Niddah 2b (ב:) — the Talmud in English

But

this

woman,

a woman who sees blood,

since she sees it originating from her body

the blood that renders her impure with nida impurity, this constitutes a disqualifying factor affecting her presumptive status.

Therefore,

we do not say: Establish her on her presumptive status

that she was pure.

And we challenge this, both according to Shammai and according to Hillel

And how is

a woman who sees blood

different

from the law stated concerning

a ritual bath?

For we learned: A ritual bath

that contained forty se’a of water, and that ritual bath was fit for immersion,

and

after some time

the ritual bath was measured

and

found deficient

of the amount required for immersion, then

all

the

pure objects that were prepared through it,

meaning, the pure objects prepared with vessels that had been impure and were immersed in that ritual bath,

retroactively,

whether

the ritual bath was

in the public domain, or

was

in the private domain—

those pure objects are impure

with certain impurity!

This is difficult according to Shammai,

for here it is demonstrated that the pure objects are rendered impure

retroactively,

and we do not say: Maintain the ritual bath in its presumptive status. Why, then, does Shammai maintain the woman in a presumptive status of purity?

According to Hillel, it is difficult that they render

the pure objects impure with

certain impurity.

For if

with regard to impurity

from time to time

retroactively

in the case of nida,

the pure objects are rendered impure only with an uncertain impurity, so that they “

remain suspended”

the kodashim [or the teruma] that she touched—they are

not eaten

by anyone,

nor are they burned,

because they are only possibly impure.

But here,

in the case of a ritual bath found deficient, the pure objects are rendered impure with

certain impurity,

and the kodashim [and teruma] are burned because of it. For they render them impure even when the ritual bath was in the public domain, whereas if we had an uncertainty concerning impurity, we would have to declare them pure, since we maintain that every uncertainty concerning impurity in the public domain is pure!?

And we answer:

There,

in the case of the ritual bath, the retroactive impurity is certain

because it can be said:

Maintain

the

impure vessel

that was immersed in the ritual bath

in its presumptive status

that it is impure; and immersion in a ritual bath whose fitness is uncertain does not remove it from its presumptive status of impurity.

And say

that the status of the vessel is like that of one who

did not immerse

with a valid immersion!

And we consider the matter:

On the contrary!

Let us say:

Maintain

the

ritual bath in its presumptive status

that it was fit for immersion,

and say that it was not deficient

at the time the vessel was immersed in it, but became deficient only now!?

And we answer:

But

the ritual bath is

deficient before you!

Therefore, one must take into account the disqualifying factor affecting its presumptive status, since it is deficient before us.

And we challenge this: If so,

here too,

in the case of nida impurity,

there is blood before you,

and there is a disqualifying factor affecting her presumptive status of purity. Why do we not decree retroactive impurity, until the time when she examined herself and found herself pure!?

And we reject this: In the case of a woman, this is not a disqualifying factor; rather, we say:

She saw it only now!

And we challenge this:

Here too,

in the case of a ritual bath found deficient, let us say:

It became deficient only now!?

And we reject this:

How can these cases now be compared?

What is the basis for the comparison!?

There,

in the case of a ritual bath that became deficient,

it can be said

that it did not become deficient all at once, but rather

it became deficient and continued becoming deficient,

and since the loss of water is a continuing process, we must say that the deficiency that disqualified the ritual bath occurred earlier, and that the ritual bath’s presumptive status was compromised long ago.

But

here,

in the case of a woman who saw blood,

is it possible to say

regarding the sighting of the blood

“I saw it, and it came; I saw it, and it came”!?

And we raise a difficulty:

But what is the difficulty

in saying that the blood’s emergence is a continuous process, like the gradual loss of water from a mikveh, which is a continuous process?

Perhaps

here too, in the sighting of blood, the blood does not emerge all at once, but rather

“little by little”

“you saw it!”

for the blood gradually accumulates in the woman’s uterus, and because it continues to accumulate, it emerges from the uterus little by little; and when a small drop of blood, the size of a mustard seed, emerges, she becomes impure. If so, even in the case of a menstruating woman’s seeing blood, there is room to say, as with a mikveh, that the blood had already emerged into the outer chamber several days earlier, and she became impure then, and only afterward, when she examined herself, did she find it!?

And we answer:

there

in the case of a mikveh found lacking

there are two grounds for disfavor!

For we must presume that the impure person who immersed remained in his presumptive status of impurity; and likewise, there is a ground for disfavor regarding the mikveh’s presumptive status of purity, since a lacking mikveh is before you.

But

here,

in the case of a woman who saw blood,

there is

only

one ground for disfavor,

for the woman’s presumptive status of purity has been impaired, since blood is before you; but with regard to the pure items that she touched, there is no disfavor, and it is possible to maintain them in their presumptive status of purity.

We now challenge Shammai, who did not decree retroactive impurity because he maintains the woman in her presumptive status of purity:

What is the difference

between a woman who saw blood

and

the law of

a barrel?

As we learned:

If one had a barrel of wine that was tevel, from which he would occasionally separate teruma for other barrels of tevel wine, and he

would inspect

it from time to time,

the barrel,

tasting from it to determine whether it had not turned to vinegar, so that it would be fit

to separate teruma from it

for other wine barrels. He had to check whether the wine had turned to vinegar because vinegar and wine are considered two distinct species, and one may not separate one species for the other.

And

this is how he

would proceed

separating teruma.

And

if

afterward it was found

that the wine had become

vinegar,

and from the time it turned to vinegar it was not fit for separating from it for wine, since from that point it was no longer of the same species.

Behold,

the first three days

from the time of the last inspection,

it is certain

that the wine had not yet turned to vinegar; and if he separated it then as teruma for another barrel of wine, it is certainly valid teruma, and the tevel that he thereby rectified is certainly permitted to eat.

But

from that point onward,

if he separated from it after three days from the day he inspected it, it is

doubtful

teruma, because perhaps the wine had already turned to vinegar, and the tevel is doubtfully rectified. Therefore, he must again separate additional teruma from the tevel.

[See Rashi, who explained that Rabbi Yohanan interpreted it this way in tractate Bava Batra.

Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi, by contrast, explained that throughout the three days preceding the inspection in which it was discovered that the wine had become vinegar, it was certainly vinegar, and from that point onward retroactively it is doubtful.]

It is proven from here, according to both Rabbi Yohanan and Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi, that one must entertain uncertainty concerning a disfavor retroactively; this presents a difficulty to Shammai: Why did he not fear rendering the woman who saw blood impure retroactively!?

And we answer:

there,

in the case of a wine barrel,

it is different, because it is possible to say:

Maintain the tevel in its presumptive status, and say that it was not rectified!

That is not so in the case of a woman, for we have no presumption by which to maintain her in a presumptive status of impurity.

And we challenge:

On the contrary, maintain the wine

in the barrel

in its presumptive status, and say that it had not turned to vinegar

when he separated teruma from it!? And we reject this:

But it had turned to vinegar before you!

And we challenge:

Here too,

in the case of a woman who saw blood,

but the blood is before you!?

And we reject this: In the case of a woman, we say:

It is only now that she saw

blood!

And we challenge:

There,

in the case of the wine barrel,

too,

let us say

it is only now that it turned to vinegar!

And we reject this:

Is that comparable!?

What is the comparison!?

There,

in the case of wine,

it is possible to say

that it is a continuous process and occurred long ago, as we say:

“It turned to vinegar, and came; it turned to vinegar, and came.”

But

here,

in the case of a woman who saw blood,

is it possible to say, “I saw it, and it came; I saw it, and it came”!?

And we challenge:

But what is the difficulty

in saying that a woman’s seeing blood is also a continuous process, like wine turning to vinegar? For even regarding the sighting of blood one can say:

“Perhaps she saw it little by little.”

And we answer:

There

in the case of the barrel,

there are two grounds for disfavor,

for we maintain the tevel in its presumptive status, and in addition, vinegar is before you.

But

here,

in the case of a woman who sees blood,

there is one

ground only

for disfavor,

since blood is before you, but there is no presumptive status of impurity here.

And

now

we juxtapose

the law of

a barrel

of wine from which teruma was separated and which then turned to vinegar, with

the

law of

a mikveh

that was measured and found lacking:

What is the difference here

in the case of the mikveh, where we rule retroactively that all those who immersed in it have the status of

definite impurity, and what is the difference here

in the case of the barrel, where we apply the law of

doubtful

teruma, and not the law of definite tevel?

Rabbi Hanina of Sura said: Who is the tanna of the barrel?

It is Rabbi Shimon, for with regard to a mikveh as well,

he disagrees with the Rabbis and

he renders it doubtful,

as the teruma is not burned because of the contact of those who immersed in it.

As we learned: A mikveh that was measured and found lacking—

all the pure items that were prepared on its basis retroactively, whether in the public domain or in the private domain —

are impure as the reason will be explained below.

and the reason will be explained below].

Rabbi Shimon says:

If the mikveh was

in the public domain—

they are pure.

And if it was

in the private domain—

they are suspended

in a state of uncertainty [as will be explained below].