Niddah 46a (מו.) — the Talmud in English

And the reason is that it is after the period, because his maturation has been completed.

He has both the required years and the two hairs, and his body has completely finished maturing.

And from here Rav Hamnuna proves:

But during the period,

even if two hairs have grown on him,

it is like before the period.

And the hairs are merely a mole.

Furthermore,

there is a difficulty against the views that one who produces hairs before the required age is considered an adult.

Rabbi Zeira raised an objection

from a beraita, as it was taught:

“When a man explicitly takes a vow.” What does the word “man” come to teach? —

It includes a boy of thirteen years and one day, so that although he does not know how to express a vow explicitly, his vows are valid

94. What are the circumstances

of the law stated in the beraita?

If

the case is one in which

he did not produce two hairs,

he is a minor.

Rather, is it not referring to one who produced two hairs? And the reason that a boy of thirteen years and one day

who has both the requisite years and hairs

is considered a man,

but during the period,

when he has only hairs and not the requisite years,

it is like before the period,

and the hairs are merely a mole!

And

this is a refutation

of the view of Rabbi Yohanan and Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi, who maintain that the period is like the time after the period.

Rav Naḥman said:

The dispute between Rav and Rav Ḥanina, who maintain that both hairs and years are required, and Rabbi Yohanan and Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi, who maintain that the hairs alone suffice, is

like the

dispute between

tanna’im:

As it was taught:

A boy of nine years who produced two hairs

— they are

merely a mole,

and, according to everyone, they are not a sign that he has already reached adulthood. However, if he produced the hairs

from the age of nine until twelve years and one day,

the matter is disputed: The first tanna maintains that they too are

merely a mole.

But

Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says:

They are

a sign

that he is an adult.

A boy of thirteen years and one day —

according to everyone,

this

is a sign

that he is an adult.

This very statement is difficult. You said: From the age of nine until twelve years and one day, they are merely a mole. Is it not implied that

the entire

thirteenth year itself

[from twelve years and one day until the end of the thirteenth year] —

is a sign? And then it teaches: A boy of thirteen years and one day: It is a sign. Is it not implied that

the entire

thirteenth year itself —

is merely a mole?

Is it not that this is a dispute between tanna’im, such that one

[the tanna who taught the first clause]

maintains that the period is like the time after the period,

and the hairs produced during the thirteenth year are signs of maturity;

while the other

[the tanna who taught the latter clause]

maintains that the period is like before the period,

and the hairs produced during the thirteenth year are merely a mole?

The Gemara rejects this:

No. Everyone

maintains that the production of hairs

during the period is like before the period. Both one and the other

[the first clause and the latter clause] are speaking

of a girl. And the first clause is Rabbi,

who maintains that a girl reaches adulthood at the age of twelve years and one day.

And the latter clause is Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar,

who maintains that a girl reaches adulthood at the age of thirteen years and one day.

And if you wish, say: Both this and that are speaking of

a boy, and the first clause is Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar, who maintains that a boy reaches adulthood at the age of twelve years and one day.

And the latter clause —

is Rabbi,

who maintains that a boy reaches adulthood at the age of thirteen years and one day.

And if you wish, say: Both this and that

[the first clause and the latter clause]

are Rabbi’s

view. Rather,

this

— the first clause — is speaking

of a boy

who reaches adulthood at the age of thirteen years and one day, whereas

this is speaking of

a girl, who reaches adulthood at the age of twelve years and one day.

And if you wish, say: Both this and that are the view of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar. This

[the first clause]

is speaking of a boy

who reaches adulthood at the age of twelve years and one day;

this

[the latter clause]

is speaking of a girl

who reaches adulthood at the age of thirteen years and one day.

We learned in a beraita:

Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says:

If a boy of nine years and one day produced two hairs, they are not judged as merely a

sign.

Rabbi Kirosfadai, son of Rabbi Shabtai, said: And this is so

that the hairs are judged as a sign and not as a mole, on condition

that

the hairs

are still present on him

when he reaches adulthood. But if they fell out in the interim, this proves that the hair is not a sign of maturity but merely a mole.

This was also taught in a beraita: A boy of nine years and one day who produced two hairs —

they are merely a mole; from the age of nine until twelve years and one day, if they are still present on him —

they are merely a mole. Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says: They are a sign.

Rava said: The halakha

is in accordance with the one who says that

the period is like before the period.

A minor orphan may be married off by her mother or brothers, by rabbinic enactment. However, she was granted the power to refuse her husband and leave him through mi’un alone; she does not require a bill of divorce and is considered unmarried for all purposes. But if she reaches adulthood and her husband has intercourse with her after she reaches adulthood, she becomes betrothed to him through betrothal by intercourse and becomes fully married to him by Torah law; she cannot leave him without a bill of divorce. And if she was divorced, she is a divorcee and not an unmarried woman.

A minor who is married by rabbinic enactment, and whose husband dies without offspring, does not need to perform yibbum or halitza with her husband’s brothers; rather, she performs mi’un and leaves.

Rav Shmuel bar Zutra taught Rava’s statement

as stating that the period is like the time after the period,

in this formulation.

That is, he inferred this principle from Rava’s words in another passage:

Rava said: A minor girl

whom her mother or brothers married off through a rabbinically enacted marriage,

throughout the twelve years,

even if she produced hairs, she may

perform mi’un and leave

her husband’s home, like any minor who can perform mi’un.

That is because, since Rava maintains that the production of hairs during the period is like before the period, they are not considered signs of adulthood but merely a mole.

But

from that point onward,

from the age of twelve years and one day,

she may not perform mi’un,

because perhaps she is an adult;

and she may not perform halitza

if she is a yevama, because she is still not considered an adult, and a minor is not eligible for halitza.

The Gemara analyzes this:

This very statement is difficult.

On the one hand,

you said:

from the age of twelve years she

may not perform mi’un. Apparently, she is an adult,

provided that she produced two hairs, and therefore mi’un without a bill of divorce is no longer effective for her. But

if she is an adult, she should perform halitza,

since an adult [who is married according to Torah law] leaves her yevama status through halitza. Why, then, did Rava say that she may not perform halitza?

And if you would say that it is doubtful to him

whether Rava is uncertain if she has already produced two hairs and is therefore an adult, or has not yet produced them and is therefore still a minor, and this is why we rule stringently: She may not perform mi’un, and if she is a yevama, she may not perform mi’un—

This cannot be said. For

is it truly doubtful to him

Rava?

But Rava said: A minor girl who has reached the age of majority

[twelve years and one day]

does not require examination

to determine whether she produced two hairs; rather, she may perform halitza, because we have a

presumption

that when she reached the age of majority, she also

produced the signs.

The Gemara answers:

These words apply

when we rely on the presumption that she has already produced two hairs,

in an unspecified case. But here, where she was examined

and

they did not find

hairs on her,

no.

She does not have the presumption that she produced two hairs.

The Gemara objects:

If so,

if the case is one in which she was examined and no hairs were found on her,

let her perform mi’un!

For we examined her and saw that she is a minor; why, then, did Rava say that she cannot perform mi’un?

The Gemara answers:

We are concerned that perhaps

she produced two hairs and afterward the

hairs fell out,

and she is in fact already an adult and cannot perform mi’un.

That works according to the one who says that we are concerned

that perhaps the hairs fell out.

But according to the one who says that we are not concerned, what can be said?

Why can she not perform mi’un?

For it was stated:

With regard to one who was examined after reaching the age of twelve years and one day, and two hairs were not found on her:

Rav Pappa said:

If it is seen that she has no hairs,

we are not concerned that perhaps they fell out;

rather, she certainly did not produce the signs, and she is certainly still a minor.

Rav Pappi said: We are concerned.

According to Rav Pappa, who maintains that she is certainly a minor, this is difficult: Why can she not perform mi’un?

The Gemara answers: What Rav Pappa said, “We are not concerned that they fell out,” means that we do not say that there certainly were hairs and that they fell out, so that she is now an adult; rather, the matter remains doubtful. Therefore,

these words

of their dispute as to whether we are concerned that the hairs fell out and she is already an adult apply

with regard

to stringency, requiring her to perform

halitza,

as one who is concerned that the hairs fell out maintains that she must also perform halitza.

But with regard

to leniency, so that only

mi’un

alone will be effective for her, everyone

is concerned

that the hairs fell out and she is already an adult, and we do not rule leniently.

The Gemara objects:

By inference, the one who says, “We are concerned,”

is saying so only with regard to

her performing halitza

?

But he merely said, “We are concerned,”

which implies that this applies both to mi’un and to halitza.

The Gemara answers:

Rather, actually —

she was not examined

to determine whether she had produced hairs.

And with regard to halitza, we are concerned

that perhaps she did not produce hairs.

And when Rava said that there is a presumption

and it is not necessary to examine whether she produced hairs, he was speaking

with regard to mi’un,

which she cannot perform, because presumably she is already an adult.

But with regard to halitza, examination is required

to establish that she is already an adult. Without examination, we do not allow her to perform halitza solely on the basis of the presumption that she is an adult.

Rav Dimi of Nehardea said: The halakha is that we are concerned that perhaps the hairs fell out. And these words apply where she was betrothed during the period

[during the years when she was certainly a minor]

and her husband had intercourse with her after the period

[at a time when, had she produced hairs, she would already be an adult],

as there is a Torah-level uncertainty,

since perhaps he had intercourse with her after she had already matured and produced hairs, thereby effecting betrothal through intercourse, so that she is fully married according to Torah law.

But initially,

if he had intercourse with her only before the age of twelve years and one day, and we have no uncertainty as to whether she might be married to him according to Torah law [because he certainly did not perform an act that would betroth her at a time when she was an adult, and betrothal of a minor is not effective according to Torah law],

we are not

concerned that there were hairs and that they fell out.

Rav Huna said: If he consecrated

a boy of twelve years and one day who was examined and found to understand how to express a vow

, and he ate

what he had consecrated,

he is flogged

98. As it is stated: “When a man explicitly takes a vow,”

which implies that even one who understands how to express a vow while adjacent to manhood [one year before becoming an adult, when he understands how to express a vow] has a valid vow, and he is even flogged if he violates his vow. This is so despite the fact that a minor is not subject to punishment for other prohibitions, because in the verse adjacent to it, it is stated:

“He shall not profane his word,”

and we derive:

Anyone who is included in explicit vows —

is included in “he shall not profane.” And anyone who is not included in explicit vows — is not included in “he shall not profane.”

is not included in “he shall not profane.”

Rav Huna bar Yehuda raised an objection

to the amora’im who disagree with Rav Huna, and

to support Rav Huna,

from what we learned in a beraita: