Sanhedrin 46a (מו.) — the Talmud in English

However,

now that they are distant from one another,

since the generalization and the specification are distant from one another, appearing in two verses,

this serves to include idol worship, which resembles it in every respect, since the generalization and specification are distant from one another.

And Rabbi Eliezer interprets the verses according to the method of inclusions and exclusions:

“and he shall be put to death, and you shall hang him”—

an inclusion.

“for he who is hanged”—

an exclusion.

And

if they were close to one another, we would include only idol worship, which resembles it in every respect.

If we were interpreting it according to the actual method of inclusion and exclusion, we would say that the exclusion comes to exclude, so that from the inclusion we include only that which completely resembles the exclusion, namely, one who worships idols.

However,

now that they are distant from one another, this serves to include the other those liable to stoning.

Since they are distant, this causes us to include through the exclusion everything that resembles it even slightly, such as all those liable to stoning. It excludes only that which does not resemble it at all, such as those subject to the other forms of execution by the court.

We learned in the Mishna: And the Sages say:

the man is hanged,

but the woman is not hanged.

And we raised a question concerning this:

What is the reason of the Sages,

that the woman is not hanged?

And the Gemara answers: Because

the verse says:

“and you shall hang him”;

this indicates only

him, and not her,

that the woman is not hanged.

And Rabbi Eliezer,

who maintains that the woman is also hanged, would say to you: This

“him” comes to teach that he is to be hanged as he is,

he is hanged in the state in which he is,

without his garment,

and it does not come to exclude the woman.

And the Gemara raises an objection:

But the Sages

also interpret “him” as referring to hanging him without his garment; how, then, do they also exclude the woman from this word?

And the Gemara answers:

Indeed, it is so,

that it is impossible to exclude the woman from “him.”

Rather, the verse says:

“And if there be in a man a sin

worthy of death,” which indicates specifically

a man, and not a woman.

And the Gemara raises an objection:

And Rabbi Eliezer, this

“and if there be in a man”,

what does he expound from it?

And the Gemara answers:

Reish Lakish said: That verse serves to exclude a stubborn and rebellious son,

who, although he is executed by stoning, is nevertheless not hanged, because he is not included in the category of “man,” as explained at the beginning of the chapter of the stubborn and rebellious son.

And the Gemara raises an objection:

But it was taught in a baraita: A stubborn and rebellious son is stoned and hanged; these are the words of Rabbi Eliezer.

Thus, Rabbi Eliezer himself does not exclude a stubborn and rebellious son from hanging.

And the Gemara answers:

Rather, Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said:

The verse comes to teach the opposite, namely,

to include a stubborn and rebellious son

for hanging. And the Gemara asks:

What is the reason—that is, how is it implied from this verse that a stubborn and rebellious son is included?

And the Gemara answers:

As the verse says:

“And if there be in a man a sin”,

which indicates specifically

“a man”,

and not a son,

so that a stubborn and rebellious son is not hanged.

And from what is stated

“a sin,”

we also learn that only

one who is killed for his sin is hanged; a stubborn and rebellious son is excluded, since he is killed on account of his eventual fate.

For he is not killed because he gorged himself and drank excessively, but because the Torah reached the ultimate conclusion regarding the character of a stubborn and rebellious son: after he squanders his father’s money and no longer has the means to continue gorging himself and drinking as he is accustomed, he will become a bandit. Therefore, the Torah said: Let him die innocent, and not die guilty.

This is an exclusion following an exclusion.

And there is a principle in Torah interpretation that

an exclusion following an exclusion serves only to include.

Thus, a stubborn and rebellious son is included with regard to hanging.

We learned in the Mishna:

Rabbi Eliezer said to them: But did not Shimon ben Shetaḥ hang women

in Ashkelon? They said to him: He hung eighty women, but two people are not judged on the same day.

Rav Ḥisda said: They taught

that two people are not judged for execution on the same day

except when they face two different forms of execution

by the court, because the court cannot examine both cases thoroughly.

But when they face one form of execution, they may judge

even two people on the same day.

And the Gemara raises an objection:

But in the incident involving Shimon ben Shetaḥ, there was only one form of execution

for all the women,

and they said to him,

the Sages said to Rabbi Eliezer,

“They do not judge [two people on the same day].”

For if Shimon ben Shetaḥ had acted solely according to the strict law, he would not have judged them on the same day.

Therefore, the Gemara states a different explanation:

Rather, if this statement was said, it was said as follows: They taught this only with regard to one form of execution that is comparable to two forms of execution,

for even when there is one form of execution, two people are not judged on the same day if the case resembles two forms of execution.

And what are the circumstances?

In what case is this said?

For example, two different transgressions,

even if both carry the same form of execution, such as desecrating Shabbat and idol worship, both of which carry stoning. Nevertheless, two people are not judged on the same day, because different evidence must be presented for each transgression, and it is impossible to examine each piece of evidence properly and seek grounds for acquitting each of the defendants.

But when there is one form of execution and one transgression, they may judge

two people on the same day.

The incident involving Shimon ben Shetaḥ did indeed involve one form of execution, but the transgressions were different, since there are different types of sorcery, such as ov and yideoni, each of which is a separate transgression. Therefore, Shimon ben Shetaḥ could not have judged them on the same day had the exigency of the hour not required it.

Rav Adda bar Ahava raised an objection

to Rav Ḥisda’s statement from what was taught in a baraita:

Two people are not judged on the same day, even an adulterer and an adulteress.

But an adulterer and an adulteress are both involved in one transgression and one form of execution, and nevertheless they are not judged on the same day.

And the Gemara answers:

Rav Ḥisda explained it:

The baraita is speaking of a case in which the two are

the daughter of a kohen

who committed adultery

and her paramour.

They are judged by two different forms of execution: she is judged by burning, while her paramour is judged by the ordinary form of execution for one who commits adultery with a Jewish woman: if she is betrothed, his sentence is stoning, and if she is married, his sentence is strangulation.

Or,

the two are

the daughter of a kohen and the false witnesses who were themselves refuted by other false witnesses.

Witnesses came and refuted the initial witnesses who had caused the daughter of the kohen and her paramour to be liable for execution. The conspiring witnesses became liable for the form of execution that they had plotted for the paramour, but not for the burning that they had plotted for the daughter of the koହen, as it is stated: “You shall do to him as he plotted to do to his brother,” and we interpret this: “to his brother,” but not to his sister.

Then other witnesses came and refuted the witnesses who had refuted the initial witnesses, and the ruling remained as established by the initial witnesses: the daughter of the koהen and her paramour are liable for execution.

It follows that she is liable for burning, as is her law, whereas the intermediate witnesses, who have now become conspiring witnesses, are liable for the form of execution that they had plotted to impose upon the initial witnesses, namely, the execution prescribed for the paramour.

It was taught in a baraita: Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov says: I heard

from my teachers

that a court may administer lashes and impose punishment not prescribed by the Torah.

It is permitted for a court to administer lashes or impose the death penalty even upon one who is not liable for it by Torah law,

but not

that they should intend

to transgress the words of the Torah,

to punish arbitrarily one who is not liable for punishment,

but rather

when their intention is

in order to

make a

safeguard [geder]

for the Torah,

when they see that the exigency of the hour requires it.

And there was an incident involving a man who rode a horse on Shabbat during the days of the Greeks, and they brought him before the court, and they stoned him!

Not because he was

was

deserving of this,

since riding a horse on Shabbat is prohibited only by rabbinic decree and does not entail liability for stoning,

but rather

because

the exigency of the hour

was

in need of this,

because the Jewish people were lax in transgressions, as the Greeks oppressed them and imposed decrees upon them until the mitzvot were contemptible in their eyes.

Again,

there was

an incident involving a man who had intercourse [ba’al]

with

his wife beneath

a

fig tree,

in an exposed place,

and they brought him before the court and administered lashes to him.

Not because he was

was

deserving of this, but rather

because

the exigency of the hour

was

in need of this,

in order to strengthen the boundaries of modesty among them.

Mishna:

How do they hang him?

They sink the beam into the ground,

driving a wooden post into the earth,

and the beam projects,

near the top of the post, a peg-like projection extended from it, upon which they would hang him.

And he brings together,

he brings close

his two hands, one upon the other,

and ties them,

and hangs him

by his hands.

Rabbi Yosei says: The beam

was not sunk into the ground; rather, it was

inclined,

leaning

against the wall

at one end, while its other end rested on the ground.

And he hangs him in the manner employed by butchers,

just as butchers hang an animal after slaughter.

And they immediately untie him.

And if he remained overnight,

if they left him hanging throughout the night,

they transgress a prohibition concerning him!

As it is stated:

“You shall not leave his corpse upon the tree; rather, you shall surely bury him

on that day

for one who is hanged is a disgrace to God,”

meaning

that people say

“Why is this one hanged?”

“Because he cursed the Divine Name!” And consequently, the Name of Heaven is profaned,

since people continually recall the matter of his blasphemy against Heaven. Therefore, the Torah said not to leave him hanging overnight, but to bury him immediately.

Rabbi Meir said: When a person suffers,

when he is punished for his sins,

what does the Divine Presence say

in what language does it lament and complain about this?

“I am distressed in My head; I am distressed in My arm.”

Like a weary and exhausted person who says: My head is heavy upon me, and my arm is heavy upon me.

This is how Rabbi Meir interprets the verse “a disgrace to God”: Kelalat means “kal li,” “I am not light”—that is, the Divine Presence says: I am not light; the suffering of a member of Israel is heavy upon Me.

If so, the Omnipresent suffers over the blood of the wicked that is spilled; all the more so

does He suffer

over the blood of the righteous

that is spilled.

And the Mishna returns to the matter of leaving the hanged person overnight:

And not only this did they say,

that one who leaves overnight one executed by the court transgresses a prohibition,

but anyone who leaves overnight

his dead transgresses a prohibition,

and it will be explained in the Gemara that this is derived from the inclusion in the verse, “you shall surely bury him.”

And if

he left

the deceased

overnight for his honor,

for example,

to obtain a coffin or shrouds for him, he does not transgress concerning him,

on account of “you shall not leave him overnight.”

And they would not bury him,

the one executed by the court,

in the graves of his ancestors,

because a wicked person is not buried beside a righteous person.

Rather, two burial grounds were designated for the court,

for those executed by it:

one—

for those executed

by the sword

and those strangled, and one—

for those stoned and burned,

which are more severe forms of execution, since even a seriously wicked person is not buried beside one who is less wicked.

And after

the flesh has decomposed

in the grave, his sin has already been atoned for through his death and degradation, and then

they gather

the bones

of his

and bury them in their place,

in the graves of his ancestors.

And the relatives

of the executed man

come and inquire after the welfare of the judges and the welfare of the witnesses; that is,

as though they say,

“We bear no resentment toward you,”

because

“you judged a true judgment!”