Nedarim 56b (נו:) — the Talmud in English

There is no need to turn over the dargesh, even though it is a type of bed,

just as is the case with a bed designated for utensils,

which in terms of its form is an ordinary bed, except that one does not sleep on it, and therefore there is no need to turn it over. The same applies to the dargesh: there is no need to turn it over, despite the fact that it is a bed.

As it was taught in a beraita: If it was a bed designated for utensils, there is no need to overturn it.

And

this is the reason that there is no need to turn over the dargesh, even though it is a type of bed: since, in the end, one does not sleep on it.

Rather, if it is difficult,

if we wish to prove that the dargesh is not an arsa degada, this should be demonstrated from

what was taught

later in that same beraita, that all this is the opinion of the Sages.

But

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: A dargesh

also requires that a sign of mourning be made with it.

And what does one do?

He releases its straps

[leather straps],

and it falls by itself.

And if we say that a dargesh

is an arsa degada—

straps

[leather straps]

does it have?

You have said that a dargesh is an ordinary bed, except that one does not sit on it because it is made for good fortune?

It follows that we still do not know what a dargesh is.

When Ravin came

when Ravin came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia,

he said:

I asked

what a dargesh is

of one of the Sages, whose name was Rav Taḥlifa bar Ma'arava, who was frequently found in the market of tanners

[a market of shoemakers].

And he said to me: What is a dargesh?—

A leather bed!

A bed whose surface is made not of ropes but of leather straps.

And it is regarding this matter that the Sages and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel disagree in the beraita cited above: According to the Sages, since the surface of the bed is made of leather, one does not turn the bed over; whereas Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says that although one does not turn over the dargesh, one releases the leather straps that form the surface of the bed, so that it can no longer be used.

It was stated: Which is a bed and which is a dargesh?

What is the difference between them?

Rabbi Yirmeya said:

The difference is in the manner in which the surface is tied and attached to the frame of the bed.

With regard to a bed, one weaves

[ties]

it over its back,

wrapping the ropes that form the surface of the bed around the frame, so that ultimately the frame cannot be seen.

Whereas,

with regard to a dargesh, one weaves it through its body.

There are holes in the frame, and the leather straps are inserted there, so that the frame of the dargesh remains visible.

The Gemara raises an objection

against Rabbi Yirmeya from what was taught in a beraita:

Wooden vessels: From when do they become susceptible to ritual impurity?

As a vessel becomes susceptible to impurity only after its manufacture is complete, what is the completion of the manufacture of

the bed and the cradle?

Once they have been smoothed with fish skin,

once the final smoothing, which was done with fish skin, has been completed.

And

if we say that

a bed is woven over its back,

the difficulty is that with such a method of tying, the frame of the bed is not visible at all; if so,

why do I need the smoothing with fish skin?

Rather,

Rabbi Yirmeya retracts what he said above and says:

Both this and that,

both a bed and a dargesh, are tied

through their bodies, by means of the

holes in the frame, and not over their backs.

Rather, the difference is that

with regard to a bed, one inserts and removes the ropes through openings,

inserting the ropes into the holes themselves.

Whereas, with regard to

a dargesh, one inserts and removes them through loops.

One inserts loops into the holes, and inserts the leather straps through the loops.

The Gemara returns to add the following regarding overturning beds in a house of mourning:

Rabbi Ya'akov bar Aḥa said that Rabbi said: A bed

that cannot be overturned because

its canopies

that is, its legs do not end at the level of the bed's surface but continue and

extend

upward, and for this reason it cannot be overturned,

one sets it upright

on its side,

and that suffices,

as it cannot be overturned.

Rabbi Ya'akov bar Idi said that Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said,

with regard to the dispute cited above concerning a dargesh in a house of mourning, in which the Sages said that one sets it upright, while Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said that one releases its straps:

The halakha is in accordance with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel!

Mishna:

Like the preceding mishnayot, our Mishna also deals with clarifying what is included in a person's statement when he prohibits something to himself by means of a vow.

Here it explains what is prohibited to one who prohibited the city to himself, what is included in the city, and what is not.

One who vows

benefit

from the city.

The city is divided into three areas:

The city itself.

The extension of the city, which is the additional seventy cubits and remnants that are allotted around the city, from which point onward the Shabbat boundary begins to be measured.

The city's boundary, which consists of two thousand empty cubits outside the city, in which it is prohibited to build.

This person, who prohibited himself from deriving benefit from the city, is prohibited only from the area of the city itself, because that is the primary designation of the term city, and therefore that is what is included in his statement.

But

he is permitted

to

to enter the city's boundary,

the two thousand cubits surrounding the city, because the city's boundary is not included in the city as a whole and therefore was not included in his prohibition.

But he is prohibited from entering its extension,

because the extension of the city is included within the city, and it too was included in his statement.

However,

although we said that one who vows benefit from the city is not prohibited from the city's boundary together with the city, with regard to a house the law is not so.

Rather,

one who vows benefit from the house is prohibited from the door-jamb inward.

The place where the door is closed is also included within the house, and that place too is prohibited.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna that one who vows benefit from the city is also prohibited from the city's extension.

It is evident that the extension of the city is also called a city.

And the Gemara asks:

From where do we know that the extension of the city

—the extension of the city—

is considered like the city

—that it is like the city?

Rabbi Yoḥanan said: As the verse says,

with regard to the siege that Joshua imposed on the city of Jericho before conquering it: “

And it came to pass when Joshua was by Jericho.” And so on.”

This is seemingly difficult:

What

does the verse mean by stating that Joshua was

by Jericho?

If you say

that the meaning is

in

the city

of Jericho itself, but is it not written: “And Jericho was tightly shut and barred,” and

it is impossible that Joshua was in the city itself.

Rather, conclude from this

that he was not in Jericho itself but

in its extension.

Nevertheless, the verse said that Joshua was in Jericho. It is proven that the extension of a city is considered like the city.

But the Gemara objects:

Perhaps

we should say that Joshua was in the city's boundary and not in its extension, and this too was considered as being in the city; and we would learn from this that

even in its boundary

of the city, it is considered like the city.

The Gemara answers: This cannot be said.

For

it is written in the

Torah, with regard to measuring the

boundary

of a city, two thousand cubits around the city:

“And you shall measure—

outside the city.”

It is evident that the Torah called the city's boundary “outside the city,” because the city's boundary is not included within the city.

Therefore, if one vows benefit from the city, the city's boundary is not prohibited to him.

We learned in the Mishna:

One who vows benefit from the house is prohibited only from the door-jamb inward:

That is, the entire house, up to the place where the door is closed, is prohibited.

And the Gemara says: Only from the place where the door is closed and inward is prohibited,

but from the door-jamb outward, no.

Rav Mari raises an objection

from what was taught in a beraita:

The Torah says with regard to the affliction of houses that the koen must come and say, “The house is impure.”

The beraita discusses where the koen must be while declaring the house impure:

It is written:

“And the koen shall go out of the house.”

One might have thought that he should go

the koen

to his house

his own house,

and

from there

declare the house quarantined

the impure house?

The verse states: “To the entrance of the house.”

It is therefore necessary for the koen to remain near the impure house and declare it impure there.

And since the verse said

“to the entrance of the house,” one might have thought that he could stand

the koen

under the lintel

of the impure house,

and declare it quarantined

while standing there?

The verse states: “From the house”—

until he has gone out of the entire house!

Seemingly, this is difficult: On the one hand, we learn from this verse that the koen must not distance himself from the impure house, while on the other hand, from that same verse we learn that he may not be inside that house—

how is this possible?

He stands beside the lintel and declares it quarantined.

For

when the koen stands outside, beside the lintel, he is not far from the house, while at the same time he is not inside the house.

It is evident from the words of the beraita that the koen may not stand directly under the lintel, since that place is considered part of the house; even from the doorway outward, anywhere under the lintel is considered part of the house.

If so, how did we say that one who vows benefit from the house is permitted to stand on the threshold of the house from the door-jamb outward, when the entire threshold beneath the lintel is part of the house?

The Gemara will resolve this below.

Meanwhile, the Gemara continues to cite the continuation of the beraita:

And from where

do we know that although the koen may not distance himself from the impure house while declaring it impure, nevertheless

if he went to his house and declared it quarantined

while in his house, his declaration concerning the afflicted house is effective?

Or that

he acted improperly and

stood under the lintel

on the thickness of the threshold beneath the lintel,

and declared it quarantined—is his declaration effective?

The verse states: “And he shall declare the house quarantined”—in any event,

meaning that after the fact, his declaration is effective even in these circumstances.

This concludes the words of the beraita.

The Gemara now comes to answer the difficulty from the beraita, from which it is evident that the entire area beneath the lintel, including its outer section, is considered like the house itself. Why, then, did we say that one who vows benefit from the house is permitted on the threshold beneath the lintel outside the place where the doors are closed?

The Gemara answers:

The case of

the law of the affliction of a

house is different, as it is written

there

“from the house,” for

we have a special indication from the verse that

until he has gone out of the entire house,

including the area beneath the entire lintel, only then may the koen declare the house impure.

But certainly, in general—for example, with regard to one who prohibits the house to himself—the threshold beneath the lintel and outward is not considered inside the house.

The Mishna before us was cited above in the Gemara, on page 47a. There, Rami bar Ḥama was uncertain how to interpret it. Here the Mishna will be explained according to the first side of Rami bar Ḥama's uncertainty, and in accordance with the interpretation of the Ran.