Nedarim 79a — the Talmud in English

a.

That silence

on the day on which he heard the vow

establishes

the vow.

And silence does not annul

the vow.

b. And likewise,

if he established it in his heart—

the vow

is established.

But if

he annulled it in his heart—

it is not annulled.

And the beraita adds further laws concerning the laws of establishment and annulment:

He established it—

he cannot

afterward

annul it.

He annulled it—

he cannot establish it.

And Rav Ḥisda proves from the words of the beraita:

It teaches

in the beraita:

that silence establishes.

Is it not

is this the intention of the beraita,

with one who remains silent in order to cause distress?

And it is proven that even silence in order to cause distress is silence that establishes.

And we reject this:

No.

The intention of the beraita is

with one who remains silent, and

thinks in his heart

in order to establish

the vow.

But the Gemara raises an objection to the rejection:

if so, this is

the preceding law of the beraita, that

if he established it in his heart, it is established.

And why did the beraita repeat this law of establishment in the heart twice?

Rather,

this is how the beraita is to be explained according to Rav Ḥanina:

The intention of the beraita is,

with one who remains silent without specification,

who did not think in his heart neither to establish nor to annul.

And therefore, one cannot prove from this beraita the law of one who remains silent in order to cause distress.

And now the Gemara discusses the words of the beraita brought by Rav Ḥisda.

We find [

we have found ] in the beraita cases in which there is

greater stringency in establishment

more

than in annulment.

And the Gemara discusses:

Greater stringency in annulment than in establishment—

from where [is this]? [

The “from where [is this]” stated here is not understood in the usual manner, “from where do we know,” but rather— ]

In what manner is there greater stringency in annulment than in establishment?

Rabbi Yoḥanan said:

the stringency is that

one inquires

of a Sage

concerning the establishment

in order to permit and uproot the establishment.

But one does not inquire concerning the annulment—

there is no possibility of obtaining permission for annulment.

Rav Kahana raises an objection

to the words of Rav Ḥanina from another beraita:

For it was taught: “

And if her husband indeed remains silent toward her,

then all her vows shall stand”—

The verse is speaking of one who remains silent in order to cause distress!

Lest you say: From where

do you say

with certainty that this verse speaks

of one who remains silent in order to cause distress?

Or [

perhaps ]

the verse does not

speak

except of one who remains silent in order to establish?

Your answer is:

when it says

in another verse, “

because he remained silent toward her,” the verse is

that one

speaking,

then how do I understand

the words of the verse here, “

if her husband indeed remains silent toward her”—

this verse is superfluous!

Necessarily,

the verse is speaking of one who remains silent in order to cause distress.

And it is explicit in the words of the beraita that it is not in accordance with Rav Ḥanina; rather, even silence in order to cause distress is considered silence.

And we conclude: indeed, these words of the beraita are

a refutation

of Rav Ḥanina.

But the Gemara raises an objection to the words of the beraita,

and let us establish

why should we not establish the two verses mentioned as referring to silence, but not to one who remains silent in order to cause distress—

this one,

let us establish one verse

as referring to one who remains silent in order to establish.

And

this one,

let us establish the second verse

as referring to one who remains silent without specification,

and then we have no superfluity in the verses from which we could learn that even one who remains silent in order to cause distress is considered to have remained silent in a manner that establishes?

And we answer:

Superfluous verses are written—

the Torah writes the language of silence three times; therefore the beraita explains that one verse refers to one who remains silent in order to establish, a second verse refers to one who remains silent without specification, and a third verse refers to one who remains silent in order to cause distress.

And now the Gemara proceeds to raise another objection to the words of Rav Ḥanina, even though his words have already been refuted above.

Rava raises an objection

from the words of the Mishna [above, 76b

“she took a vow as it was getting dark,”

close to nightfall on the conclusion of Shabbat]—

he annuls

it for her on Shabbat

before it gets dark.

Because

if he did not annul it and it became dark—

he cannot

any longer

annul it,

since he remained silent on the day on which he heard it, and therefore they permitted him to annul it even on Shabbat.

And

why

is this silence considered establishment?

Let it be like one who remains silent in order to cause distress,

for he did not intend to remain silent in order to establish; rather, he remains silent only because he cannot annul on Shabbat?

And it is proven that it is not in accordance with Rav Ḥanina; rather, every silence, even silence not in order to establish the vow, and likewise silence in order to cause distress, is considered silence that establishes the vow.

And we conclude:

a refutation!

And we raise another objection to the words of Rav Ḥanina.

Rav Ashi raises an objection

from the words of the Mishna below, 87b:

For we learned: if the husband remained silent on the day on which he heard the vow, and afterward said:

I know [

I knew ]

that there are vows [

that these vows take effect ],

but I do not know [

I did not know ]

that there are those who annul [

that it is possible to annul vows ], and therefore I remained silent and did not annul—

he shall annul

now. Since only now did he learn that it is possible to annul, this is considered as though only now he heard the vow.

And if he said:

I know that there are those who annul [

that it is possible to annul vows ],

but I do not know [

I did not know ]

that this is a vow [

that I too could have annulled this vow, and only now did I learn that I can annul this vow ]—

Rabbi Meir says: he shall not annul—

this is not considered the day on which he heard it.

And the Sages say: he shall annul—

for this too is considered as though only now he heard the vow, since only now did he learn of his ability to annul this vow.

And Rav Ashi proves:

And why

did Rabbi Meir and the Sages disagree whether this is considered the day on which he heard it?

Let it be like one who remains silent in order to cause distress!

For he did not intend by his silence to establish; rather, he remained silent only because he did not know that he was able to annul, and if so, according to everyone the silence should not be considered establishment?

And it is proven that it is not in accordance with Rav Ḥanina; rather, even silence not in order to establish the vow, but in order to cause distress, is also considered silence.

And we conclude:

a refutation.

We shall return to you, chapter “The betrothed maiden.”

The husband's right to annul his wife's vows was mentioned in the previous chapter, and at the opening of that chapter the verses relating to the husband's annulment were brought.

But this right is limited only to vows that concern matters between him and her, and to vows in which there is affliction of the soul.

In the Mishna below, it will be explained which vows cause affliction of the soul to the woman, and which vows are not included within affliction of the soul, but rather are vows that cause hostility between the husband and his wife, and therefore the husband has the right to annul them.

And in the Gemara it will be explained that there is a practical difference between the two types of vows:

Vows in which there is affliction of the soul, the husband annuls both with regard to what concerns himself and with regard to what concerns other people. Therefore, even if her husband divorced her after annulling for her a vow in which there is affliction of the soul, and the woman went and married another, her vow is permitted, and she does not need to fulfill it even with her other husband.

But with vows that are between him and her, the husband's annulment takes effect only so long as she is under his authority. But if he divorces her, and she leaves his authority, and marries another, the annulment of the vow is void, and the prohibition of the vow returns upon her as it was previously.

Mishna:

And these

are the

vows that he,

the husband,

annuls

for his wife:

Things in which there is affliction of the soul -

And although the husband can also annul vows that are between him and her, nevertheless, we find in this different laws:

Vows in which there is affliction of the soul, he annuls both for himself and for others, and if he divorces her and she marries another, the annulment is effective forever.

But with vows that are between him and her, he annuls only for himself; however, if he divorces her after the annulment, and she marries another, his annulment is void].

The woman said: “Konam, bathing is forbidden to me forever,” on condition,

if I bathe

today.

And if I do not bathe.

And likewise if the woman swore: “An oath that I will not bathe today.”

And likewise if she said: “Konam, adornment is forbidden to me forever,”

if I adorn myself

today.

And

likewise if the woman swore: “An oath

if I do not [

not]

adorn myself

today.”

According to the First Tanna, these are included within vows of affliction of the soul.