Nedarim 69b (סט:) — the Talmud in English

Come and hear,

we can resolve this question from the dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yosei.

As we learned

in tractate Temura [25b]:

A person had before him two offerings, a burnt offering and a peace offering, and he wished to effect their substitution with a non-sacred animal. [The law is that when one effects substitution of an offering with a non-sacred animal, the sanctity of the offering takes effect upon the non-sacred animal, although the original offering remains sacred.] And he said, within the time required for speech, regarding the non-sacred animal standing before him, in the following language:

This is the substitute for a burnt offering, the substitute for a peace offering—

meaning that with one non-sacred animal he effected the substitution of both the burnt offering and the peace offering—

this

animal

is

becomes

the substitute for a burnt offering,

because he said “burnt offering” first, and the sanctity of a burnt offering took effect upon it immediately; once the sanctity of a burnt offering took effect upon it, the sanctity of a peace offering could no longer take effect upon it..

These are the words of Rabbi Meir.

And Rabbi Yosei says: If he intended this,

that the non-sacred animal should be both a burnt offering and a peace offering,

from the outset,

the sanctity of a burnt offering did not take effect upon it immediately when he said “burnt offering.”

Because

since it is impossible to designate two names

of a burnt offering and a peace offering

simultaneously,

as he intended to designate them,

his statement stands,

and both the sanctity of a burnt offering and the sanctity of a peace offering took effect upon this animal. Therefore, this animal shall remain grazing until it develops a blemish; it can then be redeemed and sold, and with half of its value they shall bring a burnt offering, while with the other half they shall bring a peace offering.

Their dispute concerns the intention of the one effecting the sanctification when he mentioned the burnt offering before the peace offering:

According to Rabbi Meir, his intention was to make the sanctities conditional, saying: First, the substitute for the burnt offering shall take effect, and afterward the substitute for the peace offering shall take effect. And since the substitute for the burnt offering took effect first, the substitute for the peace offering can no longer take effect upon it.

According to Rabbi Yosei, however, since it is impossible to say both designations simultaneously, the fact that he mentioned the burnt offering before the peace offering has no particular significance; his intention was that both should take effect simultaneously, and both the sanctity of the burnt offering and the sanctity of the peace offering took effect upon the animal. The animal is sold, and with the proceeds corresponding to half its value they purchase a burnt offering, while with the proceeds corresponding to the other half they purchase a peace offering.

In light of this dispute, our uncertainty can be resolved.

According to Rabbi Yosei, there is no particular precedence to the matter he mentioned first, since it is impossible to say both simultaneously. Similarly, here there is no precedence for upholding the vow over dissolving it merely because he mentioned the upholding before the dissolution.

And since he explicitly made the dissolution preferable to the upholding, the dissolution takes effect.

And even Rabbi Meir did not say

that there is intention and precedence assigned to what he mentioned first

except

in the case of substitution,

where he did not

make a condition and

say “

Let this one take effect only if that one takes effect,”

and therefore we must assume that he intended to give precedence to what he mentioned first.

But here, where he

made a condition and

said

explicitly, “

Let the upholding take effect only if the dissolution takes effect,”

it can be said that

even Rabbi Meir likewise concedes that the dissolution takes effect,

because the preference expressed by the one dissolving the vow is for the dissolution.

Rabba raised a dilemma:

If he said, within the time required for speech, the following expression:

It is upheld and dissolved for you.

That is, he combined them and said that both the upholding and the dissolution should take effect

simultaneously—

what is

the halakha? Since both cannot take effect, should we say that the upholding takes effect [because it was mentioned first], or since he revealed his intent that both should take effect simultaneously, with neither preceding the other, does nothing take effect?

Come and hear

a resolution of the uncertainty from a principle stated by Rabba:

For Rabba said

with regard to a man who betroths two sisters simultaneously [and the betrothals cannot take effect with regard to both, because a person cannot betroth a woman and her sister; and since he betrothed both simultaneously, it is impossible to know which of them is betrothed and which is not]:

Anything that cannot

take effect

one after the other—

cannot take effect even simultaneously

at all!

And since he cannot betroth the two sisters one after the other, betrothal did not take hold with regard to either of them, since he betrothed them simultaneously; there is not even an uncertainty concerning betrothal.

And the same applies to our matter: this principle is valid.

And since the upholding and the dissolution cannot take effect one after the other [because if the dissolution takes effect, there is no vow and there is nothing to uphold, while if the upholding takes effect, the vow remains upheld and it is no longer possible to dissolve it], consequently nothing can take effect if he dissolves and upholds it simultaneously.

Rabba raised a dilemma:

If he said,

It is upheld for you today.

That is, his upholding applies only for today—

what is the halakha?

This uncertainty includes two uncertainties:

The first: Does such an upholding prevent him from dissolving the vow tomorrow?

The second: If we say that this upholding does not prevent him from dissolving the vow tomorrow, does this expression also include an expression of dissolution for tomorrow?

Do we say

that by saying “today,” it is

as though he said to her: It is dissolved for you tomorrow?

Or perhaps, he did not say to her

explicitly that it is dissolved tomorrow, and this is not included in his wording.

The Gemara adds another uncertainty: