Nedarim 7a (ז.) — the Talmud in English

As it is taught:

it is written in the passage concerning vows to the Most High [Deuteronomy 23]: "

When you take a vow to the Lord your God, do not delay fulfilling it.

For the Lord your God will surely demand it of you."

"

from you"—

this refers to gleanings, forgotten sheaves, and the corner of the field.

Rav Pappa further raised a question:

Whether

there is a partial formulation for charity, or there is no partial formulation for charity.

The Gemara analyzes it:

What are the circumstances?

If you say that the question arises in a case

where he

said: "

This coin [that is, this coin] shall be

this coin shall be

for charity, and this

coin

also"—

That—

is charity itself!

Rather, it is a case in which he said: "And

and

this

coin,"

but he did not say: "

also."

What is the ruling?

Is there a partial formulation for charity, and accordingly, when he says, "

This

coin

also charity

shall be," he

is saying that it shall be charity?

Or perhaps

there is no partial formulation for charity. And accordingly,

what is meant by the phrase "

and this coin" that he said?—

That the second coin shall be

for general use—

for expenditure

in general, and the wording "

for expenditure"

is merely what he did not complete,

as he did not finish his statement by saying that the second coin was for general expenditure.

Do we say that, since

charity

is equated with offerings, as it is written [Deuteronomy 23]: "

With your mouth"—

this refers to charity—

we should say:

Just as offerings have a partial formulation, so too charity has a partial formulation.

Or perhaps

only

with regard

to

the prohibition against delaying fulfillment is it equated,

but not with regard to a partial formulation.

And there is another question:

Is there a partial formulation for ownerless property, or perhaps there is no partial formulation for ownerless property?

The Gemara wonders: Ownerless property—

that is charity!

Since ownerless property is available to everyone, the poor can acquire it.

And we answer: "

If you can say,"

he is saying—

If you can say that there is a partial formulation for charity,

because

an equation is not divided, from now on we must raise the question concerning

we must now raise a question concerning

ownerless property:

Do we say that ownerless property

ownerless property

is charity, since the poor can acquire it?

since the poor can acquire it?

Or perhaps charity is different, for charity is fit only

for the poor.

But ownerless property

is available

both to the poor and to the wealthy.

Ravina raised a question:

Whether

there is a partial formulation

for designating a place

as a bathroom,

so that that place becomes prohibited for reciting the Shema [and likewise for prayer and Torah study],

or not.

The Gemara analyzes this question:

What are the circumstances?

If you say that he said: "

This house shall be a bathroom, and this one also"—

That—

the second one also becomes a bathroom!

Rather, it is a case in which he said: "

And this

house,"

but he did not say "

also"—

What is the ruling?

Does the word "

this"

that he said mean:

and this one also becomes a bathroom?

Or perhaps, what is meant by "

and this"?

He was referring only to ordinary use!

The Gemara interrupts its analysis of the question in order to discuss the novel implication of Ravina's words—

By inference

you learn from Ravina's words that

it is obvious

to Ravina that there is a "

designation"

for a bathroom,

so that designating a place as a bathroom prohibits reciting the Shema there even though it has not yet been used.

And

this is puzzling:

Was it not this very matter that Ravina was asking

about,

to Ravina,

who raised the question:

If one designated

a particular place

as a bathroom,

but had not yet used it—

what is the ruling concerning reciting the Shema there?

regarding reciting the Shema there?

And likewise,

if one designated it as a bathhouse,

where too it is prohibited to recite the Shema—

what is the ruling?

Does

designation

for a bathroom

take effect,

giving it the status of a bathroom or a bathhouse and prohibiting reciting the Shema there,

or does designation not take effect!?

And we answer:

Ravina's question is one question derived from another,

one question arising from another by means of an "if you can say" formulation—

this is what he was asking:

A. Whether

designation

for a bathroom or a bathhouse

takes effect.

Or does designation not take effect?

B.

If you can say that designation takes effect

for a bathroom or a bathhouse—

is there a partial formulation

for such a designation,

or is there no partial formulation?

And we conclude:

Let it remain a question!

The question remains unresolved.

We learned in the Mishna: One who says to his fellow,

"I am ostracized from you"—

Rabbi Akiva would be inclined to rule stringently.

Abaye said: Rabbi Akiva concedes that with regard to lashes, he does not receive lashes,

because the matter remained doubtful in his view.

For if so,

if he were to receive lashes,

it should teach: Rabbi Akiva rules stringently.

Rav Pappa said: It is

when one says to his fellow:

"I distance myself from you"

with regard to eating from you—

Everyone agrees that

it is certainly the language of distancing oneself by means of a vow, and

it is prohibited,

and he would even receive lashes if he violated his vow.

But when one says to his fellow:

"I am excommunicated from you"

with regard to eating from you—it is certainly the language of excommunication and not the language of a vow, and

according to everyone it is permitted

to derive benefit from him.

With regard to what do the first tanna and Rabbi Akiva disagree—