Niddah 29a — the Talmud in English

And the Gemara answers:

That

“male and female” mentioned with regard to valuations,

is needed ![](pamud.bmp "

Exact folio location")

to distinguish between the valuation of a man

which is fifty shekels

and the valuation of a woman,

which is thirty. The Torah therefore had to specify “male” and “female.” Consequently, without the additional expositions derived from the definite article and from the additional word “if,” we would not have been able to exclude a person of indeterminate sex and an androgyne. But with regard to the ritual impurity of a person suffering a flux, the words “male” and “female” are superfluous. It would have been possible to write: “You shall send out a person,” and therefore “male and female” can be expounded even without any additional word!

We learned in the Mishna:

If it emerged dismembered or in an abnormal position,

once most of it emerged, it is considered to have been born.

Rabbi Elazar said:

The Mishna’s ruling that a dismembered fetus is considered born only once most of it emerges applies

even

when

the head emerged with them,

with the other dismembered limbs. Although the head emerged, it is not considered born until most of the fetus has emerged.

And Rabbi Yohanan said: This was taught

that it is not considered born until most of the fetus emerges

only when the head is not with them,

with the other dismembered limbs.

But

if

the head was with them—

the head exempts!

For it is considered born when the head alone emerges.

And the Gemara raises a question:

Shall we say that

Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Yohanan

disagree with regard to the opinion of Shmuel?

As Shmuel said:

The head does not exempt in the case of miscarriages!

The emergence of the head is considered equivalent to the birth of the entire fetus only in the case of a living fetus, but not in the case of a nonviable fetus. One practical consequence of this discussion concerns a woman who gives birth to twins, one of whom is a nonviable fetus: If the nonviable fetus emerged first and put out its head and then withdrew it, and afterward the viable brother was born, the second is the firstborn with regard to a priest, because the emergence of the nonviable fetus’s head does not exempt the mother’s womb.

That is to say: Rabbi Elazar agreed with Shmuel. Therefore, even when the dismembered head emerged together with the other limbs, it is not considered a birth. Rabbi Yohanan, who disagrees, maintains that even a dead head has the power to establish the status of a birth.

The Gemara rejects this: In the case of a

complete

nonviable fetus, whose limbs are all attached in their proper form but which has no life,

everyone—

Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Yohanan—

agrees

that the emergence of the head is considered a birth, as both of them disagree with Shmuel!

When they disagree,

Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Yohanan,

it is with regard to a dismembered fetus.

One master,

Rabbi Elazar,

maintains: It is in the case of a complete fetus that the emergence of the head is considered

equivalent to the birth of the entire body. But

in the case of a dismembered fetus,

where the head is separated from the other limbs,

the emergence of the head is not considered

equivalent to the birth of the entire fetus.

And the other master,

Rabbi Yohanan, maintains that

in the case of a dismembered fetus as well, the emergence of the head is considered

a complete birth.

Some teach this statement as an independent discussion,

and the disagreement between Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Yohanan does not concern the ruling stated in the Mishna:

Rabbi Elazar said: The emergence

of

the head

of a nonviable fetus is not considered

equivalent to the emergence of most of its limbs!

And Rabbi Yohanan said:

The emergence of

the head

of a nonviable fetus is considered

equivalent to the emergence of most of its limbs!

And they disagree with regard to Shmuel—

Rabbi Elazar agrees with Shmuel, while Rabbi Yohanan disagrees with him. According to this version, it is impossible to explain that they disagree specifically with regard to a fetus that emerged dismembered. Since their statements were not based on the Mishna, which discusses a dismembered fetus, and their wording does not hint that they were speaking about a dismembered fetus, we must follow the unrestricted wording, which indicates that they were speaking about every nonviable fetus.

The Gemara raises an objection to Rabbi Yohanan:

We learned: “If it emerged dismembered or in an abnormal position”—

once most of it emerged, it is considered to have been born.

And the Gemara infers:

From the fact that it says

“dismembered

or in an abnormal position,” it follows that “dismembered”

is the only defect, and the dismembered fetus did not emerge in an abnormal position, but

in its proper manner,

with its head emerging first.

And it says that the tan-naitic authority in our Mishna taught that only

once

most of it emerged

of the dismembered fetus

is it considered to have been born. This is difficult for Rabbi Yohanan!

And the Gemara answers:

Rabbi Yohanan can say to you: Read it as follows: “If it emerged dismembered and in an abnormal position”!

The Gemara raises a further objection:

But does it not teach “or”?

And it answers: The word “or” in the Mishna constitutes a matter in its own right and the tan-naitic authority abbreviated its wording and

meant as follows: “If it emerged dismembered or complete, in either case

—whether dismembered or complete—it emerged

in an abnormal position,

[upside down]. Therefore, only

once most of it emerged is it considered to have been born,

since the head has not yet emerged.

Rav Pappa said:

The disagreement between Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Yohanan—whether a fetus that emerged dismembered must have most of it emerge, or whether it is enough for its head to emerge for it to be called born—

is a disagreement between tannaim.

For we learned in a beraita:

If it emerged dismembered or in an abnormal position—

once most of it emerged, it is considered to have been born!

Rabbi Yosei says:

Once it emerges in its proper manner!

And the Gemara infers:

What does

Rabbi Yosei mean? His words apparently indicate that he disagrees with the first tan-naitic authority, who stated that the emergence of most of the fetus is effective even when it is in an abnormal position, and maintains that even when it is complete it is not considered born when most of it emerges; the emergence of most of it is effective only when it emerges in its proper manner. How can this be? After all, once most of it has emerged in any manner, it is considered born?!

Therefore:

Rav Pappa said:

The version before us is not correct and the word “or” must be deleted from the beraita, and

it means as follows: “If it emerged dismembered and in an abnormal position”—

once most of it emerged, it is considered to have been born! But if

it emerged dismembered

in its proper manner—

the head exempts,

for only when the fetus is both dismembered and in an abnormal position is the emergence of most of it required.

Rabbi Yosei says: A dismembered fetus

is considered born only

once most of it emerges in its proper manner,

and two conditions are required: most of it must emerge, and it must emerge in the normal manner. However, their entire disagreement concerns a dismembered fetus. With regard to a complete fetus, Rabbi Yosei agrees that the emergence of most of it is effective even when it is in an abnormal position.

This is what Rav Pappa said, “It is a disagreement between tannaim”: Rabbi Yohanan agrees with the first tan-naitic authority, who maintains that even in the case of a dismembered fetus, the head exempts. Rabbi Elazar agrees with Rabbi Yosei, who maintains that in the case of a dismembered fetus, even if the head emerges first in its proper manner, it is not considered born unless most of it also emerges.

Rav Zevid raised an objection

to Rav Pappa: It is true, as you say, that the beraita must be emended, and that the disagreement between the first tan-naitic authority and Rabbi Yosei is identical to the disagreement between Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Yohanan . They disagree over whether the birth of the head of a dismembered fetus gives the fetus the status of one that has been born. However, your interpretation of Rabbi Yosei’s statement is incorrect.

For according to your interpretation, Rabbi Yosei maintains that a dismembered fetus is not considered born until most of it emerges in its proper manner.

It follows

that in the case of an abnormal position,

when it emerges upside down,

even the emergence of most of it does not exempt,

since it is dismembered. But this is impossible, because

we have established

throughout the Torah

that most is equivalent to all .

If so, what difference does it make that it emerged dismembered and in an abnormal position? Most of its limbs have already emerged, and it is therefore considered born?!

Rather, Rav Zevid said,

and

this is what it means [that is how the beraita should be interpreted]:

[this is how the words of the beraita are to be interpreted]:

“If it emerged dismembered and in an abnormal position, once most of it emerged, it is considered to have been born.”

But if it emerged

in its proper manner,

with the head emerging first, even in the case of a dismembered fetus, there is no need for most of it to emerge; once

the head

alone emerges, it

exempts.

And Rabbi Yosei disagrees with the inference from the words of the first tan-naitic authority that the emergence of the head is effective in the case of a dead fetus.

Rabbi Yosei

and

says:

Once it emerges in its proper manner.

When its head emerges first, this is effective specifically when it emerges

for life,

when its form is complete, like the form of a living fetus . But in the case of a dismembered fetus, there is no difference whether the head or the other limbs emerge first; it is considered born only when most of it emerges .

It was taught likewise: “If it emerged dismembered”—

in an abnormal position, once most of it emerged, it is considered to have been born,

since the head did not emerge first.

But

if it emerged

in its proper manner,

with the head emerging first,

the head exempts

even though it is dismembered, in accordance with the words of the first tan-naitic authority and Rabbi Yohanan.

Rabbi Yosei says: Once it emerges in its proper manner for life. And what is “in its proper manner for life”? Once most of its head has emerged!

And the beraita explains:

And what is “most of its head”?

1.

Rabbi Yosei says:

Once its temples have emerged.

2.

Abba Hanan said in the name of Rabbi Yehoshua:

Once its forehead has emerged

[its brow] .

3.

And some say:

Once the crown of its head is visible .

Mishna:

A woman who miscarries

a fetus

whose nature is unknown,

whether male or female,

shall observe the restrictions for a male and for a female.

She observes fourteen days of ritual impurity, as a woman who gives birth to a female, and afterward observes the days of ritual purity of a woman who gives birth to a male, until the fortieth day.

And if

it is unknown whether it was a fetus or not,

as there is also uncertainty whether she expelled only fluid,

she shall observe the restrictions for a male, for a female, and for a menstruating woman.

Because of the uncertainty, she observes fourteen days of ritual impurity, as a woman who gives birth to a female, and afterward she has no days of ritual purity at all. This is the meaning of “for a menstruating woman”: because of the uncertainty, she conducts herself as though she were merely menstruating, in which case there are no days of ritual purity. [The phrase “she shall observe the restrictions for a male” will be explained by the Gemara on the following Mishna.]

Gemara:

Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said:

A pregnant woman who

crossed a river and miscarried

her fetus into the river water, and does not know whether she miscarried a fetus or expelled only fluid,

brings the offering

of a woman who gives birth,

and it may be eaten

as a definite offering, even though the bird sin-offering is killed by pinching the neck, and if it is not an offering then it is an animal carcass. Nevertheless, she may eat it, because we are certain that it is the offering of a woman who gave birth. The reason for Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi’s ruling is:

Follow the majority of women, and the majority of women

who become pregnant

give birth to a viable fetus!

The Gemara asks Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi from the Mishna:

We learned:

If

“it is unknown whether it was a fetus,” she shall observe the restrictions for a male, for a female, and for a menstruating woman.

But according to Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi,

why must she observe the restrictions for a menstruating woman

and have no days of ritual purity at all because of the uncertainty that she may have expelled only fluid?

Let us say: Follow the majority of women, and the majority of women give birth to a viable fetus ,

so that she should at least have the days of ritual purity of a woman who gives birth to a male, after observing fourteen days of ritual impurity because of the possibility that she gave birth to a female?!

The Gemara, the Talmudic discussion of the Mishna, resolves this by establishing a particular case:

the Mishna—

deals with a woman whose pregnancy had not been established,

because it had not previously been known that she was pregnant!

And when Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said

that she brings the offering of a woman who has certainly given birth, he was referring to a case

in which her pregnancy had been established! Come and hear a proof: An animal that went out full,

that went out to pasture in a place where no one could see it, while it was pregnant,

and returned

from the pasture that same day

empty,

and it is not known whether it expelled a nonviable mass of tissue or miscarried a fetus; therefore, it is not known whether the next offspring is subject to firstborn status—

the offspring born after it

is

a firstborn

due to the uncertainty! [That is its law: Its owner may eat it after it develops a disqualifying blemish, but does not give it to a priest due to the uncertainty, because the burden of proof rests upon the claimant seeking to take property from another.]

[And its status is that its owner may eat it after it develops a blemish, but does not give it to a priest because of the uncertainty, as the burden of proof rests upon the claimant.]

The Gemara asks concerning the words of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi:

But why?

Follow the majority of animals, and the majority of animals give birth to a fully viable offspring!

This animal, too, should be judged according to the majority.

And this one,

the offspring subsequently born,

is certainly an ordinary offspring

and should be permitted to be eaten even before it develops a blemish?!

The Gemara answers:

Ravina said: It can be said—

that indeed

the majority of animals give birth to something that removes the firstborn status, while a minority give birth to something that does not remove the firstborn status.

But

all animals that give birth discharge a secretion

before giving birth: a fluid flows from them on the day of delivery, and this is an early sign that birth is imminent.

And since this animal did not discharge such a secretion

that day, before it went out to pasture,

the majority assumption concerning it has been weakened,

and therefore it is uncertain whether it gave birth to a fully viable offspring, and there is concern that it merely expelled a nonviable mass of tissue.

The Gemara challenges this:

If

every

animal that gives birth discharges such a secretion

without exception, what uncertainty is there at all as to whether the second offspring born afterward is a firstborn? After all,

since this animal did not discharge the secretion,

it certainly expelled a nonviable mass of tissue, and the offspring born afterward

is certainly a fully valid firstborn?!

The Gemara answers:

Rather, say—

most animals that give birth discharge such a secretion

but not all of them.

And since this animal did not discharge the secretion—

the majority assumption concerning it has been weakened,

and therefore the offspring born afterward is a firstborn due to uncertainty.

When Ravin came, he said: Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Hanina raises an objection from a source

against Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi, based on a teaching concerning a woman

who is uncertain

because she did not know when she gave birth. Ravin added:

And I do not know what the conclusive refutation is

from this teaching.

The Gemara explains:

What is it?

What is the teaching from which the question is raised?