Pesachim 90a — the Talmud in English

Abaye said to resolve:

It is necessarily impossible to say, as the questioner [Ulla or Rabbi Oshaya] assumed simply, that both the money was entirely consecrated and the lamb was entirely consecrated.

Rather, it is necessary to say that one of them was not “entirely consecrated.”

And two ways can be said regarding this:

A. The owner of the money, who set aside his money for the Paschal sacrifice, retained something of its sanctity. He said: “Behold, they are consecrated on this condition: that when I give them to the owner of the lamb in order to be counted with him, their sanctity will thereby lapse, and from then onward they will be unconsecrated property in his possession. I can give him the money as an outright gift, and he will count me with his sacrifice as a gift.”

B. The owner of the money consecrated it entirely, but the owner of the lamb did not consecrate it entirely, as follows.

And we found a source for this matter—that the lamb or the money is not entirely consecrated—in a beraita [Temura 30a], in which Rabbi and the Sages disagreed concerning the law of a person who set aside a lamb for his Paschal sacrifice, became in need of money, and wishes to count others with him for his sacrifice and receive from them the money that they set aside for purchasing a Paschal sacrifice, and to use that money.

According to the Sages, he may use this money only for the needs of eating the Paschal sacrifice [such as purchasing wood with it for roasting it].

Whereas Rabbi holds that he may make entirely unconsecrated use of it, and may purchase a garment or a cloak for himself with this money, even though the money he received is consecrated money and apparently cannot be transferred onto the consecrated sacrifice.

It is necessarily necessary to say that Rabbi holds that the money is not entirely consecrated.

And the reason that, according to Rabbi, it is not consecrated can be stated in two ways:

A. When the purchaser initially set aside the money, he retained something in his consecration, and set it aside in order to give it to the owner of the sacrifice so as to be counted for the Paschal sacrifice, on condition that the money would be unconsecrated property in the hands of the seller.

B. The owner of the lamb did not intend to consecrate it entirely, but retained something of its sanctity, so that part of the lamb would be unconsecrated property, in order that he could count others with him for his Paschal sacrifice.

And consequently, when he receives consecrated money from other people in exchange for participation in the lamb, the sanctity in the money is grasped by the unconsecrated portion remaining in the lamb. That is, the money itself is transferred onto it and becomes unconsecrated.

And from where do we know which of the two ways is correct: whether Rabbi’s reason is that something was retained in the sanctity of the money, or that something was retained in the sanctity of the Paschal sacrifice?

This matter is learned from the beraita in Temura 30b, concerning the payment of a prostitute, as will be explained before us:

“The payment of a prostitute”: this is one who says to a prostitute, “Here is this lamb for your payment,” for it is forbidden to offer this lamb, which is the payment of a prostitute, upon the altar. [Temura 29a] And all this applies specifically if he paid the prostitute with an animal belonging to him. But if he paid her with an animal that did not belong to him, the animal is not prohibited, for “a person cannot render prohibited something that does not belong to him.”

And in the beraita in Temura 30a they asked: From where is it derived that one who gives a sacrificial animal to a prostitute does not render the animal prohibited? And the beraita answered that there is a verse from which we learn that when one gives consecrated property to a prostitute, the prohibition of the payment of a prostitute does not take effect upon it, as follows.

And the Gemara there asked: Why did the beraita need to bring a verse from which to learn that the prohibition of the payment of a prostitute does not take effect upon consecrated property? After all, consecrated property belongs to the One on High and does not belong to him, and a person cannot render prohibited something that does not belong to him!

And Rabbi Oshaya said to resolve: The beraita is speaking of a Paschal sacrifice with which he counted the prostitute as her payment. And this Paschal sacrifice was unconsecrated in part, in accordance with Rabbi, who holds that one may purchase a garment or a cloak with the money received for that unconsecrated portion.

And since the lamb that he set aside for his Paschal sacrifice has something retained in its sanctity, for part of it is unconsecrated property, there was room to say that it should be prohibited because of the payment of a prostitute. Therefore, the beraita needed to bring a verse to permit it.

And it is to be learned from this beraita, according to Rabbi Oshaya’s explanation, that the lamb that one sets aside for his Paschal sacrifice is unconsecrated property in part.

And from here the uncertainty that we raised above concerning Rabbi’s words can be resolved: whether his reason is that something was retained in the sanctity of the money, or because something was retained in the sanctity of the lamb.

For it is proven from Rabbi Oshaya’s words that he explains Rabbi’s position as being that his reason is because something was retained in the sanctity of the lamb.

And now Abaye comes to resolve the words of the beraita, which says that one who counts others with him for his Paschal sacrifice has unconsecrated money in his possession, in accordance with Rabbi’s words, who holds that a person may purchase even a garment or a cloak with the money he received from those counted with him for his Paschal sacrifice.

And this is what Abaye said:

If Rabbi Oshaya had not established that one

if Rabbi Oshaya had not established the beraita concerning the payment of a prostitute as referring to consecrated property

as referring to counting a prostitute with him for his Paschal sacrifice,

for, by logical reasoning alone, it would have been appropriate to say that the Paschal sacrifice is prohibited because of the payment of a prostitute, since part of the Paschal lamb is unconsecrated property,

and it is Rabbi’s

position, and therefore the beraita needed to teach from a verse that the Paschal sacrifice is permitted.

I, Abaye, for my part, would not have established the beraita in accordance with Rabbi’s words.

Rather,

I would have established

I would have established this beraita

with

all

lesser sanctities,

and not specifically with the Paschal sacrifice [such as when he gave a peace-offering to the prostitute as her payment],

and

only

in accordance with Rabbi Yosei the Galilean.

For

Rabbi Yosei the Galilean

said: Lesser sanctities—

the property of the owners

they are.

And since they are the property of the owners, it would have been possible to say on the basis of logical reasoning alone that lesser sanctities given to a prostitute become prohibited because of the payment of a prostitute. Therefore, the beraita needed to teach from the verse that they do not become prohibited.

But

what Rabbi Oshaya said—that according to Rabbi something is retained in the sanctity of the Paschal lamb—this did not appear to me [Abaye] to say on my own.

For I would have said:

With

the consecration with which a person consecrated the

Paschal sacrifice

itself, with the sanctity of the body, to offer it upon the altar—

a person does not retain

anything in its sanctity; rather, he intends to consecrate all of it entirely.

And only

with the money

that a person designates for a Paschal sacrifice, in this Rabbi holds

that a person certainly retains something

in the sanctity of the money, since

from the outset [

from the beginning]

when he sets it aside

when he sets it aside,

he sets it aside with this intention

he sets it aside with the intention that when he gives it to the owner of the sacrifice, the money will be unconsecrated property in the hands of the owner of the sacrifice who counts him with him, and he will be able to do with it whatever he wishes.

That is, the owner of the lamb does not transfer to the owner of the money his share in the sacrifice in exchange for his money; rather, he counts him with him as a gift, and the money given by the one counted with him will also be given as a gift. And it will be unconsecrated property because of what the owner of the money retained when he consecrated it, so that its sanctity would be in such a form.

But

however—

the beraita concerning one who counts others with him for his Paschal sacrifice, which says that the money in his possession is unconsecrated, and Ulla said, or, alternatively, Rabbi Oshaya, “Is it possible that my Babylonian colleagues know the reason for this matter?”—I certainly say that this beraita is in accordance with

Rabbi.

And for this reason [

and for this reason]

the money in his possession is unconsecrated.

For I have already said that, in my view, Rabbi holds that

with money a person certainly retains something

in its consecration.

And even though the beraita also said that, when one counts others with him for his festival-offering, the money is unconsecrated, Rabbi spoke also of the festival-offering that comes with the Paschal sacrifice, as follows.

And

if that beraita

itself, concerning the payment of a prostitute for consecrated property [where it is explained that, by logical reasoning, the payment of a prostitute does apply to consecrated property, but the verse explicitly excluded it],

which he establishes [

which he establishes it]

Rabbi Oshaya in accordance with Rabbi,

and concerning a Paschal sacrifice,

I would not establish it myself in accordance with Rabbi.

I myself would not have established that beraita according to Rabbi’s position concerning a Paschal sacrifice.

For there is room to say

that with a Paschal sacrifice a person does not retain something

even according to Rabbi.

And if so, the lamb of the Paschal sacrifice does not belong to him, and it does not become the payment of a prostitute, since a person cannot render prohibited something that does not belong to him.

And now Abaye returns to explain his words: the beraita that says that one who counts others with him for his Paschal sacrifice has unconsecrated money in his possession must certainly be established according to Rabbi, and it cannot be established according to Rabbi Yosei the Galilean, who holds that lesser sanctities are the property of the owners:

But,

the beraita concerning one who counts others with him for his Paschal sacrifice—

there is no way to establish it according to Rabbi Yosei

the Galilean.

For it was taught concerning it—

for it was taught afterward, in the conclusion:

And one who sells his burnt-offering and his peace-offerings—

has accomplished nothing.

Whereas according to Rabbi Yosei the Galilean, peace-offerings, which are lesser sanctities, are the property of the owners, and he can sell them .

And now, that Rabbi Oshaya [ and now, that he established] established the earlier beraita concerning the payment of a prostitute for consecrated property as referring to counting a prostitute with him for his Paschal sacrifice, and it is Rabbi’s position, according to which he counts her with him for a Paschal lamb in which something has been retained in its sanctity and in which there is an unconsecrated aspect [and therefore, without the exclusion from the verse, it would have been appropriate to say that the designation “payment of a prostitute” takes effect upon it], learn from it from Rabbi Oshaya’s words, that he holds that even in the sanctity of his Paschal sacrifice a person retains something, and not only with money, which does not have the sanctity of the body. If so, all the more so it should be said that he also retains something with money. And if so, according to Rabbi Oshaya’s words, all the more so it is possible to establish the beraita concerning one who counts others with him for his Paschal sacrifice, that the money in his possession is unconsecrated, as referring to Rabbi. For according to his words, neither the lamb nor the money is entirely consecrated. And if so, it is obvious that the money in his possession is unconsecrated. And now the Gemara explains: What is Rabbi Oshaya’s matter? With reference to which Mishna did Rabbi Oshaya speak? For we learned concerning the payment of a prostitute [Temura 30a]: If he gave her to the prostitute consecrated property [ animals consecrated for a sacrifice] as her payment— behold, these are permitted. For the prohibition of the payment of a prostitute did not take effect upon them. If he gave her birds such as turtledoves and young pigeons of unconsecrated property as her payment— behold, these are prohibited. And if you say: What novelty is there in this, that if he gave her birds of unconsecrated property they are prohibited because of the payment of a prostitute? Is it not obvious that they are prohibited? And for what reason would it enter your mind to permit them? Your answer is: It could have been derived to permit birds of unconsecrated property by means of a kal va-chomer: And if consecrated animals, with which the Torah was stringent, in that a blemish disqualifies them, whether a blemish arose in them before they were consecrated or after they were consecrated, and nevertheless there is no prohibition of the payment of a prostitute and the price of a dog [one who exchanges an unconsecrated animal for a dog may not offer the animal, and it is called “the price of a dog”]. Birds of unconsecrated property, with which the Torah was lenient, in that a blemish does not disqualify them [the laws of “it shall die” and “male” were not stated concerning birds]— is it not a logical conclusion that the prohibition of the payment of a prostitute and the price of a dog does not take effect upon them! The verse says: [Deuteronomy 23:19] “You shall not bring the payment of a prostitute or the price of a dog into the House of the Lord your God for any vow”—“any” includes the birds. And therefore it was necessary to inform us that the prohibition of the payment of a prostitute takes effect upon birds of unconsecrated property. These are the words of the Mishna. And the continuation of the Mishna’s words is in the beraita: the tannai in the beraita raises an objection: Now that we have learned from the verse that the prohibition of the payment of a prostitute takes effect upon birds of unconsecrated property, let us say the reverse: a kal va-chomer for consecrated property, now! That the prohibition of the payment of a prostitute should also take effect upon consecrated animals: For just as birds of unconsecrated property, with which the Torah was lenient, in that a blemish does not disqualify them, the Torah was stringent with them, to sell lesser sanctities so that another would “achieve atonement” through it, and not in accordance with Ketzot HaChoshen. [And see Or Sameach, chapter 2 of the Laws of Theft; HaEmek She’ela, Emor, She’elta 111; and Kehillot Yaakov, Bava Kamma, section 12, that all hold that the Rambam ruled not in accordance with Rabbi Yosei the Galilean.] In brief: Abaye himself wishes to explain the beraita concerning one who counts others with him for his Paschal sacrifice as referring to Rabbi, for when they set aside the money, they set it aside with this intention, so that the one counted with him would be able to use it for all his needs. And Abaye continues and says: And now, that Rabbi Oshaya [ and now, that he established] established the earlier beraita concerning the payment of a prostitute for consecrated property

as referring to counting a prostitute with him for his Paschal sacrifice, and it is Rabbi’s

position, according to which he counts her with him for a Paschal lamb in which something has been retained in its sanctity and in which there is an unconsecrated aspect [and therefore, without the exclusion from the verse, it would have been appropriate to say that the designation “payment of a prostitute” takes effect upon it].

Learn from it

from Rabbi Oshaya’s words,

that he holds

that

even in

the sanctity of

his Paschal sacrifice a person retains something,

and not only with money, which does not have the sanctity of the body.

If so, all the more so it should be said that he also retains something with money.

And if so, according to Rabbi Oshaya’s words, all the more so it is possible to establish the beraita concerning one who counts others with him for his Paschal sacrifice, that the money in his possession is unconsecrated, as referring to Rabbi.

For according to his words, neither the lamb nor the money is entirely consecrated. And if so, it is obvious that the money in his possession is unconsecrated.

And now the Gemara explains:

What is Rabbi Oshaya’s matter?

With reference to which Mishna did Rabbi Oshaya speak?

If so, all the more so one should say that a person retains a portion within the sanctity of money.

For we learned

concerning the payment of a prostitute [Temura 30a]:

If he gave her

to the prostitute

consecrated property [

animals consecrated for a sacrifice]

as her payment—

behold, these are permitted.

For the prohibition of the payment of a prostitute did not take effect upon them.

If he gave her

birds

such as turtledoves and young pigeons

of unconsecrated property

as her payment—

behold, these are prohibited.

And if you say: What novelty is there in this, that if he gave her birds of unconsecrated property they are prohibited because of the payment of a prostitute? Is it not obvious that they are prohibited! And for what reason would it enter your mind to permit them?

Your answer is:

It could have been derived

to permit birds of unconsecrated property by means of a kal va-chomer:

And if

consecrated

animals,

with which the Torah was stringent, in that

a blemish disqualifies them,

whether a blemish arose in them before they were consecrated or after they were consecrated,

and nevertheless

there is no

prohibition of

the payment

of a prostitute

and

the price

of a dog [one who exchanges an unconsecrated animal for a dog may not offer the animal, and it is called “the price of a dog”].

Birds

of unconsecrated property, with which the Torah was lenient,

in that a blemish does not disqualify them [the laws of “it shall die” and “male” were not stated concerning birds]—

is it not a logical conclusion that

the prohibition of

the payment

of a prostitute

and

the price

of a dog

does not take effect upon them!

The verse says: [Deuteronomy 23:19] “You shall not bring the payment of a prostitute or the price of a dog into the House of the Lord your God

for any vow”—“any”

includes the birds.

And therefore it was necessary to inform us that the prohibition of the payment of a prostitute takes effect upon birds of unconsecrated property.

These are the words of the Mishna.

And the continuation of the Mishna’s words is in the beraita:

The tannai in the beraita raises an objection: Now that we have learned from the verse that the prohibition of the payment of a prostitute takes effect upon birds of unconsecrated property, let us say the reverse:

A kal va-chomer for consecrated property, now!

That the prohibition of the payment of a prostitute should also take effect upon consecrated animals:

For

just as birds

of unconsecrated property, with which the Torah was lenient,

in that a blemish does not disqualify them,

the Torah was stringent with them, so that

the payment and the price take effect upon them.

Consecrated property,

with which the Torah was stringent,

in that a blemish disqualifies them—

is it not a logical conclusion that the payment and the price take effect upon them?!

the Torah was stringent with them, in that

payment to a prostitute and the price of a dog take effect upon them.

Consecrated animals,

with regard to which the Torah was stringent,

in that a blemish disqualifies them—

is it not an a-fortiori inference that payment to a prostitute and the price of a dog should take effect upon them?!

And the baraita resolves this:

The verse states:

there:

“For every vow”—

excluding

an item subject to a vow. Thus, this is the meaning of the verse: It is prohibited to bring the fee of a prostitute and to make a vow concerning it that it should be offered as a sacrifice. From this, consecrated animals are excluded, since a vow had already been made concerning them that they should be a sacrifice; therefore, the prohibition of the fee of a prostitute does not take effect upon them.

And this is the interpretation of the verse: It is prohibited to bring the hire of a prostitute and vow concerning it that it is to be for a sacrifice. From this, consecrated property is excluded, since one has already vowed concerning it that it be a sacrifice; the prohibition of the hire of a prostitute does not take effect upon it.

And we analyze the baraita:

It follows from the words of the baraita that we would not have known that the prohibition of the fee of a prostitute does not take effect upon consecrated animals

unless

only because

the Merciful One wrote, “for every vow.”

And it follows that

if not for this

[if not for this verse],

we would have said

that

with regard to consecrated animals—

the prohibition of the fee of a prostitute does take effect upon them!

And we raise a difficulty about this:

But can a person prohibit something that does not belong to him?!

Consecrated animals belong to the Most High; how, then, can a person impose upon them the prohibition of the fee of a prostitute?

Concerning this,

Rabbi Oshaya said

to resolve the difficulty: The baraita is speaking

of one who designates a prostitute as a participant in his Paschal offering,

since a Paschal offering is the property of its owners,

and it follows the opinion of Rabbi.

And the Gemara explains:

What is the opinion of Rabbi?

Where do we find that Rabbi holds that the Paschal offering is the property of its owners?

As it was taught in a baraita:

It is stated [Exodus 12] concerning the Paschal offering:

“If the household is too small for a lamb

then he and his neighbor who is near his house shall take one, according to the number of persons.”

And the verse is expounded as follows:

“If the household is too small”—the owner of the Paschal offering has only a small amount of money.

“For a lamb”—he has nothing with which to purchase what is needed to eat the lamb of the Paschal offering [for example, he has no wood with which to roast it, as will be explained below].

Then, “he and his neighbor who is near his house shall take”—he should take money from his neighbor, enroll him as a participant in his Paschal offering, and use some of this money to purchase whatever he needs in order to eat the Paschal offering.

The Sages say: “For a lamb”—

keep it alive

with the lamb,

only if the household is too small

for the cost of the food

of the lamb.

For example, he has no wood with which to roast it.

He may sell his share only for the purpose of obtaining what is needed to eat the lamb, by enrolling additional people as participants in his offering.

But not

if the household is too small

for the cost of a purchase!

If he has no money for trade, he may not sell his Paschal offering for that purpose.

Rabbi says: Even

if the household is too small

for the cost of a purchase.

If he has no

money for buying and selling,

he enrolls another person with him in his Paschal offering and in his festival offering, and the money in his possession remains non-sacred.

Since

the Jewish people consecrated their Paschal offerings with this condition,

that the lamb would not be entirely consecrated, but that they would leave a non-sacred portion in it so that others could be enrolled in it, and the money would become consecrated in place of the non-sacred share of the offering. It is permitted to do this even in order to use the money he receives for buying and selling.

And this is according to the view of Rabbi Oshaya, whereas according to Abaye, the Gemara explains the matter below.

Rabba and

Rabbi Zeira

disagreed about the explanation of the dispute between Rabbi and the Sages:

One said: With regard to wood for roasting it,

everyone agrees

that it is permitted to sell the person’s share in the offering to others, and it is permitted to purchase with the money received from those enrolled in the Paschal offering wood for roasting it,

because since it is an improvement necessary for the Paschal offering,

it is considered like the body of the Paschal offering.

When they disagree

[about what Rabbi and the Sages disagree], it is

with regard to matza and bitter herbs,

which he wishes to purchase with this money:

The Sages hold: This

matza and bitter herbs

constitute a separate act of eating,

and are not part of the actual eating of the Paschal offering.

But Rabbi holds: Since they are what makes the Paschal offering fit,

since the matza and bitter herbs enable the eating of the Paschal offering, as it is stated concerning it, “with matzot and bitter herbs shall they eat it,” they too

are considered like the body of the Paschal offering.

And the other one said: With regard to matza and bitter herbs as well, everyone agrees

[they do not disagree], as it is written [Exodus 12] concerning the Paschal offering:

“With matzot and bitter herbs shall they eat it.” Since

matza and bitter herbs

are what make the Paschal offering fit,

[they]—

are considered like the Paschal offering.

When they disagree

this is the matter about which Rabbi and the Sages disagree:

to purchase with it

with the proceeds of the Paschal offering

a garment.

The Sages hold: The Merciful One said, “for a lamb,”

and they expounded:

keep the lamb alive

by using the money for what is needed to eat it.

But Rabbi holds: “For a lamb”—that means

«

the sale of

the

lamb.

For the Torah does not say, “for the life of a lamb,” but rather, “for a lamb.” Rabbeinu Chananel.

And we raise an objection from the wording of the baraita to Abaye’s statement:

But according to Abaye, who said: If Rabbi Oshaya had not established

[if he had not established]

that

the baraita

in question

concerning the fee of a prostitute and consecrated animals

speaks of one who enrolls a prostitute in his Paschal offering, and it follows Rabbi,

who holds that the Paschal offering itself is not entirely consecrated, -

we would have established it—

I, Abaye, would have established the baraita

as referring to offerings of lesser sanctity, and according to the opinion of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, who says that offerings of lesser sanctity are the property of their owners.

But with regard to the Paschal offering—

a person leaves nothing

of its sanctity. He consecrates all of it to the Most High.

And according to his words, there is a difficulty:

But it explicitly teaches

in the baraita: “Rabbi says: Even if the household is too small for the cost of a purchase, if he has no money, he enrolls another person with him in his Paschal offering and in his festival offering, and the money in his possession remains non-sacred,

because the Jewish people consecrated their Paschal offerings with this condition.”

It follows that they consecrated their Paschal offerings on the condition that they would not be entirely consecrated, but would leave part of their sanctity unassigned. This contradicts Abaye’s statement that with regard to the Paschal offering, a person leaves nothing unassigned!

And we answer:

Say instead: The Jewish people consecrated the money for their Paschal offerings with this condition.

That is, when the person enrolled in the Paschal offering set aside his money, he left it partially unconsecrated, on the condition that if he wished to give it as a gift, he would be able to give it as a gift while it retained the status of non-sacred money.

Mishna:

To understand what is stated in our Mishna—the early rabbinic code at the basis of the Gemara—several matters must first be introduced:

A. The laws concerning a man with a flux:

If a man experiences one discharge of flux on one day, then after sunset [when the stars emerge] he may immerse and eat consecrated food.

If he experiences two consecutive discharges on that day, or on two consecutive days, he must count seven clean days without a flux. He immerses on the seventh day and may eat consecrated food that evening.

If he experiences three consecutive discharges, he counts seven clean days from the flux and immerses on the seventh day. He is still prohibited from eating consecrated food. On the following day, the eighth day, he brings the offerings that the Torah requires a man with a flux to bring, and he may eat consecrated food that evening.

[The Sages required him to immerse a second time on the eighth day, after bringing his offerings, and only afterward may he eat consecrated food that evening.]

B. The laws concerning a woman who sees blood:

The first seven days during which a woman sees blood are called “days of menstruation.” They are followed by eleven days called “days of flux”; if she sees blood during them, she has the status of a woman with a flux. Once these eleven days have ended, her days of menstruation return, and any blood she sees during them gives her the status of a menstruant.

The law of the days of menstruation is as follows:

Whether she sees blood for one day or for seven consecutive days, she is always impure for seven days. Even if she sees blood throughout all seven of those days, once the seventh day arrives and she stops seeing blood, she waits until after sunset, may immerse that night, and immediately becomes permitted to her husband. However, she remains prohibited from eating consecrated food until the eighth day has ended, on the following day.

The law of the days of flux is as follows:

If during those eleven days she sees blood for one day [even if she sees several discharges on that day], she is called “one who observes a day corresponding to a day.” She must “observe” the day following her sighting in purity, checking that she has no blood on that day. She immerses on that day, and after sunset she may eat consecrated food.

The same law applies if she sees blood on two days: she observes the third day in purity and immerses on that day. She may eat consecrated food that evening.

But if she sees blood for three consecutive days, she counts seven clean days during which she sees no blood, and immerses only on the seventh day. On the eighth day she must bring an offering for her atonement, and she may eat consecrated food after the eighth day has ended.

C. One who touches a corpse is impure for seven days. The ashes of the red heifer mixed with water are sprinkled upon him on the third and seventh days, he immerses on the seventh day, and he may eat consecrated food that evening.

D. One who touches an impure creeping creature is impure for one day. He immerses that day and may eat consecrated food that evening.

E. “One who immersed that day” is a designation for anyone who was impure and immersed. Although he is no longer called “impure” [and his touch and carrying do not transmit impurity], he nevertheless retains a lesser degree of impurity and may not eat consecrated food until the evening following his immersion.

F. “One lacking atonement” is a designation for a person whose time to become pure has arrived and who has immersed, but who still needs to bring offerings for his atonement. Only after he brings the offerings and sunset has passed [after he brings his offerings] may he eat consecrated food.

The principle that the Mishna comes to teach is:

The Paschal offering is slaughtered on the fourteenth of Nisan on behalf of an impure person, so that he will be able to eat consecrated food on the night of the fifteenth, even though at present he is still unfit to eat consecrated food.

Therefore:

A.

A man with a flux who experienced two discharges,

who is impure for only seven days and is not required to bring an offering—

the Paschal offering is slaughtered on his behalf

on the fourteenth of Nisan, when that date falls

on the seventh day

of his impurity. Although at present he is still unfit to eat consecrated food because he is still within his seven days of impurity, nevertheless he will be fit to eat consecrated food that evening [the Gemara explains whether this refers even to before he immerses or only after he immerses].

But if he

experiences three

discharges, the offering is not slaughtered on his behalf on the seventh day, since he must bring an offering for his atonement on the eighth day and will not be fit to eat that evening.

Therefore,

the offering is slaughtered on his behalf

only

on

his

eighth day,

when it falls on the fourteenth of Nisan.

B.

A woman who observes a day corresponding to a day,

a woman who saw blood during one of the eleven days called “days of flux,” and who must observe the following day in purity and immerse in the evening—

the offering is slaughtered on her behalf on her second day,

the day following the day on which she saw blood, since she is permitted to eat that night.

But if she

sees

blood for

two days,

and must observe the third day in purity,

the offering is slaughtered on her behalf on the third day,

since she is permitted to eat that night.

C.

And a woman with a flux

who saw blood for three consecutive days during the days of flux and must count seven clean days and bring an offering on the eighth day—the offering is slaughtered on her behalf

on the eighth day,

and she brings her atonement offering before nightfall and eats the Paschal offering that night.

Gemara:

Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: The Paschal offering is slaughtered

on behalf of

and its blood is sprinkled

on behalf of

one who

has the status of

one who immersed that day,

after he has immersed and become pure from his impurity, but before sunset has passed.

And

likewise, on behalf of

one lacking atonement,

before he has brought his offering on the eighth day, since he can offer his offerings and become pure that evening.