Nedarim 79a (עט.) — the Talmud in English

a.

Silence

on the day he heard the vow

upholds

the vow.

And silence does not annul

the vow.

b. And likewise,

if he upheld it in his heart—

the vow

is upheld.

However, if

he annulled it in his heart—

it is not annulled.

The beraita adds further laws concerning upholding and annulling vows:

If he upheld it—

he cannot

afterward

annul it.

If he annulled it—

he cannot uphold it.

Rav Ḥisda proves this from the words of the beraita:

It teaches

in the beraita,

that silence upholds the vow.

Is that not

the meaning of the beraita,

that it is speaking of one who remains silent intending to cause distress?

This proves that even silence intended to cause distress is silence that upholds the vow.

And we reject this:

No.

The beraita is referring to one who remains silent,

and

thinks in his heart

with the intention of upholding

the vow.

But the Gemara challenges this rejection:

If so, this is

the earlier law of the beraita, that

if he upheld it in his heart, it is upheld.

Why, then, did the beraita repeat this law of upholding in one’s heart twice?

Rather,

this is how the beraita should be explained according to Rav Ḥanina:

The beraita is referring to one who remains silent

without any specific intention,

who did not think in his heart either to uphold or to annul the vow.

Therefore, this beraita cannot prove the law concerning one who remains silent intending to cause distress.

The Gemara now discusses the beraita cited by Rav Ḥisda.

We find

in the beraita cases in which there is

a stringency with regard to upholding

more

than with regard to annulling.

The Gemara asks:

What stringency is there with regard to annulling over upholding—

in what way?

[The phrase “from where do we know?” here is not understood in its usual sense, but rather:]—

In what manner is there a greater stringency with regard to annulling than with regard to upholding?

Rabbi Yoḥanan said:

The stringency is that

one may consult

a Sage

concerning the upholding

in order to permit and undo the upholding.

But one may not consult concerning the annulment—

there is no possibility of obtaining permission to undo an annulment.

Rav Kahana raised an objection

to Rav Ḥanina’s words from another beraita:

As it is taught: “

And if her husband remains absolutely silent concerning her,

all her vows shall stand”—

The verse is speaking of one who remains silent intending to cause distress!

Lest you say: From where

do you say

with certainty that this verse is referring

to one who remains silent intending to cause distress?

Or

perhaps

it is not

the subject of this verse

but rather one who remains silent intending to uphold the vow?

The answer is:

When it says,

in another verse, “

because he remained silent concerning her,” the verse is speaking of one who remains silent intending to uphold the vow,

that verse

is speaking,

what, then, do I make of

the wording of this verse, “

and if her husband remains absolutely silent concerning her”—

this verse would be superfluous!

It must therefore be that

the verse is speaking of one who remains silent intending to cause distress.

It is explicit in the beraita that it is not in accordance with Rav Ḥanina; rather, even silence intended to cause distress is considered silence that upholds the vow.

And we conclude: Indeed, these words of the beraita are

a refutation

of Rav Ḥanina.

But the Gemara challenges the beraita:

Let us establish,

why should we not interpret the two verses as referring to silence, but not to one who remains silent intending to cause distress—

this one,

we should interpret one verse

as referring to one who remains silent intending to uphold the vow.

And

this one,

the second verse, we should interpret

as referring to one who remains silent without any specific intention,

so that we would no longer have a superfluous expression in the verses from which we could learn that even one who remains silent intending to cause distress is considered to have remained silent in a manner that upholds the vow?

And we answer:

Redundant verses are written—

the Torah writes the language of silence three times. Therefore, the beraita explains that one verse refers to one who remains silent intending to uphold the vow, the second verse refers to one who remains silent without any specific intention, and the third verse refers to one who remains silent intending to cause distress.

The Gemara now continues to challenge Rav Ḥanina’s words, although his position was already refuted above.

Rava raised an objection

from the words of the Mishna [above, on page 76b:

If she made her vow at nightfall,

close to nightfall at the conclusion of Shabbat]—

he annuls

it for her on Shabbat

before nightfall.

Because

if he did not annul it and nightfall arrived—he

cannot

any

longer annul it,

since he remained silent on the day he heard the vow; therefore, he was permitted to annul it even on Shabbat.

And

why

is this silence considered upholding the vow?

Let it be like one who remains silent intending to cause distress,

for he did not intend to remain silent in order to uphold the vow; rather, he remained silent solely because he could not annul it on Shabbat?

This proves that it is not in accordance with Rav Ḥanina. Rather, every silence—even silence not intended to uphold the vow, such as silence intended to cause distress—is considered silence that upholds the vow.

And we conclude:

A refutation!

The Gemara raises another challenge to Rav Ḥanina’s words.

Rav Ashi raised an objection

from the words of the Mishna below, on page 87b:

As we learned: If the husband remained silent on the day he heard the vow and afterward said:

I know

that

there are vows

[that these vows take effect],

but I do not know

[I did not know]

that there are those who can annul them

[that vows can be annulled], and therefore I remained silent and did not annul it—

he may annul it

now. Since he has only now learned that it is possible to annul vows, this is considered as though he heard the vow only now.

And if he said:

I know that there are those who can annul vows

[that vows can be annulled],

but I do not know

[I did not know]

that this is a vow

[that I could also annul this vow, and only now did I learn that I can annul this particular vow]—

Rabbi Meir says: He may not annul it—

this is not considered the day on which he heard the vow.

And the Sages say: He may annul it—

this too is considered as though he heard the vow only now, since only now did he learn that he could annul this particular vow.

Rav Ashi proves:

And why

did Rabbi Meir and the Sages disagree whether this is considered the day on which he heard the vow?

Let it be like one who remains silent intending to cause distress!

For he did not intend by his silence to uphold the vow; rather, he remained silent only because he did not know that he could annul it. If so, according to everyone, the silence should not be considered upholding the vow?

This proves that it is not in accordance with Rav Ḥanina. Rather, even silence not intended to uphold the vow, but intended to cause distress, is also considered silence that upholds the vow.

And we conclude:

A refutation.

We shall return to you, chapter “The Betrothed Maiden.”

The husband's right to annul his wife's vows was mentioned in the previous chapter, and at the beginning of that chapter the verses concerning the husband's annulment were cited.

However, this right is limited only to vows that concern matters between him and her, and to vows that involve affliction of the soul.

In the Mishna below, those vows that cause affliction of the soul for a woman will be explained, as will those vows that are not included in affliction of the soul, but are vows that cause hostility between the husband and his wife, and therefore the husband has the right to annul them.

And in the Gemara it will be explained that there is a practical difference between the two types of vows:

A husband annuls vows involving affliction of the soul both with regard to himself and with regard to other people. Therefore, even if her husband divorces her after annulling her vow that involves affliction of the soul, and the woman then marries another man, her vow is annulled, and she need not fulfill it even with her other husband.

But with regard to vows between him and her, the husband's annulment takes effect only as long as she remains married to him. But if he divorces her, and she leaves his authority and marries another man, the annulment of the vow is void, and the prohibition of the vow takes effect upon her again as it did originally.

Mishna:

And these

are the

vows that he,

the husband,

may annul

for his wife:

Matters involving affliction of the soul—

Although a husband can also annul vows between him and her, nevertheless, we find differences in the laws governing these matters:

Vows involving affliction of the soul may be annulled both with regard to himself and with regard to others; and if he divorces her and she marries another man, the annulment remains effective forever.

But with regard to vows between him and her, he annuls only with regard to himself; but if he divorces her after the annulment and she marries another man, his annulment is void].

The woman said: “Bathing is konam to me forever,” on the condition

“if I bathe”

today.

“And if I do not bathe.”

And similarly, if the woman swore: “An oath that I will not bathe today.”

And similarly, if she said: “Adornment is konam to me forever,”

“if I adorn myself”

today.

And

similarly, if the woman swore: “An oath

if I do not [

not ]

adorn myself”

today.

According to the first tanna, these are included among vows involving affliction of the soul.