Nedarim 80b — the Talmud in English

And they raise an objection: Granted,

you have given a second answer,

you explained the wording of the Mishna,

“If I bathe”

as referring to a woman who says, “The benefit of bathing shall be forbidden to me forever if I bathe.” But the second part of the Mishna can still be challenged, where she says

“If I do not bathe”—

what are the circumstances?

What prohibition did she make conditional on “if I do not bathe”?

If you say

that it refers to a case

where she said: “The benefit of bathing shall be forbidden to me forever if I do not bathe today,”—

the difficulty is:

Why does she need annulment?

Why does she need her husband to annul the vow at all?

Let her bathe;

she can bathe today and will not become forbidden to bathe forever.

And they answer:

Rav Yehuda said:

It is referring to a case

where she said:

“The

benefit of bathing shall be forbidden to me forever if I do not bathe in water used for soaking flax!”

“Water used for soaking flax” means water in which flax is soaked. It has a very foul odor, and bathing in it causes her distress. Therefore, whichever way she acts, she experiences distress: if she bathes in the foul water, that itself is distress; and if she does not bathe in it, she becomes forbidden to bathe forever, which is also distress.

And they raise an objection: The tan nay in the Mishna gave two examples of vows involving personal distress: one involving adornment and the other involving bathing. This implies that the two examples involve the same type of case, not two different types of cases.

And now that we have established that the vow involving bathing refers to a case in which she said, “The benefit of bathing is forbidden to me if I do not bathe in water used for soaking flax,”

similarly,

in the example involving adornment,

which states, “If I do not adorn myself,”

it must refer to a case in which she said, “Adornment shall be forbidden to me forever

, if I do not adorn myself

today

with naphtha [unclear: the final word is abbreviated or corrupted].”

But if she simply said, “If I do not adorn myself,” her husband cannot annul the vow, since this does not involve personal distress.

And that is not possible, because naphtha is not called adornment; rather,

it is dirt!

And they answer:

He said,

[Rav Yehuda]:

She said:

“The benefit of bathing shall be forbidden to me forever if I bathe today,

and an oath that I will not bathe.

The benefit of adornment shall be forbidden to me forever if I adorn myself today,

and an oath that I will not adorn myself.”

That is, the intention of the Mishna is to say that the first tan nay and Rabbi Yosei disagree over whether refraining from bathing is considered personal distress.

There are two distinctions between their opinions:

The first is a case in which she forbade bathing forever on the condition “if I bathe.” The condition is not “if I bathe today,” but “if I bathe ever again.”

According to the first tan nay, since this involves personal distress, her husband should annul the vow. According to Rabbi Yosei, this is not personal distress, and he cannot annul it.

The second distinction concerns a case in which she took an oath that “I will not bathe.”

According to the first tan nay, her husband should annul the oath; according to Rabbi Yosei, he should not annul it.

According to this, the Mishna is interpreted as follows:

If a woman said, “Bathing forever is forbidden to me on the condition ‘if I bathe,’” or if she said, “An oath that I will not bathe”—

according to the first tan nay, her husband should annul it, while according to Rabbi Yosei he cannot annul it.

The final clause of the Mishna, concerning adornment, is interpreted in the same way.

Ravina said to Rav Ashi: In that case,

if so, the wording

“These are vows and oaths”

should have been taught!

Since the Mishna also discusses a case in which she took an oath not to bathe.

He said to him: Teach it as follows: “These are vows and oaths.”

Alternatively,

you can give another answer:

Oaths too are included under vows.

For it is the way of the tan nay that sometimes he teaches using the language of vows, while intending his wording to include the laws of oaths as well. We find this in the wording of the tan nay—

as we learned: “Like the vows of the wicked”—

a vow concerning nazirite status, an offering, or an oath.

That is, it is characteristic of the wicked to make vows and take oaths. Therefore—

if one says, “I am like the vows of the wicked,” and a nazir passes before him, this statement is an abbreviated expression establishing nazirite status.

If he says, “The vows of the wicked are upon me,” and an animal is before him, this is an abbreviated expression obligating him to bring an offering.

And if he says, “The vows of the wicked concerning it are upon me,” and a loaf of bread is before him, this is an abbreviated expression establishing the prohibition of an oath.

Thus, we find that the tan nay refers to an oath using the language of a vow.

And they raise an objection:

And

when

the Rabbis said that bathing involves personal distress, was that only when she does not bathe?

And they raise a contradiction,

from what we learned in tractate Yoma concerning the laws of distress on Yom Kippur:

Although one is prohibited from all of them,

meaning from performing labor on Yom Kippur and from the five forms of affliction—eating, drinking, bathing, anointing, wearing shoes, and marital relations—

one is liable to excision only for eating and drinking, and for performing labor.

But one is not liable to excision for the other forms of affliction. For it is written: “Any person who is not afflicted, I will destroy,” and the Sages interpreted this to mean that one is liable to excision only for something that involves personal distress. Only abstaining from eating and drinking involves personal distress; abstaining from bathing, anointing, or wearing shoes does not involve personal distress.

And if you say that when she does not bathe there is personal distress, then on Yom Kippur, when one bathes—

one should be liable to excision!

Since the Rabbis maintain that refraining from bathing is something that involves personal distress, why is one not liable to excision for bathing on Yom Kippur?

And they answer:

Rava said: Here, the matter is determined by the subject of the verse, and there, the matter is determined by the subject of the verse!

With regard to Yom Kippur, where it is written, “You shall afflict your souls,”

meaning that one must be afflicted on Yom Kippur, the meaning of affliction is

something whose affliction is known at that moment.

Therefore, the intention of the verse there is abstention from eating and drinking, since the affliction is evident at that time, on Yom Kippur itself.

But with regard to refraining from

bathing—

the affliction is not known at that moment;

the affliction is not evident on that very day, and therefore one is not liable to excision for it on Yom Kippur.

But with regard to

vows, where it is written, “Every vow and every binding oath to afflict the soul,”

the meaning of the verse is

something that will eventually bring her to affliction!

The husband may annul any vow whose eventual result will cause the woman personal distress.

And when she does not bathe—

she will come to experience affliction.

Since refraining from bathing will lead to personal distress, the husband has the power to annul the vow.

And they raise a contradiction

from that

which Rabbi Yosei said,

as

Rabbi Yosei—

as it is taught in a baraita, a tannaitic source not included in the Mishna [in the Tosefta, tractate Bava Metzia, chapter 11], explaining the public’s rights to water designated for public use:

“A spring belonging to the people of a city,”

a spring of water that flows in one city and from there continues toward other cities, and it happened that there was not enough water for all those who used the spring—

if there is a choice between

their lives,

the lives of the people of the city where the spring flows,

and

the lives of others,

the lives of others

who are not residents of this city, because the spring does not provide enough water for all the towns—

their lives—

take precedence over the lives of others.

And if there is a choice between the lives of

their animals

and the lives of

the animals of others,

because the spring does not provide enough water for all the animals of all the towns—

their animals—

take precedence over the animals of others.

And likewise, if there is a choice between

their laundry and the laundry of others,

because the spring does not provide enough water to wash the clothing of all the towns—

their laundry—

takes precedence over the laundry of others.

The lives of others and their laundry:

If the residents of another city need the water for drinking, while the residents of this city need the water only for laundry, we say:

the lives of others take precedence over their laundry 13 .

Rabbi Yosei says: Their laundry takes precedence over the lives of others.

Rabbi Yosei maintains that refraining from laundry causes great suffering and affects the well-being of a person. Therefore, the laundry of the residents of that city takes precedence over the drinking water of the residents of another city.

And he raises a difficulty:

Now, laundry—

Rabbi Yosei said that it involves suffering.

Therefore, their laundry takes precedence over the lives of the residents of another city.