Pesachim 33a — the Talmud in English

And they challenged: But the tanna of this beraita held that one who intentionally commits meila is liable to death.

Who

is the tanna

whom you heard say ![](pamud.bmp "

exact location on the page") that one who

intentionally commits meila

is

liable to death? —

It is

Rabbi.

As it is taught in a beraita: One who intentionally commits meila —

Rabbi says:

he is

liable to death!

And the Sages say:

he is liable only

to a prohibition!

And we raised the question about it:

What is Rabbi’s reason,

and from where does he derive that he is liable to death?

And Rabbi Abbahu said:

Because he

derived

by means of a gezera shava,

“sin”

“sin”

from

the eating of

teruma.

For it is written concerning the eating of teruma: “They shall not bear sin because of it.” And it is written concerning meila: “And he sinned unintentionally.”

Just as

there, a non-koen who ate

teruma

intentionally is

liable to death —

as the verse “And no foreigner shall eat the holy thing” is juxtaposed to what is written, “And they shall die through it, for they profane it” —

so too

one who intentionally commits

meila

through deriving benefit from consecrated property, is

liable to death.

And Rabba and Rav Sheshet concluded their refutation:

And from it

we also derive that there is no liability to death for intentional meila involving less than an olive-bulk. For the entire source of liability to death for meila is from teruma. Therefore,

just as teruma

one is not liable to death for it except

for

eating

an olive-bulk, so too meila

does not involve death except when the one who commits meila does so

with an olive-bulk.

And if so, it is impossible to explain the words of the beraita as saying that meila is more stringent than other mitzvot in that it involves death even for less than an olive-bulk, as Rav Hiyya bar Avin’s answer. For even for meila one is liable to death specifically for an olive-bulk, as with eating teruma.

And Rav Pappa challenged him

to Rabba and Rav Sheshet: This is not difficult at all. For

from where do you know that Rabbi holds like the Rabbis

of Abba Saul, who

holds

that one is not liable for eating teruma with less than an olive-bulk?

Perhaps he holds like Abba Saul, who said:

Anyone who

has the value of a peruta

is liable for eating it,

even though it does not contain an olive-bulk!

And if so, the same applies to one who intentionally commits meila. He is liable for a peruta, even if it does not contain an olive-bulk. For the law of meila is like the law of teruma, by means of the gezera shava. And it is properly possible to explain the words of the beraita as Rav Hiyya bar Avin explained them.

Thus Rav Pappa explicitly says that according to Abba Saul an olive-bulk is not required; rather, a peruta is sufficient.

And

this is difficult:

But Rav Pappa is the one who said

above

that Abba Saul requires two things

to make one liable for eating teruma: both an olive-bulk and a peruta.

And we conclude:

Rather, infer from this that he retracted

Rav Pappa from that! And he holds that according to Abba Saul a peruta is sufficient.

And we return to explain what was taught in the beraita above [in the refutation of the kal va-chomer from other mitzvot to meila]: “If you say this concerning other mitzvot, for which one is not liable to death, will you say this concerning meila, for which one is liable to death”?!

Mar, son of Ravina, said: This is what it is saying: If you say this concerning other mitzvot,

the reason that one does not bring a sacrifice for intentionally committing them is that they are less severe, in that

the Torah did not make

one who transgresses

them unintentionally, like

one who transgresses them

intentionally.

Rather, it made liable for them only one who transgresses intentionally. But one who is “occupied” is exempt. For example, one who transgressed and cut on Shabbat:

If

he did not intend for the labor of “reaping,” but

intended to cut something detached,

which is an act permitted on Shabbat,

and he cut something attached,

we find concerning him

that he

is

exempt.

For the Torah made one liable on Shabbat only for “constructive labor.” And there is also no liability for a sacrifice except when he was unwitting and did not know that it was now Shabbat, or did not know that this labor was prohibited on Shabbat. But when he intended to perform the labor—

And likewise concerning other prohibitions, about which it is written, “which he sinned through it.” And we exclude: except one who is occupied with another matter, and a prohibited matter came into his hand without his knowledge, in which case he is exempt.

But

will you say

so even

concerning meila

[for which there is no sacrifice for its intentional violation]?! For meila is more severe than other prohibitions, and the Torah made one liable for it even when he did not intend to derive benefit from consecrated property.

For

if there were before him bundles of ordinary wool and bundles of the animal designated as an elevation-offering, and he

intended to warm himself with the bundles of ordinary wool,

but because he did not pay attention, his hand went inadvertently toward the elevation-offering

and he warmed himself with the bundles of the elevation-offering —

we find concerning him

that he committed meila!

For no exclusion concerning one occupied with another matter was stated with regard to meila, as we find concerning Shabbat and other prohibitions.

And since meila is more severe, it cannot be learned about by a kal va-chomer from other prohibitions, for which one does not bring a sacrifice for intentional violation. Therefore, it was necessary to write concerning it, “And he sinned unintentionally,” to exclude its intentional violation from a sacrifice.

Rav Nahman bar Yitzhak said:

Even concerning other prohibitions, the Torah did not exempt one who intended to perform an act involving a permitted object but performed that same act involving a prohibited object. For example, he intended to cut something detached and cut something attached. For in such a case it is “constructive labor,” and he is liable for it, since ultimately he intended the very act of cutting.

Rather,

this is what the tanna of the beraita is saying:

of the beraita:

If you say this concerning other mitzvot

[for which one is exempt from a sacrifice for their intentional violation],

for one is not made liable for them

one

who does not

intend at all to be

occupied with another matter

in this act that he performed,

like

one who intends to be

occupied with another matter

in it.

For

indeed,

if he intended to lift something detached,

and without intention

he cut something attached,

he is

exempt!

Because this is not “constructive labor,” since he did not intend for the act of cutting at all.

But

will you say

so

concerning meila

which is more severe?! For we find

that if he extended his hand into a vessel in order to take

from it

an object,

and without intention he inserted it into a vessel full of the oil of consecrated property,

and applied

the

oil to his hand

—this

is considered that he committed meila! And this is so even though he was not occupied at all with the act of applying oil.

[continued]

The Master said:

In what

matter are these words stated, that the law of payment for teruma applies to teruma of leavened produce on Passover?

It is

when one separates teruma and

afterward

it became leavened. But if he separated

on Passover

leavened produce

and designated it as

teruma, according to everyone this

teruma

has no sanctity

at all! And even according to Rabbi Yosei the Galilean, who says, “Leavened produce on Passover is permitted for benefit,” it does not have sanctity, since the leavened produce is not fit for eating.

And we raised the question about it:

From where are these matters?

Rav Nahman bar Yitzhak said:

We derive this from the fact that the verse says concerning teruma:

“You shall give it to him.”

And we expound: Give “to him,” the koen, teruma for his bodily use, such as eating;

but do not

give him something fit only

for its light,

such as leavened produce on Passover according to Rabbi Yosei the Galilean.

However, if he had already sanctified it with the sanctity of teruma, and afterward it became prohibited for eating, the designation of teruma does not depart from it. He is obligated to give it to a koen, even though it is fit only for use as fuel.

Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, challenged:

We learned: Initially,

one does not separate from impure produce for pure produce

[for one does not separate impure produce as teruma in order to exempt the untithed produce of pure produce], because by doing so he causes a loss to the koen.

And if

he did not know that these fruits were impure, and

separated

from the impure for the pure

unwittingly —

after the fact

his teruma is teruma.

And

this is difficult:

Why

is it effective after the fact?

Let us say

that the sanctity of teruma should not take effect upon the impure produce, because it is unfit for eating and only fit for kindling. For we said

“to him”

but not for its light.

And we answer: It is not

difficult. There

the case is impure teruma;

it had a time when it was fit.

For it was fit to be separated before it became impure. But

here,

the case is teruma of leavened produce on Passover, in a place where

it never had a time when it was fit!

For these fruits were never fit to become teruma permitted for eating.

And we exclude by “to him but not for its light” only something that was never fit to become teruma permitted for eating.

And we raised the question about it:

And what is the case where it never had a time when it was fit?

For it was fit to be separated before it became leavened.

And we answer:

For example, the grain became leavened

while

still

attached

to the ground. And as long as it was attached, it was not fit for the designation of teruma to take effect upon it [because it is written concerning teruma, “the first of your grain,” and “threshing” means gathering and arranging a pile, that is, after the harvest]. And once it was harvested, it was already leavened and prohibited for eating.

Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said to him:

But

if

the grain became leavened

at a time when it was already

detached

from the ground—

—

Is it likewise that it became sanctified,

even though at the time of the raising it was already prohibited for eating?

He said to him: Yes!

“By the decree of the watchers

[angels]

is the matter, and by the word of the holy ones is the question.”

And so rule

the Torah scholars

in the study hall, like me!

And he cited this verse from Daniel in order to liken the Torah scholars to angels.