not have the status of designation that would render it prohibited in benefit.

And the Gemara raises an objection:

But it was not taught in this manner!

The beraita does not interpret the Mishna in this way.

As we learned

in the Mishna: “

The surplus of the dead is for the dead; the surplus of the dead is for his heirs.”

And it was taught concerning it,

the beraita explains:

How so?

If they collected money anonymously for the dead—

this is the surplus of the dead for the dead.

If they collected money for this particular dead person—

this is the surplus of the dead for his heirs.

Thus, the beraita explains that this refers to a case in which they collected money for the needs of a person who had already died.

But the Gemara rejects this:

But according to your reasoning, say the latter clause.

Rather than raising an objection from the first clause, you should bring proof from the latter clause to the contrary, for the latter clause of that same Mishna states:

Rabbi Meir says:

The surplus of the dead does not belong to his heirs; rather,

they may not touch it until Elijah comes.

Rabbi Natan says: He should build a monument

from it,

on his grave, or

purchase wine with it and use it for

sprinkling

so that it should give off a pleasant fragrance

before his bier,

of that particular person for whom they collected the money.

This shows that they hold that it is forbidden to derive benefit from money that was designated for a dead person. If so, this is difficult for Rava, who holds that designation is not legally significant?

The Gemara answers:

Rather, Abaye explains it according to his reasoning, and Rava explains it according to his reasoning!

Abaye explains it according to his reasoning—

Everyone

holds:

Designation is legally significant,

but

the first tanna holds

that the surplus of the dead belongs to his heirs, because only

that which is fit for him is seized:

the money needed for the burial expenses is seized and becomes forbidden for benefit, whereas

that which is not fit for him is not seized:

whatever remains and is found not to be needed for the needs of the dead was never subject to the prohibition of benefit in the first place, and the designation did not take effect upon it.

And Rabbi Meir is uncertain

about this law:

whether

that which is not fit for him

is seized, or whether it is not seized.

Therefore, because of the uncertainty, it is forbidden to give the surplus to the heirs so that they may benefit from it. But it is also impossible to use it to build a monument on the dead person’s grave without the heirs’ consent, because perhaps the law is that it is not seized, in which case he would be depriving the heirs of money that belongs to them.

Therefore, they may not touch it until Elijah comes.

And Rabbi Natan is certain that it is indeed seized.

Therefore, he should build a monument on his grave.

And Rava explains it according to his reasoning—

According to everyone, designation is not legally significant,

and there is no concern that deriving benefit from the surplus of the money is prohibited.

Rather, there is a concern here that the dead person would not consent to the heirs benefiting from money over which he was humiliated.

And the tannaim disagree about this—

The first tanna holds: Since they humiliated him,

even though the dead person is humiliated by the fact that money is collected for him, nevertheless

he waives his humiliation in favor of the heirs,

for during his lifetime he waives his humiliation even when the benefit is solely for the heirs.

Therefore, the surplus is to be given to his heirs.

And Rabbi Meir is uncertain whether

the dead person

waives

his humiliation for the sake of the heirs

or whether he does not waive it.

Therefore,

because of the uncertainty,

they may not touch it

until Elijah comes.

And Rabbi Natan is certain that he does not waive

his humiliation for the sake of the heirs, but only to the extent that it serves his own needs.

Therefore, he should build a monument on his grave or use it for sprinkling before

his bier.

Come and hear:

It was taught in a beraita:

If his father and mother

of the deceased

were throwing garments upon him,

out of affection throwing their garments over him beyond what was necessary, for in their grief they are prepared to squander all their possessions on him,

it is a mitzva for others to save them,

and to remove them from him, for there is no greater restoration of lost property than this.

This is difficult for Abaye: If designation is legally significant, what benefit is there in removing the garments from him? They have already become forbidden solely through designation.