Sanhedrin 45b (מה:) — the Talmud in English

The verse states:

“It shall surely be stoned” or

“it shall surely be shot,” in the future tense, as it does not say: “Stone, stone; shoot, shoot.” And this comes to teach that this procedure is to be followed also for future generations.

We learned in the Mishna:

“And if not, the second witness takes the stone”

and places it on his heart.

The Gemara discusses this: How is it possible that the second witness alone

takes

the stone, when it was exceedingly heavy?

But was it not taught in a beraita: Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: There was a stone

there, in the place of stoning, whose weight was

the burden of [

the equivalent of a burden borne by]

two people.

He

would take it and place it on the heart

of the one being stoned.

If he died from it, he had fulfilled his obligation.

And how could one person lift it by himself?

The Gemara answers:

And according to your reasoning,

that you raise your difficulty from the beraita,

you should raise the difficulty from the beraita itself:

if so, the beraita itself is difficult, for how is it possible that a stone that was

the burden of two people

could be

taken

by one person

and placed on his heart?

Rather,

you are forced to explain it as follows:

“He lifts it together with his colleague, and he throws it.”

His colleague assists him in lifting the stone, and afterward he throws it alone at the one being stoned,

“so that it may come from a forceful source,”

so that the throwing will be with great force. Two people cannot throw it simultaneously with force, because when one throws, the other impedes him; but one person can throw it with all his strength.

We learned in the Mishna:

“And if not, his stoning

by all of Israel.”

The Gemara raises a difficulty:

But was it not taught: “No person ever repeated it”?

For it was never necessary to stone him a second time, since he always died from the first stone. What, then, does the Mishna mean when it says that sometimes all of Israel stoned him?

The Gemara answers:

Did I say that it is performed?

Does the Mishna say that this is what happened?

Rather, if it becomes necessary, I say so.

The Mishna merely says that if it happens that he does not die from one stone, all of Israel stone him.

The Master said

in the beraita:

“There was a stone”

there, implying that this same stone was always used for stoning those liable to stoning.

And raise a difficulty:

“Whether the stone with which he was stoned, or the wood on which he was hanged”

after his stoning,

or the sword with which he was killed

—the one liable to execution by the sword—

or the cloth with which he was strangled

—the one liable to execution by strangulation—

all of them are buried with him.

How, then, is it possible for the same stone with which one person was stoned to be used again for stoning?

The Gemara answers:

“No, it is necessary to say that they prepare and bring others in their place.”

The intent of the beraita is to say that a stone was always prepared there for stoning—not that it was the same stone. Rather, each time, immediately after a stoning, they brought another stone in its place.

The Gemara raises a difficulty concerning the statement in the beraita that all of them were

buried with him.

But was it not taught:

All these

are not buried with him!?

The Gemara answers:

Rav Pappa said: What does

“with him” mean? -

With him, within his burial plot.

They are not actually buried with him in the same grave, but within his four cubits.

Shmuel said: If the hands of the witnesses were severed

before he was stoned, he is

exempt

from stoning.

What is the reason?

It is because

I require that the following be fulfilled with regard to him:

“

The hand of the witnesses shall be against him first

to put him to death,” and

it is not possible.

Since this cannot be fulfilled, he is exempt from stoning. The Gemara raises a difficulty:

“If that is so, witnesses who were maimed from birth,”

who had severed hands even before they testified,

are they likewise disqualified!?

Would we also disqualify them from testifying?

If so, why did Shmuel specifically state the case of hands severed only after they had already testified?

The Gemara answers:

“That case is different,”

where the hand was severed after their testimony. Therefore, he is exempt, because

“the verse says”

“the hand of the witnesses,”

with the definite article, meaning that at the time of the stoning they must have the same hand

that had

belonged to them

already

from the beginning of their testimony.

But if the hand was severed before they testified, there is no deficiency, since this was their hand from the outset.

The Gemara raises an objection

from that which we learned in tractate Makkot [7a]:

“Anywhere that two testify concerning him”

—two witnesses who come before any court—

“and say: We testify concerning so-and-so that his verdict was completed in such-and-such a court, and so-and-so

and so-and-so

were

his witnesses,”

and he fled before they took him out to be executed,

“he shall be executed”

in this court.

Yet here the requirement that “the hand of the witnesses shall be against him first” is certainly not fulfilled, since the original witnesses are not present here at all. Necessarily, then, the Torah stated this merely as an ideal mitzva, and its absence does not invalidate the execution.

Is this not difficult for Shmuel, who exempts the one being stoned when the hands of the witnesses were severed?

The Gemara answers:

“Shmuel explained it”

—Shmuel explains the Mishna in accordance with his own position—

“when they themselves are his witnesses.”

These witnesses who testify that his verdict was completed in such-and-such a court are the very witnesses who testified against him there, and the verdict was reached on the basis of their testimony. Therefore, the requirement that the hand of the witnesses be against him first can also be fulfilled.

We examine this:

“But do we require a verse exactly as it is written?”

Does it follow that wherever the Torah says that something must be done in a particular manner, that detail is indispensable even after the fact, including when it is impossible to perform the act in that manner?

But was it not taught:

It is stated [Numbers 35:21]:

“The murderer shall surely be put to death; he is a murderer.”

I have derived

that the murderer is executed

only with the death stated for him,

by the sword.

From where is it derived that if you cannot execute him with the death stated for him, you execute him with any death by which you can execute him?

The verse states:

“The murderer shall surely be put to death.”

And we derive from the repetition of the wording that he is to be executed

in any event,

with another form of death.

Thus, it is not necessary to require specifically a “verse exactly as it is written.” Rather, if it is impossible to fulfill the Torah’s command in its prescribed form, it may be fulfilled in another form.

If so, why does Shmuel exempt him when it is impossible to fulfill “the hand of the witnesses shall be against him first”? The Gemara answers:

“That case is different,”

in the case of a murderer,

“as the verse says”

“he shall surely be put to death,”

for the Torah explicitly expanded the law to teach that it is not necessary to execute him specifically with the death stated for him.

But where we have no explicit expansion, a “verse exactly as it is written” is specifically required.

The Gemara discusses this:

“Why not derive it from there?”

Why should we not learn from that case, with regard to the entire Torah, that a “verse exactly as it is written” is not required?

The Gemara answers:

“Because murderer and blood redeemer are two verses that come as one,”

as in both of them a “verse exactly as it is written” is not required;

“and whenever two verses come as one, they do not teach” a general principle.

And we explain:

“Murderer”—

that which we said.

The Torah expanded the law to allow him to be executed by any possible form of death.

“What is the case of the blood redeemer?”

Where do we find, with regard to the blood redeemer, that a “verse exactly as it is written” is not required?

As it was taught:

It is stated [there, verse 19]:

“The blood redeemer shall put

the murderer

to death when he encounters him.”

We have learned that

it is a mitzva concerning the blood redeemer

that the relative of the murdered person execute the murderer.

And from where is it derived that if he has no blood redeemer, the court appoints a blood redeemer for him?

As it is stated:

“When he encounters him,”

which implies that anyone who encounters him may kill him,

in any event,

even if he is not the blood redeemer, but was appointed in his place.

Mar Kashisha, son of Rav Hisda, said to Rav Ashi: But do we not require

that throughout the Torah it is not said that one must specifically follow

“the verse exactly as it is written”?

But we learned

with regard to the stubborn and rebellious son [below 71a]:

“If one of them was

his father or mother

maimed, mute, lame [

crippled]

or blind or deaf, he does not become a stubborn and rebellious son.”

“As it is stated:

‘And they shall grasp him’”—

but not maimed parents,

who cannot grasp him with their hands.

“And they shall take him out”—

but not lame parents,

who cannot take him out.

“And they shall say”—

but not mute parents.

“This son of ours,”

which implies that they can see that he is their son—

but not blind parents.

“He does not listen to our voice”—

but not deaf parents,

who cannot know whether he listens to their voice or not, since even if he says that he does not accept their words, they cannot hear this.

Mar Kashisha, son of Rav Hisda, proves from here:

“What is the reason,”

why does the Mishna exclude all these people from the law of the stubborn and rebellious son?

Is it not

the case that it is

because we require

“the verse exactly as it is written”?

This is proof for Shmuel! The Gemara rejects this:

“No,”

that is not the reason. Rather,

“that case is different, since the entire verse is superfluous.”

The verse could have said: “And they shall take him out to the gate of that city, and stone him.” Why all this elaboration? Rather, it is in order to derive all these exclusions. In general, however, a “verse exactly as it is written” is not required.

Come and hear

a proof that throughout the Torah we require “the verse exactly as it is written,” from that which was taught with regard to an apostate city:

“If it does not have

that city

a public square [

a place where the inhabitants of the city gather],

it does not become an apostate city,

because it is impossible to fulfill the verse, “And you shall gather all its spoil into the midst of its public square,”

the statement of Rabbi Yishmael.

Rabbi Akiva says:

If

“it does not have a public square, they make one for it,”

and then they make it an apostate city.

The Gemara proves:

“They disagree only up to this point”:

Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva differ only with regard to the following:

One Master—

Rabbi Yishmael—

holds: “We require the public square that existed originally,”

as the Torah refers to a public square that had been there previously, and not one made now.

And the other Master,

Rabbi Akiva,

holds: “The public square that exists now is also considered like one that existed originally.”

A public square made now is likewise considered as though it had been there previously, and through it the law of “its public square” is fulfilled.

But everyone

agrees that

we require

“the verse exactly as it is written.”

The requirement of “its public square” is indispensable for making it an apostate city.

The Gemara answers:

“It is the subject of a dispute between tannaim.”

The matter is disputed by tannaim:

As we learned

in tractate Nega’im: If

“he does not have”

—the leper—

a right thumb,

or

a right big toe,

or

a right ear

on which to place some of the blood and oil of his offerings, then

“he does not have”

—this leper—

everlasting purification.

This is because the Torah’s law must be fulfilled as written, specifically on the right thumbs and the right ear.

Rabbi Eliezer said: He places

the blood and oil

on its place

—the place of the thumb and ear—

and he is released

from his obligation through this.

Rabbi Shimon says: He places it on

them and his left ear,

and goes out.

The last two tannaim hold that when it is impossible to fulfill “the verse as it is written,” this does not invalidate the act.

Mishna:

All those who are stoned are hanged

after they have been stoned and have died,

the words of Rabbi Eliezer.

And the Sages say: Only one who blasphemes

the Name

and one who worships idolatry.

The man

is hanged with

his face toward the people.

And the woman

is hanged with

her face toward the tree

on which she is hanged,

the words of Rabbi Eliezer.

And the Sages say:

Only

the man is hanged, but the woman is not hanged

at all.

He said to them

Rabbi Eliezer:

But did Shimon ben Shetach not hang women

[witches]

in Ashkelon?

They said to him

the Sages: There is no proof from there, for

eighty women

he

hanged

on a single day,

and

yet

two people are not judged

for death

on a single day

by the same court, because the judges cannot thoroughly seek merit for each and every one of them.

And how did Shimon ben Shetach judge them?

Rather, Shimon ben Shetach did this as an emergency measure, because the daughters of Israel had become licentious with sorcery; he hanged them in order to publicize the matter. Therefore, he also judged them all on a single day, so that their relatives would not have time to prevent their execution.

Gemara:

The Sages taught:

It is stated [Deuteronomy 21:22]: “And if there will be in a man a sin deserving the judgment of death,

and he is put to death and you hang him

on a tree.”

Could it be that all those who are put to death are hanged?

The verse states

in the following verse: “You shall not leave his corpse on the tree; rather, you shall surely bury him on that day.

For a hanging person is a curse of God.”

That is, he is hanged because he blasphemed the Name, and it is disgraceful toward Heaven for passersby continually to mention that so-and-so blasphemed the Name; therefore, he must be buried.

Thus, the Torah is speaking here about the transgression of blasphemy.

And from this we learn:

Just as this blasphemer, whose

punishment is

stoning,

is hanged,

so too anyone

whose

punishment

is

stoning

is hanged,

the words of Rabbi Eliezer.

And the Sages say:

This is how we expound it:

Just as this blasphemer, who denied the fundamental principle, so too

anyone

who denied the fundamental principle

is hanged.

And you have no basis to include anyone other than one who worships idolatry; the other people liable to stoning are not included.

The Gemara explains:

With regard to what do they disagree?

The Sages expound generalizations and specifications.

Whenever the Torah first states something in general terms and then specifies it, the Sages expound it according to the hermeneutical principle of a generalization and a specification.

Rabbi Eliezer expounds augmentations and limitations.

He expounds it according to the hermeneutical principle of an augmentation and a limitation.

The difference between them is that with a generalization and a specification, only what is included in the specification is included in the generalization; that is, the specification explains the generalization, meaning that only that case, and no more, is included. Even something resembling the specification is not included on the basis of the generalization.

Whereas with an augmentation and a limitation, the limitation does not completely uproot the augmentation; rather, it narrows it somewhat, teaching that not everything is included in the generalization, but only what is stated in the limitation and anything similar to it.

Accordingly, in our case,

the Sages expound generalizations and specifications:

That is, “

and he is put to death and you hang him”—

a generalization,

that all those who are put to death are hanged. “

For a curse”—

a specification,

meaning that only the blasphemer is hanged.

And

if they had been close to one another,

if the generalization and the specification had been adjacent, we would have expounded them as an actual generalization and specification, and

we would say: Only what is included in the specification is included in the generalization; these, yes, and nothing else

meaning that only the blasphemer is hanged, and no other person who is put to death.