Sanhedrin 18b (יח:) — the Talmud in English

One who kills

unintentionally

the High Priest, or a High Priest who kills a person

unintentionally—in both these cases—

does not leave there ever.

The reason is that the Torah says “until the death of the priest,” with the definite article, meaning the High Priest serving at the time he entered the city of refuge. Since there is no High Priest [if another High Priest was not appointed before the exile], he does not leave upon the death of a High Priest who was appointed afterward, during his residence in exile.

Therefore,

let me say

it is possible to say:

he shall not be exiled,

he should not initially go into exile ;

it comes to teach us

the tanna of the beraita teaches us that he is exiled.

The Gemara asks:

And let us say that this is indeed so;

why does he in fact go into exile, when we have a rationale that he should not?

The Gemara answers:

The verse says

in the passage concerning cities of refuge: “You shall designate three cities for yourself, and it shall be

for every killer to flee there,”

and the Sages expounded from here: every killer,

even a High Priest is included!

Even a High Priest who killed is exiled, although he does not leave there.

This is the novelty of the beraita.

We further learned in the beraita:

“One who violates a positive and a negative commandment.”

The wording of the beraita, in the present tense, implies that he does violate a positive and a negative commandment. Therefore, the Gemara asks:

Does he certainly violate them!? Is it not the case that

it is sufficient

for him to fulfill his obligation

by not violating

when he does not violate a positive and a negative commandment—this is a rhetorical question!

The Gemara answers:

This is what he is saying:

the intention of the tanna of the beraita is:

“If he violated” a positive and a negative commandment, “he is like a commoner in all his matters,”

and he is judged by three judges, like any other commoner.

The Gemara asks:

It is obvious;

what is the novelty in this law? The Gemara answers: Since with regard to liability for a court-imposed death penalty his law differs from that of an ordinary person—for an ordinary person who committed an offense punishable by death is judged by twenty-three, a Small Sanhedrin, whereas a High Priest is judged by seventy-one, a Great Sanhedrin—the tanna of the beraita therefore teaches us that with regard to lashes he does not differ from an ordinary person.

For

it might enter one's mind

that one might have reasoned

and said

to say:

since we learned

in our Mishna:

“They do not judge

a capital case

of either a tribe, a false prophet, or a High Priest”

by twenty-three,

but only according to a court of seventy-one.

And

what is the reason that he is judged by seventy-one?

Rav Adda bar Ahava said:

The Torah writes in the passage concerning the appointment of judges, in which Jethro said to Moses our teacher:

“Every great matter they shall bring to you” —

to Moses, whose authority is equivalent to that of seventy-one [as explained in the first chapter]. The Sages expounded from here: “The great matter”

refers to the matter of a great person,

an important person, namely, the High Priest who is greater than his brothers.

Therefore,

let me say

it is possible to say:

“every” matter of a great person,

even the liability for lashes of a High Priest would be judged by seventy-one;

it comes to teach us

the tanna of the beraita teaches us that this is not so, but that with regard to lashes he is like a commoner in all his matters.

The Gemara asks:

And let us say that this is indeed so;

why should we not expound in this manner, that even for lashes he should be judged by seventy-one?

And the Gemara resolves:

Is it written

—did the Torah write

“the matter of the great man”

which would have implied all the cases in which he is judged? Rather,

“the great matter” is written,

which implies

a genuinely great matter,

a transgression carrying the death penalty imposed by a court. They bring such a case before Moses, whose authority was like that of the seventy-one judges; whereas lashes, which is a relatively minor matter compared with death, is adjudicated by an ordinary judge.

We learned in our Mishna: A High Priest judges and is judged,

gives testimony and testimony is given concerning him.

And the Gemara asks: Is it so that a High Priest

gives testimony!?

But we learned a beraita from which it follows that he does not give testimony.

The Torah states (Deuteronomy 22): “You shall not see your brother’s ox or his sheep straying and disregard them; you shall surely return them to your brother, etc. And so shall you do for every lost article of your brother; you may not disregard it.” The plain meaning of the verse is: You shall not see it and disregard it—that is, do not avert your eyes from your brother’s lost article. However, from the fact that the Torah wrote “and disregard it,” the Sages derived that sometimes one does disregard it.

And

this

was taught

—we learned in a beraita:

“And disregard it”— -

Sometimes you disregard

your brother’s lost article,

and sometimes you do not disregard it,

as it is stated: “You may not disregard it.”

How so?

If the finder of the lost article was

a priest, and it [

should be read:

and it ]

the lost article was

in a cemetery,

where he is forbidden to enter, or if he was

an elder,

an important man,

and

the lost article

was not fitting for his dignity,

as even if it had been his own, he would not have troubled himself to return it to himself,

or if his own work was more demanding

than that of the finder of the lost article,

more than that of his fellow,

for example, if he cuts precious stones, so that the value of interrupting his work exceeds the value of the lost article, and he would thereby suffer a loss,

therefore it is stated: “And disregard it,”

meaning that he is permitted to avert his eyes and is exempt from the mitzva of returning a lost article.

The proof is from the case of “an elder, and it is not fitting for his dignity”: Human dignity overrides the prohibition of “You may not disregard it.” If so, it is difficult: Why does the High Priest give testimony? Why do we not say that it is humiliating for him to appear in court to testify, and that his dignity overrides the prohibition of “And if he does not testify, he shall bear his iniquity”?

And the Gemara resolves:

Rav Yosef said:

Indeed, a High Priest does not give testimony concerning an ordinary person, because this is not fitting for his dignity. But what the Mishna said,

“gives testimony,”

refers to his giving testimony

for a king,

when the High Priest possesses testimony relevant to the king; this is not humiliating for him.

And the Gemara asks: But a king is not judged in court; what testimony could the High Priest give for him

? But we learned: A king neither judges nor is judged; he neither gives testimony nor is testimony given concerning him .

And the Gemara resolves: Indeed, this is not referring to a High Priest who gives testimony for a king.

Rather, Rabbi Zeira said: He gives testimony for the king’s son.

But before Rabbi Zeira explains his statement, the Gemara challenges him:

The king’s son

—is he not

an ordinary person!?

The difficulty therefore returns: It is humiliating for the High Priest to come and testify.

And the Gemara resolves:

Rather,

it is indeed referring to the king’s son, and although he is an ordinary person—

he gives testimony before the king,

as the king then comes to court for the proceeding. Therefore, it is not humiliating for the High Priest to appear and testify.

And the Gemara asks: How can they seat the king during the proceeding?

But

the halakha is

that a king may not be seated in the Sanhedrin, [

as the reason will be explained ].

And the Gemara resolves: Since the High Priest knows testimony concerning the king’s son, therefore

because of the honor

of the High Priest,

he comes

—the king appears, but he does not judge; rather,

he sits

and remains there until

they receive his testimony

—the court receives the High Priest’s testimony, and after he has completed his testimony—

he rises

—the king rises,

and goes

away,

and we examine his case

—the Sanhedrin examines the case without the king.

The fundamental passage:

The preceding discussion cited a beraita:

A king may not be seated in the Sanhedrin.

And the continuation of the beraita is:

Nor

may they seat

a king and a High Priest in

the session of the Sanhedrin for

intercalation of the year.

And the Gemara explains: They may not seat

a king in the Sanhedrin

because

it is written: “You shall not answer after the majority,”

and the verse is written defectively,

“You shall not answer after the great one,”

that is, an important person, whose words you are not permitted to contradict. If the king expresses an opinion in favor of condemnation, the other members of the Sanhedrin will be unable to find grounds for acquitting the accused.

Nor

may they seat

a king and a High Priest for intercalation of the year.

What is the reason?

A king—

because of the military payroll.

The wages that the king distributed annually to the soldiers in his army; therefore, it was advantageous for him that the year be intercalated, and so every year.

A High Priest—

because of the cold.

The High Priest performs the service of the day on Yom Kippur and must immerse five times and sanctify his hands and feet ten times. If the year is intercalated, Yom Kippur will fall during the cold of Marḥeshvan, and he does not wish to immerse in the cold.

Rav Pappa said: Infer from this

from the beraita, which states that a High Priest is not seated for intercalation of the year, that

the year

—the weather of the year—

follows the month,

and is fixed each year in accordance with the months of the year; only intercalating the year by adding an extra month changes the established weather.

That is, from the statement that a High Priest does not sit for intercalation of the year because he does not want the year intercalated due to the cold, Rav Pappa infers that the weather—the cold and the heat—is determined by the months of the ordinary, non-intercalated year. Therefore, the High Priest does not want them to intercalate the year, so that in the coming Tishrei as well he will have the ordinary warm weather of Tishrei, rather than the cold weather of Ḥeshvan [if they intercalate the year and add an additional month, so that Tishrei will occur during the cold of Ḥeshvan].

And the Gemara asks:

Is that so!?

But this is not the case.

And the Gemara proves that the weather is not fixed according to the months of the ordinary year; rather, it changes according to the relative discrepancy between the lunar year and the solar year [an eleven-day discrepancy each year]. On the contrary, intercalating the year is what causes the weather of the lunar months to correspond to that of the solar months.

The proof is from the fact that on one occasion the Sages intercalated the year based on what they heard from three cattle herders, simple people who were speaking among themselves about the weather. From their conversation, they understood that that year the months were lagging behind the weather. According to the weather, another intercalary month had to be added.

But,

there was once an incident involving

those three cattle herders, who were standing

and conversing among themselves,

and the Sages heard them saying

the following in their conversation.

One

of them

said: If the early crop

—if there is warmth in the soil, and the “early” grain seeds, which were sown early—

and the late crop,

the “late” grain seeds, which were sown later, if the seeds of both

sprout together

—sprout from the ground and grow at the same time—this is a sign that

it is appropriate

that now is the proper time for the month of

Adar,

which is the time when both the early and late crops grow.

But if not,

if the grain seeds have still not grown,

this is not Adar,

it is not now the proper time for the month of Adar; rather, it corresponds to Shevat, when the grain has not yet grown.

Thus, the weather of Shevat can occur in Adar.

And one

cattle herder

said: If an ox

in the

morning

—in the morning—

will die

and will be close to dying from the cold,

and at midday

—in the middle of the day—

will recline in the shade of a fig tree

in the shade of a fig tree

and lean against it,

so that the ox will need to take shelter in the shade of the tree because of the great heat,

and will send out its hide,

will strip its skin from itself [an expression of exaggeration], that is, it will rub itself against the fig tree because of the heat—this is a sign that

it is appropriate for it to be Adar,

that now is the proper time for the month of Adar, since in Adar it is cold in the morning and hot at midday.

But if not,

if it is also cold at midday,

this is not Adar,

it is not now the time of Adar; rather, it is the time corresponding to Shevat.

Thus, they said that the weather of Shevat can occur in Adar.

And one

cattle herder

said: If the east wind

—an easterly wind—

is very strong,

its force will be extremely powerful, and it brings cold,

you blow into your throat

—you blow with your mouth, and the breath from your mouth—

comes out to meet it,

comes out toward it, and your breath is strong and warms the easterly wind; this is a sign that

it is appropriate for it to be Adar. But if not,

if your breath is not strong against the easterly wind,

this is not Adar,

it is not now Adar but Shevat—

Thus, in the month of Adar they said that weather typical of Shevat could occur.

And

when the Sages heard their words,

the Sages intercalated that year,

making the first month of Adar like Shevat; that is, they added a second Adar. It follows that the weather does not follow the months of an ordinary year. This is difficult for Rav Pappa.

The Gemara answers:

But can you understand it

as meaning

that the Sages relied on the cattle herders,

relying only on the statements of cattle herders?!

Rather,

this is what happened:

the Sages relied on their calculations,

relying on calculations based on the seasonal cycle; even without the herders’ statements, they would have intercalated the year

, and it was merely that the cattle herders’ words happened to be corroborated,

as they were fortunate that matters were as they had said.

That is, according to the calculation of the seasonal cycle at that time, that solar year had been delayed. Even without the herders’ statements, they would have intercalated the year on account of the calculation of the seasonal cycle [see the explanation in Tosafot]. Indeed, all the signs demonstrated this: the growth of the early and late crops, and the heat and cold, showed that this month of Adar ought to be the month of Shevat, and they intercalated the month of Adar. But in most years, which proceed normally, Rav Pappa correctly said that the weather and the growth of the crops follow the lunar months.

We learned in our Mishna: The High Priest

performs halitza and halitza is performed

with his wife, and they perform yibbum with his wife; but he does not perform yibbum, because he is forbidden to marry a widow.

The Torah states in the passage concerning the High Priest (Leviticus 21): “A widow… he shall not take.” And it further states there: “And he shall take a woman in her virginity.”

These verses contain a negative commandment, forbidding him to marry a widow, and a positive commandment, to marry a virgin. Therefore, a High Priest who married a widow has violated both a positive and a negative commandment.

But a High Priest who took a widow from betrothal, meaning that she was widowed while still betrothed, does not violate the positive commandment, since she is still a virgin.

The mitzva of yibbum is to perform yibbum with the wife of a brother who died without children, and it is a positive commandment.

The general principle is that a positive commandment overrides a negative commandment. When a person is obligated by a positive commandment, and fulfilling that commandment requires him to violate a negative commandment, he must fulfill the commandment, because the prohibition is set aside before it.

But a positive commandment does not override both a negative commandment and a positive commandment. If fulfilling the commandment would require him to violate both a negative commandment and a positive commandment, he may not fulfill that commandment.

Therefore, the Gemara asks:

It states and teaches categorically,

the tanna of the Mishna teaches in definitive and unqualified language, “A High Priest does not perform yibbum with his brother’s wife.” This implies that he does not perform yibbum under any circumstances,

whether she was widowed while betrothed,

whether she is a widow from betrothal,

or whether she was widowed after marriage,

whether she is a widow from marriage.

This is difficult:

Granted, in the case of a widow from marriage,

it is correct that he may not perform yibbum with her, because

the

prohibition against performing yibbum with her involves

both a positive and a negative commandment.