Nedarim 80b (פ:) — the Talmud in English

And we object: indeed,

you explained

the wording of the Mishna

“if I bathe”

as referring to a woman who says, “The benefit of bathing shall be forbidden to me forever if I bathe.” But the second part of the Mishna can still be challenged, where she said

“if I do not bathe”:

what are the circumstances?

What prohibition did she make conditional on “if I do not bathe”?

If you say

that it refers to a case where she said

“The benefit of bathing shall be forbidden to me forever if I do not bathe today”—

This is difficult:

why does she require annulment?

Why does she need her husband to revoke the vow at all?

Let her bathe,

and then she will not be forbidden to bathe forever.

And we answer:

Rav Yehuda said:

It is referring to a case where she

said:

“The benefit of bathing shall be

forbidden to me forever if I do not bathe in water used for soaking flax!”

“Water used for soaking flax” is water in which flax is soaked; it is extremely foul, and bathing in it causes her suffering. Therefore, either way she suffers here: if she bathes in the foul water, that is suffering; and if she does not bathe in it, she will be forbidden to bathe forever, and that too is suffering.

And we object: The tanna of the Mishna cited two examples of vows involving suffering: one involving adornment and the other involving bathing. This indicates that they are two examples of the same type, and not two different types of cases.

And since we have now established that the vow concerning bathing refers to a case where she said, “The benefit of bathing shall be forbidden to me if I do not bathe in water used for soaking flax,”

similarly,

in the example involving adornment,

where it teaches “if I do not adorn myself,”

it must refer to a case where she said, “Adornment shall be forbidden to me forever

, if I do not adorn myself

today

with naphtha.”

But if she simply said, “If I do not adorn myself,” her husband cannot revoke the vow, since this does not involve suffering.

And this is impossible, because naphtha is not called adornment; rather,

it is filth!

And we answer:

He said

[Rav Yehuda]:

She said—

“The benefit of bathing shall be forbidden to me forever if I bathe today,

and an oath that I will not bathe.

The benefit of adornment shall be forbidden to me forever if I adorn myself today,

and an oath that I will not adorn myself.”

That is, the Mishna means to say that the tanna kamma and Rabbi Yosei disagree as to whether refraining from bathing is considered suffering.

There are two distinctions in this matter:

The first concerns a case where she prohibited bathing forever on the condition “if I bathe.” It does not refer to a condition of “if I bathe today,” but rather, “if I bathe ever again.”

According to the tanna kamma, since this involves suffering, he may revoke the vow; whereas according to Rabbi Yosei, this does not involve suffering, and he cannot revoke it.

The second concerns a case where she swore an oath that “I will not bathe.”

According to the tanna kamma, he may revoke it, whereas according to Rabbi Yosei, he may not revoke it.

Accordingly, the Mishna is interpreted as follows:

A woman who said, “Bathing forever shall be konam for me on the condition ‘if I bathe,’” and likewise, if she said, “An oath that I will not bathe”—

according to the tanna kamma, he may revoke it, whereas according to Rabbi Yosei, he cannot revoke it.

And the conclusion of the Mishna, concerning adornment, is interpreted in the same manner .

Ravina said to Rav Ashi: In this case,

then,

“These are vows and oaths”

should have been taught!

Since the Mishna also discusses a case where she swore that she would not bathe.

He said to him: Teach: “These are vows and oaths.”

Alternatively,

you can offer another answer:

Oaths too are included in vows.

For it is the way of the tanna that sometimes he teaches using the language of vows, while intending his wording to include the laws of oaths as well. And we find this in the wording of the tanna—

as we learned: “Like the vows of the wicked”—

a vow concerning naziriteship, a sacrifice, or an oath.

That is, it is characteristic of the wicked to make vows and swear oaths. Therefore—

if one said, “Like the vows of the wicked, I am,” and a nazir passed before him, this is an abbreviated expression indicating acceptance of naziriteship.

And if he said, “Like the vows of the wicked, this is upon me,” and an animal was before him, this is an abbreviated expression indicating an obligation to bring a sacrifice,

and if he said, “Like the vows of the wicked, from it,” and a loaf of bread was before him, this is an abbreviated expression indicating an oath prohibiting it.

Thus, we find that the tanna refers to an oath using the language of a vow.

And we object:

But

when

the Rabbis said that bathing involves suffering, they meant when she does not bathe.

And we raise a contradiction,

as we find a contradiction to this in what we learned in tractate Yoma, concerning the law of suffering on Yom Kippur—

Even though one is prohibited from all of them,

from performing labor on Yom Kippur and from the five forms of affliction—eating, drinking, bathing and anointing, wearing shoes, and marital relations—

one is liable to karet only for eating, drinking, and performing labor.

But one is not liable to karet for the other forms of affliction. For it is written: “Any person who is not afflicted, I will destroy,” and the Sages interpreted this to mean that one is liable to karet only for something that involves suffering, and only abstention from eating and drinking involves suffering. But abstention from bathing, anointing, and wearing shoes does not involve suffering.

And if you say that when she does not bathe there is suffering, on Yom Kippur, when she bathes—

should she be liable to karet!

Since the Rabbis hold that refraining from bathing is something that involves suffering, why is one who bathes on Yom Kippur not liable to karet?

And we answer:

Rava said: Here, it depends on the context of the verse, and there, it depends on the context of the verse!

With regard to Yom Kippur, where it is written, “You shall afflict your souls,”

so that one must be afflicted on Yom Kippur, the meaning of affliction is

a matter whose affliction is known now.

Therefore, the intention of the verse here is abstention from eating and drinking, since the suffering is evident now, on Yom Kippur itself.

But with regard to refraining from

bathing—

the suffering is not known now;

the suffering is not evident on that day, and therefore one is not liable for it to karet on Yom Kippur.

But with

regard to vows, where it is written, “Any vow and any oath of prohibition that causes suffering to a person,”

the meaning of the verse is

a matter that will bring her to suffering!

For every vow whose eventual consequence is to cause a woman suffering, the husband has the right to revoke it.

And when she does not bathe—

it will bring her to suffering.

And since refraining from bathing will bring her to suffering, the husband has the power to revoke the vow.

And he raises a contradiction

from that

which Rabbi Yosei said, as

Rabbi Yosei

said—

For it was taught in a beraita [in the Tosefta, Bava Metzia, chapter 11], explaining the rights of the public regarding water designated for public use:

“A spring belonging to the people of a city,”

a spring of water that flows in one city and from there flows toward other cities, and it happened that the water was insufficient for all those who used the water of this spring—

if the choice is between

their lives,

the lives of the residents of the city in which the spring flows,

and

between

the lives of others,

who are not residents of this city, because the spring is insufficient to provide drinking water for all the towns—

their lives—

take precedence over the lives of others.

And if the choice is between the lives of

their animals

and the lives of

the animals of others,

because the spring is insufficient to provide drinking water for all the animals of all the towns—

their animals—

take precedence over the animals of others.

And likewise, if the choice is between

their laundry and the laundry of others,

because the spring is insufficient for laundering the clothing of all the towns—

their laundry—

takes precedence over the laundry of others.

The lives of others and their laundry:

If the residents of another city require the water for drinking, while the residents of this city require the water only for laundering, we say

the lives of others take precedence over their laundry 13 .

Rabbi Yosei says: Their laundry takes precedence over the lives of others.

Rabbi Yosei holds that refraining from laundering causes great distress and involves a matter of vital concern; therefore, the laundry of the residents of that city takes precedence over the drinking water of the residents of another city.

And he challenges this:

Now, laundry—

Rabbi Yosei said that it involves distress.

Therefore, their laundry takes precedence over the lives of the residents of another city.