Pesachim 44b (מד:) — the Talmud in English

As it was taught:

that which is written with regard to a nazirite, “And any

extract

of grapes he shall not drink,” the verse comes

to teach that taste is like substance.

To teach us that the taste of a prohibition is like its substance and tangible matter. And whenever permitted food contains the taste of the prohibited substance, the permitted food itself becomes prohibited, because one tastes the taste of a prohibition when eating or drinking it.

For if one soaked grapes in water,

and the grapes imparted their taste to the water, until

it had the taste of wine,

then a nazirite who drinks from it

is liable

for drinking an olive-bulk of the water that contains the taste of grapes, because of the prohibition against eating grapes.

And from here you derive a ruling for all prohibitions of the Torah:

if prohibited substances impart their taste into permitted food, the permitted food itself becomes prohibited because one tastes the taste of a prohibition in it. And anyone who eats an olive-bulk of it is flogged, even though the taste of the prohibition itself does not constitute an olive-bulk. For the law that taste is like substance introduced the principle that permitted food in which the taste of a prohibition is discernible is prohibited to eat, because one tastes the taste of a prohibition when eating it.

For we can derive this by a kal va-chomer from the case of a nazirite to all prohibitions of the Torah:

And as for a nazirite,

who is subject to lesser stringency in three respects: a.

His prohibition is not permanent,

for if he takes an unspecified nazirite vow, he is a nazirite for only thirty days. And if he specifies the duration of his naziriteship, he becomes a nazirite for the period that he specified.

b.

His prohibition

does not make wine

prohibited for benefit,

but prohibits eating and drinking it בלבד.

c.

There is a way to permit his prohibition,

through the annulment of a sage.

And nevertheless,

the verse established for him that taste is like substance.

The prohibition of

mixed species

[mixed species in a vineyard], which is more stringent than it in that

its prohibition is permanent, its prohibition is one of deriving benefit, and there is no way to permit its prohibition—

is it not certainly the case that the verse should establish

for it

that taste is like substance?!

And the same law applies to orla,

for this kal va-chomer can likewise be stated with regard to it.

However, not all of the stated stringencies apply to orla, for the prohibition of orla is not permanent, but lasts only three years.

In any event, the principle that taste is like substance was established with regard to it by a kal va-chomer from a nazirite in two

of the stringencies בלבד. It is more stringent than a nazirite in that its prohibition includes deriving benefit, and there is no way to permit its prohibition during the three years. This is unlike a nazirite, whose prohibition can be permitted even during his thirty days of naziriteship through the annulment of a sage.

And since the verse “extract” came to include “taste is like substance,” from where do we know that permitted food combines with prohibited food? For the law that taste is like substance is not based on the principle that permitted food combines with prohibited food; rather, it is an independent law. Any permitted food that contains the taste of a prohibition is prohibited to eat because one tastes the taste of a prohibition when eating it. In any event, one may say that wherever the taste of the prohibition was not absorbed into the permitted food, it does not combine with it to complete the requisite measure. And we resolve it:

In any event, one may say that whenever the flavor of the forbidden substance has not been absorbed into the permitted food, it does not combine with it to complete the required measure.

This

baraita, which interprets “extract” as referring to the principle that taste is like substance,

who is its author?

It is the Rabbis,

for they do not hold that permitted food combines with prohibited food in the prohibitions of a nazirite.

And Rabbi Yohanan,

who interprets “extract” as referring to permitted food combining with prohibited food,

is the one who stated—

in accordance with Rabbi Akiva.

And we inquire:

Which

statement of

Rabbi Akiva

teaches us that permitted food combines with prohibited food in the prohibitions of a nazirite?

If you say it is Rabbi Akiva of the mishna

of Nazir—

As we learned: Rabbi Akiva says: A nazirite who soaked his bread in wine, and there is enough to combine to form an olive-bulk,

he

is liable

for eating it, meaning that if the bread and wine together contain enough to combine to form an olive-bulk, he is liable.

This indicates that permitted food combines with prohibited food.

This is no proof from there.

For

from where

do you know that there is a combination of an olive-bulk from the bread and the wine together?

Perhaps

there is enough to combine to form an olive-bulk

from the wine alone.

And the wording “combine” used there is because the wine is absorbed in the bread and is not all gathered together in one place.

And if you would say

that the objection is: If there is an olive-bulk

of wine

alone,

what

did Rabbi Akiva come

to state,

for it is obvious that one is flogged for an olive-bulk of wine?

This is not difficult.

Because

this is what

Rabbi Akiva

teaches us:

Even though

the wine is not visibly present, but only in a

mixture,

and is absorbed in the bread, nevertheless one is flogged for it.

And we conclude:

Rather, it is Rabbi Akiva of the baraita

from which we learn that he holds that permitted food combines with prohibited food in the prohibitions of a nazirite.

As it was taught: Rabbi Akiva says: A nazirite who soaked his bread in wine and ate an olive-bulk

formed by combining

bread and wine

together

is liable.

And this is so even though the wine alone does not contain the measure that entails liability.

This indicates that permitted food combines with prohibited food.

But the Rabbis disagree and say that the part of the bread into which wine was not absorbed does not combine to complete the measure. One is flogged only if wine was absorbed into an olive-bulk of the bread, by virtue of the principle that taste is like substance.

And we inquire: Since

Rabbi Akiva

interprets “extract” as referring to permitted food combining with prohibited food,

from where does he derive

the law that

taste is like substance

for all prohibitions of the Torah?

And we resolve:

Rabbi Akiva derives

this law

from

meat

with milk, which were cooked together and caused the meat, whose substance remains present, to become prohibited through the absorption of milk into it. For is the milk absorbed into the meat

not merely its taste?

For actual milk is not absorbed into the substance of the meat; only its taste is absorbed.

And

even so, it is

prohibited

because of the mixture of meat and milk. This indicates that the taste of the milk is like the substance of the milk.

And here too,

in all prohibitions of the Torah,

there is no difference!

Therefore, the taste of the prohibition is sufficient to prohibit the permitted food into which it was absorbed.

But the Rabbis

hold:

We do not derive from meat and milk

for the entire Torah,

because

it is a novel law,

unlike the other prohibitions. Therefore, we do not derive from it even the stringency of the principle that taste is like substance.

And we inquire:

And what novelty

is there in meat and milk beyond the other prohibitions?

If you say

it is because

this

meat

by itself is permitted, and this

milk

by itself is permitted, but

once they were mixed

with one another they are prohibited

to eat—this novelty is found elsewhere as well.

For we find the same law even with

mixed species,

because

this

grain

by itself is permitted

to eat,

and this grapevine by itself is permitted. But

once they were mixed

with

one

another

together,

they are

prohibited

to eat and to derive benefit from.

And we conclude:

Rather, the novelty of the prohibition of meat and milk is that if

one soaked

[them]

in

meat

all day in milk, it is permitted

by Torah law to eat it. Although the taste of the milk was absorbed into it during the soaking, the Torah did not prohibit it, since the taste was not imparted by way of cooking.

For it is specifically if

he cooked it with cooking

the meat together with the milk that it is

prohibited.

As it is written: “You shall not cook a kid in its mother’s milk.” And if he cooked them together and ate them, he transgresses twice: both for cooking and for eating.

And since the Torah did not prohibit meat and milk merely when one imparts taste, but only through cooking, this is a novel law. Therefore, we do not derive from it the law that taste is like substance for the entire Torah.

Therefore, the Sages had to derive this law from “extract,” which is written concerning a nazirite. And “extract” was consequently no longer available to include the law that permitted food combines with prohibited food in the prohibitions of a nazirite.

And the Gemara retracts what was stated above, that Rabbi Akiva derives the principle that taste is like substance from meat and milk.

Rather,

Rabbi Akiva too

agrees that

meat and milk certainly constitute a novel law,

and it is impossible to derive from them a principle for the entire Torah.

Rather, he derives

the principle that taste is like substance

from the pots of gentiles.

A pot in which a gentile cooked prohibited foods becomes prohibited, because it absorbed the products of the gentile’s cooking. And when a Jew subsequently cooks permitted food in it, the pot releases the absorbed prohibited taste into the permitted dish and prohibits it.

And we derive this from the Torah’s command concerning the vessels of Midian that they be purged of the absorbed prohibited substances before they are used, as it is written: “Anything that comes into the fire, pass it through the fire and purify it.”

And is the prohibition of the pots of gentiles

not

because of the

taste

of the prohibition

alone?

And

even so, anything that absorbs from them is

prohibited. This indicates that taste is like substance.

And here too,

in all prohibitions of the Torah,

there is no difference!

And since Rabbi Akiva derives it from there, “extract,” which is written concerning a nazirite, is available to teach that permitted food combines with prohibited food.

But the Rabbis

hold:

the pots of gentiles too constitute a novel law.

Therefore, we do not derive from them. Consequently, “extract” is again necessary for the principle that taste is like substance.

For

it is established throughout the Torah that

any

prohibition that

imparts a defective taste

is

permitted.

And

we derive this from

that which is written concerning

carrion: “You shall not eat any carrion; you shall give it to the stranger who is within your gates, that he may eat it.” And we interpret this to mean: Carrion that is fit for a stranger to eat is called carrion. But if its taste has deteriorated to the point that it is no longer fit for a stranger to eat, it is not called carrion.

And the prohibited substance absorbed in the walls of a pot likewise has a defective taste. It no longer improves the permitted food when it is released into it.

an unslaughtered animal carcass: “You shall not eat any unslaughtered animal carcass; you shall give it to the stranger who is within your gates, and he shall eat it.” We derive that a carcass fit for a foreigner to eat is called a carcass. But if its flavor has deteriorated so that it is no longer fit for a foreigner to eat, it is not called a carcass.

The forbidden substance absorbed into the walls of the pot likewise has a deteriorated flavor. It therefore no longer improves the permitted food when it is released into it.

And

nevertheless, the Torah said

here

[in gentile vessels], that

it is forbidden

to eat what was subsequently cooked in them. Evidently, the prohibition of gentile vessels is a novelty, unlike anything else that we find throughout the Torah. Therefore, we cannot derive from it even the fundamental law of “taste is like the substance itself.”

And Rabbi Akiva

held that it is not a novelty. And

accordingly

said

Rav Hiyya, son of Rav Huna: The Torah did not prohibit

gentile

vessels

,

except

in the case of

a pot used that day!

Only on the same day on which the gentile cooked in it is it forbidden to cook in it again. For until the completion of twenty-four hours, the flavor of the absorbed substances in the vessel has not yet become defective. But after a day has passed since the cooking, its flavor has become defective, and it is permitted to cook permitted food in it again.

And since the verse is speaking of a pot used that day,

therefore, it is not a case of imparting defective flavor!

Consequently, it is not a novelty, and we can once again derive from it, with regard to the entire Torah, the law of “taste is like the substance itself.”

And the Rabbis

held that although the Torah did not prohibit the purging of gentile vessels after twenty-four hours, nevertheless, even in

a pot used that day, it is impossible that it did not impair slightly

the flavor

a little

absorbed in the pot. The flavor of the vessel impairs the flavor of the absorbed substance, and consequently the absorbed forbidden substance no longer enhances the permitted food when it is emitted into it. By law, we should not have to prohibit the food on its account. Rather, it is a novelty that the Torah instituted with regard to the purging of gentile vessels. Therefore, we cannot derive from it with regard to the entire Torah.

Rav Aha, son of Rav Avya, said to Rav Ashi:

But Rabbi Akiva and the Rabbis both derived their laws from “mesharet.” Why do we say according to Rabbi Akiva that it applies specifically to the prohibitions of a nazir, and not to all the prohibitions of the Torah? Surely

from the Rabbis one can infer Rabbi Akiva’s position.

And

did the Rabbis not say

that we derive from

“mesharet”

to establish that taste is like the substance itself,

and

from here you derive this for all the prohibitions of the Torah

that taste is like the substance itself? Let us say the same

for Rabbi Akiva as well

: For when we derive

“mesharet”

to establish that permitted substance combines with prohibited substance, from here you derive this for all the prohibitions of the Torah,

meaning that the Gemara’s wording refers to all the prohibitions of the entire Torah, in that the permitted substance combines with the prohibited substance to complete the requisite measure?

He said to him

Rav Ashi: One cannot derive from the case of a nazir for the entire Torah that permitted substance combines with prohibited substance.