Pesachim 45a (מה.) — the Talmud in English

Because nazir and hattat are two verses that come as one.

For the law that permitted food combines with prohibited food is stated with regard to a hattat as well. And whenever there are two verses that come as one,

they do not teach.

And the Gemara explains:

Nazir

we derive from “mishrat” that permitted food combines with prohibited food, as

in the matter we said

above.

What is the case of hattat—what is the exposition derived from it?

As

it was taught:

It is written with regard to a hattat:

“Everything that touches its flesh

[of the hattat]

shall become holy,”

and so on!

If ordinary meat or the meat of a shelamim offering absorbed some of the meat of the hattat, it becomes holy like it. All the laws governing the eating of the hattat apply to it as well.

One might have thought even

if the piece of meat touched the hattat and

did not absorb

any of it, it too should become holy like it, since it is written, “that touches”?

The verse states: “its flesh”—

only once it absorbs

from it

into the flesh

of the item touching it. Only then

“shall become holy”

to become like it.

For if

the hattat

is invalid

and prohibited for eating, the piece that absorbs from it will also

become invalid,

and it must be taken to the place of burning.

But if

the hattat

is valid, it shall be eaten

the piece that absorbed it

according to

the law of

the more stringent one.

For if it is the meat of a shelamim offering, it now possesses two sanctities: the sanctity of a shelamim offering and the sanctity of a hattat. Therefore, the stringencies of a hattat are applied to it: it may be eaten only for one day and the following night, by male members of the priesthood, and within the curtains [within the boundaries of the Temple courtyard].

Even though the portion of the meat of the hattat absorbed into the meat of the shelamim is not enough to constitute the measure of an olive-bulk, it combines with it, and the meat of the shelamim completes the measure of an olive-bulk, thereby giving the act the status of eating.

Learn from this that in the case of a hattat, “permitted food combines with prohibited food.”

Since the Torah revealed with regard to a hattat and a nazir that permitted food combines with prohibited food, learn from this that this law applies specifically in these two cases and not throughout the Torah.

For since we could have derived the law for the entire Torah by means of an av binyan from nazir, why did the Torah repeat this innovation with regard to a hattat as well? Rather, this teaches you that the law of permitted food combining with prohibited food applies only in these two cases and not elsewhere.

And we challenge this:

But according to the Rabbis,

who derive from “mishrat” of a nazir the law that taste is equivalent to substance,

also—

let nazir and hattat be two verses that come as one

to teach the law that taste is equivalent to substance. For “mishrat,” written with regard to a nazir, comes to establish that taste is equivalent to substance. And from the hattat as well we learn that anything touching it and absorbing its taste becomes prohibited like it. And this too is the principle that “taste is equivalent to substance.”

And

since they are two verses,

they do not

teach

teach

the entire Torah that taste is equivalent to substance.

And we answer:

They say

the Sages in the house of study, in response:

Those

two verses

are both necessary,

and therefore they do teach.

The principle that two verses that come as one do not teach applies only when the second verse is superfluous.

For the foundation of the principle that two verses that come as one do not teach is that when the Torah repeats a matter that we could have derived by means of an av binyan from the first verse, this demonstrates that the matter cannot be derived for the entire Torah from that verse. Therefore, the Torah wrote the second verse to teach that this law applies only in those two verses.

But if there is some necessity for the second verse, we no longer have proof that the matter cannot be derived from here by means of an av binyan for the entire Torah. Shortly, it will be explained why both verses are necessary.

And the Gemara explains the position of Rabbi Akiva:

But Rabbi Akiva

would say to you:

Why

—why

are both necessary,

the two verses?

Granted, if the Merciful One had written with regard to a hattat

alone that permitted food combines with prohibited food,

he could not

have

derive

to learn

from it that a nazir

also has permitted food combine with prohibited food, because

we do not derive ordinary food from sacrificial food,

since sacrificial food is more stringent than ordinary food.

But

rather,

let the Merciful One write it with regard to a nazir

alone, that permitted food combines with prohibited food.

And let

it come,

and let the hattat derive

and learn

from it

that permitted food combines with prohibited food.

For all prohibitions of the Torah are derived from nazir,

and certainly a hattat, which is sacrificial food.

Since the Torah had to repeat the law that permitted food combines with prohibited food with regard to a hattat, it is proved that “mishrat,” written with regard to a nazir, applies only to a nazir and a hattat. They are therefore two verses that come as one, and it is impossible to derive the law from them.

But the Rabbis say to you:

Both of them

are necessary. “

Everything that touches it shall become holy,” written with regard to

a hattat,

is necessary

to

teach us the law of

permitted food combining with prohibited food,

in a case in which one cannot impose liability on the basis of “taste is equivalent to substance.”

For example, the taste of the hattat was not absorbed throughout the entire olive-bulk of permitted meat, but only into part of it; in order to impose liability for eating an olive-bulk, one must combine with it the eating of an additional portion of permitted meat into which no meat of the hattat was absorbed.

Even if one eats half an olive-bulk of pigul and half an olive-bulk of permitted food that are not mixed together, one is liable by virtue of the law that permitted food combines with prohibited food.

And we do not derive ordinary food from sacrificial food,

and therefore we do not derive the law for the entire Torah from a hattat.

And

in

“mishrat”

written with regard to a nazir, there is no law there at all that permitted food combines with prohibited food. Rather, it comes

to establish that taste is equivalent to substance.

And from here you derive the law for all prohibitions of the Torah,

the law that taste is equivalent to substance, for these are not two verses that come as one but a single verse.

But Rabbi Akiva

held that taste being equivalent to substance is not derived from nazir. Rather, it is derived from the absorbed flavor of gentile utensils. If so,

both

[nazir and hattat] come

to establish that permitted food combines with prohibited food.

Therefore,

they are two verses that come as one, and whenever there are two verses that come as one, they do not teach.

Rav Ashi said to Rav Kahana: But concerning that which was taught:

It is written with regard to a nazir:

“From everything that is made from the grapevine, from grape seeds to grape skin

he shall not eat.”

And from the fact that the verse included grape seeds and grape skin in one prohibition of eating,

it taught

through this

with regard to the prohibitions of a nazir, that they

they

combine with one another

to complete the measure of an olive-bulk.

If one ate half an olive-bulk of grape seeds together with half an olive-bulk of grape skin, one is liable for “he shall not eat.”

According to what has been said, why was a verse necessary for this?

Now, according to Rabbi Akiva, prohibited and permitted food combine

with one another to complete the measure of an olive-bulk. Is it possible that

with regard to prohibited food and prohibited food it is necessary

for the verse to state that they combine?

He said to him,

Rav Kahana:

Prohibited and permitted food

combine to complete the measure of an olive-bulk specifically when one eats them

at the same time.

But the verse “from grape seeds to grape skin” comes to teach that half an olive-bulk of

one prohibition

and

a

half an olive-bulk of

another prohibition

combine to form an olive-bulk even if one ate them

one

after the other

within the time required to eat half a loaf.

Mishna:

Dough

of hametz

that

is stuck

in

the interior

crevices of a kneading trough

[a bowl]:

if there is

in it

an olive-bulk in one place,

it

must be removed

before Passover.

But if not—rather, that olive-bulk of dough is dispersed among several places in the trough—

it is

nullified by its small quantity,

and one is not required to remove it.

And likewise with regard to ritual impurity.

If there was a trough to which dough was stuck,

if

it

is something he is particular about,

intending to remove it from there, it

interposes.

But if

he

wants it to remain,

intending to leave it there permanently,

it

is considered

as

the very substance of

the trough

itself and does not interpose.

The Gemara will explain what “likewise” refers to and what the matter of interposition entails.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: If there is an olive-bulk in one place, one must remove it.

Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: They taught

this

only

when that dough was found

in a place where it is not intended

for the dough

to strengthen

the walls of the trough. It does not need to be there to prevent the water placed in the trough from leaking. For example, the dough was placed in the upper part of its walls, where the water poured into it does not reach.

Since there is no need there to seal the cracks with this dough, it is not nullified with regard to the trough. Therefore, even while it remains there, it retains the status of hametz, and one must remove it.

But

if the olive-bulk of dough was found

in a place intended to strengthen

its walls, for example, in cracks at the bottom of the trough, where water is poured in, and it is placed between the cracks to prevent the water from leaking out, so that the trough cannot be used without this sealing—

one is not required to remove it.

Since the dough is needed by the trough, its owners presumably nullified it with regard to the trough. It is therefore merely like wood, and the laws of hametz do not apply to it.

And from the fact that Shmuel established the Mishna as referring to a place not intended for strengthening, we infer:

By implication

you learn from his words

that

if there is

less than an olive-bulk

in one place,

even in a place where

the dough

is not intended for strengthening,

also

one is not required to remove it!

As the Mishna teaches: “But if not—it is nullified by its small quantity.” Even though there are several half-olive-bulks dispersed among several places in the trough, since they are not in one place, they are not significant, and the owners nullify them with regard to the trough.

There are those who teach it

with regard to this statement of Shmuel, in relation to that which is taught in

the latter clause: But if not

[that there is no olive-bulk in one place]—

it is nullified by its small quantity!

Concerning this

Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: They taught

this

only in a place where

the dough

is intended for strengthening,

such as at the bottom of the trough, where it is nullified with regard to it.

But in a place where it is not intended for strengthening,

such as high on the walls, it

must be removed,

because since the trough does not need it, it is not nullified with regard to it.

And we infer: From the fact that Shmuel established the Mishna as referring to a place intended for strengthening,

by implication,

if there is

an olive-bulk

in one place,

even in a place intended for strengthening—

one must remove it!

Although in this place he certainly intends to nullify the hametz, nevertheless, since it contains an olive-bulk, it is significant and is not nullified with regard to the trough.

It was taught in accordance with the first formulation.

And

it was taught in accordance with the latter formulation.

It was taught in accordance with the first formulation: Dough in the cracks of a trough—

if it is

in a place intended for strengthening, it is nullified with regard to the trough. Therefore,

it

does not interpose

with regard to immersion.

And

likewise

one does not transgress

because of it on Passover.

But if it is

in a place not intended for strengthening, it is not nullified with regard to the trough. Therefore, it

interposes

with regard to immersion.

And

likewise

one transgresses

because of it on Passover.

When are these words said? When there is

an olive-bulk

in one place.

But

if in one place there is only

less than an olive-bulk,

even

if it is in

a place not intended for strengthening,

it is nullified with regard to the vessel.

And it does not interpose

against it. If the trough became impure and one came to immerse it, the dough does not interpose between it and the waters of the mikveh. Its immersion is therefore valid even while the dough remains stuck to it.

And

likewise

one does not transgress

because of it on Passover.