Nedarim 7a — the Talmud in English

For it was taught:

it is written in the section of vows to the Most High [Deuteronomy 23]: "

When you vow a vow to the Lord your God—you shall not delay fulfilling it.

For the Lord your God will surely demand it of you." ![](pamud.bmp "

exact page location") "

from you"—

this is gleanings, forgotten sheaves, and the corner of the field.

Rav Pappa further raised a doubt:

Does

charity have a yad, or does charity not have a yad?

And the Gemara discusses:

What are the circumstances?

If you say,

if we say that the problem is in a case where he

said, "

This coin [that is, this coin] shall be

for charity, and

this

coin

also"—

that—

itself is charity!

Rather, it is such as where he said, "

and

this

coin,"

but did not say, "

also."

What?

Does charity have a yad, and accordingly, "

this

coin

also charity

shall be," he

said?

Or perhaps

charity does not have a yad. And accordingly,

what is the meaning of "

and this coin" that he said?—that the second coin shall be

coin," which he said? It means that the second coin should be

for ordinary use,

for expenditure;

and the speech "

for expenditure"

he did not complete,

as he did not finish his statement by saying that the second coin is for ordinary expenditure.

Do we say: since charity was likened

to offerings,

as it is written [Deuteronomy 23], "

in your mouth"—

this is charity,"

we must say:

just as offerings have a yad, so charity has a yad.

Or perhaps

only

with regard to

the matter of

“you shall not delay” was it likened,

but not with regard to a yad.

And there is another problem:

Does ownerless property have a yad, or perhaps ownerless property does not have a yad?

And the Gemara wonders: ownerless property—

that is charity!

since the ownerless property is for everyone, and the poor can take possession of it.

And we answer: "

If you should find it stated," he

said—

If you should find it stated that charity has a yad,

because

a comparison cannot be partial,

from now on we have to raise a doubt concerning

ownerless property:

Do we say that

ownerless property

is charity,

since the poor can acquire it?

Or perhaps charity is different, for charity is fit only

for the poor.

But ownerless property

is

both for the poor and for the wealthy.

Ravina raised a problem:

Does

a yad exist

for designating a place

as a lavatory,

so that that place is forbidden for reciting the Shema [and likewise for prayer and Torah study],

or not?

And the Gemara discusses this doubt:

What are the circumstances?

If you say that he said, "

This house shall be a lavatory, and this one also"—

that—

it too became a lavatory!

Rather, it is such as where he said, "

and this

house,"

but did not say, "

also"—

What?

Does "

this"

that he said mean—

and this too shall be a lavatory?

Or perhaps, what is the meaning of "

and this"—

he said it for ordinary use!

And the Gemara interrupts the explanation of the question in order to discuss the novelty in Ravina’s words—

By implication,

you learn from Ravina’s words,

it is obvious

to Ravina that there is a "

designation"

as a lavatory,

such that designating a place as a lavatory forbids it for reciting the Shema, even though it has not yet been used.

And

this is difficult:

he has a problem with this law

for

Ravina,

who raised the doubt:

If he designated

a particular place

as a lavatory,

but had not yet used it—

what is

the law concerning reciting the Shema in it?

And likewise,

if he designated it as a bathhouse,

which too is a place in which reciting the Shema is forbidden—

what is the law?

Does

designation

as a lavatory

take effect,

causing the designation of a lavatory or the designation of a bathhouse to apply to it, so as to forbid reciting the Shema in it,

or does designation not take effect!?

And we answer:

Ravina [asked] one [question] from within another,

one question from within another question, by way of “if you should find it stated”—

he was asking:

a. Does

designation

as a lavatory or as a bathhouse

take effect?

Or does designation not take effect?

b.

If you should find it stated that designation takes effect

as a lavatory or as a bathhouse—

does a yad exist

for such designation,

or does no yad exist?

And we conclude:

Let him have the problem!

The problem remains without a resolution.

We learned in the Mishna: one who says to his fellow,

“I am ostracized from you”—

Rabbi Akiva would deliberate to rule stringently.

Abaye said: Rabbi Akiva concedes with regard to lashes that he does not receive lashes,

because the matter remained doubtful in his eyes.

For if so,

if he received lashes,

let us teach: Rabbi Akiva is stringent.

Rav Pappa said: When he

says to his fellow:

“I am separated from you”,

that I shall eat yours—

everyone agrees that

it is certainly an expression of distancing by means of a vow, and

it is forbidden,

and he even receives lashes if he transgresses his vow.

But when one says to his fellow:

“I am placed under a ban from you”,

that I shall eat yours—it is certainly an expression of ostracism and not an expression of a vow, and

according to everyone it is permitted

to derive benefit from him.

With regard to what did the first tanna and Rabbi Akiva disagree—