Pesachim 3a (ג.) — the Talmud in English

And we learned in tractate Keritot [7b]:

“If she miscarries on the night of the eighty-first,”

on the night of the eighty-first day following her previous birth of a female, so that on the following day she would be required to bring an offering for that birth—

Beit Shammai exempt her from a second offering

and one offering suffices for both births. For although the days of purity following the first birth had already ended at the conclusion of the eightieth day, nevertheless, since she was not fit to bring the offering until the following morning—for offerings are not slaughtered at night—it is considered as though the time of liability for the offering for the first birth had not yet arrived.

And Beit Hillel obligate her

to bring two offerings, because the night of the eighty-first day is already after the completion of the days of purity, and she has already become intrinsically liable to bring an offering for the first birth.

Beit Hillel said to Beit Shammai: What is the difference

between one who miscarries

on the night of the eighty-first,

whom you exempt from a second offering, and one who miscarries

on

the

day of the eighty-first,

whom you too concede is liable to bring an additional offering? And why should there be a dispute between these cases, since with regard to any matter connected to a time, the day and the preceding night are equivalent?

They further said to them: With regard to the ritual impurity of blood that she sees from this point onward, the night of the eighty-first and the day of the eighty-first are equivalent. Neither is included among her days of purity, since throughout all her days of purity, if she sees blood, she remains pure. But if she sees blood from the night of the eighty-first onward, she is impure, like a menstruant. And

if you equated

the night

with

the day

with regard to

the matter of

impurity,

why

would you not equate it with regard to

the matter of

the offering,

so that just as if she miscarries on the following day she is liable to bring a separate offering for it, so too if she miscarried at night she should be liable to bring a separate offering for it? And Mar Zutra concludes his objection:

From the fact that Beit Hillel said to Beit Shammai

“What is the difference between the night of the eighty-first and the day of the eighty-first?”—learn from it

that “night”

means evening.

And this is difficult for Rav Huna?

And we conclude:

Learn from it!

And further,

meytivi

against Rav Huna from that which was taught in a beraita:

One might have thought

the meat of a peace-offering

could be eaten on the night of

the

third day

following its slaughter, and only on the following morning would it become forbidden to eat, when it becomes notar and must be burned. Therefore,

there is a logical inference:

we can derive by analogy from what we find elsewhere:

Sacrifices

of the thanksgiving-offering and the Paschal offering

are eaten for one day, whereas peace-offerings are eaten for two days.

Just as there,

with regard to the thanksgiving-offering and the Paschal offering, they are eaten also on the

night

following

the first day

—as it is written concerning the thanksgiving-offering: “You shall not leave any of it until morning,” which indicates that it is still permitted to eat it at night; and similarly, concerning the Paschal offering it is stated: “You shall not leave any of it until morning” —

so too here,

with regard to peace-offerings, it is stated that they may be eaten on the

night

following

the second day

as well.

The verse states

with regard to peace-offerings [Leviticus 19:6]:

“On

the day of your sacrifice it shall be eaten, and on the next day; and what remains until the day

of the third day shall be burned in fire.” And we expound: Only on the following day,

while it is still day, may it be eaten; it may not be eaten on the night of

the

third day.

day.

One might have thought it could be burned

what remains of it

immediately

on the night of the third day, since, as you say, its eating-time has already passed by then?

There is a logical inference

that it should be burned then, since

sacrifices

of the thanksgiving-offering and the Paschal offering

are eaten for one day and one night, whereas peace-offerings are eaten for two days and one night

[the night between the two days].

Just as there,

with regard to the thanksgiving-offering and the Paschal offering,

immediately upon

the end of the time of

eating,

that is, immediately in the morning of the second day, is the time of

burning,

as it is stated concerning the Paschal offering: “What remains of it until morning you shall burn in fire,”

so too here,

with regard to peace-offerings, it is stated that

immediately

at the conclusion of the second day, which is

the

end of the time of

eating,

there shall be

burning?

The verse states

with regard to peace-offerings [there, 7:17]:

“And what remains of the flesh of the sacrifice, on the third day shall be burned in fire.”

Here it does not say “until the third day,” but rather “on the third day,” to teach that with regard to the time of burning, only

by day may you burn it, but you may not burn it at night,

since sacrificial meat is not burned at night.

And we resolve the objection:

From the fact that it says “

one might have thought it

could be eaten on the night of the third day”—it follows that

“night”

means evening,

for there the meaning is certainly the night of the third day and not the third day itself, since obviously it is forbidden to eat it during the day. And this is difficult for Rav Huna?

And we conclude:

Learn from it!

Ta shma,

a proof for Rav Yehuda: It was taught in a beraita:

The night

[the night]

of Yom Kippur, one recites

the silent prayer of

seven

blessings,

and confesses,

reciting the confession of Yom Kippur at the end of the prayer. And likewise, at the

morning

prayer of Yom Kippur, he

recites

the prayer of

seven blessings and confesses.

And likewise,

at Musaf he recites seven blessings and confesses.

And likewise,

at Minhah he recites seven blessings and confesses.

And

at Arvit

following Yom Kippur, he

recites

the weekday prayer,

a prayer resembling the Eighteen.

That is, the first three blessings and the last three blessings, while in the middle he recites the prayer of “Havinenu,” which contains the essence of the thirteen middle blessings. This is a shortened prayer instituted for travelers who cannot prolong their prayer. Even following Yom Kippur they permitted one to recite it, because of the strain of the fast.

Rabbi Hanina ben Gamliel says in the name of his forefathers:

He should not recite “Havinenu”; rather, he

recites

the weekday prayer of

eighteen

blessings,

in full.

Because he must recite Havdala

of “Atah Honantanu”

in

the blessing

“Who grants knowledge.”

But in “Havinenu” there is no blessing of “Who grants knowledge” into which the Havdala could be incorporated.

Thus, the night of Yom Kippur is called “night.”

It follows that

“night”

means evening,

in accordance with Rav Yehuda.

And we conclude:

Learn from it!

Ta shma,

another proof for Rav Yehuda:

For the school of Shmuel taught: On the night of the fourteenth, one searches for hametz by candlelight! It follows

that

“night

of the fourteenth,” as stated in the Mishna,

means evening,

for one searches for hametz at night and not during the day.

And on the basis of all these proofs, we conclude:

Rather, both Rav Huna and Rav Yehuda

do not disagree.

Everyone

agrees that

“night”

means evening.

They both said the same thing,

and do not disagree.

Rather,

one

calls night

according to the usage of his place,

as was customary in his locale,

and the other

calls night

according to the usage of his place.

In Rav Huna’s place they called

the night

“Naghai,”

from a term meaning light.

And in Rav Yehuda’s place they called

the night

“Li li.”

And we inquire:

And as for our tanna, what is the reason

he used in the Mishna the expression “night of the fourteenth,” and

did not teach

“nights

of the fourteenth,” as the school of Shmuel taught? And we answer: The tanna of our Mishna

used an elegant expression. “Night” is a refined expression, and it is a mitzva to speak in refined language,

and this is likewise the practice of people of refined character.

And this is in accordance with Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi.

For Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: A person should never utter an improper expression from his mouth.

For the verse deviated [

prolonged ]

the wording by eight letters, rather than uttering an improper expression.

As it is stated [

Genesis 7:8 ]

“From the pure animal and from the animal that is not pure,”

rather than stating “the impure animal,” as it does throughout the Torah. Rather, in one place the verse altered its wording and added eight additional letters [as the word “impure” contains five letters, whereas “that is not pure” contains thirteen], in order to teach you to seek refined language. [

Indeed, “night” is not an improper expression, and Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi’s statement does not refer to the Mishna. Rather, from it we learn that it is the practice of the Sages to seek clear and refined language ].

Rav Pappa said:

even

nine

letters are found that the verse added in order not to utter an improper expression.

As it is stated [

Deuteronomy 23:11 ]

“If there will be among you a man who will not be pure, due to a nocturnal occurrence,”

rather than writing “impure,” whose spelling contains three letters. Instead, it wrote “who will not be pure,” whose spelling contains twelve letters [at minimum, even if the defective spelling taher is read]. Thus, it added nine letters.

Ravina said: Ten

letters by which the verse deviated here, since we must also count the

vav of “tahor,”

as it is in fact written with a full spelling.

Rav Aḥa bar Yaakov said: Sixteen

letters are found that the verse added in order not to utter an improper expression.

As it is stated [

I Samuel 20:26 ]

“For he said: It is an occurrence; he is not pure, for he is not pure,”

rather than stating “It is an occurrence; he is impure.” Here there is an addition of sixteen letters in order not to write “impure.”

It was taught in the school of Rabbi Yishmael: A person should always speak in refined language.

For with regard to a

man,

the verse called

him

“a riding-place,”

as it is stated [Leviticus 15:9]: “And every riding-place upon which the man with a discharge rides shall become impure.”

And with regard to a woman,

a menstruating woman or a woman who experiences a discharge,

it called

her

“a seat,”

meaning that the halakha of a riding-place is not mentioned with regard to a woman, but only the halakha of a seat, as it is stated [ibid., 23]: “Or upon any vessel upon which she sits.” Although there is no difference between a man and a woman, and a woman, too, when she is impure, renders even her riding-place impure, it is because it is improper to mention riding and the spreading of the legs with regard to a woman. Therefore, the halakha of a riding-place was not stated with regard to her.

And the verse also

says

further [Job 15:5]:

“And you choose the language of the cunning.”

The verse commands one to choose the language of the Sages, which is refined language.

And

it

also

says [

ibid. 33:3 ]

“And the knowledge of my lips

they speak clearly,”

meaning clear and refined speech.

And we inquire about this:

Why

was it necessary to add another

“And it says” from the two verses in Job? Had we not already learned this from the preceding verses concerning one with a discharge?

And we answer: It was necessary to cite additional verses because,

if you would say that from the verses of the Torah we could still say:

This applies only to Torah law,

as only the Torah was particular about its language, because it came from the mouth of the Holy One, blessed be He.

But with regard to rabbinic law, it does not;

the Sages need not be particular about their language in the Mishna and the beraita.

Therefore,

come and hear: “And it says: ‘And you choose the language of the cunning,’”

we learn that the cunning [the Sages] choose refined language.

And still,

if you would say: This applies only to rabbinic law,

as only the Sages in the Mishna and beraita must be particular about refined language,

but with regard to ordinary matters, it does not.

There is no need to be particular about this.

Therefore, come and hear:

“And it says: ‘And the knowledge of my lips they speak clearly,’”

one must always be particular to use clear and refined language.

And we raise an objection to the proof brought by the beraita from the fact that “riding-place” was not stated with regard to a woman:

And

is it true that

with regard to a woman, the expression “riding-place” was not written?

But it is written [

Genesis 24:61 ]

“And Rebekah and her maidservants arose, and they rode upon the camels”?!

And we answer:

There, because of the fear of the camels,

the height of the camels,

it is customary

for a woman

to do so,

to ride upon the camel, since, out of concern that she might fall from the camel, she sits upon it in a riding position, so that she can hold onto it with her hands and legs.

We raise another objection:

But it is written [

Exodus 4:20 ]

“And Moses took his wife and his sons and set them upon the donkey,”

yet the verse uses the language of riding even with regard to a donkey, upon which a woman can sit?

And we answer:

There,

But is it not written [Exodus 4:20]

“And Moses took his wife and his sons and had them ride upon the donkey,”

so that even regarding a donkey, upon which it is possible for a woman to sit, Scripture used the language of riding?

And we answer:

There,