Nedarim 66a (סו.) — the Talmud in English

To say that the marriage contract is not torn up

when he has nothing with which to repay it, even if he has nothing except to sell the hair of his head; rather, the debt remains forever, until he is able to repay it.

The novelty of this matter is that from the laws of Arakhin we learn only the arrangement made for a debtor, but we do not learn from there another halakha stated with regard to Arakhin: that one assesses the possibility of collecting from the debtor and collects whatever can be collected, thereby freeing him entirely from his debt; and even if he subsequently becomes wealthy, he need not repay the remainder of the debt to the Temple treasury.

Our Mishna teaches us that with regard to a marriage contract, as well as other debts, one merely makes an arrangement for the debtor; but if he becomes wealthy, he is obligated to repay the remainder of the debt.

Mishna:

One who vowed to fast for a certain period, or not to eat meat during it,

they open

an opportunity for regret concerning his vow

on Festivals and on Shabbat.

They ask the one who took the vow: Had you known that it is prohibited to suffer on Shabbat and Festivals by abstaining from food,

would you have taken the vow? And if he says, “No,” they release him from the vow.

Initially, they would say:

Only

those days,

the Shabbatot and Festivals,

are permitted,

because only with regard to these days is there an opening for his vow,

while all the other days are prohibited,

as the vow was not released with regard to them.

Until Rabbi Akiva came and taught: A vow that was released

in part

of its scope—

is entirely released!

How

does the principle operate that a vow that was released in part is entirely released, and likewise, a vow that did not take effect in part did not take effect in its entirety?—

a. If he

said to several people, in a single vow:

to several people, in a single vow:

“It is konam for me to benefit from all of you!”

Then, when

the vow is released

with regard to

one of them,

all of them are released

for him

to benefit from

them.

b. But if he said in a single vow: “It is konam

for me to benefit from this one and from that one.”

Only if

the vow is released

with regard to

the first—

all of them are released

for him

to benefit from them, since he made his prohibition against benefiting from the second dependent on his prohibition against benefiting from the first, and so on.

But if

But if

the vow is released

with regard to

the last—

only with regard to

the last is it permitted

for him to benefit from him,

while all of them are prohibited

for him to benefit from them.

c. And if he specified his vow with regard to each one of them, and said:

“It is konam for me to benefit from this one,”

as something that is prohibited to me

like a sacrificial offering, and

so

from this one

it is prohibited to me,

like a sacrificial offering—

An opening is required for each and every one

separately, in order to release his vow with regard to each of them, since a vow formulated in this manner consists of several separate vows, one with regard to each person.

d. If he said:

“It is konam for me to taste wine,”

because

wine is harmful to the intestines.

They said to him: But

the wine

that is aged is beneficial to the intestines!

He is released

because of his mistake

with regard to

wine that is

aged,

as is the law concerning a mistaken vow, which does not take effect and requires no release at all, since he made his vow dependent on wine being harmful to the intestines.

And he is released not only with regard to aged wine, but with regard to all wine,

because a vow that does not take effect in part does not take effect in its entirety.

And similarly, if he said:

“It is konam for me to taste onions,”

because

onions are harmful to the heart.

They said to him: But

the kuferi onion

is beneficial to the heart!

He is released with regard to

the

kuferi onion.

And he is released not only with regard to

the

kuferi onion, but with regard to all onions.

There was an incident

involving a man who vowed against onions, saying in his vow that he prohibited them to himself because they were harmful to the heart.

And Rabbi Meir released him with regard to all onions.

Since the kuferi onion is beneficial to the heart, with regard to it his vow was a mistaken vow and did not take effect, since he made his vow dependent on onions being harmful.

Therefore, all the onions were also permitted, because a vow that did not take effect in part did not take effect in its entirety.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna:

One who said, “It is konam for me to benefit from this one and from that one,” thereby making them dependent on one another: if

his vow was released

with regard to

the last—

only his vow with regard to

the last is permitted, while all of them are prohibited.

If he said: “It is konam for me to benefit from this one, like a sacrificial offering, and from that one, like a sacrificial offering”—an opening is required for each and every one.

It is evident from the wording of the Mishna, which uses the word “sacrificial offering” with regard to each and every one, that only when he divided his vow and mentioned with regard to each and every person that he prohibited benefiting from him like a sacrificial offering is his vow considered a separate vow with regard to each person, requiring a separate opening for each.

But if he says that he prohibits benefiting from one person and from another like a sacrificial offering—whether he says this with the connecting conjunction, “from this person and from that person,” or says, “from this person, from that person”—since he included them all in one statement of “like a sacrificial offering,” it is one vow, and if part of it is released, the entire vow is released.

And the Gemara explains:

Who is the tanna

who holds this view, given that we find a dispute among the tannaim concerning the matter?

Rava said: It is Rabbi Shimon,

as he says

this in tractate Shevuot 38a with regard to one oath concerning several people.

Five people were claiming money from one person, and he falsely swore to them that he did not owe them money. He is obligated to bring a sacrifice because, through his oath, he denied owing money.

The Sages and Rabbi Shimon disputed the case in which he said in the wording of the oath: “An oath that I do not owe money either to you or to you”—is he obligated to bring two sacrifices, or one sacrifice?

According to the Sages, since the wording of his oath is directed toward five people—“to you and to you”—it is as though he swore five separate oaths, one to each person individually, and he is obligated to bring five sacrifices.

Whereas Rabbi Shimon says:

He is obligated to bring only one sacrifice, since he included them all in a single oath,

until he says

the wording of an

oath

separately

to each and every one.

We learned in the Mishna:

“It is konam for me to taste wine,”

because wine is harmful to the intestines. They said to him: But aged wine is beneficial to the intestines.

And the Gemara asks: Why is it necessary to say that aged wine is beneficial to the intestines?

And let it follow

that it is sufficient

that it is not

bad

harmful

to the intestines, so that his vow would not take effect with regard to aged wine.

Rabbi Abba said:

This is what the tanna intended to say:

First, aged wine is not harmful to the intestines.

And furthermore,

not only is it not harmful to the intestines, but

it is beneficial

to them—

This is how

the tanna teaches

it in the Mishna.

And similarly, we learned in the Mishna:

“It is konam for me to taste onions,”

because onions are harmful to the heart. They said to him: But the kuferi onion is beneficial to the heart.

Here too, the Gemara asks:

And let it follow

that it is sufficient

that

the kuferi onion is not

harmful

to the heart; why was it necessary to tell him that it is beneficial to the heart?

Rabbi Abba said: “

And furthermore, it is beneficial”;

the tanna teaches

this, as with regard to aged wine.

Mishna:

They open an opportunity for a person

who prohibited his wife to himself by a vow until he divorces her,

based on his own honor and the honor of his children—and so

they say to him:

Had you known that tomorrow people would say about you:

“This is

the way he behaves,

the practice

of so-and-so,”

that he

divorces his wives?

And concerning your daughters they would say: “The daughters

of divorced

women they are!”

And then they would add and say:

“What did the mother of these women see that caused her to be divorced?”

Why did her husband divorce her? It can only be because he found in her an immoral matter!

It follows that by taking this vow you are creating a bad reputation for your sons and daughters, as though they are the children of a woman who committed adultery while married!

And

if

the one who took the vow says:

“Had I known that this is what

people would say about my sons and daughters,

I would not have taken the vow”—

he is permitted,

and we need not fear that perhaps he lied because of embarrassment.

And if he said:

“It is konam for me to marry so-and-so,”

because she is

ugly.

But she is beautiful.

Or he said: “It is konam for me to marry a certain woman,” because she is

dark-skinned.

But she is fair-skinned.

And similarly, if he took the vow because she was

short, but she is tall.

In all these cases,

he is permitted to her.

And the Mishna explains that the basis of the permission is

not

because she

was

ugly

at the time of his vow

and became

afterward

beautiful

afterward, or because she was

dark-skinned

at the time of the vow

and became fair-skinned

afterward, or because she was

short

at the time of the vow

and became

afterward

tall

afterward.

For in such a case it is impossible to release the vow, even through an opening, since this is a case of something newly arisen, nolad, as women do not ordinarily change from ugly to beautiful, from dark-skinned to fair-skinned, or from short to tall.

Rather,

the entire basis of the permission is

that the vow was a mistake,

and at the time he took the vow she was already beautiful, fair-skinned, or tall. Since it was a mistaken vow, it requires no release by a Sage at all.

There was an incident involving a man who vowed against benefiting from his sister’s daughter

because she was ugly, and he did not wish to marry her.

They brought her into the house of Rabbi Yishmael, and beautified her.

Rabbi Yishmael said to him

to the one who had taken the vow:

“My son,

is it

from

a beautiful woman

that you took this vow

of prohibiting benefit?”

He said to him: No!

And Rabbi Yishmael released him

so that he could marry her, since it is possible to make an ugly woman beautiful, and therefore this is not something newly arisen, nolad.

At that moment Rabbi Yishmael wept and said: The daughters of Israel are beautiful,

all of them,

but poverty makes them unattractive.

And when Rabbi Yishmael died, the daughters of Israel carried a dirge and said: “Daughters of Israel, weep for Rabbi Yishmael!”

And so it says concerning Saul

[II Samuel 1]:

“Daughters of Israel, weep for Saul.”

Gemara:

And the Gemara asks: The

incident

involving Rabbi Yishmael, who released the vow concerning a woman who was ugly and became beautiful, does it come

to contradict

the words of the Mishna, which says that if she became beautiful afterward, this is nolad, which cannot be used as a basis for release? It is not the way of the tanna to cite an incident that contradicts his own words; rather, he cites only a dissenting opinion.

And we answer:

The Mishna is incomplete,

in its wording,

and this is what it teaches:

Rabbi Yishmael

disagrees, and

says: “Even if she was ugly and became beautiful, dark-skinned and became fair-skinned, short and became tall,

it is possible to release her vow, as this is not nolad.

And

there was an incident involving a man who vowed against benefiting from his sister’s daughter, and they brought her into the house of Rabbi Yishmael, and beautified her.

And so on.