Pesachim 33a (לג.) — the Talmud in English

And they challenged: But according to the tanna of this beraita, one who intentionally commits me'ila is liable to death.

Who

is the tanna

that you heard say

that one who

intentionally commits me'ila

is

liable to death? —

It is

Rabbi.

As it was taught in a beraita: One who intentionally commits me'ila —

Rabbi says:

he is

liable to death!

And the Sages say:

he is liable only

to a warning!

And we raised a difficulty concerning it:

What is Rabbi's rationale, and from where does he derive that one is liable to death?

and from where does he derive that he is liable to death?

And Rabbi Abbahu said:

It is because he

derives

by means of a gezera shava,

“sin”

“sin”

from

the eating of

teruma.

For it is written with regard to eating teruma: “They shall not bear sin on account of it.” And it is written with regard to me'ila: “And he shall sin unwittingly.”

Just as

there, with regard to a non-koen who ate

teruma

intentionally, he is

liable to death —

as the verse “And no foreigner shall eat anything sacred” is juxtaposed to that which is written: “And they shall die through it, if they profane it” —

so too

one who intentionally commits

me'ila

through deriving benefit from consecrated property, he is

liable to death.

Rabba and Rav Sheshet concluded their refutation:

And from this

we also derive that there is no liability to death for intentional me'ila involving less than an olive-bulk. For the entire source of liability to death for me'ila is teruma. Therefore,

just as teruma

does not entail liability to death except for

an

eating of

an olive-bulk, so too me'ila

entails no liability to death except when one commits me'ila

with an olive-bulk.

If so, the statement of the beraita cannot be explained as meaning that me'ila is more stringent than other mitzvot in that it entails liability to death even for less than an olive-bulk, as Rav Hiyya bar Avin explained. For even with regard to me'ila, one is liable to death specifically for an olive-bulk, as with eating teruma.

And Rav Pappa challenged

Rabba and Rav Sheshet: There is no difficulty here at all.

From where do you know that Rabbi follows the view of the Sages

of Abba Shaul,

who holds

that one is not liable for eating teruma in an amount less than an olive-bulk?

Perhaps he holds the view of Abba Shaul, who said:

Anyone in which

there is the value of a peruta

one is liable for eating it,

even though it does not contain an olive-bulk!

If so, the same applies to one who intentionally commits me'ila: he is liable for a peruta, even if it does not contain an olive-bulk. The law of me'ila follows the law of teruma by virtue of the gezera shava. Thus, the statement of the beraita can properly be explained as Rav Hiyya bar Avin explained it.

Rav Pappa explicitly said that according to Abba Shaul an olive-bulk is not required; a peruta suffices.

And

this is difficult:

But Rav Pappa is the one who said

above

that Abba Shaul requires two things

for liability for eating teruma: both an olive-bulk and a peruta.

And we conclude:

Rather, conclude from this that he retracted

this statement! Rav Pappa holds that according to Abba Shaul a peruta suffices.

And we return to explain the statement taught above in the beraita [in the refutation of the kal va-chomer from other mitzvot to me'ila]: “If you say so with regard to other mitzvot, for which one is not liable to death, can you say so with regard to me'ila, for which one is liable to death?”

Mar, son of Ravina, said: This is what the tanna means: If you say so with regard to other mitzvot,

the reason that one does not bring an offering for intentionally violating them is that they are less severe, in that

the Torah did not render

one who violates them

without intending it, like

one who violates them

intentionally.

Rather, it imposes liability only on one who acts intentionally. But one who is mit'asek—occupied with another act—is exempt. For example, one who violated Shabbat by cutting.

If

he did not intend the labor of “reaping,” but

intended to cut something detached,

which is a permitted act on Shabbat,

but cut something attached,

we find with regard to him

that he is

is

exempt.

This is because the Torah imposed liability on Shabbat only for “creative labor.” Liability for an offering likewise exists only when he acted unwittingly, not knowing that it was Shabbat, or not knowing that this labor was prohibited on Shabbat. But when he intended to perform the labor—

The same applies to other prohibitions, concerning which it is written: “That he sinned through it.” We exclude from this one who was occupied with another matter, and an act of prohibition came about through him without his awareness; he is exempt.

But can

you say

the same

with regard to me'ila

? [For which there is no offering for an intentional violation.] Is me'ila not more stringent than other prohibitions, since the Torah imposed liability for it even when one did not intend to derive benefit from consecrated property?

For

if there were before him bundles of ordinary wool and bundles of wool belonging to an offering, and he

intended to warm himself with the bundles of ordinary wool,

but because he did not pay attention, his hand unwittingly moved toward the offering,

and he warmed himself with the bundles of the offering —

we find with regard to him

that he committed me'ila.

This is because no exclusion was stated in the laws of me'ila for one who is occupied with another act, as we find with regard to Shabbat and other prohibitions.

And since me'ila is more stringent, it cannot be learned by a kal va-chomer from other prohibitions, for which one does not bring an offering for an intentional violation. Therefore, it was necessary to write with regard to it: “And he shall sin unwittingly,” to exclude an intentional violation from liability to an offering.

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said:

Even with regard to other prohibitions, the Torah did not exempt one who intended to perform an act involving something permitted but performed that same act with something prohibited. For example, he intended to cut something detached but cut something attached. In such a case, “creative labor” is present, and he is liable for it, since in the end he intended the actual act of cutting.

Rather,

this is what

the tanna of the beraita

means: If you say so with regard to other mitzvot

[for which one who violates them intentionally is exempt from bringing an offering],

for they do not impose liability upon

one

who does not

intend at all to be

occupied with another act

in the act that he performed,

like

one who intends to be

occupied with another act

in it.

For

if

he intended to lift something detached,

but without intending to

he cut something attached,

he is

exempt!

This is because it is not “creative labor,” since he did not intend the act of cutting at all.

But can

you say

so

with regard to me'ila,

which is more stringent? For we find

that if he extended his hand into a vessel in order to take

from it a

物

and without intending to, he inserted it into a vessel full of consecrated oil,

and applied

the

oil to his hand

this,

he committed me'ila!

And this is so even though he was not occupied at all with the act of applying oil.

The Master said:

In

what circumstances

does the law of compensation for teruma apply to teruma of leaven on Passover?

When he designated teruma and

afterward

it became leavened. But if he designated

on Passover

leaven

and designated it as

teruma, according to everyone this

teruma

does not acquire sanctity

at all! And even according to Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, who says that “leaven on Passover is permitted for benefit,” it does not acquire sanctity, since the leaven is unfit for eating.

And we raised a difficulty concerning it:

From where are these matters derived?

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said:

We derive this from the fact that the verse says with regard to teruma:

“You shall give it to him.”

And we expound: You shall give “to him,” the koen, teruma that is suitable for his personal use, such as eating,

but do not

give him something suitable only

for its light,

such as leaven on Passover according to Rabbi Yosei HaGelili.

Nevertheless, if it had already acquired the sanctity of teruma and afterward became prohibited to eat, its status as teruma does not lapse. He must give it to a koen, even though it is suitable only for use as fuel.

Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, raised an objection:

We learned: Initially,

one may not separate from impure produce for pure produce

[one may not designate impure produce as teruma in order to exempt the untithed produce of pure produce], because by doing so he causes a loss to the koen.

And if

he did not know that these fruits were impure and

separated

from the impure for the pure

unwittingly —

after the fact,

his teruma is teruma.

And

this is difficult:

Why

is it effective after the fact?

Let us say

that the sanctity of teruma does not take effect upon the impure produce, since it is unfit for eating and suitable only for kindling. Yet we said

“to him”

but not for its light.

And we answer: This is not

difficult. There

we are dealing with impure teruma that

had previously had a time when it was fit.

For it had been fit to be separated before it became impure. But

here

we are dealing with teruma of leaven on Passover, in a case where

it had never had a time when it was fit!

These fruits had never been fit to become teruma that was permitted to eat.

The exclusion from “to him but not for its light” applies only to something that had never been fit to become teruma permitted for eating.

And we raised a difficulty concerning it:

And what would be a case in which it had never had a time when it was fit?

It was fit to be separated before it became leavened.

And we answer:

For example, the grain became leavened

while the grain was

still

attached

to the ground. As long as it was attached, it was not fit for the designation of teruma to take effect upon it [because it is written with regard to teruma: “The first of your grain.” And “threshing” refers to gathering and forming a heap, which occurs after harvesting]. Once it was harvested, it was already leavened and prohibited to eat.

Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said to him:

But

if

the grain became leavened

while the grain was

already

detached,

—

then it too acquires sanctity,

even though at the time of its designation it is already prohibited to eat?

He said to him: Yes!

“By the decree of the watchers

[angels]

is the matter, and by the word of the holy ones is the question.”

And so rule

the Torah scholars

in the study hall, like me!

And he cited this verse from Daniel in order to compare the Torah scholars to angels.