Pesachim 19b (יט:) — the Talmud in English

And we raised an objection to this: But according to rabbinic law, even the vessels that came into contact with impure liquids become impure. Although by Torah law liquids do not impart impurity to a vessel, the Sages decreed this impurity concerning them due to liquids of a zav, such as his saliva and urine, which are primary sources of ritual impurity and impart impurity even to a person and to vessels. However, in the Temple they did not enact this decree concerning vessels.

If so, the knife too should have become impure because of the liquids on the meat [which became impure because of the needle]. And it is pure only because they did not enact this form of impurity in the Temple.

If so, Rabbi Akiva should have said:

“We have gained that there is no impurity of hands or vessels in the Temple.”

Why did he say this only with regard to the hands?

Rav Yehuda said that Rav said, and some say

that

Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina said: The statement concerning the hands

was taught before the decree concerning vessels!

When this testimony was given, the decree concerning hands had already been enacted, but the impurity of vessels that came into contact with liquids had not yet been decreed. Therefore Rabbi Akiva referred only to the decree concerning hands.

Rava said:

That is not so. For

both of them,

the decree concerning hands and the decree concerning vessels,

were enacted on that same day

[when the eighteen decrees were enacted in the upper chamber of Hanania ben Ḥizkiah ben Garon]

they decreed

concerning them.

As we learned:

On that day they decreed concerning every

scroll

among the twenty-four books of the Holy Writings that it should have the status of second-degree impurity, and that it disqualifies teruma. They enacted this for the benefit of the scrolls, because the priests would store teruma beside the scrolls, and mice would eat the scrolls.

And

likewise they decreed concerning

the hands

that had not been washed, that they disqualify teruma.

And

likewise concerning

one who immersed that day,

who disqualifies teruma. [And there the Gemara objects: But one who immersed that day is impure by Torah law. And it concludes: “Erase ‘one who immersed that day’ from here”; it is not part of the Mishna.]

And

likewise concerning

food and vessels that became impure through impure liquids,

which disqualify teruma. This was decreed due to the liquids of a zav, which render food and vessels first-degree impure by Torah law.

It is evident, then, that on that same day they decreed both concerning the hands and concerning the vessels.

The original difficulty therefore returns: let Rabbi Akiva say, “We have gained that there is no impurity of hands or vessels in the Temple.”

Rather, Rava said: Set aside the impurity of

the

knife, for even with non-sacred food it does not become impure.

And the statement is not specifically referring to the Temple.

For

this knife, which came into contact

with what

did it come into contact?

If we say that it came into contact with

the impure meat,

but food does not impart impurity to a vessel,

not even by rabbinic law.

Rather,

let us say

that it came into contact with the needle?

But a vessel does not impart impurity to another vessel.

They decreed only concerning a vessel that became impure through liquid, due to the liquids of a zav. But in that case there were no liquids accompanying the meat at all.

And furthermore, we raised a difficulty:

This needle—

what was it doing there?

And why do we have reason to be concerned that it is impure?

If we say that it was an uncertain needle,

and we did not know whose it was or whether it was impure or pure, it would be included in the decree concerning “uncertain vessels that are found,” which are impure by rabbinic uncertainty.

This cannot be said.

For

it was stated: Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina:

One

of them

said: They did not decree concerning uncertain spittle found in Jerusalem.

Ordinarily, they decreed concerning any spittle that is found, when its source is unknown, and declared it impure, due to the possibility that it is the spittle of a zav or of a menstruating woman, which is a primary source of impurity. But in Jerusalem they did not enact this decree.

And the other

of them

said: They did not decree concerning uncertain vessels found in Jerusalem.

Although they decreed impurity concerning an ordinary vessel whose status is unknown, in Jerusalem they did not enact this decree concerning it.

If so, the needle found in the meat cannot be understood as an ordinary needle. For in Jerusalem it is pure even by rabbinic law. And the meat does not become impure at all because of it.

Rav Yehuda said that Rav said:

What are we dealing with here?

For example, he lost a needle

that had come into contact with a corpse and had become

impure through contact with a corpse, and he recognized it

as the needle that was now found

in the meat.

And for this reason the meat is impure.

Rabbi Yosei bar Avin said:

Actually, the case involves an uncertain needle.

And for example, the

the

cow had been muzzled

at its mouth, and this is how it

came from outside Jerusalem.

The needle certainly came from outside Jerusalem, and its status is that of an uncertain vessel outside Jerusalem, which is impure.

The substance of the matter: Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina; one said: They did not decree concerning uncertain spittle found in Jerusalem.

And the other said: They did not decree concerning uncertain vessels found in Jerusalem.

And we wonder:

Spittle—

this was already

taught

in the Mishna. And

vessels

were also already

taught.

The Gemara first explains the question:

“Spittle

was

already taught.”

As we learned: All spittle found in Jerusalem is pure, except for that of

spittle found in

the upper marketplace.

For there the impure people would gather, so as not to render their companions impure, and we attribute the spittle found there to them.

And we answer:

It is necessary

to teach us only that

even though it was established

that at that particular place in Jerusalem

a zav

had passed, nevertheless the spittle found there is pure.

The Gemara now explains the question:

“Vessels

found in Jerusalem were

already taught

to be pure.”

As we learned: All vessels found in Jerusalem,

if they are found on

the path

of

descent to the immersion chamber,

they are

impure.

For there were two paths leading to the immersion chamber. On one they descended to it, and on the other they ascended from it. And a vessel found on the path of descent is certainly impure, since presumably they brought it there in order to immerse it, and it fell before they immersed it.

This proves that it is specifically there that they are impure.

But

vessels

ordinarily,

found in other places in Jerusalem, are

pure.

And we answer:

But according to your reasoning, say the latter clause

of the Mishna: If the vessels are found on

the path

of

ascent

from the immersion chamber, they are

pure,

as they certainly fell there after they had been immersed.

This proves:

But

vessels

in general,

found in other places in Jerusalem, are

impure.

And the inference from the first clause contradicts the inference from the latter clause.

Rather,

necessarily, either the first clause or the latter clause is not to be understood precisely. Therefore it was necessary to teach us that the inference from

the first clause

is

precise: only vessels found on the path of descent are impure, but those found elsewhere in Jerusalem are pure.

And the inference from

And the inference from

the

latter clause is not precise. Rather, it mentions “the path of ascent”

to

exclude the side passages

[small passageways]. In addition to the principal paths of ascent and descent, there were other small passageways adjacent to the immersion chamber. At times people descended through them to the immersion chamber, and at times they returned through them. Vessels found there are impure, since it is uncertain whether they fell while being carried to the immersion chamber or while being carried back from it.

And we challenge this:

And according to Rav, who says

that the Mishna is referring to

“a case in which he lost a needle that had become impure through contact with a corpse, and he recognized it in the meat,”

why are the knife and the hands that touch it not impure?

But

since the Master said: “It is written, ‘in the hollow of a sword,’”

and we expound:

A sword

that comes into contact with a corpse

is like the corpse itself,

and the sword becomes a primary source of impurity of the highest degree, like the corpse [and the same applies to every metal vessel]—if so,

a person and vessels should also become impure

through this needle.

Rav Ashi said:

What are we dealing with here? With a case in which it is uncertain whether the knife and the hands came into contact with the needle, or whether they did not come into contact with it. And because of the uncertainty, they are pure. And

this teaches:

that the

Temple courtyard

is a public domain,

and this is

an uncertainty

concerning impurity in a public domain. And any uncertainty concerning impurity in a public domain is considered pure.

For we hold: In the case of uncertain impurity in a private domain, its status is impure. This is derived from the case of a woman suspected of adultery: If a husband warned his wife not to seclude herself with a particular man and she then secluded herself with him, she is forbidden to her husband. Although it is uncertain whether she became impure through relations with him, the Torah treats her uncertainty as certainty, as it is written: “And she became impure.” That case took place in a private domain, since only the man and the woman were there. If another person had been present, this would no longer be considered seclusion.

For we hold: An uncertainty concerning impurity in a private domain is impure. And we derive this from the case of a sota: If a husband warned his wife not to seclude herself with a particular man, and afterward she went and secluded herself with him, she is forbidden to her husband. Although it is uncertain whether or not she became impure, the Torah renders her uncertainty as definite, as it is written: “And she became impure.” And that case involved a private domain, since only the man and the woman were there. For if another person had been there, this would no longer be seclusion.

From here we learn that the verse treats every uncertainty concerning impurity in a private domain as definite impurity. But an uncertainty concerning impurity in a public domain is treated as definite purity, because it is not comparable to the uncertainty concerning a sota.

The Temple courtyard is also a public domain, because any place in which there are more than two people is considered a public domain with regard to impurity. This is because it is no longer comparable to the case of a sota. Therefore, when it is uncertain whether the knife and the hands came into contact with the impure needle in the Temple courtyard, they are pure.

And we challenge this: From the fact that Rav Ashi declared them pure because the Temple courtyard is a public domain, it follows that

but

if this uncertainty had been

in a private domain, its status would be impure.

This is difficult.

Granted,

this

very

knife, concerning which it is uncertain whether it came into contact with the

needle,

is a matter

that has no capacity to be asked.

For a knife has no capacity to come and ask about itself whether it is pure or not. And we derive from the case of a sota only uncertainty as to whether a person came into contact with a creeping creature or not, since a person has the capacity to be asked about himself whether he is pure.

And anything that has no capacity to be asked, whether in a public domain or in a private domain—

its uncertainty is pure,

because it is not comparable to the case of a sota, which concerns a woman who has the capacity to be asked. And anything that is not comparable to a sota has a pure status in a case of uncertainty.

And we answer: This uncertainty concerning the knife is considered an uncertainty involving something that has the capacity to be asked.

Because it is an uncertainty concerning impurity brought about by human agency.

For the knife did not come into contact with the meat on its own; rather, the person holding it brought it into contact with the impure needle. Therefore, had this uncertainty been in a private domain, its status would have been impure.