Nedarim 65b — the Talmud in English

Rabbi Abba raised an objection from

the following Mishna, below:

“A vow: The benefit of my marrying so-and-so, who is ugly, is konam”.

And she is beautiful.

The benefit of my marrying so-and-so,

who is black.

And she is white.

The benefit of my marrying so-and-so,

who is short.

And she is tall—

he is

permitted to her.

And the Mishna explains these cases:

He is

not

permitted to her

because

she was

ugly

at the time of the vow

and became beautiful

afterward. Or she was

black

at the time of the vow

and became

afterward

white.

Or she was

short and became tall

afterward.

Rather,

it is speaking of a case

in which the vow was an error,

for at the time of the vow she was beautiful, or white, or tall.

Granted, according to Rav Huna, who says

that the reason for our Mishna is that

he is considered to have made his vow dependent on a matter,

the following Mishna was properly taught.

For initially

the tannai

taught here the law of

one who makes his vow dependent on a matter, and

in the following Mishna

the tannai

taught the law of

a vow based on an error.

But according to Rabbi Yohanan, who says

that the reason for our Mishna is because

he had already died, and had already repented,

and it is a vow based on an error, if so,

why do I need him to teach it twice

why did the tannai repeat and teach twice, in the two Mishnayot, the law of

a vow based on an error!?

And we conclude: Indeed,

it is difficult!

Mishna:

And Rabbi Meir further said:

There are cases in which

they open for him

an opening for the one who made the vow

from what is written in the Torah, and they say to him:

If he prohibited his fellow to himself by a vow from deriving benefit from him because he asked to borrow an article from him, and his fellow refused him, they say to him:

Had you known that you were transgressing [Leviticus 19] “

Do not take vengeance,”

and

“Do not bear a grudge,”

since by this vow you are taking vengeance on your fellow or bearing hatred toward him for what he did to you.

And

if he vowed not to ask after his welfare, they say to him: Had you known that by this vow you were transgressing

against “

You shall not hate your brother in your heart,”

for this vow is an expression of hatred, and likewise by it you are transgressing

“

You shall love your fellow as yourself.”

And if the one prohibited from benefit was his relative, they add and say to him that by this vow he is destined to transgress [Leviticus 25] “

And your brother shall live with you.”

For

perhaps he will become poor,

the one prohibited from benefit,

and you will be unable to support him

from your property, because you prohibited it to him.

And if

the one who vowed said

:

Had I known that this was so, I would not have vowed—

he is permitted.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna that they can open for one who prohibits his property to his relative, with the opening that perhaps he will become poor and he will not be able to support him from his property.

Rav Huna bar Rav Ketina said to Rabba:

Let us say,

why should the relative not say,

every

person

who becomes poor,

including my relative—

it is not upon me

alone

that

the burden of supporting him has fallen.

Rather, only

whatever falls to me,

what is imposed upon me

to support him together with everyone,

together with the entire public, according to the proportional share—

we will support him.

And this is not an opening at all.

He said to him

Rabba:

I say: Anyone who falls

from his property

does not fall into the hands of the charity collector

to support him

first,

rather, his relatives must support him, until the charity collectors ascertain whether his relatives have the ability to support him themselves; and it follows that by this vow he prevents the support of his relative if he becomes poor.

Mishna:

They open for a person

who prohibited his wife to himself from deriving benefit from him

with

payment of

his wife’s ketuba.

For had he known that he was obligated to pay her entire ketuba, he would not have vowed.

And there was an incident involving one who vowed not to derive benefit from his wife, and her ketuba was four hundred dinars.

And he came before Rabbi Akiva, and he obligated him to give her her ketuba.

He said to him: Rabbi! Father left eight hundred dinars

to us

as an inheritance,

and from it comes all my property.

My brother took four hundred, and I took four hundred.

And since all my property is four hundred, is it

not enough that she should take two hundred,

half of my property,

and I

should remain with

two hundred!?

Rabbi Akiva said to him: Even if you sell the hair of your head,

and you have no other property—

you must give her

the full

value of her ketuba!

He said to him: Had I known that this was so, I would not have vowed.

And Rabbi Akiva permitted him

with this opening.

Gemara:

And the Gemara assumed that the inheritance was in money, and therefore the Gemara wondered:

Movable property—

is it subject to a lien for

payment of

her ketuba?

But Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis disputed this matter, and the halakha is like the Sages, that a woman collects her ketuba only from land and not from movable property!?

Abaye said: Their father left land worth eight hundred dinars

as an inheritance.

But the Gemara still objects:

And it teaches

that Rabbi Akiva said to him that even if he sells

the hair of his head,

he must pay the ketuba,

and

the hair of his head is movable property!

And we answer:

This is what

Rabbi Akiva said to him:

Even if

you have nothing from which to support yourself, but

you sell the hair of your head and eat,

and purchase food for yourself with the price of the hair of your head—you are obligated to give all the land in your possession toward payment of the ketuba.

And the Gemara infers from this that he cannot leave any property in his possession for his support, but is compelled to sell the hair of his head:

You may learn from it

that

they do not

“make arrangements”

arrangements for sustenance

for a creditor.

That is, we find that in the case of one who vowed his value to the Temple treasury, and he does not have the ability to pay the full amount unless he remains without means of support, arrangements are made for him to be able to exist, and they leave him money for his food for thirty days, and his essential utensils, and from the remainder they collect his debt to the Temple treasury. And the Sages disputed whether the law of valuations is to be learned from for every creditor, that arrangements must be made for him to have the possibility of support, or whether the law of valuations is not learned from, but all his property is collected from him.

And since Rabbi Akiva said that even if he supports himself from selling the hair of his head nothing is left in his possession, it is inferred from him that they do not make arrangements for a creditor.

Rav Naḥman bar Rabbi Yitzḥak said:

This is not a proof, for in fact they do make arrangements for a creditor; rather, Rabbi Akiva’s intention was—