Niddah 3a — the Talmud in English

And both

the first Tanna and Rabbi Shimon,

did not derive it

the law of the ritual bath

except from the sota:

The Rabbis hold

that the pure things are certainly impure,

because

as with the

sota:

Just as the sota is doubtful,

for we did not see that she committed adultery,

and they made her like a certainty,

in that she is forbidden to her husband with a definite and absolute prohibition—for even if she did not commit adultery, she is forbidden to him until she drinks the sota water—

so here too

with a ritual bath, although the purification of the vessels immersed in it is

doubtful—

they made it

the teruma that touched the vessels

like a certainty,

and we burn it according to the law of teruma that certainly became impure.

And we inquired concerning it:

If it was from the sota

that the Sages derived it—

say

this: that the law of the pure things made with vessels that were immersed in this ritual bath is

like

like

the sota

in the following manner:

Just as the sota

about whom the doubt arose when she was

in the public domain—

her doubt is

pure,

for she is not forbidden at all because of the doubt, but remains with the presumption of fitness for her husband—

so here too

with a ritual bath, if it had been

in the public domain,

its doubt should have been

pure!?

And we reject this:

Is this now so!?

What is the comparison!?

There,

with the sota, all her prohibition is

because of seclusion.

For this is the decree of the written Torah: if her husband warned her and she secluded herself, she is certainly forbidden to her husband.

And there is no seclusion in the public domain,

for the public domain is not considered a “place of seclusion,” and therefore she is pure in the public domain .

But

here,

with a ritual bath, the fact that we ruled that the pure things are impure is

because

the ritual bath

is lacking,

and if so—

what difference is there to me whether it is lacking in the public domain, and what difference is there to me whether it is lacking in the private domain!?

And if you would say

that in any event one should ask:

After all, every doubtful impurity in the public domain

we derive from the law of the sota, whose doubt is

pure.

And here too, with the ritual bath, it has not departed from being a doubtful impurity; in what way is the law of a ritual bath that is lacking different from the law of all doubts, which, if they occurred in the public domain, their doubt is pure!?

And we answer: Here, with a ritual bath that is lacking,

since there are tartei le-ra'uta,

the presumption of impurity of the vessels and the deficiency of the ritual bath—

it is considered certain impurity!

That is, we learned to purify only in a case of doubtful impurity in the public domain, but not when we relate to the matter as “certain impurity,” because it is tartei le-ra'uta.

And now, after the words of the Sages who deem it impure have been clarified—that they deem it so both in the private domain and in the public domain because they treat tartei le-ra'uta as a certainty—the Gemara explains the reasoning of Rabbi Shimon, who purifies entirely in the public domain and “suspends judgment” in the private domain:

And

also

Rabbi Shimon held

that the law of the ritual bath is

like the sota.

But he derived from the sota in a different manner:

Just as the sota

when the doubt arose concerning her

in the public domain,

her doubt is

pure, so here too

with a ritual bath, if the doubt occurred with regard to a ritual bath that was

in the public domain,

its doubt is

pure.

That is, Rabbi Shimon disputes the Rabbis’ treatment of tartei le-ra'uta as certain impurity, and holds that it has still not ceased to be a doubt. Therefore, we must derive from the sota, as with every doubtful impurity, that in the public domain its doubt is pure.

But now, since Rabbi Shimon holds that the law of a ritual bath that is lacking is like every doubtful impurity, whose laws we derive from the sota, it is difficult:

If it is from the sota

that we derive the law of a ritual bath that is lacking,

say

that the law of the ritual bath is

like the sota

in all its aspects—

just as the sota

if the doubt occurred when she secluded herself

in the private domain,

the relation to her impurity is as though she were

certainly impure, so here too

if it occurred that the ritual bath was lacking

in the private domain,

the pure things made with vessels immersed in that ritual bath should be held to be

certainly impure,

and why did Rabbi Shimon say that they are held to have doubtful impurity, and if they were teruma, we would neither eat them nor burn them!? We reject this:

Is this now so!?

What is the comparison between a ritual bath that is lacking in the private domain and a woman who secluded herself in the private domain!?

There,

with the sota, when we deem her impure in the private domain with certain impurity, this is because

“there are circumstantial indications,”

[“a sign of impurity”—Rashi’s wording],

for he warned her,

he warned her not to seclude herself with this man,

and she secluded herself

with him; and by virtue of the warning and the seclusion she becomes forbidden with a definite prohibition.

But

here,

with a ritual bath that is lacking,

what “circumstantial indication” is there!?

Therefore, we do not deem the pure things certainly impure, but suspend judgment concerning them because of the doubt .

From here we learn that in every case of doubtful impurity in the private domain Rabbi Shimon disputes the Sages and holds that we do not deem it certainly impure, but only suspend judgment because of the doubt—even where there are tartei le-ra'uta. For this is not certainly impure, but only doubtfully impure. If so, the same applies to all doubts in which there is a situation of tartei le-ra'uta: Rabbi Shimon disputes and holds that the situation must still be treated as doubtful and not as certain .

Therefore, even in a barrel of wine that turned into vinegar, which has two grounds for deterioration—the presumption of untithed produce and the vinegar before us—we do not regard it retroactively as certainly untithed produce, but as a doubt.

And if you wish, say

the Sages did not learn the law of the ritual bath from the sota!

For if they learn from the sota, they should purify the ritual bath in the public domain, since the Sages also hold that two grounds for deterioration do not create a state of certainty, and in a case of doubt one must purify, as with the sota. [And that which the Sages said—that one who immersed in a ritual bath that was found deficient in the private domain is certainly impure—is because of the presumption of impurity of the person immersing, as will be explained below].

For the Sages hold that what can be learned from the sota is only the law of a doubt that occurred at the time of contact, with regard to the thing becoming impure, as with the sota, whose case concerns the sota becoming impure; but not a doubt that occurred at the time of immersion in the ritual bath, which concerns the thing immersed becoming purified from its impurity.

But now, since the reason of the Sages is that one does not learn a doubt concerning purification from the doubt concerning the sota becoming impure, what is the reason of Rabbi Shimon, who purifies in the public domain? And we say:

This is the reason of Rabbi Shimon: he derives “the end of impurity,”

a doubt concerning purification, at the time of immersion,

from “the beginning of impurity,”

from a doubt of impurity at the time of contact, [which even according to the Sages can be learned from the sota].

Just as with “the beginning of impurity,”

when there occurred a

doubt

whether he

touched or did not touch

an impure object

in the public domain,

he is

pure,

for this law can be learned from the sota, in whose case there is a doubt “whether she touched or did not touch”;

so too, “the end of impurity,”

when there was a

doubt

whether he

immersed or did not immerse—

in the public domain

his doubt is

pure! And the Sages,

who disagree with Rabbi Shimon, say:

How can this be compared?!

How can the doubt concerning immersion be compared to the doubt concerning contact?!

For

there,

in the case of a doubt concerning contact,

the person

about whom you are uncertain whether he touched an impure object

stands with a presumption of purity,

and therefore

because of a doubt we do not bring him down

[we do not bring him down]

to impurity.

But

here,

in the case of one who immerses in a deficient ritual bath, and we have a doubt whether he became purified through this immersion,

the person—

stands with a presumption of impurity.

And if so,

because of a doubt we do not remove him from his impurity.

And now, after the distinction between the law of a woman who saw blood—for according to Shammai we do not suspect her of having become impure retroactively because she has a presumption of purity—and a deficient ritual bath, concerning which we suspect the ritually pure objects retroactively because of the presumption of impurity of the ritually pure objects, we raise another objection to Shammai:

And what is different

about the law of a woman who saw blood, where we do not suspect that the ritually pure objects with which she came into contact became impure retroactively,

from

the law of a

passageway—

For we learned: A creeping creature found in a passageway—

renders impure retroactively

all the ritually pure objects made in that passageway,

until someone says

a person: “

I examined this passageway, and there was no creeping creature in it!”

or until the time of sweeping,

when that passageway was swept. But the ritually pure objects made in it retroactively until then are impure; from the time of sweeping onward they are pure. And what is different from a menstruating woman, concerning whom we do not suspect retroactively?

And we answer:

There,

in the passageway,

also

its law is like that of a ritual bath,

since there are creeping creatures

of

the passageway itself, and

there are, in addition,

creeping creatures that come from outside—

it is comparable to two grounds for deterioration!

And one must regard the ritually pure objects made in the passageway as certainly impure, and therefore we do not take into account the presumption of purity of the ritually pure objects, but render them impure retroactively. But in the case of a woman, where there are not two grounds for deterioration, we establish her upon her presumption.

b. And now the Gemara explains a second reason why Shammai holds that one should not decree retroactive impurity upon a menstruating woman, on account of another reason:

And if you wish, say: This is the reason of Shammai

that he does not suspect that she saw blood retroactively:

since a woman

from whom blood emerges

feels it herself

at the time the blood emerges.

And this woman, who did not feel anything before finding the blood, may rely on the absence of sensation, and attribute it to the fact that certainly the blood emerged now, at the time she examined herself with a “cloth.”

And Hillel,

who does not rely upon the absence of sensation—what is his reason?

And we explain: there is concern that the blood emerged retroactively with a sensation, without her noticing this sensation, because

she thought,

at the time she felt it, that this was not the sensation of blood emerging, but rather

the sensation of urine.

And now we object:

And according to Shammai,

who relies upon the absence of sensation—

is there not

the blood emerging while she is

sleeping,

and she does not perceive the sensation at that time? If so, how can one rely on the fact that she did not feel anything until now? And we answer: even a woman

who is sleeping also

feels the emergence of blood, because

on account of her distress

at the time the blood emerges, she

awakens,

she awakens from her sleep and feels the emergence of the blood,

just as it is with the sensation of urine,

for she feels its emergence and awakens from her sleep.

And we object to Shammai: how could he say that all women have only their present time?

Is there not

a

mentally incapacitated

woman, who does not understand how to feel the emergence of blood; and why should there be no concern, when she sees blood, that perhaps it emerged from her retroactively with a sensation, but she does not recognize it!?

And we answer:

Shammai concedes in the case of a woman who is a fool

that there is concern to render her impure retroactively.

And we challenge:

but “all women

their time alone is sufficient”

it teaches,

without exception!?

And we answer: Shammai’s intention is to say—“

all intelligent women”

alone.

And we challenge:

but let him teach

Shammai:

“women—

their time alone is sufficient,” and why does he teach “all women”?

And we answer: Shammai’s intention in saying “all women” is—

to exclude the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer!

For Rabbi Eliezer said:

only

four women

who are “removed from blood” have their time alone sufficient,

and no more!

He informs us

Shammai that not only women who are removed from blood, but

all women

who are intelligent have their time alone sufficient.

And we inquire concerning Shammai’s words:

but there is

finding

stains,

which she finds on her body or on her garment, for we hold in the Mishna below that they render her impure retroactively, until she knows that the garment had been examined, even though she did not sense the blood’s departure!

And if so, should we

say that we have learned

below concerning the Mishna of

stains,

which renders her impure retroactively,

that it is not according to Shammai!?

For according to Shammai, who relies on the absence of sensation, in the case of stains she should not be rendered impure at all, since one can rely on the absence of sensation and say that this stain did not come from her body but from elsewhere!?

Abaye said: Shammai concedes with regard to stains

that she is to be rendered impure, even though she did not sense it, and even retroactively!

And we explain: this woman cannot attribute the blood that she found to any cause whatsoever. Therefore, we do not care that she did not sense it; rather, we say that this blood necessarily came from her body. And since we do not know when it left her body—for she discovered the stain after the blood had left—we render her impure retroactively.

And this is what we say:

What is the reason

Shammai concedes with regard to a stain that it renders her impure retroactively? For this woman

with

the blood of

a bird—

it is known to us that she

did not handle it,

and therefore it is impossible to attribute the stain to the blood of a bird that she handled.

And likewise

she did not pass through the marketplace of slaughterers,

so that we could attribute the blood to that; and if so—

this

stain

from where does the blood come!?

Necessarily, it is from her body, and she is impure retroactively, until the time of laundering, or until the time of the previous examination of the garment.

C. And now the Gemara explains a third reason for Shammai’s words:

If you wish, say: this is the reason of Shammai

that all women have their time alone sufficient,

for if it were blood—

it would have come from the outset,

since it is the way of blood to leave immediately and not remain in the outer chamber!

And Hillel

disagrees and holds that there is concern lest

the walls of the womb held back the blood

before it emerged outside.

And Shammai

disagrees and holds that

the walls of the womb do not hold back blood!

And we inquire concerning Shammai’s words: a woman who is

using a wad,

who fills that place with a wad in order to prevent pregnancy—for Shammai,

what is there to say?

Why is she not rendered impure retroactively? For here there is concern that the wad that she placed in that place delayed the blood’s emergence outside!?

Abaye said: Shammai concedes in the case of a woman using a wad

that indeed she is rendered impure retroactively!

Rava said: a woman using a wad also

has her time alone sufficient, because

due to perspiration—

it contracts and contracts,

and there is room for the blood to emerge; and since it did not emerge earlier, it is proven that it emerged only now.

And Rava concedes with regard to a tightly pressed wad,

where the blood cannot emerge at all, that according to Shammai she is rendered impure retroactively.

And we inquire about it:

and what is the difference between these

two

formulations

the latter ones with which we resolve Shammai,

and the first formulation

in which we resolve Shammai’s reason on the basis of maintaining a woman according to her presumption.