Pesachim 91b (צא:) — the Talmud in English

Minors and slaves

may not be in a single group

because of

promiscuity—

male intercourse.

The Gemara resumes the subject:

The Gemara now discusses the substance of the beraita cited by Rav Ukva bar Ḥinnana:

We learned in a beraita:

A woman—

for

the first Passover offering,

one slaughters it on her behalf as an independent offering; and for the second, one makes her ancillary to others

because she is not obligated in it; rather, it is optional for her,

the words of Rabbi Yehuda.

Rabbi Yosei says: A woman

is obligated

in

the second Passover offering,

and one slaughters it on her behalf as an independent offering.

And since she is obligated in the second Passover offering, which comes to rectify the first Passover offering, the primary obligation,

it is not necessary to say

that she is obligated

in the first

and that one slaughters it on her behalf as an independent offering.

Rabbi Shimon says: For the first, one makes a woman

ancillary to others.

But one does not slaughter it on her behalf as an independent offering, because she is not obligated in the first Passover offering; rather, it is optional for her.

Whereas

for the second, one does not slaughter it on her behalf at all.

And even if she was registered for it, it is forbidden to feed it to her, because she has no connection to it whatsoever; this is like feeding the Passover offering to those who were not registered for it.

And we raise a question:

With regard to what do they disagree—

for what reason do they disagree?

And we answer:

Rabbi Yehuda holds

that one expounds from what is stated concerning the Passover offering: [Exodus 12]

“According to the number of persons,”

which indicates all persons,

even women.

And if you would say,

meaning, if you would ask:

If so, even for

the second Passover offering

as well,

should they slaughter the Passover offering on behalf of women as independent offerings?

Rabbi Yehuda would answer:

It is written [Numbers 9] concerning one who was obligated in the second Passover offering but did not offer it:

“

His sin shall be upon that man.”

And we expound:

“Man”—yes

;

“woman”—no.

From here it follows that a woman is exempt from the second Passover offering.

And if you would say,

meaning, if you would ask:

If so,

a woman

may not even be ancillary for the second

—should we not make her ancillary to others?

Rabbi Yehuda would answer: With regard to permitting a woman to participate in the second Passover offering,

it is effective—

the verse stated concerning the second Passover offering is effective:

“According to all the statutes of the Passover offering

[the first Passover offering], they shall offer it.” From here they learned that the second Passover offering is like the first with regard to a woman,

only as an ancillary member

but not as an independent member.

And we raise a question:

And Rabbi Yosei,

who said that for both the first Passover offering and the second Passover offering one slaughters an offering on behalf of a woman, even as an independent offering,

what is the reason?

And we answer: Because

it is written concerning the first: “According to the number of persons.”

All persons are included,

even a woman.

And it is written concerning the second Passover offering: “And that soul shall be cut off from Israel.”

“Soul”

means any soul,

even women.

Rather,

if you ask:

“His sin shall be upon that man,”

which indicates specifically a man and not a woman,

what does it exclude—

what is this verse coming to exclude?

Rabbi Yosei would answer: “That man” comes

to exclude a minor from karet.

The meaning of the verse is: a man, but not a minor. And we raise a question:

And Rabbi Shimon,

who says that for the first Passover offering a woman is made ancillary, whereas for the second one does not slaughter an offering on her behalf at all—what is his reason?

And we answer:

It is written concerning

the

first

Passover offering: “Man” [and below the Gemara asks which verse is meant], and they expounded from this:

“Man”—yes

;

“woman”—no.

And if you would say,

meaning, if you would ask:

If so

[if that is so],

she may not even be ancillary!

Rabbi Shimon would answer:

It is effective for him—

the verse “According to the number of persons,” which also includes a woman, is effective for Rabbi Shimon to teach

that she may be ancillary.

One makes her ancillary to others.

And if you would say,

meaning, if you would ask: If so,

even for the second as well,

they should make the woman ancillary to others!

Rabbi Shimon would answer: Behold,

the Merciful One excluded her in the second

—one does not make a woman ancillary to others,

as it is written: “His sin shall be upon that man,”

and they expounded from this:

“Man”—yes

;

“woman”—no.

From where—

from what basis—

does it exclude her

? The verse excluded a woman from the second Passover offering.

If it is from the obligation,

that a woman is not obligated in the second Passover offering, this cannot be. For

now, in the first,

a woman is

not

obligated—

is it necessary to say so with regard to the second

? Must one state that she is not obligated in the second? After all, the second Passover offering comes to rectify the first!

Rather, no:

it excluded her even

from being ancillary;

the verse excluded her.

And we raise a question:

And what is

“man”

that Rabbi Shimon says?

Which verse contains “man,” from which Rabbi Shimon derives the exclusion—man but not woman?

If we say

that it is the verse concerning the first Passover offering: [Exodus 12]

“And they shall take for themselves, each man, a lamb for his ancestral household,”

that cannot be said. For the “man” stated there is not superfluous, since

that expression is needed

in order to derive from it

the teaching of Rabbi Yitzḥak, who says: A man acquires

on behalf of others when he takes the Passover offering for the members of his household,

but a minor does not acquire

on behalf of others through his taking it, because a minor cannot act as an agent.

Rather,

it must necessarily be said that Rabbi Shimon expounded

from “Each man according to his eating”—

a man but not a woman.

But this too is impossible:

For

this follows from Rabbi Yosei:

since he said that one slaughters the Passover offering even on behalf of a single person, he cannot expound “You may not slaughter the Passover offering in one”—that is, for one individual. Rather, he

holds in accordance with Rabbi Shimon,

who expounds the verse with regard to one who slaughters the Passover offering at a private altar.

If so, correspondingly,

Rabbi Shimon as well,

who did not expound the verse “You may not eat the Passover offering in one” to mean that one may not slaughter it for a single person, but expounded it with regard to a private altar, must necessarily

hold in accordance with Rabbi Yosei,

who expounded “Each man according to his eating” to mean that one slaughters the Passover offering even on behalf of a single person.

For if you would say that Rabbi Shimon does not hold in accordance with Rabbi Yosei, why did he not derive from here that one may not slaughter an offering on behalf of a single person, in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda? After all, that is the more natural interpretation!

And

since this is so,

that

the verse “Each man according to his eating”

is needed

to expound that one slaughters the Passover offering on behalf of a single person! How, then, did Rabbi Shimon derive from it the exclusion of a woman?

Rabbi Shimon could say to you:

If so,

if the verse came only to teach that one slaughters the Passover offering on behalf of a single person,

let the Merciful One write “according to his eating”

in the singular, and not write “man.” That would suffice to teach that one slaughters the Passover offering on behalf of a single person.

Why, then, is

“man”

written?

You may derive two things from it.

Both matters can be learned from here.

The Gemara now discusses the statement of Rabbi Elazar, who said above (79b) that for a woman the first Passover offering is obligatory and the second is optional, and it overrides Shabbat.

And we raise a question:

In accordance with whom does this statement follow

[that is, according to whose approach was it said],

that which Rabbi Elazar said: For a woman, the first is obligatory and the second is optional, and it overrides Shabbat—

according to which of the tannaim who previously disagreed does Rabbi Elazar hold? Before the Gemara clarifies this question, it challenges the substance of Rabbi Elazar’s statement:

If

women’s participation in the second Passover offering is

optional,

why did Rabbi Elazar say that it

overrides Shabbat?

An optional matter does not override Shabbat!

Rather, say: For the second it is optional; and for the first

—

it is obligatory, and it overrides Shabbat.

That is, specifically the first Passover offering, which is obligatory for women as well, overrides Shabbat. And now, after explaining Rabbi Elazar’s statement, the Gemara returns to the question asked initially:

According to whom—

according to whose approach does Rabbi Elazar hold?

And we answer:

In accordance with Rabbi Yehuda,

who said that for the first Passover offering one slaughters an offering on behalf of a woman as an independent offering, whereas for the second one makes her ancillary. This is because for the first she is obligated, while for the second it is optional.

Rabbi Yaakov said in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan: One may not form a group consisting entirely of converts.

For

perhaps,

because they are not learned in Torah,

they will be excessively meticulous about it

—about the Passover offering, so that they will be overly exacting in examining it—

and cause it to become disqualified,

disqualifying it gratuitously.

The Sages taught: The Passover offering, matza, and bitter herb, on the first

night of Passover,

are obligatory.

From here onward, they are optional. [

The Gemara below explains what “from here onward” means.]

Rabbi Shimon says: For men they are obligatory, and for women they are optional.

And we raise a question: The statement of the beraita, “From here onward, they are optional,”

to what does it refer?

With regard to which of the three matters—Passover offering, matza, or bitter herb—did the tanna say that from here onward it is “optional”?

If you say

that it means

the

Passover

offering,

and the tanna intends to say that it is optional throughout all seven days of the Festival, this cannot be.

Can there be a

Passover offering throughout all seven days!?

Is it permitted to offer and eat the Passover offering throughout all seven days of the Festival?!

Rather,

necessarily, the tanna means

matza and bitter herb,

which are optional throughout all seven days of the Festival.

But this too is difficult. For

consider the latter clause [

as it is stated at the end of the beraita]:

Rabbi Shimon says: For men they are obligatory, and for women

optional.

That is, with regard to the first night, on which the first tanna said that eating matza and bitter herb is obligatory, Rabbi Shimon disagrees and says that it is obligatory only for men, whereas for women it is optional.

And this is difficult:

Does Rabbi Shimon not accept

—does he not hold—

that which Rabbi Elazar said: Women are obligated by Torah law to eat matza,

as it is stated [Deuteronomy 16] concerning the Passover offering:

“

You shall not eat leavened bread with it; for seven days you shall eat matzot with it”—

the verse juxtaposed the prohibition against leaven to the positive mitzva of eating matza. And they expounded from here:

Anyone who is included

in the prohibition

“Do not eat leaven” is included in

the positive mitzva of

“Arise and eat matza.”

And these women,

these women,

since they are included in “Do not eat leaven”

[for with regard to the prohibitions in the Torah, a woman is obligated like a man, as it is stated [Numbers 5]: “Whether man or woman, when they commit any sin of man”]—

they are included

as well

in “Arise and eat matza”!

Rather, say

that the beraita should be stated as follows:

The Passover offering, matza, and bitter herb on the first night are obligatory; from here onward

matza and bitter herb are

optional.

Rabbi Shimon says: The Passover offering

alone,

for men is obligatory, and for women optional,

in accordance with his position cited in the earlier beraita: “Rabbi Shimon says: For the first Passover offering, one makes a woman ancillary to others.”

But with regard to matza, women are obligated.

Mishna:

1.

An onen

on the day when one of his seven close relatives dies [his father, mother, son, daughter, brother, unmarried sister, or wife]:

immerses and eats his Passover offering in the evening,

even if the deceased has not yet been buried, because aninut by Torah law applies only on the day of death itself.

But he may not

eat

sacred offerings,

because on the night following the day of death, aninut applies by rabbinic decree. The Sages applied their decree only to eating other sacred offerings, for eating them involves only a positive mitzva [as it is stated: “And they shall eat those things with which atonement was made for them” (Exodus 29)]. With regard to the Passover offering, however, failure to eat it entails karet, and the Sages did not apply their decree.

By Torah law, he may eat in the evening without immersing, but the Sages decreed that an onen must immerse before eating sacred offerings, since previously he had been prohibited from eating sacred offerings. [In our case, although he is also prohibited from eating sacred offerings at night, he nevertheless immerses because of the eating of the Passover offering, since during the day he had been prohibited by Torah law from eating all sacred offerings. Now he is permitted.]

2.

One who hears about the death of his relative

who died some time earlier is an onen by rabbinic decree and is prohibited from eating sacred offerings that entire day.