Nedarim 65b (סה:) — the Talmud in English

Rabbi Abba raised an objection

from the following Mishna, below:

“A konam: I will not marry so-and-so, for she is ugly.”

But she is beautiful.

“I will not marry so-and-so, for she is”

black-skinned.

But she is fair-skinned.

“I will not marry so-and-so, for she is”

short.

But she is tall—

he is

permitted to marry her.

And the Mishna explains these cases:

He is

not

permitted to marry her

because

she was

ugly

at the time of the vow

and became beautiful

afterward. Or she was

black-skinned

at the time of the vow

and became

afterward

fair-skinned.

Or she was

short and became tall

afterward.

Rather,

the case concerns a situation in which

the vow was made in error,

as at the time of the vow she was beautiful, fair-skinned, or tall.

Granted, according to Rav Huna, who said

that the reason for our Mishna is that

he is considered to have made his vow conditional upon a matter,

the following Mishna was appropriately taught.

For first

the tanna

taught here the law of

one who makes his vow conditional upon a matter, and

in the following Mishna

the tanna

taught the law of

a vow made in error.

But according to Rabbi Yohanan, who said

that the reason for our Mishna is that

he had already died, and he had already repented,

and this is a vow made in error, if so,

why do I need the tanna to teach it twice,

why did he repeat and teach twice, in the two Mishnayot, the law of

a vow made in error!?

And we conclude: Indeed,

it is difficult!

Mishna:

And Rabbi Meir further said:

There are cases in which

we open for him

an opening for the one who made a vow

from a verse in the Torah, and we say to him:

If one prohibited himself by vow from deriving benefit from another because he had asked to borrow an article from him and the other had refused, we say to him:

Had you known that you were transgressing [Leviticus 19] “

Do not take vengeance,”

You shall not take revenge,”

and

“You shall not bear a grudge,”

since through this vow you are taking revenge against your fellow or bearing hatred toward him for what he did to you.

And

if he vowed not to inquire about the other’s welfare, we say to him: Had you known that through this vow you were transgressing

the prohibition of “

You shall not hate your brother in your heart,”

for this vow expresses hatred, and likewise through it you are transgressing

“You shall love your fellow as yourself,”.

And if the person from whom he prohibited himself was his relative, we additionally say to him that through this vow he is destined to transgress [Leviticus 25] “

And your brother shall live with you.”

For

perhaps he will become poor,

the person from whom he prohibited himself,

and you will be unable to support him from your property, because you prohibited him from benefiting from it.

And if

the one who made the vow

said:

“

Had I known that this was so, I would not have made the vow”—

he is permitted.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna that one may open for a person who prohibited his property from benefiting his relative with the opening that perhaps the relative will become poor and he will be unable to support him from his property.

Rav Huna bar Rav Ketina said to Rabba:

Let us say,

why should the relative not say:

Anyone

who

becomes poor,

including my relative—

the burden has not fallen upon me

alone

to support him,

for support of him.

Rather, only

what falls to me,

what is incumbent upon me

to support him together with everyone else,

together with the entire community, according to my proportional share—

I will support him.

And this is not an opening at all.

Rabba said to him

Rav Huna:

I say that anyone who falls

from his property

does not initially fall into the hands of the charity collector

to support him,

at first,

but his relatives must support him, until the charity collectors investigate whether his relatives are capable of supporting him themselves. It follows that through this vow he prevents his relative from being supported if he becomes poor.

Mishna:

We open for a person

who prohibited his wife from deriving benefit from him

with

payment of

his wife’s ketuba.

For had he known that he was obligated to pay her entire ketuba, he would not have made the vow.

And there was an incident involving a man who vowed not to derive benefit from his wife, and her ketuba was four hundred dinars.

He came before Rabbi Akiva, and he obligated him to give her the amount of her ketuba.

He said to him: Rabbi! Our father left us eight hundred dinars

as an inheritance,

my brother

and I deriving all our property from it.

My brother took four hundred, and I took four hundred.

And since all my property amounts to four hundred, is

it not enough that she take two hundred,

half of my property,

and I

will remain with

two hundred!?

Rabbi Akiva said to him: Even if you sell the hair of your head,

and you have no other property—

you must give her

the full

amount of her ketuba!

He said to him: Had I known that this was so, I would not have made the vow.

And Rabbi Akiva released him

on the basis of this opening.

Gemara:

The Gemara assumed that the inheritance consisted of money, and therefore the Gemara asked:

Movable property—

is it subject to a lien for

payment of

her ketuba?

But Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis disagreed about this matter, and the halakha is in accordance with the Rabbis, that a woman collects her ketuba only from land and not from movable property!?

Abaye said: Their father left land worth eight hundred dinars

as an inheritance.

But the Gemara still objects:

And it was taught

that Rabbi Akiva said to him that even if he sold

the hair of his head,

he must pay the ketuba, and

the hair of his head—

that is movable property!

And we answer:

This is what

Rabbi Akiva said to him:

Even if

you have nothing with which to support yourself, except that

you sell the hair of your head and eat,

purchasing food for yourself with the proceeds of selling your hair—you are obligated to give all the land in your possession toward payment of the ketuba.

The Gemara infers from this that he cannot retain any property in his possession for his support, but is forced to sell the hair of his head:

Infer from this

that

no “

arrangement is made”

for means of subsistence

for a creditor.

That is, we find that in the case of one who consecrated his value to the Temple and cannot pay the full amount unless he is left without means of subsistence, an arrangement is made to enable him to survive: money sufficient for his food for thirty days and his essential household implements are left for him, and his debt to the Temple is collected from the remainder. The Sages disagreed whether the law of arakhin teaches that the same applies to every creditor, so that provision must be made for his subsistence, or whether we do not derive the law of every creditor from arakhin, but collect all his property from him.

And since Rabbi Akiva said that even if he supports himself by selling the hair of his head nothing is left in his possession, it follows that no provision is made for a creditor.

Rav Naḥman bar Rabbi Yitzḥak said:

This is not a proof, for in fact provision is made for a creditor. Rather, Rabbi Akiva’s intention is—