Sanhedrin 18b — the Talmud in English

One who kills

unintentionally the

High Priest, or a High Priest who killed a person

unintentionally—in these two cases -

does not leave there forever.

And the reason is that the Torah said “until the death of the priest,” with the definite article, meaning the High Priest serving at the time he entered the city of refuge; and since there is no priest [if another High Priest was not appointed by the time of his exile], he does not leave upon the death of the High Priest who was appointed afterward, during his residence in exile.

And therefore,

let me say

it is possible to say:

let him not go into exile

that he should not initially go into exile ,

it comes to teach us

the tanna of the beraita informs us that he goes into exile.

The Gemara asks:

And let us say that this is indeed so,

why does he truly go into exile, since we have a rationale that he should not go into exile?

The Gemara answers:

The verse says

in the section concerning cities of refuge: “You shall designate three cities for yourself, and it shall be

for every murderer to flee there,”

and the Sages expounded from here: every murderer,

even a High Priest is included!

For even a High Priest who killed goes into exile, although he does not leave there.

And this is the novelty of the beraita.

We further learned in the beraita:

“One who transgresses a positive commandment and a negative commandment.”

The wording of the beraita—in the present tense—implies that he is transgressing a positive commandment and a negative commandment; therefore the Gemara asks:

Does he certainly transgress!? Is it not enough

not to suffice

that he fulfills his obligation

by not transgressing

when he does not transgress a positive commandment and a negative commandment, rhetorically!

The Gemara answers:

This is what it says:

the intention of the tanna of the beraita is:

“If he transgressed” a positive and a negative commandment, “he is like an ordinary person in all his matters,”

and he is judged by three judges, like an ordinary commoner .

The Gemara asks:

It is obvious,

and what is the novelty in this law ? The Gemara answers: Since with regard to liability for a court-imposed death his law differs from that of an ordinary commoner—for an ordinary commoner who committed a transgression carrying the death penalty is judged by twenty-three, a small Sanhedrin, whereas a High Priest is judged by seventy-one, a Great Sanhedrin—therefore the tanna of the beraita informs us that with regard to lashes he does not differ from an ordinary commoner.

For

it might enter one’s mind,

it might enter one’s mind

to say,

that

since we learned

we learned in our Mishna:

“They do not judge

a capital case

neither the tribe, nor the false prophet, nor the High Priest” -

before twenty-three,

but only according to a court of seventy-one.

And

what is the reason that he is judged before seventy-one?

Rav Adda bar Ahava said:

It is written in the Torah, in the section concerning the appointment of judges, that Jethro said to Moses our master:

“Every great matter they shall bring to you” -

to Moses, whose authority is like that of seventy-one [as explained in the first chapter]; and the Sages expounded from here: “the great matter” -

the matter of the great one,

an important man, namely the High Priest, who is greater than his brothers.

And therefore,

let me say

it is possible to say,

“every” matter of the great one,

even the liability of lashes of a High Priest should be judged before seventy-one,

it comes to teach us

the tanna of the beraita informs us that this is not so, but with regard to the law of lashes he is like an ordinary person in all his matters.

The Gemara asks:

And let us say that this is indeed so,

why do we truly not expound this way, that even for lashes he should be judged before seventy-one?

And the Gemara answers:

Is it written

“Did the Torah write”

“the words of the great one”

which would have implied all the cases that are judged by him? Rather,

“the great matter” is written,

which implies

a truly great matter,

a case of a grave transgression for which there is death by the court; they bring it before Moses—whose authority was like that of seventy-one—whereas lashes, which is a small matter relative to death, is judged as an ordinary person .

We learned in our Mishna: The High Priest judges, and they judge him,

he testifies, and they testify concerning him.

And the Gemara asks: Is it so that the High Priest

testifies!?

But we learned a beraita from which it is implied that he does not testify.

It is written in the Torah (Deuteronomy 22): “You shall not see your brother’s ox or his sheep straying and withdraw yourself from them; you shall surely return them to your brother, etc. And so shall you do for every lost article of your brother; you shall not be able to withdraw yourself.” The plain meaning of the verse is: You shall not see and withdraw yourself—that is, do not avert your eyes from your brother’s lost article. However, from the fact that the Torah wrote “and withdraw yourself,” the Sages expounded that sometimes you withdraw yourself.

And

this

was taught:

We learned in a beraita:

“And withdraw yourself”—

Sometimes you withdraw yourself

from your brother’s lost article,

and sometimes you do not withdraw yourself,

for it is stated: “You shall not be able to withdraw yourself.”

How so?

If the one who found the lost article was

a priest and he [

it should be read:

and it ]

the lost article was

in the cemetery,

where he is forbidden to enter, or if he was

an elder,

an important man,

and

the lost article

was not according to his honor,

for even if it had been his own, he would not have troubled himself to return it to himself,

or if his work was [more]

that of the finder of the lost article,

greater than that of his fellow,

for example, he was a cutter of precious stones, whose interruption of work was worth more than the value of the lost article, and it turns out that he loses,

therefore it was stated, “and withdraw yourself,”

for it is permitted for him to avert his eyes and he is exempt from the mitzva of returning a lost article.

The proof is from “an elder, and it is not according to his honor,” that the honor of people overrides the prohibition of “You shall not be able to withdraw yourself.” If so, it is difficult: Why does the High Priest testify? And why should it not be said that it is a disgrace for him to appear in court to testify, and that his honor overrides the prohibition of “And if he does not tell, he shall bear his sin”?

And the Gemara answers:

Rav Yosef said:

Indeed, the High Priest does not testify for an ordinary person, because this is not his honor. And what the Mishna said,

“he testifies,”

refers to his testifying

for a king,

when the High Priest knows testimony concerning him, and this is not a disgrace.

And the Gemara asks: But the king is not judged in court; what testimony does the High Priest testify concerning him!?

But we learned: A king neither judges nor is judged; he neither testifies nor is testimony given concerning him .

And the Gemara answers: Indeed, it is not speaking of a High Priest who testifies for a king.

Rather, Rabbi Zeira said: He testifies for the king’s son.

But before Rabbi Zeira explains his words, the Gemara raises an objection against him:

The king’s son,

is he not

an ordinary person!?

And the question returns: After all, it is a disgrace for the High Priest to come and testify.

And the Gemara answers:

Rather,

it is indeed speaking of the king’s son, and although he is an ordinary person—

he testifies before the king,

for then the king comes to court for the trial. Therefore, it is not a disgrace for the High Priest to appear and testify.

And the Gemara asks: How do they seat the king during the trial?

But

the halakha is

that one does not seat a king in the Sanhedrin, [

as the reason will be explained ].

And the Gemara answers: Since the High Priest knows testimony concerning the king’s son, therefore,

because of the honor

of the High Priest,

the king comes,

he appears, and he does not judge, but

sits

and waits

until they receive his testimony

until the court receives the High Priest’s testimony; and after he has completed his testimony—

he rises

the king rises

and goes

and goes away,

and we examine his case

and the Sanhedrin examines the case without the king.

The body of the matter:

In the preceding discussion a beraita is brought:

One does not seat a king in the Sanhedrin.

And the continuation of the beraita is:

Nor

do they seat

a king and a High Priest in

the Sanhedrin session for

intercalation of the year.

And the Gemara explains: One does not seat

a king in the Sanhedrin

because

it is written, “You shall not answer regarding a quarrel,”

and it is written in the Torah in defective spelling,

“You shall not answer after the great,”

that is, an important personality, whose words you are not permitted to contradict; and if the king expresses an opinion to the detriment of the defendant, the other members of the Sanhedrin will not be able to find merit for the defendant.

Nor

do they seat

a king and a High Priest for intercalation of the year.

What is the reason?

The king—

because of the military payroll.

The wages of the soldiers whom the king distributed annual wages to; therefore it is advantageous for him that the year be intercalated, and so every year.

The High Priest—

because of the cold.

For the High Priest performs the service of the day on Yom Kippur and is required to perform five immersions and ten sanctifications of the hands and feet. And if the year is intercalated, Yom Kippur will fall in the cold of Cheshvan, and he does not wish to immerse in the cold.

Rav Pappa said: Infer from this

from the beraita, which says that they do not seat a High Priest for intercalation of the year, that

the year,

the weather of the year,

follows the month,

and is fixed each year in accordance with the months of the year; only intercalation of the year, by adding an additional month, changes the fixed weather.

That is, from what they said—that the High Priest does not sit for intercalation of the year because he does not want the year intercalated on account of the cold—Rav Pappa infers that the weather of cold and heat follows the months of an ordinary, non-intercalated year. Therefore, the High Priest does not want them to intercalate the year, so that also in the coming Tishrei he will have the usual warm weather of Tishrei, and not the cold weather of Cheshvan [if they intercalate the year and add an additional month to it, so that Tishrei will occur during the cold of Cheshvan].

And the Gemara asks:

Is that so!?

But this matter is not so.

And the Gemara proves that the weather is not fixed according to the months of the ordinary year; rather, it changes according to the relative lag between the lunar year and the solar year [eleven days of lag each year]. On the contrary, intercalation of the year is what causes the weather of the lunar months to correspond to the solar months.

The proof is from the fact that once the Sages intercalated the year in accordance with what they heard from three cattle shepherds, who were simple people, who spoke among themselves about the weather; from their conversation they understood regarding that year that the months of the year were late relative to the weather, so that according to the weather it was necessary to add another intercalary month.

And this,

for once an incident occurred with

those three cattle shepherds, who were standing,

standing and conversing among themselves,

and the Sages heard them saying,

and the Sages heard them, that this was what their conversation was.

One

one of them

said: If the early crop

if there will be warmth in the ground, and the “early” grain seeds, which were sown early,

and the late crop,

the “late” grain seeds, which were sown late, if the seeds of both

sprout together,

sprout from the ground and grow at the same time, this is a sign that

this is the proper time,

that now is the appropriate time for the month of

Adar,

which is the time when the early and late grain grow.

And if not,

if the grain seeds still do not grow,

this is not Adar,

now is not the appropriate time for the month of Adar, but it is suitable for the month of Shevat, when the grain still does not grow.

It follows that the weather of Shevat can occur in Adar.

And one

one shepherd

said: If an ox

an ox

in the morning

in the morning

dies,

it will be close to dying from the cold,

and at midday

at noon

it will lean in the shade of a fig tree,

in the shade of a fig tree,

it will lean,

the ox will need to shelter in the shade of the tree because of the great heat,

it will send out its hide,

it will strip its skin from itself [an expression of exaggeration], that is, it will rub itself against the fig tree because of the great heat; this is a sign that

this is the proper time for Adar,

that now is the appropriate time for the month of Adar, since in the month of Adar it is cold in the morning and hot at noon.

And if not,

if it is cold also at noon,

this is not Adar,

now is not the time of the month of Adar, but rather it is the time suitable for the month of Shevat.

It follows that they said that in Adar there can be the weather of Shevat.

And one

one shepherd

said: If the east wind

an east wind

is strong to an extreme,

its force will be very strong, and it brings cold,

you blow into your throat

and you blow with your mouth, and the wind of your mouth

goes out toward it

comes out toward it, and your breath is forceful and warms the east wind; this is a sign that

this is the proper time for Adar. And if not,

if your breath is not forceful against the east wind,

this is not Adar,

now is not Adar but Shevat—

Thus, in the month of Adar they said that there could be weather like that of Shevat.

and

when the Sages heard their words,

the Sages intercalated that year,

and made the first month of Adar as though it were Shevat; that is, they added a second Adar. Thus, the weather does not follow the months of the ordinary year. And this is difficult for Rav Pappa.

And the Gemara answers:

But can you understand it [otherwise]?

Do you think

that the Sages relied on cattle herders,

relying only on the words of cattle herders?!

Rather,

the matter was as follows:

the Sages relied on their calculations,

they relied on the calculations according to the calculation of the seasons, and even without the words of the herders they would have intercalated the year

, and it was only that the matter of the cattle herders was assisted,

they were fortunate, for it was as they had said.

That is, according to the calculation of the season at that time, that solar year had been delayed. And even without the words of the herders they would have intercalated the year because of the calculation of the season [see the explanation in Tosafot]. And in truth all the signs demonstrated this: the growth of the early and late crops, and the heat and the cold, showed that this month of Adar was fit to be the month of Shevat, and they intercalated the month of Adar. But in most years, which are as they should be, Rav Pappa correctly said that the weather and the growth of the grain follow the lunar months.

We learned in our Mishna: The High Priest,

performs halitza and halitza is performed

for his wife, and they perform yibbum with his wife; but he does not perform yibbum, because he is forbidden to a widow.

The Torah wrote in the section concerning the High Priest (Leviticus 21), “A widow... he shall not take.” And it is further stated there, “And he shall take a woman in her virginity.”

And these verses contain a negative commandment, that it is forbidden for him to take a widow, and a positive commandment, to take a virgin. Therefore, a High Priest who married a widow transgressed a positive and a negative commandment.

But a High Priest who took a widow while betrothed, who was widowed while she was still betrothed, does not transgress the positive commandment, for she is still a virgin.

The mitzva of yibbum is to perform yibbum with the wife of a brother who died without children, and it is a positive commandment.

The general principle is that a positive commandment overrides a negative commandment. And one upon whom a positive commandment rests, and through fulfilling the mitzva he must transgress a negative commandment, must fulfill the mitzva, for the prohibition is set aside before it.

But a positive commandment does not override both a negative commandment and a positive commandment: if, through fulfilling the mitzva, he would have to transgress both a negative commandment and a positive commandment, he is forbidden to fulfill the mitzva.

And therefore the Gemara raises an objection:

it states and teaches categorically,

the tanna in the Mishna teaches in decisive and absolute language, “A High Priest does not perform yibbum with his brother’s wife.” And it implies that under all circumstances he does not perform yibbum,

it makes no difference whether she was widowed while betrothed,

whether she is a widow from betrothal,

and it makes no difference whether she was widowed after marriage,

whether she is a widow from marriage.

And this is difficult:

Granted, with regard to a widow from marriage,

it is proper that he does not perform yibbum with her, because

the prohibition

of performing yibbum with her

is a positive and a negative commandment.