Nedarim 68a (סח.) — the Talmud in English

The school of Rabbi Yishmael taught:

The source for the law of a betrothed maiden is from the verse:

“Between a man and his wife, between a father and his daughter;

“during her youth, in her father’s house.”

The meaning of the verse is that it is referring to a betrothed maiden. And from the fact that the verse juxtaposes a father with a husband, it can be derived:

From here it is derived that, with regard to a betrothed maiden, her father and her husband annul her vows.

And we challenge this:

And according to the school of Rabbi Yishmael,

the verse

“And if she shall be betrothed to a man”—

what does he do with it!?

But Rabbi Yishmael derives the law of a betrothed maiden from “between a man and his wife.” If so, the verse “and if she shall be betrothed to a man” is superfluous!

And we answer: Rabbi Yishmael

establishes it—

he applies the verse “and if she shall be betrothed to a man”—

to Rava’s other teaching [to another exposition taught by Rava], below, on page 70a: If the betrothed man dies, the father alone can annul her vows.

And we challenge this:

And

according to

the view of

Rava

above, who derives the law of a betrothed maiden from the verse “and if she shall be betrothed to a man,” then

this

verse, “between a man and his wife,”

which the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught

to derive the law of a betrothed maiden from it—

what does he do with it?

This verse is superfluous, since the law of a betrothed maiden is already derived from “and if she shall be betrothed to a man”!

And we answer:

It is needed [according to Rava, this verse is necessary]

to

teach that the husband annuls

also

vows between him and her,

and not only vows involving affliction of the soul.

For vows involving affliction of the soul are stated explicitly in the verse; therefore, the expression “between a man and his wife” comes to teach about the annulment of vows between him and her.

A dilemma was raised before them:

The Gemara is uncertain how to define the partnership of the father and the husband in annulling the vows of a betrothed maiden:

Is the definition that, since a vow of a betrothed maiden can be annulled by two partners, the father and the husband, it is as though the vow was divided from the outset into two parts, and each of them annuls his part?

Therefore, when only the betrothed man annulled his part, and the father did not annul, it is as though the

husband cuts off

[cuts] the vow: The half of the vow belonging to the husband is completely nullified, whereas its other half, belonging to the father, remains intact as it was initially.

Or

the vow is not considered divided into two; rather, it is one vow, except that the annulment by one of the partners acts upon the vow so that it

becomes weakened

[weakened] in its entirety. And after the husband’s annulment, before the father annulled it, it is a “weakened vow.”

The Gemara explains the uncertainty:

Where does the uncertainty arise for us

[what is the practical difference] between whether the husband cuts off the vow or weakens it?—

For example, she vowed with regard to two olives,

that she would derive no benefit from eating food measuring two olives [and according to the Ran, two specific olives],

and the betrothed man heard

her vow,

and the betrothed man

heard her vow,

and annulled it for her,

while the father had not yet annulled his part,

and

the woman

ate them

—those two olives from which she had vowed not to derive benefit.

If we say that the husband

cuts off

his part, thereby nullifying only half the vow, while the other half was not annulled at all,

then the woman

is liable for lashes

[she is lashed], since she ate something entirely forbidden by the vow. For there is here half a vow amounting to an olive-size measure that was not annulled. [According to the Rosh. According to the Ran, there is one complete olive that was annulled and one complete olive that was not annulled, but it is not known which olive was the one annulled and which was the one not annulled].

However,

if we say that the husband

weakens

it, then the prohibition of the entire vow has been weakened, and

it is

merely a prohibition,

not the complete prohibition of a vow, and she is not lashed for eating the two olives.

Come and hear,

the uncertainty can be resolved from the words of a beraita—

As we learned in the Mishna below, on page 70a, concerning a betrothed maiden whose father and husband annul her vows jointly: If the husband dies, his authority is “emptied out” and passes to the father, who can then annul alone the vows that she made while betrothed.

But if the father dies, the father’s authority is not “emptied out,” nor does it pass to the husband. The betrothed man cannot annul her vows alone.

And a beraita was taught concerning this Mishna:

A.

When did they say

that if

the husband dies, his authority is emptied out

the betrothed man’s

to the father,

so that the father can annul alone the vows that she made during the betrothal period? Only

when the husband had not heard

the vow

before he died, or when he heard and annulled it, or when he heard it, remained silent, and died on the very day that he heard it,

before he had the opportunity to annul or uphold it.

And this is what we learned

in the Mishna:

If the husband dies, the authority of the betrothed man is emptied out to the father.