Sanhedrin 37b (לז:) — the Talmud in English

And they add and say to them:

And should you say:

"

What have we to do with this trouble—

to involve ourselves in this concern, even when the truth is at stake; do not say so—

For has it not already been stated: "

And he is a witness, whether he has seen or knows; if he does not testify

and he shall bear his iniquity"? It is therefore your duty to testify, and you bear iniquity if you do not testify to what you saw.

And should you say:

Nevertheless,

why should we incur liability

[to become liable and be punished]

for this man's blood,

who will die through us, and it is preferable for us to remain subject to "if he does not testify, he shall bear his iniquity"; do not say so—

For has it not already been stated: "

When the wicked perish there is song,"

and you will neither incur liability nor be punished through the death of this wicked man.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: How do they intimidate the witnesses? In capital cases, they would bring them in and intimidate them: Perhaps you will say that you reached your conclusion through conjecture, or from hearsay, one witness testifying on the basis of another witness:

The Sages taught: How is "

through conjecture" understood?

The one who intimidates them says to them,

he who is intimidating them:

Perhaps this is what you saw: He pursued another into a ruin, and you pursued him, and you found a sword in his hand

belonging to this man,

with his blood dripping

[blood dripping from the sword],

and the murdered man writhing—

if this is what you saw, you saw nothing.

It was taught: Rabbi Shimon ben Shetaḥ said:

I shall see consolation

[as though he said: I shall not see the consolation and redemption of Israel]

if I did not

that

see

with another witness

one man pursuing another into a ruin, and I pursued him, and I saw a sword in his hand, with his blood dripping, and the murdered man writhing—

And I said to him: Wicked one! Who killed this man?

Either I or you,

and it is certain that you are the one who killed him—

But what can I do, for your blood is not entrusted to my hand

to kill you on the basis of what we saw,

for the Torah said: "

By the testimony of two witnesses shall the dead man be put to death,"

which implies: specifically witnesses who saw the act itself — but

the Knower of thoughts

will exact punishment from that man who killed his fellow

[that is, from you]!

The Sages said:

:

They did not move from there until a snake came and bit

that murderer,

and he died.

And we challenge this:

But

for

such a one—

that the murderer is liable to execution by the sword for his deed—

is he a candidate for a snake?

That is: Is it the case that one who became liable to execution by the sword but cannot be executed is bitten by a snake?!

But Rav Yosef said, and it was likewise taught

in a beraita

of the school of Hezekiah:

from the school of Hezekiah:

From the day the Temple was destroyed,

although the Sanhedrin ceased to function, the four forms of execution did not cease.

And we inquire about this: Is it true that

the four forms of execution did not cease

with the cessation of the Sanhedrin?

But

surely

they ceased?!

Rather,

this is what it means:

The law of the four forms of execution did not cease.

That is, one who became liable for one of the four forms of execution is visited by a divine punishment resembling the execution to which he was liable. How so?

One who became liable to stoning,

which is carried out by pushing him from the height of two stories, so that he falls and dies:

either he falls from a roof, or an animal

throws him to the ground and

tramples him.

One who became liable to burning: either he falls into a fire, or a snake bites him,

and the snake's venom burns him.

One who became liable to execution

[by the sword]:

either he is handed over to the government,

whose practice is to execute by the sword,

or bandits

whose practice is likewise to execute by the sword—

come upon him.

One who became liable to strangulation: either he drowns in a river,

which is a death by strangulation,

or he dies of seronchi

[diphtheria], and this death too is by strangulation.

It is therefore clear that the substitute for execution by the sword at the hands of the Sanhedrin is execution by the government or by bandits, whereas a snakebite is the substitute for burning. If so, why was one who became liable to execution by the sword bitten by a snake?!

They said,

the scholars of the academy, in answer:

That man had another transgression,

[that murderer had another transgression for which he became liable to burning, and in place of that execution the snake bit him]. This is why he died through the substitute for burning rather than through the substitute for execution by the sword, because

the master said: One who became liable to two forms of execution by the court

is

judged by the more severe one,

and burning is more severe than execution by the sword.

We learned in the Mishna: Regarding capital-case witnesses, they intimidate them lest you say

through conjecture

or from hearsay, one witness testifying on the basis of another witness:

And we infer: Since we learned this warning—not to say that they reached their conclusion through conjecture—only in our Mishna, which deals with capital-case witnesses, and we did not learn this in the Mishna above, 29a, which deals with the intimidation of witnesses in monetary cases, it follows:

It is only in capital cases that we do not rely on conjecture

[witnesses cannot testify on the basis of conjecture];

but in monetary cases we do rely on conjecture,

and therefore the witnesses are not intimidated with regard to this.

In accordance with whose view

is our Mishna?

In accordance with Rabbi Aḥa?!

Is our Mishna in accordance with Rabbi Aḥa, who holds that the law of conjecture differs between testimony in capital cases and testimony in monetary cases?

For it was taught: Rabbi Aḥa says:

A rutting camel

[mating with the female]

among camels, with a dead camel found beside it—it is certain that this one killed it,

and its owner is liable to pay the owner of the dead camel for the damage, because it is an inference that this camel killed it, as this is their manner when they are aroused for mating: they strike those standing beside them.

It is thus clear that, according to Rabbi Aḥa, an inference is effective in monetary testimony.

And we answer:

But according to your reasoning—

you infer from the fact that this warning is given to capital-case witnesses but not to monetary-case witnesses that, indeed, in monetary cases they may testify even on the basis of conjecture—“lest you say ...

one witness testifying on the basis of another witness,”

which it teaches

in the Mishna only with regard to capital cases, and they are not given this warning in monetary cases, since this warning was not mentioned in the Mishna above, 29a. Would you say here too, according to our Mishna:

It is only in capital cases that we do not say,

that is, they may not testify as “one witness testifying on the basis of another witness,”

but in monetary cases we do say

such testimony, even if it is based on another witness?!

But

this is necessarily not so, for

did we not learn

above, 29a:

If

the witness testified:

He

[the borrower]

said to us

that "

I owe him,"

that is, the borrower said to us in these words, “I owe him,” but the borrower did not say this in the presence of the claimant, in which case it would be an admission by a litigant—

or the witness said: "

A certain man said to us

that he

[the borrower]

owes him,"

and this is testimony of “one witness testifying on the basis of another witness”—

It has no legal force until he says

the witness: "

He admitted to him in our presence

[that is, the claimant and I were there when he admitted]

that he owed him two hundred zuz."

If so, it is clear that even in monetary cases testimony of one witness based on another witness is invalid. Nevertheless, we do not find that the witnesses are intimidated not to testify on the basis of another witness except in capital cases, and not in monetary cases.

Apparently,

this is proven from here:

Although such testimony is invalid \-

testimony of one witness based on another witness—even

in monetary cases,

nevertheless

we say to them, “lest you say, one witness testifying on the basis of another witness,” only

in capital cases,

so as to increase the detail and elaborate in issuing the warning,

whereas in monetary cases we are not so concerned to intimidate them at such length.

Here too—

with regard to testimony based on conjecture—we cannot prove from the fact that this warning is given only in capital cases that witnesses may testify on the basis of conjecture in monetary cases, because

although such testimony is invalid in monetary cases

as it is in capital cases, nevertheless

we say

to them, “lest you say, through conjecture,” only

in capital cases;

and our Mishna follows the Sages, who invalidate testimony based on conjecture even in monetary cases.

We learned above: “How do they intimidate the witnesses? Regarding capital-case witnesses ...

Know

that capital cases are unlike monetary cases. In monetary cases, a person can give money, and it atones for him. In capital cases, his blood and the blood of his descendants hang upon him for all eternity. For so we find with regard to Cain, who killed his brother, as it is stated: ‘The bloods of your brother cry out.’ It does not say, ‘the blood of your brother,’ but ‘the bloods of your brother’: his blood and the blood of his descendants. Alternatively, ‘the bloods of your brother’ means that his blood was cast upon the trees and the stones.” Thus far the Mishna.

The Gemara explains why Cain's blood was cast upon the trees and stones:

Rav Yehuda, son of Rabbi Ḥiyya, said,

from the fact that it is written “bloods,” in the plural,

this teaches that Cain inflicted many wounds and many lacerations upon his brother Abel,

because

he did not know from where the soul departs, until he reached his neck,

and killed him. Therefore, his blood was cast in every direction.

And

further,

Rav Yehuda, son of Rabbi Ḥiyya, said

in this matter:

From the day the earth opened its mouth and received the blood of Abel, it has not opened it again.

As it is stated

[Isaiah 24:16]:

“From the wing of the earth

we have heard songs: Glory to the righteous .”

It is thus explained that the song of the earth is recited

“from the wing” of the earth,

and not from the “mouth” of the earth.

Hezekiah, his brother, raised an objection to him

[he challenged him],

saying

that it is written in the passage concerning Korah (Numbers 16:32):

“And the earth opened its mouth”?

He said to him,

indeed,

it opened for a negative purpose

and opened its mouth even afterward, but

it did not open for a positive purpose.

And

further,

Rabbi Yehuda, son of Rabbi Ḥiyya, said

in this matter:

Exile atones for half of a sin.

We learn this from the passage concerning Cain.

At first it is written, “I shall be a wanderer and a fugitive,” and ultimately it is written, “He settled in the land of Nod.”

That is, at first his punishment was to wander and flee, but ultimately, after he was exiled, his exile atoned for half, and he no longer needed to wander; he remained in the land of Nod.

That is, at first his punishment was to wander and move about, but afterward, once he had been exiled, his exile atoned for half, and he no longer needed to wander; he remained in the land of Nod.

That is, she conceived him in an unnatural manner.]