Sanhedrin 48a — the Talmud in English

We derive it from “objects used for” and “objects used for.”

It is preferable to derive the law of a dead person from idolatry, because both involve “objects used for”: in the case of a dead person, the discussion concerns objects used for the dead, and the verse “where the nations served” also refers to objects used for idolatry.

This excludes the beheaded heifer, since it itself is sacred.

The beheaded heifer itself is sacred; it is not merely an “object used for” something sacred.

The Gemara asks:

And according to Abaye, what is the reason that he does not derive it from idolatry?

The Gemara answers:

He could say to you:

Abaye says:

We derive a matter whose ordinary use is this way from a matter whose ordinary use is this way.

A dead person and a beheaded heifer are both matters whose ordinary use is that they will be

excluding idolatry, whose ordinary use is not this way.

There is no ordinary practice of serving idolatry, since even a descendant of Noah is prohibited from idolatry. Therefore, one cannot derive from idolatry that designation does not prohibit an object. Perhaps the reason there is no prohibition there is specifically that, even after a person designates an object for idolatrous use, he may eventually regret it and not use it for idolatry.

A mnemonic: Kaf-Hei, Nefashya, Hatziva, Nakhisa, Da, and Mana.

These are mnemonic signs for the Mishnayot and beraitot—Tannaitic sources not included in the Mishna—from which the Gemara will seek proofs in the dispute between Abaye and Rava as to whether designation has legal significance.

They raise an objection from a source

that we learned in tractate Kelim:

A head cloth

is a cloth that a woman wears on her head,

which is susceptible to impurity of a seat

Although the cloth is not primarily intended for sitting, it nevertheless becomes susceptible to impurity of a seat because sometimes a woman folds it and sits on it, or rests her head on it,

and she designates it for a scroll,

meaning that she set the cloth aside to wrap a Torah scroll in it,

it is pure from impurity of a seat.

The impurity of a seat leaves it without any immersion, since it is no longer fit for sitting, as it is prohibited to sit on a cloth used for a Torah scroll. The designation “seat” is removed from it, since one says to the person sitting on it: “Stand up, so that we can perform our work.”

But it is impure

with the impurity of contact with a seat.

A lesser degree of impurity nevertheless remains on the cloth: the impurity resulting from contact with an object impure as a seat. The cloth descends from the status of a primary source of impurity, which can render people and vessels impure, to the status of a first-degree source of impurity, which renders only food impure.

This is because even when it serves as a cloth for scrolls, it still retains the status of a vessel and can become impure through contact. In addition to having itself been impure as a seat, the cloth had, at that time, come into contact with the impurity of a seat and thereby become impure through that contact. This impurity remains on it even after the impurity of a seat has left it.

It follows that merely designating the cloth for a Torah scroll removed its impurity as a seat, because designation has legal significance. This is a difficulty for Rava, who says that designation has no legal significance. What is the answer?

The Gemara answers:

Say

that the Mishna means that the woman did not merely designate the cloth for a Torah scroll, but

she designated it and wrapped it around the scroll,

so that there was an act, and not merely designation.

The Gemara asks:

Why do I need “she designated it and wrapped it around the scroll”?

Why must both things be done—that she designate the cloth for the Torah scroll and also wrap it around the scroll? Is wrapping it alone, which is an act, not sufficient?

The Gemara answers:

It is as Rav Hisda said, as Rav Hisda said: If one designated this cloth to enclose phylacteries in it

that is, he designated a cloth for placing phylacteries inside it,

and he enclosed phylacteries in it,

meaning that he placed the phylacteries inside it,

it is prohibited to enclose coins in it.

It is prohibited to place money in it, because the cloth has become an object used for a mitzva.

This applies specifically when he both designated the cloth and placed phylacteries in it. But if he merely

designated it

for phylacteries

but did not enclose them in it,

and ultimately did not place the phylacteries inside it, it is not prohibited to place money in it, because designation has no legal significance.

Similarly, if he merely

enclosed phylacteries in it but did not designate it

for that purpose from the outset,

it is permitted to enclose coins in it,

because placing the phylacteries there was merely incidental. Therefore the Mishna says, “and she designated it”: the woman must also designate the cloth for the Torah scroll; wrapping it around the scroll alone is not sufficient.

And according to Abaye, who says that designation has legal significance,

he disagrees with Rav Hisda and holds that

if he designated it, even though he did not enclose phylacteries in it,

that alone is sufficient to prohibit placing money in it, because designation has legal significance.

However, if he

enclosed phylacteries in it

but did not designate it beforehand, he agrees with Rav Hisda that only

if he designated it

for this purpose from the outset

does

the cloth become prohibited. But

if he did not designate it, it does not.

It is not prohibited, because the placement of the phylacteries there was merely incidental.

According to Abaye, the Mishna in Kelim can therefore be understood according to its plain meaning: it is sufficient for the woman to designate the cloth for the Torah scroll for the impurity of a seat to leave it, since designation has legal significance. It is unnecessary for her also to wrap the cloth around the Torah scroll.

Come and hear a proof:

It was taught in a beraita:

A structure over a grave

that is built above the grave,

which one built for

a

living

person, in order to bury him there when he dies,

is permitted for benefit,

because it does not yet have the status of a grave.

And if he added one course of stones to it

one additional row of stones,

for the sake of a dead person,

for someone who had already died,

it is prohibited for benefit.

It follows that merely building the grave and designating it for the dead is sufficient to prohibit it for benefit. This is a difficulty for Rava, who says that designation has no legal significance. What is the answer?

The Gemara answers:

Here, with what are we dealing? With a case where they placed a dead person in it.

The grave was not merely designated for a dead person; they also buried the dead person in it, and therefore it became prohibited for benefit.

The Gemara challenges this:

If so, why specifically

did the beraita state that he

added

a course of stones? Even

if he did not add one, as well,

the grave should become prohibited, since he actually buried the dead person there. The Gemara answers:

It is necessary

for the beraita to teach that

even though he removed him,

even if he later removed the dead person from there, the grave nevertheless remains prohibited for benefit because he added a course of stones and designated it for the dead person. Without the designation, the grave would not remain prohibited after the removal, since we would say that the burial was merely incidental, as in the case where one placed phylacteries in a cloth without having designated it, in which case it is not prohibited to place money in it because placing the phylacteries there was merely incidental.

Rafram bar Pappa said in the name of Rav Hisda: If he recognized it,

the particular course of stones that he added for the sake of the dead person,

he may remove it

from the structure

and it is permitted

for benefit, since by doing so he nullifies the act of designation.

Come and hear a proof:

It was taught in a beraita:

One who hewed out a grave for his father and then went and buried him in another grave may not be buried in it

the son

forever.

It follows that merely hewing out the grave renders it prohibited for benefit, because designation has legal significance. This is a difficulty for Rava. What is the answer?

The Gemara answers:

There

the reason is not that it is prohibited for benefit, but

because of the honor of his father.

For this reason the son may not be buried in it. But if he had hewed out the grave for another dead person who was not his father, he would be permitted to be buried in it.

This is also logically evident:

the entire reason is only because of the honor of his father.

As the latter clause teaches

of that same beraita:

Rabban Shimon

ben Gamliel says: Even one who hewed stones

from a mountain in order to build a grave for his father,

and then buried him

eventually

in another place,

and did not use those stones to build his father’s grave,

may not be buried in them

the son

forever.

Granted, if you say

that the reason is

because of the honor of his father, it is well:

for that reason the son may never be buried in those stones, since doing so would not be an honor for his father.

But if you say

that the reason is

because of designation,

there is a difficulty: Is it really the case that

thread spun for weaving—

someone who spins flax in order to weave a garment from it for a dead person—

is there anyone who says

that it becomes prohibited? Even Abaye says that designation has legal significance only when one has woven and completed the garment so that it is fit for the dead person. But spinning alone certainly is not even considered designation. Is this not so?

Here too, merely hewing stones does not even give them the status of designated objects. Why, then, should it be prohibited for the son to be buried in those stones? Rather, clearly the reason is only the honor of his father.

Come and hear a proof

from what was taught in a beraita:

A new grave,

in which no one has yet been buried,

is permitted for benefit.

And if one

placed a stillborn child in it

inside the grave,

it is prohibited for benefit.

The Gemara infers:

“He placed one”—yes.

Only if he actually buried the dead person in it does the grave become prohibited. But

“he did not place one”—no.

It does not become prohibited, even if he designated the grave for a dead person.

This is a difficulty for Abaye, who holds that designation has legal significance. What is the answer?

The Gemara answers: In fact,

the same law applies: even though he did not place the stillborn child

in it, the grave becomes prohibited immediately through designation, because designation has legal significance.

The beraita therefore mentioned that he placed a stillborn child in it in order to teach that a stillborn child has the legal status of a dead person and renders its grave prohibited, even after the child is removed from it.

And this excludes the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, who says: A stillborn child does not establish a grave.

If one buried a stillborn child and removed it from there, the grave does not become prohibited for benefit, because a stillborn child does not have the legal status of a dead person.

It teaches us

that a stillborn child indeed renders its grave prohibited.

A new grave that is permitted for benefit means either that it was hewed for a living person, to bury him there when he dies, or that it was hewed without a specific designation in order to use it when necessary. It therefore does not have the status of a designated grave.

Come and hear a proof

from what we learned in tractate Shekalim:

The surplus collected for the dead

—money left over from a charity collection held for the needs of a person who died while obligated in a mitzva, or for the needs of poor people who died—may be used

for

the needs of

other dead people.

других.

The surplus collected for a dead person

—if the money was collected for a particular dead person, the surplus belongs

to his heirs.

The heirs may benefit from the money that remained. It follows that although the money was designated for the needs of a particular dead person, it does not become prohibited for benefit. This is difficult for Abaye, who says that designation has legal significance. What is the answer? The Gemara answers:

Here, with what are we dealing? With a case where they collected

the money

while he was alive,

when the particular person was still alive. Therefore, the money did not yet have the status of designated money that would become prohibited for benefit.

And the Gemara challenges this:

But it is not taught that way!

The baraita—a tannaitic source not included in the Mishna—does not explain the Mishna in this way.

As we learned

in the Mishna, the early code of the Sages: "

The surplus collected for the dead belongs to the dead; the surplus collected for a particular dead person belongs to his heirs."

And it teaches concerning this,

the baraita explains:

How so?

If money was collected for the dead without specifying a particular person—

this is the surplus collected for the dead, which belongs to the dead.

If money was collected for this particular dead person—

this is the surplus collected for the dead person, which belongs to his heirs.

Thus, the baraita explains that the ruling concerns money collected for a person who had already died.

But the Gemara rejects this:

But according to your reasoning, consider the latter clause.

Rather than raising a difficulty from the first clause, you should bring a proof to the contrary from the latter clause, where the same Mishna states:

Rabbi Meir says:

The surplus collected for a dead person does not belong to his heirs; rather,

they may not touch it until Elijah comes.

Rabbi Natan says: He should build a monument

from it

on his grave, or

he should buy wine with it and use it for

sprinkling

so that it gives off a pleasant fragrance

before his bier,

that of the particular person for whom the money was collected.

This shows that they hold that it is forbidden to benefit from money that was designated for a dead person. If so, this is difficult for Rava, who holds that designation has no legal significance?

The Gemara answers:

Rather, Abaye explains it according to his reasoning, and Rava explains it according to his reasoning!

Abaye explains it according to his reasoning—

Everyone

holds:

Designation has legal significance.

However,

the first Tanna holds

that the surplus collected for a dead person belongs to his heirs, because only

what is fit for him is seized:

the money needed for the burial expenses is seized and becomes forbidden to benefit from, whereas

what is not fit for him is not seized:

whatever remains and turns out not to have been needed for the dead person's expenses was never seized by the prohibition against benefit, and the designation did not take effect upon it.

And Rabbi Meir is uncertain

about this law:

whether

what is not fit for him

is seized or is not seized.

Therefore, because of the uncertainty, it is forbidden to give the surplus to the heirs for them to benefit from it. But it is also impossible to use it to build a monument on the dead person's grave without the heirs' consent, because perhaps the law is that it was not seized, in which case he would be causing the heirs to lose money that belongs to them.

Therefore, they may not touch it until Elijah comes.

And Rabbi Natan is certain that it is certainly seized.

Therefore, he should build a monument on his grave.

And Rava explains it according to his reasoning—

Everyone agrees that designation has no legal significance,

and there is no concern that one might violate the prohibition against benefiting from the surplus money.

Rather, there is a concern that the dead person would not consent to his heirs benefiting from money over which he was humiliated.

And the tannaitic sages disagree about this—

The first Tanna holds: Since they humiliate him,

even though the dead person is humiliated by the fact that money is collected for him, nevertheless

he waives his humiliation for the sake of his heirs,

as, while he was alive, he waived his humiliation even when the benefit was only for his heirs.

Therefore, the surplus is given to his heirs.

And Rabbi Meir is uncertain whether

the dead person

waives

his humiliation for the sake of his heirs

or does not waive it.

Therefore,

because of the uncertainty,

they may not touch it

until Elijah comes.

And Rabbi Natan is certain that the dead person does not waive

his humiliation for the sake of his heirs, but waives it only to the extent that it serves his own needs.

Therefore, he should build a monument on his grave or use it for sprinkling before

his bier.

Come and hear a proof:

It was taught in a baraita:

If his father and mother

of the dead person

were throwing garments onto him,

out of their love for him they throw more clothing onto him than necessary; in their grief, they are prepared to lose all their property for him,

it is a mitzva for others to save them,

and remove them from him, for there is no greater restoration of lost property than this.

This is difficult for Abaye: If designation has legal significance, what benefit is there in removing the garments from him? They have already become forbidden merely through designation.