Pesachim 43b (מג:) — the Talmud in English

Because

it might enter your mind

to permit them to eat it,

since it is written,

“You shall not eat leavened bread with it—

for seven days you shall eat matza with it.”

The verse juxtaposes the eating of leavened bread with the eating of matza. And it might have been said that only

everyone

who

is included in “Arise and eat matza,”

is the one who

is included in “Do not eat leavened bread.”

But

these women, since they are not included

and are not

in

the mitzva of

“Arise and eat matza”—

because

the obligation of eating matza on the first night is

the obligation to eat matza on the first night

a time-bound positive mitzva [and women are exempt from every time-bound positive mitzva],

say—

they are likewise not included in “Do not eat leavened bread.”

This teaches us

the inclusion derived from “Whoever eats anything leavened shall be cut off,” that women too are prohibited from eating leavened bread.

It follows that it is impossible to derive from this “whoever” an obligation of karet for eating a mixture containing leavened bread.

The Gemara adds:

And now, since they have been included

women in the prohibition of

“Do not eat leavened bread” from “Whoever eats anything leavened shall be cut off,”

women are included

women

also in

the mitzva of

eating matza.

And this is

in accordance with what

was expounded by

Rabbi Elazar.

As Rabbi Elazar said: Women are obligated by Torah law to eat matza, as it is stated:

“You shall not eat leavened bread with it; for seven days you shall eat matza with it.”

And this can be learned by virtue of the juxtaposition of matza to leavened bread:

Anyone included in “Do not eat leavened bread”—

is included in

the obligation of

eating matza.

And these women too, since they are included in “Do not eat leavened bread,”

who were included by “Whoever eats anything leavened shall be cut off”—they

are included

also

in “Arise and eat matza.”

We ask:

What do you see

to say

that this

“whoever”

comes

to include women, while you exclude its mixture [and exclude a mixture containing leavened bread from karet]?

Say

the opposite: “Whoever” comes

to include its mixture

of leavened bread for karet , and we should not include from it the prohibition against women eating leavened bread.

Then the opposite would follow: women would be exempt from eating matza by virtue of the juxtaposition of matza to leavened bread.

We answer:

It is more plausible

that the verse comes to include women in the prohibition against eating leavened bread, and not to impose the punishment of karet for a mixture containing leavened bread.

Since the inclusionary word “whoever” [in the verse, “For whoever eats anything leavened shall be cut off”]

refers

and concerns

the

inclusion of the people who

eat,

and not the inclusion of types of leavened food that are eaten.

And therefore, it

includes

another type of

people who eat,

namely, women.

For is it possible to say that

the inclusion

of “whoever”

refers to those who eat, and includes

thereby another type of

food eaten,

such as a mixture containing leavened bread?!

Rav Natan, the father of Rav Huna, challenged this: And

why

whenever

the verse

concerns

people who

eat, is it not

possible that the verse

includes

types of

food eaten?!

But it was taught in a beraita: “For whoever eats fat from the animal from which he brings

an offering to God, the soul that eats it shall be cut off from its people.”

I have derived

the prohibition

only with regard to the fat

of animals

without blemish,

because

it

is

fit to be offered

on the altar.

With regard to the fat

of

blemished animals,

for which we cannot apply “from the animal from which he brings an offering”—

from where

do we know that it too is prohibited?

The verse states: “For whoever

eats fat.”

“Whoever” is an inclusion, and from it we include even the fat of blemished animals.

Rav Natan concludes his challenge:

But here, the verse

the verse

concerns those who eat,

as it is written, “For whoever eats fat”; the inclusionary “whoever” was written not with regard to the food eaten, but with regard to the person who eats.

And

nevertheless,

it includes

from it a type of

food eaten,

namely, the fat of blemished animals.

If so, here too let us say that the “whoever” written with regard to one who eats leavened food includes a mixture containing leavened bread.

We answer:

There,

with regard to fat,

where there is no possibility

of including

those who eat,

since women are prohibited by all the negative commandments of the Torah, therefore

the tanna includes

from it the type of

food eaten.

But

here,

with regard to leavened bread,

where there is

the possibility of including women, who constitute an inclusion among

those who eat,

it is more plausible to expound the “whoever” with reference to them.

For

the tanna does not leave [does not abandon]

for them

the inclusion of

those who eat

that is stated in the verse,

and

instead

include food eaten.

We ask:

And as for the Rabbis,

who disagree with Rabbi Elazar, since

they do not maintain

a prohibition by a negative commandment for

a mixture

of leavened bread, הרי בהכרח פשיטא שגם את הריבוי של "כל" האמור בפסוק השלישיIt is necessarily obvious that they likewise do not expound the inclusionary “whoever” stated in the third verse:

“Any

leavened substance you shall not eat”

—they do not expound it

as an inclusion prohibiting a mixture containing leavened bread.

And if so,

but

as for the fact that

women

are warned regarding leavened bread—

from where do they derive it?

For according to Rabbi Elazar, women were included only by the “whoever” written with regard to “Whoever eats anything leavened shall be cut off.”

And since we said that the Rabbis do not expound the word “whoever” [with regard to a mixture containing leavened bread] in the verse “You shall not eat any leavened substance,” and they also do not expound the word “whoever” in the verse “Whoever eats anything leavened shall be cut off” [whereas the first verse, “Whoever eats leavened bread shall be cut off,” may not be expounded even according to Rabbi Elazar as prohibiting women from eating leavened bread, because it is designated for another exposition. Tosafot].

If so, from where do they know that women are warned against eating leavened bread?

After all, we have a juxtaposition stating that anyone who is not included in eating matza is not included in the prohibition against eating leavened bread. If so, let us exempt women from eating matza, since it is a time-bound positive mitzva, and by virtue of the juxtaposition of leavened bread to matza, let us also permit them to eat leavened bread!

We answer: Indeed, the Rabbis

“whoever”

alone in the second verse [in the warning, “You shall not eat any leavened substance”]

do not expound

it to include foods in a mixture containing leavened bread.

But

“For whoever

eats anything leavened shall be cut off” [in the third verse, which concerns the punishment of karet], since the word “for” is added to the word “whoever”—

they do properly expound it

to include women through it [and this is an inclusion of “those who eat,” not of “food eaten”].

And from here they derived that women are prohibited from eating leavened bread and are liable to karet for it.

But now that we have learned that the addition of the word “for” to “whoever” serves as an inclusion even according to the Rabbis, who do not derive an inclusion from “whoever” alone, the Gemara asks that Rabbi Elazar too should derive an additional matter from “for whoever”:

And as for Rabbi Elazar,

who includes from the word “whoever” alone, he should derive two matters from “For whoever eats anything leavened shall be cut off.”

And say:

“Whoever”—

to include women.

“For whoever”—

to include

even

its mixture

of leavened bread for karet.

For whenever there is no one to include among those who eat, according to his view he also includes food eaten. And from the word “for,” added to “whoever,” he should include a mixture containing leavened bread as liable to the punishment of karet, since women are included by the word “whoever.”

And if you would say

to answer that

“For whoever”—

Rabbi Elazar does not expound

it for an additional exposition,

this cannot be said.

For

it was taught in a beraita:

it is written, “For every

leavening

and every honey

you shall not [“not”]

offer

offer

from it an offering to God.”

I have derived

the prohibition

only

when the offering

entirely

consists of leavening [and he offered an olive-bulk of leavening, since the minimum measure for offering is an olive-bulk].

If he offered leavening in

part of

the measure of offering, namely, half an olive-bulk of leavening—

from where

do we know that he transgresses?

The verse states: “Every

leavening”—to include one who offers leavening in part of the measure required for offering.

Tosafot. They answered their first difficulty in Yevamot [4a]. They wrote that there it is not a juxtaposition but סמוכין, an association based on the proximity of the verses, since mixtures and tzitzit are two separate verses. A juxtaposition is stronger than סמוכין. Women’s exemption from tzitzit is derived through a juxtaposition, since the entire Torah was juxtaposed to tefillin, and women are exempt from time-bound positive mitzvot. They are exempt from tefillin because tefillin was juxtaposed to Torah study, as it is written, “You shall teach them diligently to your children,” and afterward it is written, “And you shall bind them.” And they are exempt from Torah study because it is written, “You shall teach them diligently to your children,” and not “to your daughters” [Kiddushin 35a]. Then the opposite would follow: women would be exempt from eating matza by virtue of the juxtaposition of matza to leavened bread. We answer: It is more plausible that the verse comes to include women in the prohibition against eating leavened bread, and not to impose the punishment of karet for a mixture containing leavened bread. Since the inclusionary word “whoever” [in the verse, “For whoever eats anything leavened shall be cut off”] refers and concerns the inclusion of the people who eat, and not the inclusion of types of leavened food that are eaten. This is Abaye’s interpretation. But Zeiri explains it immediately below in a different manner.

Its mixture

of leavening [leavening that was kneaded and mixed with a valid meal-offering after it had been broken into pieces, and is no longer discernible]—

from where

do we know that it too is prohibited for offering?

The verse states: “For every

leavening.”

That is, the “for” added to “every” comes to teach an additional inclusion, to include its mixture [and this teaches us that the prohibition is not nullified by virtue of the permitted matter].

Tosafot.

We conclude the question:

Whom do you find who expounds “every”

by itself? Is it not

Rabbi Elazar?

For the Rabbis disagree and do not expound “every” alone.

And since this tanna, who follows Rabbi Elazar’s approach, derives an additional exposition from “for every,”

apparently, Rabbi Elazar also expounds

Rabbi Elazar also

“for every.”

If so, here too, with regard to leavened bread, let us include its mixture as liable to karet by deriving it from “for every.”

We conclude:

The difficulty remains unresolved!

Rav

i

Abbahu said that Rabbi Yohanan said: With regard to all prohibitions of the Torah—

permitted matter does not combine with prohibited matter

to complete its measure.

For example, with regard to prohibitions involving eating, whose measure is an olive-bulk: If one ate half an olive-bulk of forbidden fat and half an olive-bulk of meat at once, he is exempt. He is liable only once he eats an olive-bulk of the forbidden fat by itself.

Except for the prohibitions of

eating that apply to a

nazirite,

where permitted food combines with the prohibited food to complete its measure. Thus, if he ate half an olive-bulk of grapes together with half an olive-bulk of bread, he is liable because of “and grapes he shall not eat.”

That is, the measure for the prohibitions of a nazirite is a measure of eating, and not a measure of the prohibited substance itself. Therefore, if a nazirite eats an eating that contains the requisite measure, then even if the substance prohibited to him constitutes only part of that eating and does not itself contain the requisite measure, he is liable, since his act of eating is deemed an “eating.”

This stringency applies to the prohibitions of a nazirite, and differs from other prohibitions.

For the Torah states

with regard to a nazirite,

“And every substance

of grapes he shall not drink,” teaching through the inclusionary word “every” that he is liable even when the wine does not contain a quarter-log. It is sufficient that he soak his bread in a small amount of wine, and the bread combines with the wine to complete the measure, so that he receives lashes for the small amount of wine.

The proof that this is the intent of the verse is that it cannot be referring to a case in which the wine alone contains the requisite measure that creates liability. For if so, it is obvious that he is liable, and a verse would not be needed for this.

Rather, necessarily, the verse comes to make him liable even when the wine alone does not contain the requisite measure, but reaches it together with the bread.

Conclude from this that with regard to the prohibitions of a nazirite, permitted matter combines with prohibited matter.

And Zeiri said:

Not only with regard to the prohibitions of a nazirite does permitted matter combine with prohibited matter;

even

with regard to offering

leavening

on the altar, permitted matter combines with prohibited matter.

For if he offered half an olive-bulk of a handful of leavening together with half an olive-bulk of matza, he transgresses

“You shall not offer

leavening.”

We ask:

In accordance with whose view

does Zeiri hold? Necessarily, it is

in accordance with Rabbi Elazar, who expounds

“every”

that is written with regard to leavening, to include part of it.

And Zeiri establishes this exposition with regard to one who offers a complete olive-bulk, half of which is leavening and half of which is a valid meal-offering; he is liable for the offering because “permitted matter combines with prohibited matter.”