Sanhedrin 46a — the Talmud in English

But

now that they are distant from one another,

since the generalization and the specification are distant from one another in two verses,

it is effective to include idolatry, which resembles it in every respect

the matter is effective so that we also include the idolater for hanging, because he completely resembles the blasphemer, for he too denied the fundamental principle just as the blasphemer did.

And Rabbi Eliezer derives [the law] through inclusions and exclusions. “

And he shall be put to death and you shall hang him” —

an inclusion. “

For a curse” —

an exclusion.

And

if they were close to one another, we would include only idolatry, which resembles it in every respect.

If we were to expound it as a genuine inclusion and exclusion, we would say that the exclusion comes to exclude, so that from the inclusion we include only that which completely resembles the exclusion, namely, only an idolater.

But

now that they are distant from one another, it is effective to include the other [offenders] liable to stoning.

Since they are distant, this is effective so that from the exclusion we include everything that resembles it even in part, such as all those liable to stoning. It excludes only that which does not resemble it at all, such as those subject to the other court-imposed deaths.

We learned in the Mishna: And the Sages say:

the man is hanged

but the woman is not hanged.

And we raised a difficulty concerning it:

What is the reason of the Rabbis

that the woman is not hanged?

And the Gemara answers: Because

the verse says: “

And you shall hang him”;

this indicates only

him and not her

—the woman is not hanged.

And Rabbi Eliezer,

who holds that the woman too is hanged, would say to you: This

“him”

comes to teach that he is hanged as he is,

without his garment,

and not to exclude the woman.

And the Gemara raises an objection:

And the Rabbis

—they too derive “him” with regard to hanging him without his garment; how do they exclude from this the woman as well?

And the Gemara answers:

Indeed, it is so,

that it is impossible to exclude the woman from “him”;

rather, the verse says: “

And when there is in a man a sin

deserving the judgment of death”—this indicates specifically

a man and not a woman.

And the Gemara raises an objection:

And Rabbi Eliezer—this “

when there is in a man”

what does he derive from it?

And the Gemara answers:

Reish Lakish said: That [verse] serves to exclude a stubborn and rebellious son

—although he is put to death by stoning, nevertheless he is not hanged, because he is not included in the category of “man,” as explained at the beginning of the chapter dealing with the stubborn and rebellious son.

And the Gemara raises an objection:

But it was taught in a baraita: A stubborn and rebellious son is stoned and hanged; these are the words of Rabbi Eliezer.

It follows that Rabbi Eliezer himself does not exclude a stubborn and rebellious son from hanging.

And the Gemara answers:

Rather, Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said:

The verse comes to do the opposite:

to include a stubborn and rebellious son

for hanging. And the Gemara asks:

What is the reason?

That is, how is it indicated from this verse that a stubborn and rebellious son is to be included?

And the Gemara answers:

For the verse says: “

And when there is in a man a sin”;

this indicates specifically

a man

and not a son

—a stubborn and rebellious son is not hanged.

And from what is stated, “

a sin,”

we also learn that only

one who is put to death for his sin

is hanged; this excludes a stubborn and rebellious son, who is put to death on account of his eventual destiny. He is not put to death because he gorged himself and drank excessively, but because the Torah reached the end of the stubborn and rebellious son’s understanding: after he squanders his father’s money and has no means with which to continue gorging himself and drinking excessively as is his habit, he will become a bandit. Therefore, the Torah said: Let him die meritorious, and let him not die guilty.

It is an exclusion following an exclusion.

And it is a principle in the Torah that

there is no exclusion following an exclusion except for inclusion.

And a stubborn and rebellious son is included for hanging.

We learned in the Mishna:

Rabbi Eliezer said to them: But did not Shimon ben Shetaḥ hang women

in Ashkelon? They said to him: He hanged eighty women, and two are not judged on one day.

Rav Ḥisda said: They taught this

—that two people are not judged for death on one day—

only with regard to two deaths

imposed by the court, because the court cannot examine both of them thoroughly.

But with regard to one death, they may judge

even two on one day.

And the Gemara raises an objection:

But the incident involving Shimon ben Shetaḥ involved one death,

for all the women,

and they said to him

—the Sages to Rabbi Eliezer—

that they do not judge [two on one day].

For if Shimon ben Shetaḥ had acted only according to the strict law, he would not have judged them on one day.

Therefore, the Gemara says otherwise:

Rather, if it was stated, it was stated as follows: They taught this only with regard to one death resembling two deaths,

that even with one death they do not judge two on one day if it resembles two deaths.

And what are the circumstances?

In what manner is this said?

For example, two transgressions,

different ones. Even if both involve the same death, such as Shabbat and idolatry, both of which are subject to stoning, nevertheless they do not judge two on one day, because different proofs must be brought for each transgression, and it is impossible to examine every proof properly and deliberate in favor of each of those being judged.

But with one death and one transgression, they may judge

two on one day.

The incident involving Shimon ben Shetaḥ indeed involved one death, but the transgressions were different, because there are different types of sorcery, such as ov and yidoni, each of which is a transgression in its own right. Therefore, Shimon ben Shetaḥ could not have judged them on one day had there not been an urgent need of the hour.

Rav Adda bar Ahava raised an objection

to Rav Ḥisda’s words from what was taught in a baraita:

They do not judge two on one day, even an adulterer and an adulteress.

But an adulterer and an adulteress are both involved in one transgression and one death, and nevertheless they do not judge both of them on one day?

And the Gemara answers:

Rav Ḥisda interpreted it:

The baraita is speaking of two who are

the daughter of a kohen

who committed adultery

and her paramour.

They are judged by two different deaths: she is judged by burning, while her paramour is judged by the ordinary death of one who has intercourse with a Jewish woman—if she is betrothed, his punishment is stoning, and if she is married, his punishment is strangulation.

Or

the two are

the daughter of a kohen and the conspirators against the conspirators.

Witnesses came and refuted the first witnesses, who had made the daughter of a kohen and her paramour liable to death, and the conspiring witnesses became liable for the death which they had plotted for the paramour, and not for the burning which they had plotted for the daughter of a kohen, as it is stated: “You shall do to him as he plotted to do to his brother,” and we derive: to his brother, but not to his sister.

Then other witnesses came and refuted the refuting witnesses, and the law remained as established by the first witnesses: the daughter of a kohen and her paramour are liable to death.

It follows that she is liable to burning, as is her law, whereas the intermediate witnesses, who have now become conspiring witnesses, are liable for the death which they plotted to impose upon the first witnesses, namely, the death of the paramour.

It was taught in a baraita: Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov says: I heard

from my teachers

that a court may strike and punish beyond the requirements of the Torah.

It is permitted for a court to impose lashes and the death penalty even upon one whom the Torah has not made liable for this,

but not

with the intention

of transgressing the words of the Torah,

to punish arbitrarily one who is not liable for punishment,

rather

when their intention is

in order

to make

a safeguard [

fence ]

for the Torah,

when they see that there is an urgent need of the hour.

And there was an incident involving one who rode a horse on Shabbat during the days of the Greeks, and they brought him before the court, and they stoned him!

Not because he

was

fit for this,

for riding a horse on Shabbat is prohibited only by rabbinic enactment, and it does not entail liability to stoning,

but

because

the hour

was

in need of this,

since Israel were dissolute in transgressions because the Greeks oppressed them and decreed decrees against them, until the mitzvot were despised in their eyes.

Again,

there was

an incident involving a certain man who had intercourse [

cohabited ]

with his wife beneath

a

fig tree

in an exposed place,

and they brought him before the court and flogged him.

Not because he

was

fit for this, but

because

the hour

was

in need of this,

to establish a fence for them regarding modesty.

Mishna:

How do they hang him?

They sink the beam into the ground,

driving a wooden post into the earth,

and the wood projects

near the top of the post; a peg-like projection came out from it, on which they hung him.

And he brings together

he brings close

his two hands, one upon the other,

and binds them,

and hangs him

by his hands.

Rabbi Yose says: The beam

was not sunk into the ground; rather, it was

inclined,

resting

against the wall

at one end, while its other end lay on the ground.

And he hangs him as the butchers do,

as butchers hang an animal after slaughter.

And they release him immediately.

And if he remained overnight,

if they left him hanging for the entire night,

one transgresses a negative commandment concerning him!

As it is stated: “

You shall not leave his corpse upon the tree, but you shall surely bury him

on that day,

for a hanging person is a curse of God,”

meaning

that people say:

Why is this one hanging?

Because he cursed the Name! And the Name of Heaven is thereby profaned,

since the matter of the blasphemy against Heaven is constantly mentioned. Therefore, the Torah said not to leave him hanging, but to bury him immediately.

Rabbi Meir said: When a person suffers,

when he is punished for his sins,

what expression does the Divine Presence use?

In what language does it lament and complain about this? “

My head is heavy for me, my arm is heavy for me.”

Like a person who is tired and weary and says: My head is heavy upon me, and my arm is heavy upon me.

Thus Rabbi Meir expounds the verse, “a curse of God.” For “curse” means “lightness there is not”: that is, the Divine Presence says, “I am not light; the suffering of a person from Israel is heavy upon me.”

If so, the Omnipresent suffers over the blood of the wicked that is shed—how much more so

does He suffer

over the blood of the righteous

that is shed.

And the Mishna returns to the matter of leaving the hanged person overnight:

And not only this did they say,

that one who leaves overnight one executed by the court transgresses a negative commandment,

but anyone who leaves his

dead overnight transgresses a negative commandment.

And it will be explained in the Gemara that this is derived from the additional wording of the verse, “you shall surely bury him.”

And if

he left him overnight,

the dead man,

for his honor,

such as

to bring him a coffin and shrouds, he does not transgress concerning him

because of “you shall not leave him overnight.”

And they would not bury him,

one executed by the court,

in the graves of his fathers,

because they do not bury a wicked person beside a righteous person.

Rather, two burial grounds were prepared for the court,

for those executed by it:

one—

for those executed

by the sword

and strangled, and one—

for those stoned and burned,

which are more severe deaths, since they do not bury even a gravely wicked person beside a less wicked person.

And after

the flesh has decomposed

in the grave, his sin has already been atoned for through his death and his disgrace; then

they collect the

bones

of his

and bury them in their place,

in the graves of his fathers.

And the relatives

of the executed man

come and inquire concerning the welfare of the judges and concerning the welfare of the witnesses; that is,

as though they say,

we bear no resentment against you,

because

you judged a true judgment!