Niddah 29a (כט.) — the Talmud in English

And the Gemara answers:

that

“male and female,” which are stated with regard to valuations,

is needed

to distinguish between the valuation of a man,

which is fifty shekels,

and the valuation of a woman,

which is thirty.

And the Torah had to specify male and female. Therefore, without the exposition based on the added definite article and the added word “if,” we would not be able to exclude a tumtum and an androgynos. But with regard to the impurity of a woman with a flux, the words “male and female” are superfluous, since it would have been possible to write: “You shall send out the person.” Therefore, “male and female” can be expounded even without any additional redundancy!

We learned in the Mishna:

If it emerged dismembered or inverted,

once the majority of it emerged, it is considered born.

Rabbi Elazar said:

The Mishna’s ruling that a dismembered fetus is considered born only once the majority of it has emerged applies

even

when

the head emerged with them,

with the rest of the dismembered limbs. Although the head emerged, it is not considered born until the majority of the fetus has emerged.

And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: They taught

that it is not considered born until the majority of the fetus has emerged

only when the head is not with them,

with the rest of the dismembered limbs.

But

if

the head was with them—

the head exempts!

For it is considered born merely by the emergence of the head.

And the Gemara is uncertain:

Shall we say that Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Yoḥanan

disagree

with regard to the opinion of Shmuel?

As Shmuel said:

The head does not exempt in the case of a stillborn!

The emergence of the head is considered the birth of the entire fetus only in the case of a viable fetus, but not in the case of a stillborn. A practical difference arising from this issue concerns a woman who gives birth to twins, one of whom is a stillborn: The stillborn emerged first, his head emerged and then returned, and afterward his viable brother was born. The second is the firstborn with regard to the kohen, because the emergence of the stillborn’s head does not exempt the mother’s womb.

That is: Rabbi Elazar held in accordance with Shmuel, and therefore even when the dismembered head emerged together with the other limbs, it is not considered a fetus born. And Rabbi Yoḥanan, who disagrees, maintains that even a dead head has the power to establish the status of birth.

And the Gemara rejects this: In the case of

an intact

stillborn, whose limbs are all properly connected and whose only deficiency is that it has no life,

everyone—

Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Yoḥanan—

does not disagree

that the emergence of the head is considered birth, as both of them disagree with Shmuel!

They disagree—

Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Yoḥanan—

with regard to a dismembered fetus.

One master,

Rabbi Elazar,

holds: It is only in the case of an intact fetus that the emergence

of the head is considered like the birth of the entire body;

but in the case of a dismembered fetus,

with the head separated from the rest of the limbs,

the emergence

of the head is not considered like the birth of the entire fetus.

And the other master,

Rabbi Yoḥanan, holds that

even in the case of a dismembered fetus, the emergence

of the head is considered a complete birth.

Some teach this statement independently,

and the disagreement between Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Yoḥanan does not concern what is stated in the Mishna:

Rabbi Elazar said: There is no

emergence of the

head

of a stillborn that is considered

like the majority of the limbs!

And Rabbi Yoḥanan said:

The emergence of the

head

of a stillborn is considered

like the majority of the limbs!

And they disagree with regard to Shmuel—

Rabbi Elazar holds in accordance with Shmuel, while Rabbi Yoḥanan disagrees with him. According to this version, it is impossible to explain that they disagree specifically with regard to a fetus that emerged dismembered. Since their statements do not concern the Mishna, which deals with a dismembered fetus, and their wording does not hint that they were speaking of a dismembered fetus, we must follow the unqualified wording, which indicates that they were speaking of every stillborn.

The Gemara raises an objection to Rabbi Yoḥanan:

We learned: If it emerged dismembered or inverted—

once the majority of it emerged, it is considered born.

And the Gemara analyzes this:

From the fact that it says, “

dismembered

or inverted,” it follows that “dismembered”

is its only deficiency, and the dismembered fetus did not emerge inverted, but

in its proper position,

with its head emerging first.

And it says that the tanna of our Mishna ruled that only

once

the majority of it emerged

of the dismembered fetus

is it considered born—this is difficult for Rabbi Yoḥanan!

The Gemara answers:

Rabbi Yoḥanan could say to you: Say: “If it emerged dismembered and inverted!”

The Gemara raises an objection:

But it teaches “or”!

And it answers: The “or” stated in the Mishna is an issue unto itself, and the tanna abbreviated his wording and

this is what he is saying: If it emerged dismembered or intact, in either case

—whether dismembered or intact—the fetus in question emerged

inverted,

[inverted], and therefore only

once the majority of it emerged is it considered born,

since its head had not yet emerged.

Rav Pappa said:

The disagreement between Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Yoḥanan as to whether a fetus that emerged dismembered must have its majority emerge, or whether the emergence of its head alone suffices for it to be called born, is

a disagreement between tannaim—

As we learned in a beraita:

If it emerged dismembered or inverted—

once the majority of it emerged, it is considered born!

Rabbi Yosei says:

Once it emerges in its proper position!

And the Gemara analyzes this:

What is Rabbi Yosei saying?

Apparently, his words indicate that he disagrees with the first tanna, who stated that the emergence of the majority is effective even for an inverted fetus, and he maintains that even when the fetus is intact, it is not considered born when its majority emerges; the emergence of the majority is effective only when it emerges in its proper position. How can this be? Surely, once the majority has emerged, regardless of the manner in which it emerged, it is considered born?!

Therefore,

Rav Pappa said:

The version before us is incorrect ; the word “or” must be omitted from the beraita, and

this is what it is saying: If it emerged dismembered and inverted—

once the majority of it emerged, it is considered born! But

if it emerged dismembered

in its proper position—

the head exempts,

as it is only when the fetus is both dismembered and inverted that the majority must emerge.

Rabbi Yosei says: A dismembered fetus

is considered born only

once the majority of it emerges, in its proper position,

and two conditions are required: that the majority emerge and that it emerge in the usual manner. However, their entire disagreement concerns a dismembered fetus; in the case of an intact fetus, Rabbi Yosei agrees that the emergence of the majority is effective even when it is inverted.

This is what Rav Pappa meant by “a disagreement between tannaim”: Rabbi Yoḥanan follows the first tanna, who maintains that even in the case of a dismembered fetus the head exempts. And Rabbi Elazar follows Rabbi Yosei, who maintains that in the case of a dismembered fetus, even if the head emerges first, in its proper position, it is not considered born unless the majority of it also emerges.

Rav Zevid challenged Rav Pappa:

You are correct that the beraita must be emended, and that the disagreement between the first tanna and Rabbi Yosei is identical to the disagreement between Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Yoḥanan — they disagree as to whether the birth of the head of a dismembered fetus establishes the fetus as born. However, your interpretation of Rabbi Yosei’s words itself is incorrect.

For according to your interpretation, Rabbi Yosei holds that a dismembered fetus is not considered born until the majority of it emerges in its proper position.

It follows—

that in the case of an inverted fetus,

which emerges inverted,

the majority also does not exempt,

since it emerged dismembered. But this is impossible, because

we have established

throughout the Torah

that the majority is equivalent to the whole, 239 ,

and if so, what difference does it make that the fetus emerged dismembered and inverted? Its majority has already emerged, and therefore it is considered born?!

Rather, Rav Zevid said,

and

this is what it is saying

[this is how the words of the beraita are to be interpreted]:

If it emerged dismembered and inverted, once the majority of it emerged, it is considered born;

but

in its proper position,

with the head emerging first, even in the case of a dismembered fetus it is not necessary for the majority to emerge; once

the head

alone emerges,

it exempts.

And Rabbi Yosei disagrees with the inference from the first tanna’s words that the emergence of the head is effective in the case of a dead fetus,

and Rabbi Yosei

says—

once it emerges

in its proper position.

When its head emerges first, this is effective specifically when it emerges

for life,

when its form is complete, like the form of a living fetus ; but in the case of a dismembered fetus, there is no difference whether the head or the other limbs emerge first: It is considered born only when the majority emerges.

It was also taught: If it emerged dismembered—

inverted, once the majority of it emerged, it is considered born,

since the head did not emerge first.

But

if it emerged

in its proper position,

with the head emerging first,

the head exempts

despite the fact that it is dismembered, in accordance with the words of the first tanna and Rabbi Yoḥanan.

Rabbi Yosei says: Once it emerges in its proper position for life; and what is “in its proper position for life”? Once “the majority of its head” has emerged!

And the beraita explains:

And what is “the majority of its head”?

1.

Rabbi Yosei says:

Once its temples have emerged.

2.

Abba Ḥanan in the name of Rabbi Yehoshua says:

Once its forehead has emerged

[its brow] 243 .

So explained Rashi in Bekhorot [46b] explained it. Maimonides (Forbidden Intercourse 10:6) wrote that once the majority of the forehead emerges, it is considered born, and an entire forehead is not required. The Beit Yosef (Yoreh De’ah 194:10) explained that the Rambam understood that “head” does not include the entire skull, but only the forehead down to the eyes. Therefore, if the entire forehead were required to emerge, this would not be “the majority of the head” but all of it. Consequently, from Rabbi Yosei’s statement that the majority of the head is sufficient, it follows that the majority of the forehead is sufficient.

3.

And some say:

Once the horns of its head are visible 244 .

Mishna:

A woman who miscarries

a fetus

and it is not known what it is,

whether male or female,

shall observe the periods for a male and for a female,

fourteen days of impurity as a woman who gives birth to a female, and afterward she shall observe the days of purity of a male, until forty days.

And if

it is not known whether it was a fetus or not,

as it is also uncertain whether she miscarried a fluid mass,

she shall observe the periods for a male, for a female, and for a menstruating woman,

as, due to the uncertainty, she observes fourteen days of impurity as a woman who gives birth to a female, and afterward she has no days of purity at all. This is the meaning of “for a menstruating woman”: Due to the uncertainty, she conducts herself as though she were merely a menstruating woman, who has no days of purity at all. [The phrase “she shall observe the periods for a male” will be explained by the Gemara’s discussion of the following Mishna] .

Gemara:

Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said:

A pregnant woman who

crossed a river and miscarried

her fetus into the river water, and does not know whether she miscarried a fetus or a fluid mass,

brings the offering

of a woman who gives birth,

and it may be eaten

as a definite offering. This is so even though a bird sin-offering is slaughtered by pinching, and if it is not an offering it would be an animal carcass; nevertheless, she may eat it, since it is certain to us that it is the offering of a woman who gave birth. And Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi’s reason is:

Follow the majority of women, and the majority of women

who are pregnant

give birth to a viable fetus!

The Ramban raised a difficulty from the beraita cited at the beginning of the chapter [21a], which states that a woman who miscarried without knowing what she miscarried brings an offering, but it may not be eaten. He answered that the beraita there must be referring to a woman who had not been established as pregnant, in accordance with the Gemara’s answer later in our discussion. See also what we wrote there in the notes.

And the Gemara asks Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi from the Mishna:

We learned:

If

it is not known whether it was a fetus, “she shall observe the periods for a male, for a female, and for a menstruating woman,”

and according to Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi,

why should she observe the period for a menstruating woman

and have no days of purity at all, due to the uncertainty whether she miscarried a fluid mass?

Shall we say: Follow the majority of women, and the majority of women give birth to a viable fetus 247 ,

so that she should at least have the days of purity of a male, after observing fourteen days of impurity as a female due to the uncertainty?!

And the Gemara resolves this by establishing that:

the Mishna—

is referring to a case in which her pregnancy had not been established,

as it had not previously been known that she was pregnant.

And when Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said

that she brings the offering of a woman who has certainly given birth—

when her pregnancy had been established! Ta shma: An animal that went out full,

that went out to pasture in a place where it was not seen, while pregnant,

and came

back from the pasture that same day

empty,

and it is unknown whether it miscarried a sac of fluid or gave birth to an offspring, and consequently it is unknown what the status of the next offspring is, whether it is a firstborn or not—the offspring

that follows it

is

a firstborn—

as a matter of uncertainty!

[And its status is that its owner may eat it after it develops a blemish, but does not give it to a priest because of the uncertainty, as the burden of proof rests upon the claimant.]

And the Gemara asks concerning the statement of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi:

But why?—

Follow the majority of animals, and the majority of animals give birth to viable offspring!

This animal, too, should be judged in accordance with the majority.

And this one,

the offspring born afterward,

is certainly ordinary

and should be permitted to be eaten even before it develops a blemish?!

And it answers:

Ravina said: Because it can be said—

that indeed

the majority of animals give birth to something that exempts from the laws of the firstborn, while a minority give birth to something that does not exempt from the laws of the firstborn.

But—

all animals that give birth discharge

a secretion before giving birth, which flows from them on the day of birth and is an early sign of impending birth.

And this one, since it did not discharge

on that day, before it went out to pasture,

the majority is undermined with regard to it,

and therefore it is uncertain whether it gave birth to a viable offspring, as there is concern that it merely miscarried a sac of fluid.

The Gemara objects:

If

all

animals that give birth discharge

without exception, what uncertainty is there at all whether the second offspring, born afterward, is a firstborn? After all,

this one, since it did not discharge,

certainly miscarried a sac of fluid, and the offspring born afterward

is certainly a fully valid firstborn?!

And it answers:

Rather, say:

the majority of animals that give birth discharge

but not all of them.

And this one, since it did not discharge—

the majority is undermined with regard to it,

and therefore the offspring born afterward is a firstborn as a matter of uncertainty.

When Ravin came, he said: Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Ḥanina raised an objection

to Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi from a teaching concerning a woman

who is uncertain,

as she did not know the time of her giving birth; and Ravin added—

and I do not know what the refutation is

from this teaching.

And the Gemara explains:

What is it,

the teaching from which the objection is raised?