Niddah 3a (ג.) — the Talmud in English

Therefore, even in the case of a barrel of wine that has turned to vinegar, which has two factors to its detriment—the presumptive status of untithed produce and the vinegar before us—we do not retroactively regard it as certainly untithed produce, but as a matter of uncertainty.

And if you wish, say instead:

The Sages did not derive the law of the ritual bath from the case of the sota!

For if the law is derived from the sota, the ritual bath should be declared pure in the public domain, since the Sages too maintain that two factors to its detriment do not create a state of certainty, and in a case of uncertainty it should be declared pure, as in the case of the sota. [And as for what the Sages said, that one who immersed in a ritual bath that was subsequently found deficient in the private domain is certainly impure—that is because of the presumptive status of the person who immersed, as will be explained below.]

The Sages maintain that what can be derived from the sota is only the law governing an uncertainty that arose at the time of contact, with regard to the object becoming impure, as in the case of the sota, where the issue is whether the sota became impure; but not an uncertainty that arose at the time of immersion in the ritual bath, which concerns the object immersed becoming purified from its impurity.

But now, since the Sages' reason is that they do not derive an uncertainty concerning purification from an uncertainty concerning the sota becoming impure, what is Rabbi Shimon's reason for declaring the person pure in the public domain? And we say:

This is Rabbi Shimon's reason: He derives the “end of the impurity,”

an uncertainty concerning purification at the time of immersion,

from the “beginning of the impurity,”

an uncertainty concerning impurity at the time of contact, [which, according to the Sages as well, can be derived from the sota].

Just as with the “beginning of the impurity,”

when

an uncertainty

arose as to whether he

came into contact or did not come into contact

with an impure object

in the public domain,

he is

pure,

since this law can be derived from the sota, where the uncertainty is “whether she came into contact or did not come into contact,”

so too with the “end of the impurity,”

when there was

an uncertainty

as to whether he

immersed or did not immerse—

in the public domain

his uncertain status is

pure! But the Sages,

who disagree with Rabbi Shimon, say:

Can this really be compared!?

How can the uncertainty concerning immersion be compared to the uncertainty concerning contact!?

But

there,

in the case of the uncertainty concerning contact,

the person

about whom you are uncertain whether he came into contact with an impure object

stands with a presumptive status of purity,

and therefore

we do not lower him on account of an uncertainty

[we do not bring him down]

to impurity.

But

here,

in the case of one who immersed in a deficient ritual bath, and there is uncertainty whether he was purified through this immersion,

the person

stands with a presumptive status of impurity.

And therefore,

we do not remove him from his impurity on account of an uncertainty.

And now, after the distinction between the law concerning a woman who saw blood—for according to Shammai we do not suspect that she became impure retroactively, because she has a presumptive status of purity—and the case of a deficient ritual bath, where we suspect the ritually pure objects retroactively because of the presumptive status of impurity of the objects, we again raise a difficulty against Shammai:

And in what way is

the case of the woman who saw blood, where we do not suspect that the ritually pure objects with which she came into contact became impure retroactively,

different from

the law concerning a

passageway—

As we learned: If a creeping creature is found in a passageway, it

renders impure retroactively

all the ritually pure objects that were handled in that passageway,

until someone says

: “

I examined this passageway, and there was no creeping creature in it!”

Or until the time when it was swept,

when that passageway was swept. But the ritually pure objects handled there retroactively until then are impure; from the time of the sweeping onward, they are pure. And how is this different from the case of a menstruating woman, where we do not suspect retroactively?

And we answer:

There,

in the case of the passageway,

also

its law is like that of a ritual bath,

since there are creeping creatures

of

the passageway itself, and

there are, in addition,

creeping creatures that came from outside—

it is comparable to two factors to the detriment of the object!

The ritually pure objects handled in the passageway must therefore be treated as certainly impure, and we do not rely on their presumptive status of purity; rather, we render them impure retroactively. But in the case of a woman, where there are not two factors to the detriment of the object, we leave her in her presumptive status.

B. The Gemara now explains a second reason why Shammai maintains that one should not impose retroactive impurity upon a menstruating woman, based on another consideration:

And if you wish, say instead: This is Shammai's reason:

he does not suspect that she saw blood retroactively,

since a woman

from whom blood emerges

feels it herself

at the time the blood emerges.

This woman, who did not feel anything before finding the blood, can rely on the absence of sensation and attribute the matter to the certainty that the blood emerged only now, when she examined herself with an examination cloth.

And Hillel,

who does not rely on the absence of a sensation—what is his reason?

And we explain: We must suspect that the blood emerged retroactively with a sensation, but she did not notice that sensation, because

she thought,

when she felt it, that it was not the sensation of blood emerging, but rather

the sensation of urine.

The Gemara now raises a difficulty:

And according to Shammai,

who relies on the absence of a sensation—

but there is

the possibility that the blood emerged while she was

asleep,

when she did not perceive the sensation at that time. If so, how can one rely on the fact that she had not felt anything until now? We answer: Even a woman who is

asleep also

feels the blood emerge, because

on account of the pain

at the time the blood emerges, she

awakens,

and feels the blood emerging,

just as she feels the sensation of urine,

for she feels it emerge and awakens from her sleep.

The Gemara raises a difficulty against Shammai: How can he say that all women have only the status of the time of their discovery?

But there is

a

mentally incapacitated

woman, who does not understand how to feel the blood emerging. Why, when she sees blood, do we not suspect that it emerged from her retroactively with a sensation, but that she was unable to discern it!?

And we answer:

Shammai concedes in the case of a woman who is mentally incapacitated

that there is concern that she was impure retroactively.

And we challenge this:

But “all women

their status is determined at the moment they discover the blood,”

it teaches,

without exception!?

And we answer: Shammai’s intention is to say:

“All mentally competent women”

only.

And we challenge this:

But let

Shammai

teach: “Women

their status is determined at the moment they discover the blood” only. Why, then, does he teach “all women”?

And we answer: Shammai’s intention in saying “all women” is

to exclude the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer!

As Rabbi Eliezer said:

Only

four women

who are “devoid of menstrual blood” have their status determined at the moment they discover the blood,

and no others!

He teaches us

that, according to Shammai, not only women who are devoid of menstrual blood, but

all women

who are mentally competent have their status determined at the moment they discover the blood.

We examine Shammai’s ruling:

But there is

the sighting of

bloodstains,

when she finds blood on her body or garment. For we maintain in the Mishna below that such a woman is deemed impure retroactively, until she knows that the garment had been examined and found clean, even though she did not feel the blood emerge!

If so, is it possible that

we should say that it is taught

below, in the Mishna concerning

bloodstains,

that they render her impure retroactively,

not in accordance with Shammai!?

For according to Shammai, who relies on the absence of a sensation, she should not be rendered impure at all on account of bloodstains, since it is possible to rely on the absence of a sensation and say that this stain did not come from her body but from an external source!?

Abaye said: Shammai concedes with regard to bloodstains

that she must be deemed impure, despite the fact that she did not feel anything, and even retroactively!

And we explain: This woman cannot attribute the blood she found to any possible cause. Therefore, the fact that she did not feel anything is irrelevant; rather, we say that this blood necessarily came from her body. Since we do not know when it emerged from her body—for she discovered the stain only after the blood had emerged—we render her impure retroactively.

And this is what we say:

What is the reason

that Shammai concedes with regard to a bloodstain that it renders her impure retroactively? For this woman

with

the blood of a

bird—

we know that she

did not handle it,

and therefore the stain cannot be attributed to the blood of a bird that she had handled.

And likewise,

she did not pass through a butchers’ market,

so that we could attribute the blood to that. If so,

this

stain—

from where did the blood come!?

It necessarily came from her body, and she is impure retroactively, until the time the garment was laundered or until the time of the garment’s previous examination.

C. The Gemara now explains a third reason for Shammai’s ruling:

Alternatively, this is the reason for Shammai’s ruling:

All women have their status determined at the moment they discover the blood,

for if it was indeed blood,

it would have emerged at the outset,

since blood normally emerges immediately and does not remain in the outer chamber!

And Hillel

disagrees and maintains that we must be concerned lest

the walls of the womb held the blood in place

before it emerged.

And Shammai

disagrees and maintains that

the walls of the womb do not hold blood in place!

We examine Shammai’s ruling: In the case of a woman who

uses a wad,

who fills that place with a wad in order to prevent pregnancy, according to Shammai,

what can be said?

Why should she not be rendered impure retroactively? Here, after all, there is concern that the wad she placed in that place delayed the blood’s emergence!

Abaye said: Shammai concedes in the case of a woman who uses a wad

that she is indeed rendered impure retroactively!

Rava said: In the case of a woman who uses a wad as well,

her status is determined at the moment she discovers the blood, because

due to perspiration

it contracts and contracts,

leaving room for the blood to emerge; since it did not emerge earlier, this proves that it emerged only now.

And Rava concedes in the case of a tightly pressed wad,

where the blood cannot emerge at all, that according to Shammai she is rendered impure retroactively.

We inquire about this:

And what difference is there between these

two

formulations

the latter explanations that we offer for Shammai,

and the first formulation,

which explains Shammai’s reasoning on the basis of placing the woman in accordance with her presumptive status?